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PART ONE

EUROPE

IN

THE

MELTING

POT

1789–1814

1. *Revolution in France*
2. *France at War*
3. *Dictatorship in France*
4. *Napoleonic Empire*



IN THE YEAR 1789 two events of world importance happened. The new federal Constitution of the United States of America came into operation; revolution broke out in France. While the New World entered upon an era of integration and expansion within a flexible framework of government, the Old World relapsed into twenty-five years of great disorder and upheaval which shattered its existing political structure.

The sequence of events in Europe during the quarter century after 1789 can be described in four dramatic words: Revolution, War, Dictatorship, Empire. The story can be told, and has often been told, as an epic of heroic grandeur, marching remorselessly toward its predestined end. In this view, violent revolution led naturally to war; revolution and war, in combination, had as their nemesis the dictatorship of a soldier; and military dictatorship led no less naturally and fatalistically to the Caesarist ambitions of Napoleon. These successive upheavals haunted all subsequent development in Europe, for it was by receiving the message of the Revolution, enduring the wars that it caused, experiencing the efficient but exacting rule of Napoleon, and struggling to free themselves from his tyranny, that the nations of Europe took modern shape. This romantic interpretation of the making of modern Europe cannot be accepted. Historians have become suspicious of inevitability, too conscious of complexities and too inquisitive about the mysterious working of historical change, to accept unchallenged this neat standardized account of how nineteenth-century Europe began. The consequences of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, and of the wars to which both gave rise, were indeed of great importance. But they were variable in importance and by no means the only formative influences on nineteenth-century Europe. Nor was the sequence of events inevitable.

The necessary prologue to an exploration of European history since 1815 is some assessment of how each of these four main phases of change did give place to the next, and of how profound, permanent, and general was their accumulative effect on later generations.

CHAPTER

REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

The Revolutionary Situation

IT IS a paradox that no important people or forces in France of 1789 wanted revolution. Revolutions may begin, as wars often begin, not because people positively want them. They happen because people want other things that, in a certain set of circumstances, implicate them in revolution or in war. There had been growing in Europe, throughout most of the eighteenth century, what has been called "the revolutionary spirit." This spirit, a spirit of rationalist criticism and of resistance to the established powers of the Roman Catholic Church, the absolutist monarchy, and the privileged nobility, was fostered particularly by the work of a remarkable series of French thinkers and literary men, the *philosophes*. The writings of men like Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, and Rousseau were widely read throughout Europe, and they themselves became European figures of eminence and influence.

But the connection between their ideas and the outbreak of revolution in 1789 is somewhat remote and indirect. They did not preach revolution, and were usually ready enough to lend support to any absolute monarch who was prepared to patronize them and adopt their teachings. Nor were most of their readers inspired to want, or to work for, revolution; they were mostly themselves aristocrats, lawyers, business people, and local dignitaries, whose lot in the existing order was far from unhappy. The doctrines of the *philosophes* came to be used later on, during the course of the revolution in France, often to justify measures that the *philosophes* themselves would have opposed. Their teachings became more important later; if they had any influence at all on the outbreak and the initial stages of the great revolution, it was only to the extent that they had fostered a critical and irreverent attitude toward all existing institutions. They made men more ready, when the need arose, to question the whole foundation of the old order. What mattered in 1789—and what made men revolutionary almost in spite of themselves—was the whole "revolutionary situation"; and in pro-

ducing that situation the work of the *philosophes* played no very important role.

The essence of the "revolutionary situation" was that the King, who was the linchpin of the whole established social and political system in France, was in desperate financial straits. For a decade before, successive ministers had tried to put royal finances on a sounder footing, but all had failed. The costs of government were increasing rapidly, and the cost of wars simply could not be met from the usual sources of royal revenue. It was no new thing for a French king to be hard up; indeed it was the normal situation. But the various means by which he could properly raise taxes had already been so fully and so wastefully exhausted that the country was heavily burdened. By the standards of the time France was a very large, populous, rich, and powerful state. Her foreign trade had increased fivefold since the death of Louis XIV in 1715. She had a bigger middle class of businessmen and small manufacturers and a generally more prosperous peasantry than any other state in Europe. The peasants owned two fifths of the soil and worked almost all of it. But these very facts contributed to the "revolutionary situation." It tends to be people with something to lose, and not merely something to gain, who think most eagerly of improving the existing state of society. And that was what people thought of most in 1789. There was an insistent demand for reform of certain abuses, a more efficient and equitable system of taxation and administration, a better system of government. The last thing most people wanted was violent and destructive revolution, which they knew might deprive them of what they had without gaining for them what they wished.

Louis XVI won fresh popularity when he made known his intention of summoning the Estates-General, which was the nearest institution France had to a parliament representative of the whole nation. His action aroused hopes of liberal and constitutional reforms, because it was the traditional role of the monarch to defend the mass of his subjects against abuses and hardships. Just as nobody of importance wanted revolution, so nobody of importance wanted a republic. It was 1792 before a republican movement of any strength appeared, and until then the hopes of reformers centered upon the King and not against him.

Yet the King's well-received action of summoning the Estates-General precipitated revolution. The economic and social structure of France had greatly outgrown her political and governmental system. There was a sharp and bitterly resented contrast between the economically effective parts and the politically effective parts of the nation. Her traditional legal and political structure gave special privileges to the two classes most divorced in outlook and interests from the peasantry and the middle classes—the higher clergy and the nobility. These two segments of the ruling class had much in common, and many of the higher offices

in the Church were held by aristocrats. By the time of Louis XVI every bishop was a nobleman, and members of noble families almost monopolized the highest posts of government service and the army. Since they numbered in all only about half a million out of a population of 24 or 25 million, political power was concentrated in very few hands. This was one of the bitterest grievances of the growing and wealthy class of merchants, businessmen, financiers, and lawyers, who collectively also owned a good deal of the land but who were excluded by the chances of birth and social status from most of the more responsible and dignified offices in state and Church. Moreover, because clergy and nobles enjoyed so many exemptions from taxation, the main burden of meeting the expenses of state and Church fell on the middle classes and the more prosperous peasants. The summoning of the Estates-General suddenly gave them an opportunity to make their social and economic weight politically effective. It was a chance they seized with both hands.

By not only arousing hopes of liberal reform but then drawing together many of the people most eager for an overhaul of the social and political system, Louis crystallized the revolutionary situation. He confronted the representatives of the privileged orders, the First and Second Estates of clergy and nobility, with the representatives of the unprivileged orders, the Third Estate of middle class and peasantry. Then by attempting to handle this critical situation through obsolete procedures and creaking, rusty machinery, and with no clear plans or firm sense of direction, the King began a train of events which led in the end to his own downfall. It was only after he had forfeited his original public support by his lack of policy, his wavering and disappointing conduct, and in the end his open betrayal of his own promises, that republicanism grew. Only the king, in eighteenth-century France, could have created a republic.

The King and his ministers were themselves in a dilemma. The situation was inherently revolutionary, because the king and his ministers, with the best will in the world, could not satisfy the demands of the middle classes and peasants for a larger share of political power and a smaller share of taxation without destroying the tangle of ancient rights by which nobles and Church had their own law courts and powers of jurisdiction, monopolized all the most lucrative offices in the state, and enjoyed immunity from the main burdens of taxation. They could not do this without challenging and changing the whole social and political structure of France, the essential character of the old order, in which their own authority was deeply embedded. The French monarchy was a feudal monarchy, based on the centuries-old accumulation of feudal relationships between king, aristocracy, clergy, and all the rest of the population known as the "Third Estate." The right of the king to rule

existed on the same foundations as the rights and immunities of the privileged orders. To attack any part of this anomalous and fossilized structure was to attack by implication every other part, including royal power itself. Yet the power of the king was regarded as absolute; and it was absolute insofar as there existed no public authority with an acknowledged right to check or deny the power of the king to govern as he chose. It had been checked in the past only by violent resistance on the part of over-mighty nobles or by obstructionist behavior of the local *parlements*, both reactionary and not reformist forces. The king who claimed to rule by Divine Right and to wield absolute authority was in fact enmeshed in a system that denied him autonomy in jurisdiction, obliged him to rule only through the privileged orders of society, and compelled him to finance his rule by unjust and wasteful fiscal arrangements. His authority came not from God but only from prescription; his power was not absolute, only arbitrary. Only a monarch prepared to be a revolutionary could have escaped from the dilemma.

It was a position of deadlock and stalemate, where reform was inhibited by prudence, and revolution prevented only by apathy. The situation could not have lasted indefinitely, and perhaps the chief cause for surprise is that it had lasted so long. Already other states, notably Great Britain and Prussia, had escaped from similar positions, one by evolving strong parliamentary institutions, the other by concentrating more substantial power in her monarchy. When the Estates-General met, there were many proposals in the air for ways in which France could similarly solve the dilemma. Most attractive and persuasive of these was the argument put forward by the Abbé Sieyès, who was to become one of the most indefatigable constitution-makers of the next twenty years. In his pamphlet, widely read by members of the Estates-General, he asked the crucial question, "What is the Third Estate?" His answer was that it was nearly everybody, yet it counted for nothing: that it was identical with the nation, yet excluded from the government of the nation. This was exactly what many already believed, but in January, 1789, Sieyès put it in a nutshell.

The Crisis of 1789

THERE was thus, in the France of 1789, an inherent constitutional crisis, if the term may be used of a country that really had no constitution at all in the American or British sense. This theoretically absolute monarchy was in practice powerless to effect the changes that most urgently needed making. When it was obliged to admit its complete bankruptcy as well, a financial crisis was superimposed on the constitutional crisis. But behind these lay an even more serious

crisis, which contributed a particularly explosive element to the whole situation. It was the even less appreciated economic crisis in the country caused by prolonged inflation.

Between 1726 and 1780 France had absorbed no less than half the precious metals imported into Europe, and in the course of the eighteenth century her population had increased from roughly 18 to 25 million. With much more metallic currency in circulation, an expansion of credit facilities, an increased demand for goods on the part of her larger population, and a relatively slow expansion in production, prices inevitably rose. As compared with the average general prices of consumers' goods between 1726 and 1741, prices between 1785 and 1789 were 65 per cent higher; and even in the longer period 1771-89 they averaged 45 per cent higher. Average money wages rose only about a third as fast as prices, and the cost of living rose most steeply for those who were living closest to subsistence level. Even nature added to the crisis. The harvests of 1787 and 1788 were bad, partly because of great hailstorms in 1788. This brought extreme social distress, which forced many desperate and hungry men into the few large towns. It was this that introduced the element of violence, because it made the Paris mob and led to the peasant riots (or *jacqueries*) of the countryside in 1789.

The political crisis of 1789, which started the course of events that made the revolution, is explicable only in this setting of deep economic and social crisis. When, in preparation for the meeting of the Estates-General in May, 1789, the localities were invited to prepare *cahiers* or lists of grievances, it was the long-standing grievances that got listed: the lack of a "constitution" to restrict ministerial despotism, the need to lighten the burden of indirect taxes and to control taxation by periodic national assemblies, the desirability of ending internal customs barriers and of ensuring freedom of the press. The more immediate discontents of the rural population got eliminated from many of the *cahiers* and were scarcely voiced in the assembly. This neglect only enhanced their importance as a source of violent upheaval and made for a general revolt in the countryside in the summer of 1789.

Although the accumulating crisis could not longer be deferred, it might still have been eased in several different ways. If the King could have found and kept able ministers who had a realistic grasp of the needs of the moment, and if they could have used the Estates-General to put through a clear and comprehensive policy of constitutional and fiscal reforms, it is conceivable that some more durable form of constitutional monarchy might have evolved. But the personalities of all the leading figures militated against this possibility: the character of the King, who was well-meaning but weak-willed; even more the character of the Queen, Marie Antoinette, whose Austrian connections and notorious frivolity and extravagance made her very unpopular, and who persist-

ently used her influence with the King to kill any projects of reform; the character of the Comte de Mirabeau, the ablest statesman and debater who served the monarchy but also the most personally disreputable and distrusted; the royal entourage, including the King's brothers, whose intransigence and irresponsibility helped to doom the monarchy for the future.

Alternatively, if the privileged orders could have been persuaded to surrender voluntarily their great administrative and juridical privileges and their fiscal immunities, the impasse might have been broken without bloodshed and violence. On June 17 the Third Estate took the title of National Assembly, and was joined by individual clergy and nobles. On August 4, 1789, there took place within it the famous surrender of feudal privileges, when liberal nobles vied with one another in giving up their ancient rights and the clergy competed with them in sacrificing tithes and church rights. But that remarkable burst of generosity was modified in several ways. It is true that such important grievances as aristocratic immunity from taxation, serfdom, forced labor (*corvée*), and the monopolistic and judicial privileges of the nobles were then destroyed, and were destroyed without indemnity. But other important feudal dues were to be commuted and redeemed, and the National Assembly was hoping to salvage the more important feudal property rights by sacrificing the less valuable. Even the genuine sacrifices so made were vitiated by the fact that they came a month too late—after the Paris mob had tasted power in the fall of the Bastille on July 14, and after the peasants throughout the countryside had begun burning the *châteaux*, destroying feudal archives, and asserting their own freedom from feudal burdens. The Assembly completed its gesture of generosity by conferring on Louis XVI the title of "Restorer of French Liberty" and then decreed that "the feudal regime is entirely destroyed." Frenchmen knew that it was not Louis but the action of the population as a whole which had restored liberty, and that it was the peasants, not the Assembly, who had really overthrown feudalism.

It was part of this new political crisis that the National Assembly was itself out of touch with public opinion, and despite its recent election had slender claim to represent the nation as a whole. The Estates-General was traditionally composed of three assemblies representing the three Estates. The King had decided that the Third Estate should have about 600 deputies out of a total of 1,155, but he had not decided the crucial issue whether voting was to be by head in one single assembly, or by each Estate casting its vote in three separate assemblies. Having decided that the Third Estate should have more representatives than the nobility and clergy together, if he had also decreed that they should be able to use this numerical superiority within one large assembly, he would have ended the political powers of feudalism by his own decision and so kept

initiative and leadership. His indecision left it open for the Third Estate to usurp, by its own defiant action, the status of a truly national assembly, and then, after the adhesion of sections of nobility and clergy, to enforce the principle of voting by heads. This happened, after considerable confusion and exacerbation, on June 20, when the representatives of the Third Estate took an oath, in the rain and on the royal tennis court, not to disperse until the constitution of the realm had been firmly established. This act of political usurpation marked the first important stage in the downfall of the absolute monarchy.

The National Assembly also decreed that taxes should continue to be paid only so long as it remained in session, and it took the further logical step of declaring parliamentary privilege. It decreed that the person of each deputy was inviolable. It refused to disperse when the King ordered it to do so. Thus challenged, the King gave way as he had often given way in the past. "They want to stay?" he asked peevishly, "then let them stay." Joined by most of the representatives of the nobility and clergy, the Third Estate henceforth existed as a National Assembly, with the self-imposed task of issuing a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and of protecting the liberty of the nation against the Crown and its ministers. The King, for the first time, found himself on the opposite side from the representatives of the nation. He never succeeded in rejoining them or in reasserting his initiative in reform. Henceforth, if the monarchy was not doomed, at least its existing difficulties were very greatly enhanced. Its political assets were squandered as wastefully as its financial.

Henceforth, too, the constitutional movement became more and more doctrinaire, reflecting the extent to which the lawyers, businessmen, and journalists had imbibed the notions of the *philosophes*. The first consequence was the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," which the Assembly, after lengthy debate, adopted on August 26. It had echoes of the American Declaration of Independence, and asserted that "men are born and remain free and equal in rights," that "the aim of all political association is to preserve the natural and imprescriptible rights of man," and that "these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." The famous declaration, which has remained of considerable importance and as recently as 1946 was "reaffirmed" in the preamble to the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic, was adequately described by its full title.

It was, first, a *Declaration*—a manifesto and a statement of the general principles on which the National Assembly hoped to reform the French system of government. It was, secondly, a Declaration of *Rights*—not a Declaration of Duties. It was an assertion of the new claims and a statement of the political, constitutional, and social rights that its

framers held to be essential for making a better regime. It was, thirdly, a Declaration of the *Rights of Man*—a statement intended to have universal application and which certainly had very far-reaching implications. It was drawn up not for France alone, but for the benefit of men everywhere who wanted to be free and to rid themselves of comparable burdens of absolutist monarchy and feudal privilege. This universalism of the original French Revolution was to be of great importance. It was, finally and fully, a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and although the last three words of its title are often omitted they are among its most important. It was careful to specify those civic rights that most concretely expressed the immediate aims of the middle classes which now predominated in the Assembly: equality of all before the law, eligibility of all citizens for all public offices, personal freedom from arbitrary arrest or punishment, freedom of speech and the press, and above all an equitable distribution of the burdens of national taxation and the inviolability of private property. These claims it founded on the two general doctrines that “the principle of all sovereignty rests essentially in the nation,” and that “law is the expression of the general will.” These doctrines—intended to be universal in application—would clearly, if accepted, destroy the very foundation of the old order of society and disrupt the state everywhere in Europe. This was the inherent challenge of events in France to every one of her neighbors, including Britain. One French historian has called the Declaration “the death certificate of the old regime.” It certainly remained a charter of liberalism throughout the nineteenth century.

Even so, the Declaration is less abstract and more realistic than it might appear at first. Its omissions, as a manifesto of liberalism, are significant. It made no mention of freedom of economic enterprise or of trade, so dear to its bourgeois makers, because the old order had already in recent years suppressed the guilds and removed controls on the grain trade; it said nothing of rights of assembly and association, nor of education or social security, although many were aware of how important these were, for these matters were less relevant to the immediate tasks of destroying the old regime. Although it tried to be universal, it did not set out to be comprehensive. It deliberately omitted any Declaration of Duties, an omission not remedied until 1795. Its most liberal principles were stated cautiously. Exercise of natural rights is limited by the need to assure enjoyment of the same rights for others. “Law may rightfully prohibit only those actions that are injurious to society.” Freedom of opinion is limited by the proviso that it must not trouble public order as established by law, and that it must not be abused. Even the sanctity of property is subject to an “obvious requirement of public necessity.”

The Declaration was not, moreover, a manifesto of democracy. Even the Americans had not yet instituted universal suffrage, and the French contented themselves with stating that "all citizens have the right to take part, in person or by their representatives," in forming the law and in voting taxes. That they intended neither universal suffrage nor direct democracy became clear before the end of 1789, when a constitution was drawn up by the Assembly. This made a distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens and withheld the vote from the latter, defined as those who did not pay taxes equal in value to three days' wages; it set up a purely representative and parliamentary system of government, based less on Rousseau's ideas of popular sovereignty than on Montesquieu's theory of a "separation of powers." If the Revolution became the great source of democratic revolutions, that quality was derived from subsequent events, and was not present in either the intentions or the actions of the original revolutionaries.

The most revolutionary doctrine included in the Declaration had also been included in the American Declaration of Independence: the right of resistance to oppression. The Assembly intended, by including it, to justify its own defiance of the king and to legitimize the insurrection of July 14, when the Paris mob had captured the grim old fortress of the Bastille, which symbolized arbitrary power. Paris had then organized, under the liberal noble Lafayette, a new civic or "National Guard" to protect both public order and the Assembly. In October the principle of resistance had again to be invoked, to overcome the obstacle of the king's right to veto all legislation. In the "October Days" the ultimate revolutionary sanction of popular violence was decisive. On October 5 some six or seven thousand of the women of Paris marched in the rain to Versailles to clamor for bread and to fetch the King to Paris. After the usual vacillation and muddle, they got their way, and on the afternoon of the following day, in the mud and rain, a strange procession moved into Paris from the palace of the kings. Headed by men of the National Guard with wagons full of wheat and flour, and accompanied by cheering women, the procession included a carriage in which rode the King and his family, with the Marquis de Lafayette, the revolutionary hero of two continents, riding beside it. It also included carriages bearing a hundred deputies chosen to represent the Assembly. The crowd rejoiced that they were bringing to the capital "the baker, the baker's wife, and the baker's boy." That night the royal family was housed in the Tuileries, a palace it had deserted for more than a century. Not only had the King, confronted with threats, agreed to ratify the Assembly's decrees; but now, a virtual prisoner of the Paris mob, he could be a constitutional monarch only under obvious compulsion. He had forfeited any hope of appearing to lead the revolution, as well as any material chance of resisting it.

The Roots of War

DURING the year 1790 two factors, above all others, made still worse the now precarious position of the monarchy. One was the bitter conflict caused by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and its attempt to make the Church a department of state; the other was the influence of the *émigrés*, the growing tide of exiles who fled from France and incited foreign governments to take up arms against the revolution. The religious schism and the issues of foreign relations combined to effect a transition from revolution to war. This ultimately made the French Revolution an event not only in French but in European history.

Strangely enough, the first negative changes in the position of the Church met with little resistance. On August 4, 1789, the Gallican Church voluntarily gave up its corporate status and its rights to tax and to administer itself; and in February, 1790, certain religious orders were abolished with the consent of the higher clergy in the Assembly. Schemes to abolish ecclesiastical tithes and to alienate ecclesiastical land were alike accepted without great resistance. It was the more positive changes of 1790 which aroused fierce opposition. They were not an attempt to separate Church from state, but the contrary—to subordinate the organization of the Church to the dictates of the state, and to fill all ecclesiastical offices by popular election. The French Church was to be separated from the Papacy and its clergy were to become paid officials of the state. These changes were sanctioned by the King and promulgated on August 24. They aroused enough opposition within the Church for the Assembly to impose on all office-holding clergy an oath that they would uphold the new constitution of the Church. Half of the lower clergy and all but seven of the bishops refused to take this oath, and in March and April, 1791, the Pope condemned the Civil Constitution and other political reforms of the Revolution. Henceforth the Church fell into rival and irreconcilable factions. In May relations were broken off between France and the Holy See.

In addition, by the end of 1790 there were already arrayed against the Revolution strong and influential counterrevolutionary forces at Brussels, Coblenz, and Turin. In 1791 an *émigré* army was formed in the Rhineland. The Comte d'Artois established headquarters at Coblenz, and *émigré* agents roamed France persuading other members of *émigré* families to join their relatives in exile and prepare for the "liberation" of France.

The impact of this whole movement upon the position of the monarchy became apparent with the fiasco of the King's flight to Varennes

in June, 1791. Louis had abandoned his original hopes that he could ride the storm at home, his scruples of conscience about having sanctioned the Civil Constitution of the Clergy had deepened, and the Queen urged that only foreign intervention could now restore his power. Foreign intervention could hardly be expected until the King broke with the Revolution and openly joined the counterrevolution. He was at last, by the spring of 1791, persuaded that he must leave the country. Late on the night of June 20, disguised as a valet and a governess, Louis and Marie Antoinette escaped from Paris on a planned flight to the stronghold of Montmédy near the Luxembourg frontier. The journey was a whole chapter of miscalculations and accidents. The fugitives were recognized and stopped at Varennes, and were brought back to Paris amid ominously silent crowds. Placed under virtual imprisonment, the royal family could now be regarded as little more than potential traitors to the nation, prepared to join foreign armies and exiles against the cause of the Revolution. There followed a wholesale desertion of royal army officers. The Girondins within the Assembly, a group increasingly favoring war, gained greatly in strength. The enemies of the Revolution could now be depicted as the enemies of France.

The Legislative Assembly, in October, 1791, under the new constitution, replaced the old National Assembly. In January, 1792, it decreed that the Habsburg Emperor of Austria, Leopold II, should be invited to declare whether or not he would renounce every treaty directed against the sovereignty, independence, and safety of the French nation; a fortnight later it ordered the property of the *émigrés* to be sequestered. This was an ultimatum to both Europe and the *émigrés*. Leopold, himself embarrassed in diplomatic relations with Catherine II of Russia, was ready to be conciliatory. But he died on March 1. His son Francis II, who succeeded him, was a less intelligent man and more dominated by militarist and absolutist advisers. When he rejected the French ultimatum, the Legislative Assembly on April 20, 1792, declared war "in rightful defence of a free people against the unjust aggression of a king."

At once the army of King Frederick William, in accordance with the Prussian alliance with Austria, prepared for active service. Austria and Prussia were joined by Victor Amadeus of Savoy, king of Piedmont. Catherine of Russia, busily engaged in gaining Polish territory, held aloof for the time, as did the British government. The initial conflict was between the revolutionary armies of France and a league of three neighboring monarchs supported by an army of French exiles.

From the spring of 1792 until the rise of Napoleon the consequences of war and of revolution became inextricably mixed. The immediate causes of the war included the intrigues of the court and the *émigrés*, the war clamor of the Girondins in the Assembly, the aggressive self-confidence of the revolutionaries, the discredit of the King, and the

diplomacy of Prussia. But its basic cause lay deeper. It was, in more modern terms, the issue of whether two forms of society based on totally different principles, could peacefully coexist. France within her own territories had ended feudalism, destroyed the pretensions of royal absolutism, and founded new institutions on the principles of sovereignty of the people and personal liberty and equality. The old institutions, which had been overthrown in France, remained established in her continental neighbors. The influence of the Revolution was spreading, undermining the position of other rulers and implicitly challenging the survival of serfdom, feudalism, and absolutism everywhere. The revolutionary ideals were too dynamic to be ignored by the established order. The result was the First Coalition of 1793, comprising Austria, Prussia, Britain, the Netherlands, and Spain.

This inexorable conflict became apparent in the rival manifestos issued by each side. In August, 1791, the Austrian and Prussian rulers issued the Declaration of Pillnitz, expressing the hope that there would be consultation between the powers about the position of Louis XVI, and hinting at joint armed intervention in the cautiously worded suggestion to employ, in certain conditions, "efficacious means for enabling the King of France full freedom to set up a monarchical government in conformity with his rights and the welfare of the nation." This aroused violent resentment in France. Nearly a year later, and after war had begun, the Duke of Brunswick as commander-in-chief of the Austro-Prussian forces issued from Coblenz his famous manifesto, declaring categorically that his armies were intervening in France to suppress anarchy and to restore the king's lawful authority. By threatening that the lives of the deputies and Paris administrators would be held forfeit for whatever harm might befall the royal family, he ensured that the revolutionaries would resist to the death. The Brunswick manifesto of July 27 had its sequel in the revolutionary manifesto of November, 1792, in which the French, in the first flush of early victories against Prussia and Austria, offered "fraternity and assistance" to all peoples wishing, like the French, to assert their liberty. In December the Assembly served notice on Europe that France would enforce revolutionary social principles everywhere. Occupation of any territory by French armies, they declared, would be accompanied by the ending of feudal obligations and the confiscation of clerical and aristocratic property.

The ideological conflict became clear. It was a clash between the old order and the new, now locked in a struggle to the death for the whole of Europe. So, at least, it seemed to men in the winter of 1792. The loudest trumpet call to conservatism had come in 1790 from the Irishman, Edmund Burke, whose violently eloquent *Reflections on the Revolution in France* provided all enemies of the Revolution with a counterrevolutionary philosophy; here was one of the most persuasive

expositions of traditionalism ever penned, predicting anarchy and dictatorship as the outcome of such revolution. The revolution in France had become war in Europe: not an old-fashioned, familiar kind of war between monarchs for territory, but a newer ideological war between peoples and kings for the ending of old institutions and the fulfillment of dreams of a new society. In short, war in Europe now meant revolution in Europe.

CHAPTER 2

FRANCE AT WAR

The Jacobin Terror

FROM the spring of 1792 onward, France sustained revolution and war at the same time. The consequences for France were momentous. They were, in brief, the overthrow of the monarchy, the dictatorship of Robespierre, the Reign of Terror, and the rise to power of General Bonaparte. For Europe, too, the consequences were far-reaching.

The first casualty of the war was the French monarchy. The newly elected assembly known as the Convention¹ met on September 21, 1792, the day after the battle of Valmy in which the revolutionary armies led by Generals Dumouriez and Kellermann routed the Prussians. The following day it abolished the monarchy and decreed that the first year of the Republic should date from September 22.² After the further victory of Jemappes on November 6, as a result of which the French occupied Brussels, the new Republic gained in self-confidence and decided upon the trial of the King. He was executed on January 21, 1793. This act, added to a series of other tensions between France and Britain, led to declaration of war against Britain and Holland at the beginning of February, against Spain in March, and against Hungary in April. This rapid extension of the war to most of Europe outside Scandinavia was soon accompanied by French reverses. A revolt broke out in the western region of the Vendée in March; Dumouriez was defeated at Neerwinden and the French were driven out of Holland in the same month. On

¹ See p. 19.

² The romantic and innovating spirit of the time was well expressed in the re-naming of the months from September to August with the somewhat absurd names *Vendémiaire*, *Brumaire*, *Frimaire*; *Nivôse*, *Pluviôse*, *Ventôse*; *Germinal*, *Floréal*, *Prairial*; *Messidor*, *Thermidor*, *Fructidor*. These have survived among historians because of the French habit of using them to mark the great revolutionary (and counterrevolutionary) incidents. The contemporary English translation of them was an apt comment: Wheezy, Sneazy, Freezy; Slippy, Drippy, Nippy; Showery, Flowery, Bowery; Wheaty, Heaty, Sweety.

April 6 the desertion of Dumouriez to the Austrians created a state of siege and emergency in France.

These events had great repercussions on the course of the revolution in France because they brought to an end the power of the Girondins. As the war party they were discredited by the reverses. Their failures opened the door to the rule of the more extreme Jacobins: advocates of direct democracy, republicans, and most ardent champions of vigorous national defense against the forces of counterrevolution. In Maximilien Robespierre the Jacobins found a leader of genius and extraordinary fixity of purpose, whose ruthlessness and fanaticism enabled him to dominate the Convention. From July, 1793, when he first became a member of its Committee of Public Safety until July, 1794, when he died on the guillotine, Robespierre was virtually dictator of France. The revolution, on the defensive, sought salvation in personal tyranny—in the first, perhaps, of all the single-party dictatorships of the modern world.

Of all the great French revolutionary personalities, Robespierre remains somehow the most memorable and the most symbolic: more than Mirabeau, who was a better orator and a greater statesman; more than Lafayette, whose statescraft failed to measure up to his inflated reputation; more even than Danton, an infinitely more attractive figure and the generous inspiration of national resistance to invasion and reaction. It is strange that so tumultuous and heroic an event as the French Revolution should remain personified in the slight, bespectacled, and unglamorous figure of this fastidious little provincial attorney. Is it that he in some sense represented the precise mixture of social and ideological impulses which triumphed in the Revolution? Socially, he was the archetype of the provincial lawyer who predominated in the revolutionary assemblies, the feline party intriguer and critic, fluent in the idealistic phrases that so constantly rang through those inexperienced parliamentary bodies. He was the little man of humble origins made great by the upheaval of revolution. In purpose and principle he stood for all that Jacobinism stands for in modern history: a doctrinaire idealism, exalting the principle of the sovereignty of the people, the liberty, equality, and fraternity of all men, the national republic "one and indivisible." In his own experience and career he personified the Jacobin revolutionary impulses.

To examine the anatomy of his dictatorship is to reveal the shape of things to come. It set the pattern for further revolutionary activity throughout most of Europe in the century that followed. The cell of revolution remained the club and the secret society, centering in Paris but frequently with provincial branches and committees throughout France. The pattern was, above all, the Jacobin Club of the "Society of Friends of the Constitution" where, from the Revolution's earliest days,

the respectable bourgeoisie of Paris listened intently to Robespierre's sententious moralizings. By its role in exerting pressure upon the elected national assemblies, its capacity to mobilize opinion and discontent in the provinces, its propensity to fall into the hands of the most extremist and ruthless leaders, it eventually triumphed over its many rivals. By the end of 1790 it had 1,100 members, mostly of the middle class, and when the monarchy fell, the Jacobin Club had more than a thousand local societies affiliated with it. It remained the only real and effective political organization in France as a whole. It offered the perfect milieu for the full exercise of Robespierre's talents for intrigue, maneuver, and persuasion.

The second medium of revolution was the Commune, and here too Paris was the hub. Municipal and local organizations existed for many purposes, mainly administrative and military. In June, 1789, the 407 delegates of the several quarters of Paris who had elected deputies to the Estates-General set themselves up at the Hôtel de Ville as an unofficial municipal government. In other towns local risings led to the formation of similar municipal bodies. By December, 1789, local communal councils had been set up in all towns and villages. Local revolutionary surveillance committees often came into existence. The National Guard, instituted at the time of the fall of the Bastille and with mainly middle-class recruitment, was also organized in local sections with regional federations. This mass of local bodies tended to fuse together into local insurrectionary organizations, and most significantly in Paris.

In August, 1792, with recruits flowing into Paris on their way to the frontiers, and amid fierce discontent in all the working-class quarters of the capital, the populace broke into open revolution against the Legislative Assembly. They stormed the Tuileries, imprisoned the King and royal family, and demanded the election, by universal male suffrage, of a new National Convention. They also set up a revolutionary municipal government or "Commune" in Paris. Robespierre was elected to it on August 11 and for a fortnight attended its meetings. This body, supported by the extreme Jacobins, remained a rival authority in the capital to the national representative assembly, and exerted constant pressure on it for ever more violent and extreme measures. This was the second great medium of Robespierre's power, to be revived in even more violent form in 1871.³

A third was the single-chamber assembly of the National Convention. It was elected on universal male suffrage in the crisis of the fall of 1792 in response to the demands of the Jacobins and the Commune. With the monarchy overthrown, executive power fell into the hands of committees of the Convention. This arrangement lent itself admirably to the machinations of the Jacobins and the special talents of Robespierre. The two most important committees were the Committee of Public

³ See p. 364.

Safety, first created in April, 1793, and the Committee of General Security. The former was subject to monthly re-election by the Convention and was entrusted with wide discretionary powers of government. The latter was especially concerned with police functions, and from September, 1793, onward its members were chosen by the Committee of Public Safety. Robespierre joined the Committee of Public Safety in July, after the exclusion of Danton, whose heroic efforts to stem the tide of French defeats had plainly failed. The immense powers of both committees were virtually at the disposal of Robespierre and his two closest colleagues, Louis de Saint-Just and Georges Couthon. From August, 1792, there had also existed in Paris a special court known as the Revolutionary Tribunal. Set up originally to try political offenders, it became a convenient means by which the government could by-pass the regular courts.

Such was the constitutional basis of Robespierre's "revolutionary dictatorship," claiming justification in the desperate internal and external condition of France and determined to suppress all resistance by rigorous terrorism. In the frenzy of the time all resistance could be denounced as treason or counterrevolution and punished with the guillotine. This situation also chimed well with the personality of Robespierre, who had a mystical faith in the need for a "Republic of Virtue." The word "Virtue" had echoes of both Machiavelli and Montesquieu, for whom it meant a civic spirit of unselfishness and dutiful self-sacrifice, as well as of Rousseau, who had added to it a more sentimental flavor of personal purity and incorruptibility. Robespierre's dream was of a democracy of loyal citizens and honest men, and he treated it as his personal mission to inaugurate a new democratic religion. In June, 1794, he presided over the first festival of the Cult of the Supreme Being, having a month before issued a decree organizing the cult. The second and third articles of that decree were the most significant; they recognized "that the proper worship of the Supreme Being consists in the practice of human duties," and that "the most important of these duties are to hate treachery and tyranny, to punish tyrants and traitors, to succor the unfortunate, respect the weak, and defend the oppressed, to do all the good one can to one's neighbor, and to treat no one unjustly." It was a revolutionary Declaration of the Duties of Man and of the Citizen, a belated but necessary sequel to the Declaration of Rights. It was a sign that the main surge of revolution had run its course; and a month later Robespierre himself fell victim to the guillotine, when his own oppressive tyranny had become at last intolerable. With him died his colleagues Saint-Just and Couthon.

The Jacobin Club, the Commune, and the Committees of the Convention were, in these ways, the three institutional bases of Robespierre's revolutionary dictatorship. Yet his strange power remains only partially explained unless there is added to these the atmosphere of restless inse-

curity and anxiety, the wider elements of revolutionary fervor and patriotic enthusiasm, the constant blackmailing power of the excited and ferocious Paris mob, which compelled every political leader to outbid his colleagues in denouncing treachery and giving proof of his own unsullied purpose. The Reign of Terror became possible because of the overthrow of all familiar established forms of government and the double menace of counterrevolution at home and invasion from abroad. That it went so far and lasted so long was due to other causes; above all, to the power of *enragés* and *sansculottes*, the *bras-nus* and the *canaille*⁴—in short of proletarian violence and of criminal extremism exploiting the excitement and savagery of the urban mob. The Terror was directed not just against recalcitrant nobility and clergy or treacherous *bourgeoisie*, but even more against the mass of ordinary French men and women who were unfortunate enough to fall victim to the twists and turns of party strife. Many were denounced because the chief anxiety was to save yourself by condemning others. The Terror was not an instrument of class war, and 70 per cent of its victims belonged to the peasantry and laboring classes, mostly in rebellion against the state. The Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris condemned to death 2,639 people; revolutionary courts condemned in all about 17,000. The rest of the Terror's 40,000 victims mostly died in summary mass executions in places such as the Vendée and Lyons where there was open rebellion against the Convention. Atrocious though it was, by the test of atrocities committed by more modern dictatorships the Terror was mild and relatively discriminating.

The social incidence of the Terror was matched by the social incidence of the emigration. Over the whole decade 1789-99, the number of bourgeois, peasant, and working-class refugees outnumbered noble and clerical *émigrés* by about two to one. It was in 1793, during the Reign of Terror, that the emigration included mainly the unprivileged, and became broadly representative of the whole nation. The Revolution was devouring its own children, and both by execution and exile it was increasingly alienating large sections of the population. What gave it this terrifying destructive power was the perpetuation of the war. The ultimate excuse for the Terror was the identification of enemies of the nation with enemies of the Republic, an equation that the emigration and the internal rebellions alike helped to strengthen. The revolutionary dictatorship rested on revolutionary war.

Whether it was the Revolution which attacked Europe, or Europe which attacked the Revolution, is a question almost impossible and certainly unprofitable to answer. As already suggested, there was an inexorable conflict between the two, and once war had begun, for what-

⁴ These slang terms meant, respectively, the "wild men" or republican extremists; the "common people" or poor; those "with bare arms," or the working classes; and "the rabble" or mob.

ever reason or excuse, the conflict was likely to continue until it burned itself out on the field of battle. The impact of war on the internal reconstruction of France was immense. The converse was equally true. The *levée en masse* or universal conscription for military service, introduced by the Committee of Public Safety in August, 1793, on the advice of Lazare Carnot, revolutionized modern warfare. It did not at once mean the mobilization of everyone, which would have simply disorganized the country. At first only bachelors and childless widowers between the ages of 18 and 25 were called up. But the measures established a novel and far-reaching principle: that in time of emergency the state has the right to command the services of all its citizens. It enabled France to put into the field of battle massive formations, organized and equipped by the genius of Carnot, against which the older professional royal armies proved outmoded. The system, perpetuated by the Directory⁵ in its Law of Conscription of September, 1798, laid a firm foundation for the military dictatorship of Napoleon.

Of necessity imitated by other countries, the system led eventually to the modern citizen-army, and helped to turn war from a battle between armies into a conflict between whole nations. Combined with the doctrines of democracy which prevailed in 1793, it led also to a program of internal reforms which was full of significance for the future. If persons and services can be conscripted, so can property; and if all must make sacrifices, it is the duty of the state to provide for the needs and welfare of those whose services it commands. The relation between government and governed, between state and society, became an infinitely more reciprocal and intimate relationship than had ever existed under absolutist monarchies. The revolutionary dictatorship undertook to control prices and wages, to organize the distribution of supplies, to regulate currency and trade, to encourage improvements in agriculture, to provide better technical education, to assist the poor, even to abolish slavery in the French colonies. Paternalistic monarchies, too, had done most of these things; but now they were done in the name of democracy, through an assembly of the nation's democratically elected representatives, and in a mood of excited enthusiasm for popular welfare. This connection between necessities of warfare and the development of welfare was to remain constant throughout subsequent European history.

In August, 1793, the main justification for the Terror was that there were five enemy armies on French soil, and Paris had to be organized like a beleaguered citadel. By the spring of 1794 the tide had turned. The revolt in the Vendée had been broken; the British had been repelled at sea; the Prussian and Austrian forces had been held and then pushed back out of Alsace and forced over the Rhine; in May the Ardennes and western Flanders were reoccupied, and by June all Belgium was

⁵ See p. 24.

again in French occupation. These successes were, in one sense, a measure of how far the Terror had succeeded in its nationally defensible purpose. That the Terror not only continued but greatly intensified during the summer, until the execution of Robespierre, was due mainly to its own impetus—the inability of extremists to drop their habitual demands when there was personal peril in relaxing their grip on power. In June and July the guillotine claimed 1,285 victims. Some pretext for strenuous and harsh government could still be found in the deplorable economic conditions of the country. War on the rich (especially the new rich of profiteers and speculators) for the benefit of the poor could be indefinitely continued, the redistribution of property by confiscation and taxation which Robespierre had proclaimed was certainly not yet completed, and the laws of the Maximum, which attempted to control inflation by setting maximum prices, were undoubtedly widely evaded. But France could not support Terror for such ends alone. It had outlived its usefulness. After the death of Robespierre on July 28, 1794, some 80,000 prisoners were immediately released, and soon all arrests made before his fall were canceled. Nearly 90 members of the Commune shared Robespierre's fate.

The Directory

BUT if the "Red Terror" was over, the "White Terror" of reaction was just beginning. The Convention sat until October, 1795, reorganized its committees and readmitted surviving Girondins to positions of power. These last fourteen months of the Convention are known as the Thermidorian reaction (because in the new revolutionary calendar it was on 9th Thermidor that Robespierre was overthrown). It was significantly not a royalist reaction. The forms of revolutionary government went on just as the war went on. But it was a swing back toward moderate Jacobinism, a revulsion against the final excesses of the Terror, a liquidation of party feuds and hatreds. Only in May, 1795, was the Revolutionary Tribunal abolished, though its most despotic powers and procedures were taken away from it earlier. The Convention gave up attempts to enforce the laws of the Maximum, and some of the *émigrés* began to find their way back into France. Abandoning the draft constitutions of both the Girondins and the Jacobins, the Convention now drew up a third, which betrayed not only fear of the executive but also fear of the mob. It began with a declaration of duties as well as of rights. This Constitution came into operation in October, 1795, and lasted until November, 1799.

The Directory of five, which held executive power under this new Constitution, was ill-fated from birth. The men who successively be-

came Directors were, except for the patriotic organizing genius of Carnot, disreputable and self-seeking politicians of little ability. The corrupt leaders of a period when the moral standards of social and political life were at exceptionally low ebb, they presided over the final liquidation of the Revolution. The new ruling class which backed the measures of the Directory, as of the latter-day Convention, included businessmen and financial speculators, army contractors and landowning peasants—all those middle-class elements that had profited most from the revolution and the war. These new rich, vulgar in taste and unscrupulous in habits, wanted above all to consolidate and increase their gains. Opposed equally to royalist reaction and to further mob violence, their aims were a constitutional parliamentary system on a narrow social basis, moderate in action and so devised as to prevent personal dictatorship. They succeeded in preventing a repetition of Robespierre's revolutionary dictatorship only at the price of producing Napoleon's military dictatorship. Explanation of how this came about lies in their success in crushing rebellion at home and their failure to produce victory abroad.

At home the Directory more and more openly relied upon the army to defend it against revolt. The Convention had already, in 1795, destroyed the main instruments of revolutionary action when it closed the Jacobin Club, ended the Commune and executed the Communards, reorganized its own committees, and abolished the Revolutionary Tribunal. The Convention had also set the example of relying upon troops to crush insurrection. By the spring of 1795 the severe winter, dislocation of trade, and increase in social distress bred a series of revolts. In April when Parisians rioted and demanded "bread and the Constitution of 1793," troops under General Pichegru promptly crushed them. In May, when insurgents led by Jacobin rebels occupied the hall of the Convention, regular troops under Murat and Menou drove them out. Barricades hastily erected in the working-class districts were easily demolished. The National Guard, traditional ally of revolutionaries, was reorganized into a truly middle-class body. Again in October, when the Paris mob made one final effort to assert itself against the representatives of the nation, the Convention called to its defense the troops of General Barras. His subordinate was young Napoleon Bonaparte, whose reward for his services was command of the home army. The Directory readily enough followed these examples, and was mainly a mere continuation of the Thermidorian reaction under the Convention. With an army of more than 800,000 men—the largest ever raised until then by one European power⁶—it felt able to make up for its lack of popularity by frequent use of armed force.

⁶ In the eighteenth century it had been Prussia, not France, that had set the example of large standing armies. Although in 1789 the population of Prussia was only one third that of France, she could raise in time of war an army of 250,000.

The last episode of the French Revolution was not the fall of Robespierre but the strange and extravagant episode known as the Babeuf Plot of 1796. In October, 1795, in resistance to the new Constitution of the Directory devised by the Convention to embody and perpetuate the power of the new rich, a political club was formed called the Society of the Panthéon. It attracted many former Jacobins and held meetings in a crypt by torchlight. It circulated its own paper, the *Tribun*, edited by François-Noël Babeuf, an embittered and fanatical young agitator. While it was hesitating between remaining a political debating society and becoming an active conspiracy, it was attacked by the Directory, which in February, 1796, sent General Bonaparte in person to close the meeting place and dissolve the society. The more extremist members, led by Babeuf and Sylvain Maréchal, retaliated by setting up an insurrectionary committee or "Secret Directory" of six, and preparing revolt. It was to be the final battle for the forgotten revolutionary ideal of equality—the ideal most blatantly derided by the existing conditions of inflation, distress, and corruption.

The Babouvists proposed to revive the Jacobin Constitution of 1793, which had been approved but never implemented, in place of the new Constitution of 1795; to restore the revolutionary movement to its original purity of idealism and sincerity of purpose; and to proclaim a "Republic of Equals," in which a communistic organization of society would abolish the growing gulf between rich and poor. Revolutionary agents, under the direction of the central committee, were to penetrate units of army, police, and administration. This was the last important attempt to win back the army to the cause of revolution. Preparations for insurrection were remarkably thorough, arms and ammunition were stored, and on the given signal citizens from each district of Paris, to the summons of tocsin and trumpet, were to march behind banners to support the mutineers of the army. Public buildings and bakeries were to be seized. The Secret Directory would exercise power until completely democratic elections for a new national assembly could be held. But the police had spies within the movement from the start; on the eve of the insurrection its leaders were arrested or dispersed by loyal troops, and the plot came to nothing. The days when a *coup d'état* based on the Paris mob could dictate to France were over for a time, and the strategy of the conspirators already had a somewhat old-fashioned air.

Yet the event became of considerable historical importance because

France in 1789 could muster 211,000, or 287,000 if the militia, included at war strength, were added. But the Directory's Law of Conscription of 1798 was the first to introduce the principle that the regular army, as distinct from the militia, should be recruited by systematic national conscription. Though it worked badly and ineffectively, it was later turned to full use by Bonaparte, and through him it affected all Europe.

of the mythical and legendary character it acquired. The trial of the plotters, staged in 1797 before a special court and intended to frighten waverers into support of the Directory, lasted for three months and became a platform for expounding the Babouvist ideals. Babeuf made it the occasion for an indictment of the existing regime as well as of the social order, and the Directory rested on so little public loyalty that he hit it just where it was most vulnerable. The execution of Babeuf after his attempted suicide made him the last famous martyr of the White Terror. Through the propagandist work of his colleague, Philippe Buonarroti, the Babeuf Plot became a heroic republican legend among the most active revolutionaries of nineteenth-century Paris. Babeuf won renown by his passionate sincerity. The insurrectionary techniques and inner organization of the Plot were exhaustively studied, imitated, and elaborated. Modern Communism also claims some affinities with the ideals of Babeuf. Perhaps he has acquired greater renown than he deserved, or than the importance of the Plot in 1796 merited. But in revolutions legends are powerful and ghosts can walk.⁷

In foreign affairs, too, the army assumed an ever greater role. By the beginning of 1796 France's only active enemies on land were Austria and Sardinia, and at sea Great Britain. The Convention had made peace with Holland, Spain, and Prussia. By incorporating the former Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) into France in October, it was committed to continuing the war against Austria, which would not accept this loss; while British refusal to make peace, even after the breakup of the First Coalition, kept active the war at sea. Peace had also been made with Portugal, with the German states of Saxony and the two Hesses, with the Italian states of Naples, Parma, and the Papacy. By the beginning of 1796 the Directory was able to concentrate all its efforts on the war against Austria.

On the last day of 1795 Pichegru had signed an armistice with the Austrians on the Rhine front. Using this respite, the Directory planned to send its main armies against Vienna, under the leadership of Moreau and Jourdan, by way of the Black Forest and the Danube. This was to be the decisive frontal attack. To aid it, another army was to create a diversion against Austrian power in Italy. This army was put in the charge of General Bonaparte. By the Battle of Mondovi he defeated the Sardinians and forced them to make an armistice by which they ceded Nice and Savoy to France. Marching on, Bonaparte's army defeated the Austrians at Lodi on May 10 (the very day when the Babeuf Plot was suppressed) and took Milan, where he was greeted as a liberator from Austrian rule. By January, 1797, he had succeeded, after a long struggle, in taking the central Austrian stronghold of Mantua, and in routing an Austrian army of some 70,000 at the Battle of Rivoli. Pressing northeast-

⁷ See pp. 124 and 173.

ward to Laibach, he forced the Austrians to make an armistice in April.

Peace was delayed for six months because the main French armies in Austria had made much less decisive progress; but when Bonaparte pressed on even to the Danube, Austria signed the peace of Campo Formio on October 17, 1797. She thereby abandoned Belgium to France and recognized its annexation; recognized the new French creation of a Cisalpine Republic in northern Italy; surrendered the Ionian Islands off Greece; but kept Venice and all her territory in Italy and the Adriatic. Under secret articles the bargain went further. The Austrian Emperor promised to cede to France large districts of the Rhineland, and in return was promised part of Bavaria, the ecclesiastical state of Salzburg, and the exclusion of his rival, Prussia, from any territorial gains. It was a settlement as characteristic of sly Napoleonic diplomacy as the campaign had been of Napoleonic generalship. Only Britain now remained at war with France. (See Map 1.)

At home the Directory faced its first political crisis with the elections of 1797, which it was expected would result in an anti-Jacobin majority. Only 13 out of the 216 retiring members of the elected councils were returned: a clear enough protest against the failure of the government to restore French credit and currency or to alleviate the widespread social distress. In September, 1797, the Directory forestalled the action of the new hostile and mainly royalist majority. With the help of Bonaparte it expelled the newly elected members from the assemblies. By this *coup d'état* of Fructidor the Directors forfeited their last shreds of legality, and henceforth relied more openly on armed force. Bonaparte's own seizure of power was brought one step nearer. In the further elections of May, 1798, nearly all moderates abstained from voting, with the result that the extremists held the field and the Directory resorted to the further *coup d'état* of Floréal, in which it annulled 98 elections. The political system was as bankrupt as the treasury. The elections of May, 1799, could not be suppressed with equal impunity, and they brought into the legislative assemblies all the Directory's most active opponents. Of the five Directors, Barras and Sieyès were resolved to resort to the ultimate sanction: open alliance with Bonaparte, the most popular personality in France, with a victorious army at his command.

Bonaparte in 1798 had departed on an expedition to Egypt designed to cut off the British from India and their other eastern possessions. He had captured the island of Malta in June, occupied Alexandria in July, and marched against Syria. Then he suffered reverses. His fleet was destroyed by Nelson at Aboukir Bay in the Battle of the Nile (August, 1798). Plague broke out among his troops. By May, 1799, he withdrew to Egypt with heavy losses. The campaign produced, too, a second coalition against France, which included Turkey and Russia as well as Britain. Bonaparte sailed from Alexandria in August, 1799, evaded the

watching British fleet, and reached France in October. Despite his losses and reverses he was the only man in France who enjoyed general confidence, and in the new conditions of emergency it was to him that men turned.

On November 9 (18th Brumaire) in conspiracy with Barras and Sieyès, Napoleon carried out the projected *coup d'état* that brought him to political power. It did not go according to plan. He had hoped that the assemblies, over one of which his own brother Lucien Bonaparte presided, could be persuaded to move from Paris to Saint-Cloud, to entrust him with command of the troops in Paris, and then to vote for constitutional revision under his direction. His chief hope was that his undoubted popularity would lead to his being acclaimed almost spontaneously as head of the state. The first two steps in the program were safely carried out, and at Saint-Cloud he addressed each assembly in turn. But they did not receive him with the acclaim he expected. Instead, on November 10 they rejected his pretensions and affirmed their loyalty to the Constitution. He had to appeal, unwillingly, to armed force. He ordered his troops to chase the assemblies from their hall. A small number of the representatives remained and, in collusion with Sieyès, voted for constitutional revision. They appointed three consuls to carry it out: Sieyès, Bonaparte, and a nonentity, Roger Ducos.

The *coup* succeeded because neither assemblies nor Directory had any popular esteem left, and the population as a whole—even in Paris—accepted the accomplished fact with little resistance. It remained only for that veteran constitution-monger, the Abbé Sieyès, to draft a constitution on his new formula, "Confidence from below; power from above," and for Bonaparte to adapt it to his own views of the situation, which required his personal autocracy endorsed by popular plebiscite. Executive government was invested in a first consul, with two other consuls subordinate to him; a nominated state council was to initiate legislation; a senate of 60 members was to be nominated by the consuls. When the new arrangement was submitted to plebiscite, it was announced that more than three million votes had been for it, only 1,562 against it. The Revolution had fulfilled the remarkable prophecy of Edmund Burke of nine years before: "In the weakness of one kind of authority and the fluctuations of all, the officers of an army will remain for some time mutinous and full of faction, until some general who understands the art of conciliating the soldiery . . . shall draw the eyes of all men upon himself. Armies will obey him on his personal account. But the moment in which that event shall happen, the person who really commands the army is your master, the master of your King, the master of your Assembly, the master of your whole Republic." On Christmas Eve, 1799, only a decade after the Revolution began, that prophecy was completely fulfilled in the formal inauguration of the Consulate.

The Impact on Europe

MEANWHILE, the effects of the war upon Europe were little less revolutionary than upon France itself. Until 1914 the French Revolution could properly be regarded as the most important event in the life of modern Europe, comparable in its consequences with the Reformation of the sixteenth century and the religious wars of the seventeenth. It destroyed the landmarks of the old established order in politics, economics, social life and thought, diplomacy, and war. Throughout Europe the impact of revolution and war was enhanced by the previous cult of all things French, which dated from the time of Louis XIV and from the spread of the Enlightenment during the earlier part of the eighteenth century. In Germany particularly, French manners, literature, and thought had become familiar long before 1789. The movement of the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) promoted by men such as Gotthold Lessing spread belief in reason and challenged all existing institutions and beliefs. The same was true, if to a lesser extent, in Belgium, northern Italy, and even Great Britain.

This cultural preparation explains the widespread enthusiasm evoked by the early stages of the revolution in France. In Britain and the United States radicals and democrats of all kinds welcomed the signs that the very model of established absolutist monarchy was at last yielding to the need for constitutional reforms. There took place in 1789 a symbolic gesture of the solidarity of the democratic international when Lafayette, the hero of the United States and newly appointed commander of the National Guard, handed to Tom Paine, the republican English hero of America, the key of the Bastille to take to George Washington. In 1792 the National Assembly conferred upon Tom Paine the title of "French citizen," and he was elected as a deputy to the Convention, where he supported the Girondins. The leading English radical philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, despite his hostility to natural rights and Jacobinism, was also made a citizen of France, and as such he duly recorded his vote for Napoleon in 1799. The dominant classes and parties of revolutionary France, feeling that they were conducting a revolution on behalf of all mankind, welcomed into their ranks men of any other nation whom they regarded as sharing their aspiration. And many generous-minded men of other nations responded to this view of the Revolution—at least until the excesses of the Terror and the aggressions of French armies disillusioned them. The eighteenth century was in culture cosmopolitan, and it fittingly culminated in a cosmopolitan revolution.

It was precisely this universal characteristic of the Revolution—dramatized by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen

and by the revolutionary manifestoes⁸—that provoked European rulers into antagonism. It was something that would not let them alone, and which therefore they could not ignore. But this recognition was not immediate. If radicals were over-enthusiastic in their welcome of revolution, rulers were at first equally exaggeratedly apathetic. France was a traditional rival of all her neighbors, and for the French king to find himself enmeshed in difficulties at home was no unwelcome news to them. There was a rough balance of power in the Europe of 1789, a tolerable equilibrium between Bourbon and Habsburg, Austria and Russia, Russia and Turkey. There was, as yet, no concert of Europe, no organization for regular consultation about common European problems, no "Holy Alliance" to lead a crusade against revolution. All these were consequences of the revolutionary decade between 1789 and 1799, not factors in it. Even at war France found herself opposed only by partial and unstable coalitions, held together mainly by British strategy and subsidies, and then not for long. Normal diplomatic relations were governed by considerations of dynastic security and acquisition of territories. Poland was partitioned during the Revolution itself, when in 1793 and 1795 the rulers of Prussia, Russia and Austria completed the carving-up that had begun twenty years before. In January, 1795, indeed, the monarchs of Russia and Austria made a treaty for the partition or acquisition not only of Poland, but of Turkey, Venice, and Bavaria as well. The sweeping successes of the first revolutionary armies become understandable only if this greedy and separatist characteristic of their opponents is realized.

The disillusionment of democrats with the early promise of the Revolution is not to be explained only by the Terror and the course of the Revolution inside France, though all Europe watched that struggle with the liveliest attention. It is related even more directly to the shift in pretension and behavior which came about in the revolutionary armies themselves in 1793. The declared war aims of the revolutionary government became more and more selfishly nationalistic in character, less and less distinguishable from the time-honored aggressive policies of the French kings. Danton's doctrine of the "natural frontiers" of France included not only the indisputable ones of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pyrenees, but also the highly debatable ones of the Rhine and the Alps. This seemed but old Bourbon dynasticism writ large. When the Convention supported these claims to the extent of annexing Nice, Savoy, and Belgium, and attacking Holland, and when it openly defied existing public law and practices in Europe, the claims had to be taken seriously. They were of a kind that neither kings nor peoples could accept with equanimity, for they violated both dynasticism and nationalism.

The rigorous introduction of the novel French laws and institu-

⁸ See p. 14.

tions into annexed or occupied territories was further proof of French intentions. The task of gallicizing Europe, which the *philosophes* had begun in cultural matters and which Napoleon was later to attempt in imperial administration, was equally vigorously attempted by the revolutionaries. They were aided, indeed, by native supporters, and the destructive side of their work was often welcome enough. It was only when populations found French masters no less exacting than their old regimes that they were fired to ideas of self-government. The idea that "sovereignty of the people" should lead to national independence was the indirect result of French occupation: its original meaning, of abolishing privilege and universalizing rights, came to merge into this new implication only as a result of conquests. The French revolutionaries spread liberalism by intention but created nationalism by inadvertence.

Under the arrangements made at Campo Formio in 1797 much of the Rhineland and northern Italy were added to the territories directly under French administration. By then the need for the French armies to live on local supplies and to make war profitable, combined with Bonaparte's tendency to exact heavy tribute from the occupied territories, further intensified anti-French feelings. The whole of western Europe between the Pyrenees and the Baltic was infused with a strange mixture of general sympathy for the original ideals of the Revolution and an immediate hostility to the practices of the French. It was the perfect mixture for nourishing the seeds of nationalism. (See Map 1.)

In the belligerent states that remained beyond French rule, the results were naturally different. In Austria and Prussia the major effect of the wars was to impose strain upon their financial resources and domestic administrations. Reverses shook the position of their governments at home and enhanced the hardships and burdens of war. Otherwise the short-term effects were not vastly different from the effects of more familiar kinds of interdynastic struggle. Never was there any likelihood of an outbreak of revolution. And court circles, in Vienna and Berlin as much as in the majority of the smaller states of Germany, were in general stiffened in their existing tendencies of conservatism, scared away from any previous thoughts of alliance between monarchy and the Enlightenment. They kept their power over territories which were economically and socially still unfavorable to the reception of revolutionary propaganda. In Russia, Catherine II and her successor Paul did all in their power to seal off the country against the infiltration of French influences and agents; they succeeded sufficiently well to prevent revolutionary ideas from reaching Russia until a whole generation later.

Of all the opponents of France, it was the most persistent, Great Britain, that was most immediately and most profoundly affected by the course of events. By dint of her own turbulent past in the seventeenth century, her relatively advanced constitutional development, her early

progress in industrialism, Britain was especially receptive to the revolutionary ideas. Not only did her active radical leaders like Tom Paine, Horne Tooke, Thomas Hardy, and those who formed a coterie around Lord Shelburne, welcome the Revolution as the greatest event since American independence, but the large and influential Whig party, led by Charles James Fox, was at first prepared to defend it in parliament. The moderate Tory government, led by the younger William Pitt, had from 1784 onward sought to introduce many financial and administrative reforms, and it had even considered parliamentary reform. It took time for the opinion of the influential classes of England to set against the Revolution; and only after the King's execution, the Terror, and the outbreak of war did the bulk of the Whig party, headed by the Duke of Portland, take the fateful decision to desert Fox in opposition and to support the war administration of Pitt.

Fox, though himself very far from revolutionary, was impulsive and generous by nature. He refused to believe that in England Jacobinism could ever be dangerous enough to justify repression of free speech and association. But others were panicked by the rapid growth of a host of radical societies and clubs, often on the model of the French and in contact with the French. The London Corresponding Society included mainly small tradesmen, artisans, and lower-class elements; and it had affiliated societies in northern cities. The Constitutional Society and the Friends of the People were societies of gentry and tradespeople. They and many others demanded reform of the constitution and varying degrees of democratic freedom. In November, 1793, there even met, in Edinburgh, a "British Convention" demanding universal suffrage and annual elections. But with prolongation of the war such activities came to seem more and more unpatriotic, the government hardened in its repressive policy as it won broader national support, and the outcome was on the one hand a deepening of radical sentiments among the working classes, and on the other a consolidating of Toryism into a policy of resistance to all reform. Parliamentary reform, which had seemed near at hand before 1789, was postponed until 1832. The demands of the war, including payment of subsidies to Britain's continental allies, imposed heavy financial burdens on the country. Pitt borrowed money and thus increased the national debt and the *rentier* class. In 1798 he introduced a novelty which was to have an immense future: the income tax.

territory of erstwhile church-states scattered throughout Germany and Austria. By 1799 six republics dependent on France were set up in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy. Thus enlarged and screened with satellite states, France in November, 1799, came to be ruled by the Consulate, with General Bonaparte as First Consul.

As the century reached its close, so did the war in Europe. The First Consul knew that because his power rested on the support of the army, he must ultimately give the army conquest and glory. He also knew that his popularity at home depended upon his giving France a more stable, efficient, and businesslike government than she had hitherto known. To settle and consolidate his position in France, to establish order and security, he needed a truce. He therefore fought Austria to a standstill at the Battle of Marengo in June, 1800, and when this was followed up by Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden in December, the result was the treaty of Lunéville in February, 1801. It confirmed the terms of the treaty of Campo Formio. In the same year Bonaparte made a concordat with the Vatican and settled the religious issue for the rest of his reign. In 1802 even Britain agreed to make peace and signed the treaty of Amiens. The Second Coalition of 1799, which had included Austria, Russia, Britain, Naples, and Portugal, broke up, as did its predecessor of 1793.⁹ The revolutionary wars were over; the Napoleonic wars proper had not yet begun. In the interval Napoleon dazzled France and Europe with the achievements of dictatorship.

⁹ See p. 15.

CHAPTER 3

Dictatorship IN FRANCE

Napoleon Bonaparte

THE MAN who was to rule France and much of Europe for the next fifteen years was only thirty years old when he became First Consul—the same age, exactly, as his greatest military opponent, Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington. A Corsican by birth, Napoleon was French only because the island of Corsica had been annexed to France the year before he was born. He was trained as an artillery officer in French schools, self-consciously a foreigner and sensitively solitary. By 1793 he had been converted to Jacobin ideas, and won some repute for his services in repulsing the British from Toulon. His first great series of victories, in the Italian campaign of 1796–97, were due to his skilled application of new principles of warfare which as a young officer he had studied and elaborated. Scientific improvements had encouraged a new and more offensive type of warfare. Better roads and maps, combined with more mobile artillery more closely co-ordinated with the movements of infantry, were revolutionizing armies and their uses. Instead of using cumbrous equipment suited best to slow movement and siege warfare, it became possible to organize campaigns of swifter movement, more rapid concentration of force, and greater surprise. The infantry, too, drawn less from professionals and mercenaries and more from the whole body of citizens through the *levée en masse*, had greater dash and *élan*. New generalship had to be resourceful and adaptable, mastering a greater mass of details and combining versatility of tactics with precision in their execution. Great military opportunities lay before a soldier of genius who chose to seize them. Bonaparte, with his insatiable ambition and boundless energy, did not hesitate to do so.

It is a constant temptation, in looking back upon the meteoric rise of a great conqueror such as Napoleon, to invest him not only with indomitable will power, which he undoubtedly had, but also with a degree of foresight and control over events which seems uncanny. The true genius of Napoleon is distorted unless this temptation is resisted. At several crucial moments in his career, when his fortunes hung in

the balance, he showed unexpected hesitation and uncertainty of purpose. One such moment was in the *coup d'état* of Brumaire itself, when he was fraught with nervous anxieties and his brother Lucien showed greater presence of mind and more capacity to control events than did Napoleon himself. It might even be argued that so long as his character permitted of this degree of hesitancy, which revealed some humility and also bred prudence, his plans were usually successful; it was when unbroken triumphs had fostered excessive confidence and destroyed all humility that he began to fail. The nervous excitement and anxiety that he was wont to suffer at critical moments serve to remind us that to even the greatest historical figures each momentous decision was a choice between relatively unknown alternatives. Every move was, at the time, a leap in the dark.

Bonaparte was the supreme opportunist, driven by a burning desire for power, which consumed his energies, and guided by a highly intelligent insight into the forces at work in the Europe of his time. He was a masterful opportunist partly because the opportunities before him were so great. The momentum of the revolutionary movement in France had burned itself out, and, as Burke had foreseen, the time was now ripe for a popular soldier with a genius for organization to take over authority. Provided he could discriminate between the durable results of the Revolution which could now be consolidated and its excesses and aberrations which had to be suppressed, he could make for himself a unique position as the heir and legatee of the Revolution.

Internal Reorganization

(BETWEEN 1800 and 1803 Bonaparte as First Consul was free to devote his energies mainly to the internal reorganization of France. It was in this period, one of the most important in the whole of modern French history, that his most constructively valuable work was done. He brought to the task of reorganization the qualities of swift decision and action, the same precision and concentration upon essentials which had already brought him success in war.) The spirit behind the great reforms of the Consulate at home was the transference of the methods of Bonaparte the general to the tasks of Bonaparte the statesman. (And, as in war, he was able to enlist in his service a band of men imbued with the same spirit and devoted to the same ends.)

Many reforms had been projected during the Revolution but only some of them had been carried out. The division of France for purposes of local administration into a fairly symmetrical pattern of communes and departments had been made in 1790; the administration of the pub-

lic debt had been unified by Joseph Cambon in 1793; the metric system had been introduced in 1793; the beginnings of more modern technological education had begun in 1794, with Carnot's foundation in Paris of the Polytechnic School (*École Polytechnique*). But other reforms had been only partially launched or merely projected: the erection of a central administration for assessing and collecting taxes attempted by the Directory in 1797, and the codification of the law which was begun between 1792 and 1796. Now, using the ablest men regardless of their past loyalties, ranging from former servants of the monarchy such as the financial bureaucrat Martin Gaudin to former regicide members of the Committee of Public Safety such as the administrator Jean Bon Saint-André, Bonaparte provided the concentrated drive that got things done. He was the architect, they the technicians. His over-all purpose was a systematic reconstruction of the main legal, financial, and administrative institutions of France, which gives Bonaparte a strong claim to be the last and greatest of the eighteenth-century benevolent despots.

(Financial administration and taxation, the cancers of the old regime, were among the first to be overhauled. The Bank of France was founded in 1800, its constitution drafted by a leading Paris banker, Perregaux. The only four existing banks of any importance had been created since 1796. Although at first an independent corporation, the Bank of France was from the outset linked with the management of government loans and tax-collectors' deposits, and in 1803 it was given the monopoly of issuing bank notes. The system of collecting taxes, which the Revolution had entrusted to autonomous local authorities, was now centralized and made more efficient by Gaudin. Local government itself was at the same time centralized by putting a prefect, appointed by the First Consul, in sole charge of each department. Local elected councils were left with only advisory powers, and even the mayor of each commune was centrally appointed. These measures virtually restored the centralized authority of the old regime with its powerful intendants, since the prefects, who enjoyed immense local power, were all in turn completely under the direction of the central government.)

(The enormously complex task of codifying French law was completed. In 1789 France knew no common law, but only a medley of local laws and jurisdictions, all overlaid with a tangle of feudal custom, royal edicts, and ecclesiastical Canon Law. Property rights and civic rights had been entirely changed by the upheavals of the Revolution, and to define, stabilize, and codify the new situation had become a vital need. The powerful Council of State, itself a revival in modern form of the old *curia regis* or royal council, was the machine through which Bonaparte remodeled the law. It held 84 sessions to discuss various drafts of the new codes, with Bonaparte himself presiding over 36. It hammered out a synthesis between the liberal, customary, and "natural

law" theories of the Revolution and the Roman law theories) which, under the Directory, had been revived in reaction against the Revolution. (The synthesis, which was eventually embodied in the 2,287 articles of the Napoleonic Code of 1804, was itself made possible by Bonaparte's readiness to employ men of talent whatever their past.) On the Council of State former revolutionaries like Théophile Berlier and Antoine Thibaudeau upheld the claims of customary law, while former royalist jurists like Jean Portalis upheld the claims of Roman law.

(The Code gave prominence to the principles of Roman law—a fact that made the Napoleonic Code acceptable to other European countries in later years.) (This bias affected especially the laws of the family, marriage and divorce, the status of women, paternal authority, and property.) (The authority of the father over his wife, his children, and the property of the family was strengthened, as against the revolutionary tendency toward equality of persons and equal division of property.) Under the new Codes wives were subjected to husbands, divorce was made more difficult, and property up to a quarter of the whole could be bequeathed away from the family. If Bonaparte supported these changes, it was less as a champion of Roman law than as an astute statesman, eager to end the laxity of manners and morals which had existed under the Directory. (In other respects equality of civic rights was preserved. The Code confirmed the rights of private property and the land settlement of the Revolution, and reassured all who had acquired the former lands of Church and nobility that their existing rights would be preserved. Bonaparte ensured, above all, that there would be no counterrevolution—and this rallied middle classes and peasants alike behind the Consulate.)

(An ecclesiastical settlement was no less urgent and important. Bonaparte himself shared the skepticism of the *philosophes* but not their violent anticlericalism. He had a lively sense of the political importance of religion, which he valued chiefly as a social cement. His only aim was therefore to end the religious strife of the Revolution and find a realistic settlement. He wanted to separate royalism from Catholicism) and to satisfy both the strong Catholic religious feelings of large parts of the population, including peasants and intellectuals, and the anxiety of all who held former Church lands and wished to avoid any ultra-Catholic reaction that might seek to restore the Church's secular power and property. (Taking advantage of the accession in 1800 of a new pope, Pius VII, Bonaparte began negotiations for a concordat with the Papacy which would serve these ends.)

(By July, 1801, he completed the bargain.) He guaranteed freedom of worship subject only to the preservation of public order, and recognized Roman Catholicism as "the religion of the majority of Frenchmen." He undertook to pay the salaries of bishops and clergy, and so

won papal recognition for the revolutionary confiscation of Church property. In return, too, the Pope agreed that all existing bishops would resign, and that in the future, bishops nominated by the French government would be instituted by the Pope. In April, 1802, Bonaparte embodied the Concordat in a general Law of Public Worship, which applied also to other religious denominations and he added provisions, not agreed to by the Pope, which subjected the clergy to minute state regulation. Here, too, Bonaparte in effect reverted surreptitiously to the prerevolutionary Gallican Church, closely linked with the state and in a certain defiance of the Vatican. The ecclesiastical settlement proved to be among the less durable of his achievements. It alienated many devout Catholics as well as the more violent anticlericals. It was, in the nature of things, not a synthesis, as were the legal codes, but a compromise; and like many compromises it left both extremes actively dissatisfied.

Apart from all these institutional reforms of the Consulate, it achieved much that was more silent and constructive. Bonaparte disciplined France and established order. Brigandage was stopped. Life and property were made secure. Public works were begun. The "career open to talents" and free social and educational opportunity were ensured. The system of education was developed with the opening of *lycées* or secondary schools, where boys were taught to be good citizens and above all to be good soldiers. Scientific research and technological education were encouraged. The Consulate began a healing process in French life, and built a framework of public order and more efficient government within which the energies and genius of the French people could again labor fruitfully. Bonaparte took pride in supporting the sciences and the arts; and as on his famous expedition to Egypt, so also as ruler of France, he liked to surround himself with *savants* and scientific experts. He helped to modernize France, and during the truce of Amiens people from Britain and elsewhere flocked to Paris to behold the impressive new scientific system of government which had at last emerged from the Revolution.

The Renewal of War

BUT the Consulate was devoted also to extensive preparations for the renewal of war in Europe. Bonaparte, like many Englishmen and Austrians, regarded the Peace of Amiens as bound to be only a truce. He planned to rival British naval supremacy, and pressed on with the expansion of ports and dockyards. He began extensive shipbuilding and fitted out colonial expeditions to Mauritius and Madagascar, ominously on the route to India. He reorganized the

Cisalpine Republic in northern Italy, the Batavian Republic in Holland, and the Helvetic Republic in Switzerland, all previously set up under the Directory, as tributary and satellite states of France (*see* Map 1). In 1803 with the consent of the tsar of Russia he devised a new imperial constitution for Germany which recast the old map of tiny principalities and greatly reduced their number. In particular Prussia gained most of Westphalia in the heart of Germany, and Habsburg predominance in the Diet was destroyed. In 1802 Bonaparte made himself Consul for life, instead of only for the period of ten years originally fixed in 1799. In 1804 he took the further step of becoming "Emperor of the French," inducing the Pope to come to Paris in December for the ceremony of coronation and then, at the crucial moment, placing the crown on his own head. It was a realistic gesture: he was a self-made emperor, well suited to the new era of self-made men which the industrial revolution was bestowing upon Europe.

In the decade between 1804 and 1814 Europe beheld in France a system of government which was as much a defiance of the traditional basis of existing governments as had been the revolutionary dictatorship of Robespierre. It surrounded itself with many of the trappings of more traditional monarchies: a court of brilliance and elaborate etiquette, imperial titles and honors, new uniforms and old ceremonials. Napoleon even took care to marry into the most grandiose dynasty of all, the Habsburgs, when in 1810 he married the Archduchess Marie Louise, a niece of Marie Antionette. But these old-fashioned trimmings of respectability barely hid the realities of an upstart military dictatorship. Unlike the monarchs of Vienna or St. Petersburg, Berlin or London, Napoleon could never claim to derive power from descent and from the past. Instead he claimed to derive authority from the present: from popular will. He took care to endorse all his main seizures of power with the subsequent approval of a plebiscite. In reality, as all knew, he derived political authority from military power. He ruled France because he had been a successful and popular general, because the army remained loyal to him, because he devoted all his life, talents, and energies to winning and keeping this military power. It was only if the doctrines of the Revolution and the ideas of democracy were true, that his position could be justified. A child of the Revolution, he combined the substance of old absolutism with the new sanction of popular approval. He was even more of a challenge to other monarchs than was the Revolution itself: a crowned and anointed Jacobin, a usurper legitimized by the will of the sovereign people.

As emperor he continued the constructive work of the Consulate. By 1808 he produced the scheme for the "University of France," a form of centralized Ministry of Public Instruction which was to supervise all levels of education. By 1813 he made the system of secondary

education in France the best in Europe, though primary education was neglected. Paris was beautified and schemes of public works continued. But now such beneficial schemes were accompanied by an increased stifling of social life and political freedom. The Ministry of Police, suppressed in 1802, was revived in 1804 under the care of Joseph Fouché. A decree of 1810 virtually revived the hated *lettres de cachet* of the old regime, for it set up state prisons and allowed arrest and detention without trial on the authority of the Council of State. The press was heavily censored and by 1810 only four papers appeared in Paris. Correspondence was censored 'too. An army of spies and secret agents kept Napoleon well informed of any opposition, and he could crush it ruthlessly whenever he chose.

France relapsed more and more into a police state, under an autocracy often heavy-handed and tempered only by the military needs of the Emperor. To meet these he was prepared to perform—and to drive others to perform—prodigies of organization, of labor, of self-sacrifice. Yet he had none of the extravagance, showed none of the wastefulness, of the old regime. His serious and dull court had none of the frivolity of the Bourbon courts. He had a passion for financial solvency, pared down every state expenditure, and constantly urged frugality and thrift upon his whole administration. By inflicting heavy exactions upon other countries, he spared the pockets of French taxpayers, even during his costliest campaigns. Only in 1813 did French taxes have to be sharply raised, and when he abdicated in 1814 the French public debt was only 60 million francs. Never had a great state been run more economically. At the same time he saw to it that industries were encouraged, unemployment relieved, food supplies maintained. He was anxious to make empire, and even war, sound business for France.

The dictatorship of Napoleon in France was a utilitarian, efficient, industrious, hard-headed government. Its oppressiveness must not be exaggerated. It lacked the fanaticism and passions of the rule of Robespierre and the harsh all-pervasive ruthlessness and brutality of twentieth-century dictatorships. Although extreme royalists, fervent Roman Catholics, and more doctrinaire Jacobins were never reconciled to it, Napoleon contrived to rally the support of the great majority of the French people. From about 1808 onward the growing tensions within his Empire, the protracted wars, and the shadow of defeat increasingly tarnished his regime, but the order, efficient government, and prestige that it provided satisfied most Frenchmen. Part of his strength was the absence of any acceptable alternative to his government. At a time when memories of revolutionary excesses were still fresh and fears of royalist reaction still active, Bonapartism seemed preferable to both, even though the price to be paid for it was incessant war.

A further element of strength was the economic advantages that

Napoleon's policy brought to French industrialists, farmers, and traders. The Continental System, the attempt to seal the continent of Europe against British trade, was more than a device of economic warfare against Britain. It was a vast system of economic preference and protection in favor of France, and against not Britain alone but the rest of Europe. Italy was almost turned into an economic colony of France, providing raw materials for French industry and a market for French textiles. The economic development of Holland was entirely subordinated to that of France. While the introduction of machinery was encouraged in France, it was discouraged elsewhere. The French cotton and sugar-beet industries prospered behind a heavily protective screen. In economic terms the Empire undoubtedly paid handsomely, at least on the short run.

The Napoleonic Empire was doomed because of its inherent and self-defeating contradictions. Its program of conquests ensured remorseless British resistance. From May, 1803, when war began again, until the abdication of Napoleon in 1814, there was no more truce. After the failure of his invasion plans in 1804-05 and the Battle of Trafalgar in October, 1805, when Nelson annihilated the main body of the combined French and Spanish fleets, it was clear that Britain remained superior at sea. Napoleon resorted to the Continental System in an effort to undermine naval power by economic weapons—sapping British trade and undermining her commercial prosperity. To make the system effective he had to extend his territorial conquests and gain control of more and more of the continental coastline. But such further aggressions only intensified British resistance and threw more of Europe into active hostility. It was a vicious circle of conquest and resistance, which British trade could survive so long as the other continents of the world were open to it. The Continental System had to be virtually abandoned in 1813 because it was a failure. The Empire was self-defeating, too, in the inner contradictions between Napoleon's dynastic and nationalist policies. He placed his brothers on the thrones of Holland, Naples, Westphalia, and Spain, creating a new dynastic system in Europe. But the junior branches of the dynasty struck no native roots because it was Napoleon's policy to subordinate their countries so completely to French interests. "My policy," he wrote in 1810, "is France before all." Old family dynasticism and modern exclusive nationalism do not go together: since the revolutionary ideas as well as the revolutionary example had served to stimulate ideas of national self-determination, he was committed to frustrating the very tendencies to which he owed his own position. Thus it was the Empire that completed the whole process of upheaval and transformation in Europe which had begun in those far-off days of 1789.

CHAPTER 4

NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

The Empire and Its Effects

THE Empire of Napoleon in Europe was established as a result of the great series of brilliant victories by which, within two years, he smashed the Third Coalition of 1805. In 1805 Pitt constructed a coalition of Great Britain, Austria, and Russia. In the treaty of Pressburg in January, 1806, Austria made peace after being defeated at the battles of Ulm in October and Austerlitz in December, 1805. When Prussia joined the coalition, she too was defeated—at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt in October, 1806—and forced to cede large territories to Napoleon. He then routed the Russian armies at Friedland in June, 1807, and by a brilliant stroke of diplomacy induced the tsar Alexander I not only to make peace but to become an ally of France for five years.

The emperors of France and Russia met privately on a raft in the river Niemen, and the outcome was the Treaty of Tilsit in July, 1807. Napoleon won Alexander's recognition as Emperor of the West in return for the entrancing vision he depicted of Alexander's own possible future as Emperor of the East. The only obstacle to both was the stubborn resistance of Britain, which barred Napoleon's path in the west as she checked Alexander's expansion toward Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. In November, 1806, Napoleon had issued from conquered and occupied Berlin a decree forbidding the importation of British goods into any part of Europe under his control or allied with him. Russia and Prussia both agreed to enforce this decree, and within a few months they as well as Austria declared war against Britain. Not only was the Third Coalition smashed—it was reversed. The Continental System, an economic boycott of British trade throughout Europe set up by the Berlin Decree, was the basis of the new Empire.

The Treaty of Tilsit and its consequences represent the moment when the Napoleonic Empire reached not its greatest extent but its firmest consolidation (*see* Map 2). Annexed to France were Belgium, Nice, Savoy, Genoa, Dalmatia, and Croatia. As an inner ring of satellite states were

Holland (with Louis Bonaparte as king), the Confederation of the Rhine (formed in 1806), the kingdom of Westphalia under Jérôme Bonaparte (formed in 1807 out of Prussia's Rhenish lands), the kingdom of Italy (formed in 1805 with Napoleon as king), the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (formed in 1807 mostly out of Prussia's Polish lands), and Switzerland. Joseph Bonaparte was made king of Naples and Sicily in 1804, and after 1808 king of Spain. The Confederation of the Rhine was extended in 1807, the Duchy of Warsaw in 1809. As allies, France had Bavaria and Württemberg, Denmark and Sweden, Spain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Britain was diplomatically isolated; her great war leader Pitt had died in January, 1806. There were to be further additions of territory until 1811, when the Grand Empire and its allies covered the whole European mainland, except the Balkans. But by then Napoleon was faced with rebellion and war in Spain and Portugal, renewal of the war against Austria, and the breakdown of his Continental System caused by organized smuggling and the countermeasures of the British naval blockade.

The extent of the Empire at its greatest was made possible by the separatist and expansionist rivalries of the other main powers. Just as the early successes of the French revolutionary armies had been facilitated by the absence of any concert of Europe,¹ so the great victories of Napoleon were won against incorrigibly unstable and unreliable coalitions. He was able to defeat his enemies one by one. Pursuing their separate and often rival purposes, beset by mutual distrusts, the powers were as ready to ally with Napoleon as against him. He was simply more successful than they in doing what they were all doing—seeking to acquire territories, extend influence, enhance prestige. British colonial expansion, Prussian ambitions for leadership in northern Germany and eastern Europe, Habsburg imperial aims in the Danube valley, Russian aspirations in Poland and Turkey, were different from French aims more in degree and in incidence than in kind. But they worked to closer horizons, save perhaps the visionary Alexander I. Prussian and Austrian aims were regional rather than continental in scope. The chief concern of Britain was to preserve some balance of power in Europe; for unification of European resources under a single hostile power would threaten her national security, end her naval superiority, and impede development of her overseas trade. The uniqueness of Napoleon's Empire lay partly in its generalized aim of dominating the whole continent, but even more in the immense energy, ingenuity, ability, and success with which he pursued his objective.

It may be doubted whether, even in 1807, he had any precise and far-reaching design of imperial organization outside the limited regional area of France and her surrounding annexations and satellites in western Europe. Within this area he evolved certain techniques of empire. These included, besides the enthronement of his brothers and intermarriage


¹ See p. 30.


with older ruling houses, besides the economic policy implicit in the Continental System, such devices as the introduction of the *Code napoléon* into conquered territories and the establishment of a relatively uniform system of administration and justice. Napoleon was wedded to the idea of government as a rationally and scientifically constructed system, a matter of technique capable of being applied anywhere regardless of historic traditions. What people wanted was public order, equitable administration, efficient organization. This, he believed, he could provide through his legal codes and trained administrators. He did so, for a time, in Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Germany. Beyond these areas he had to deal with established regimes less easily overthrown—as in Russia and Austria—and in these he relied not on imperial organization but merely on diplomacy. Whereas in the west he aimed at some unity, in the east his concern was to exploit disunity. His aim, indeed, was to prevent any general settlement or pacification of Europe. He avoided congresses and general negotiations, and insisted on dealing separately with each power. He contrived to play upon their mutual fears and jealousies in order to keep them from combining. Unification in the west had to be accompanied by constant division and conflict in the east; and his power was never consolidated east of the Elbe and the Adriatic.

✓ The special characteristics of his empire can best be described by comparing it with the other empires of his day. It was quite unlike that insubstantial medieval relic, the Holy Roman Empire, which Voltaire had derided as being neither Holy nor Roman nor an Empire. In 1804 when Francis II promulgated the Austrian Empire as distinct from the Holy Roman Empire of which he was the Habsburg heir, he tried to substitute a more substantial reality for the shadow of a defunct system; and in 1806 the Holy Roman Empire was formally dissolved by Napoleon, who gathered his 15 client German states into the new Confederation of the Rhine. It resembled more closely the Habsburg Aus-

MAP 2. EUROPE, 1810. See following pages.

This map shows the power of Napoleon at its height. To the conquests of the revolutionary armies (see Map 1) he had now added the Netherlands and northern Germany, Piedmont, Genoa, a kingdom in western Italy, and the Illyrian provinces of the Dalmatian coast. By means of dependent régimes he controlled all the rest of Germany and Italy, Spain, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. His allies included, at this time, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Britain, Portugal, and the Balkans ruled by the Ottoman Turks, remained beyond his grasp. His invasion of Portugal in 1810 was repelled by Wellington. Anxiety to keep Russia within the orbit of his power led in 1812 to his fateful campaign (see inset), which was to end in the catastrophe of his retreat from Moscow and the crumbling of his Empire.





trian Empire, which was basically a mere conglomeration of territories, with some geographical unity in the Danube valley, but held together only by the common overlordship of the Habsburg dynasty. It was totally different from the British Empire, which was a maritime, overseas, commercial entity, held together by trade and settlement and defended by naval power. The western empire of Napoleon was the transient product of lightning war and diplomatic *coups*, hastily bound together by dynastic settlement of thrones upon members of his family and by the emergency devices of the Continental System. It did not last long enough even in the west for the more durable mortar of a common code of law, justice, finance, and administration—which he injected into its joints—to set hard and bind it into a real imperial system. Opportunism and expediency haunted it throughout.

Its most destructive achievements were among its most permanent. Napoleon extended and perpetuated the effects of the French Revolution in Europe by destroying feudalism in the Low Countries, in much of Germany, and in Italy. Feudalism as a legal system, involving noble jurisdiction over peasants, was ended; feudalism as an economic system, involving payment of feudal dues by peasants to nobles, was ended, though often in return for compensation and indemnity. The claims of the Church were never allowed to stand in the way of this reorganization. Middle classes and peasants became, like nobles, subjects of the state, all equally liable to pay taxes. The system of levying and collecting taxes was made more equitable and efficient. Old guilds and town oligarchies were abolished; internal tariff barriers were removed. Everywhere greater equality, in the sense of careers open to talents, was inaugurated. A gust of modernization blew through Europe in the wake of Napoleonic conquests. His violent attempts to hammer western Europe into one subservient bloc of annexed or satellite territories succeeded, at least, in shaking it free from accumulated relics of petty feudal power, from antiquated jurisdictions and privileges, from outworn territorial divisions. Most of what he swept away could never be restored. If the French Revolution had thrown Europe into the melting pot, Napoleon stirred it about, making sure that much of the dross was removed and giving it a shape it was never to lose. Europe could never be the same again, however earnest and extensive the attempts at “restoration” after his fall.

Destruction of the Empire

THE METHODS by which the Empire was created were one of the main reasons for its defeat. The internal contradictions of the Napoleonic Empire in France have already been

suggested; they were matched by its broader European contradictions. It had none of the qualities of permanence of his domestic work as First Consul. It was experience of how territories were consistently snatched from them after military victories, of how dynastic interests were violated by diplomatic maneuver, that eventually persuaded the great powers of Europe to combine in a concerted effort to destroy Napoleon. Motivated as they were by separatist interests, it was only the proven necessity for joint action to defend these interests which at last induced the rulers of Europe to make common cause. The most important contribution of Britain to his defeat was to remain intransigently at war until, one by one, her former allies came round to the view that yet a fourth coalition must be formed and kept in being until victory. Meanwhile Britain contained Napoleon's power within Europe, strangling it by her naval supremacy and the power of her blockade. Only the threat posed by Napoleon could have united the governments of Europe in so solid and formidable an alliance: he made the Grand Empire, and he destroyed it.

While defeats, territorial losses, and diplomatic humiliations drove the governments of Europe into alliance, so the disastrous effect of French economic exactions and of the continental blockade aroused among the peoples of Europe a deeper, more national resentment against the rule of Napoleon. It is easy to exaggerate the extent and the depth of the forces of nationalist feeling aroused in Germany and Italy, Spain and Russia, by Napoleon's victories. Such reactions were strongest in Italy and Germany, and, in the romantic cultural environment of the time, hurt national pride readily took semipolitical forms. But what most impressed ordinary people was no doubt the glaring contrast between the professed French aims of popular sovereignty and liberation from oppression, and the actuality of the more efficient despotism clamped upon France and Europe by Napoleon. This impression was powerfully backed by bitter experience of high prices, acute shortages, and even occasional starvation, caused by his economic policy of protecting France and fighting Britain by disrupting the whole of Europe's trade. Resistance to him at a popular level in Europe was mainly regional and economic, a matter of guerrilla warfare as in Spain or of bitter economic grievances as in Holland and Italy. It became truly national only later and often only in retrospect, as there grew up the legend of mass popular revolt against the foreign tyrant. But the amalgam of governmental resolve to destroy him by a concerted use of regular, professional state armies, with popular revulsion against his treatment of conquered peoples, was powerful. It proved sufficient to make his Empire but a transient episode in the history of the continent.

Open and active revolt came first in Spain where British naval and military help were most readily forthcoming. It was there that Napoleon

suffered his first serious reverses on land. The Spanish people had profound regional and local loyalties, and a certain national pride in their great past. Unlike Germany or Italy, Spain was a single kingdom, though governed by an effete and corrupt monarchy. This monarchy, beset by quarrels between the reigning Bourbon king, Charles IV, and the crown prince Ferdinand, headed a regime so little rooted in popular loyalties that Napoleon expected little resistance. He forced Spain into war against her neighbor Portugal in order to deprive Britain of harbors, and he took the opportunity to billet French troops in Spain. In 1808 Charles IV abdicated in favor of Ferdinand, but Napoleon induced him to repudiate his abdication and surrender all his rights as king of Spain to the Emperor of the French. In May, Joseph Bonaparte was declared king of Spain. The Pyrenees, it seemed, no longer existed. But the Spanish people, by provinces and cities, broke out in open revolt against this purely dynastic handling of their fate, and Britain at once sent them help.

Napoleon found himself fighting a war that cost him half a million men, and he was later to blame "the Spanish ulcer" for his downfall. The Peninsular War, which dragged on for the rest of his reign, gave Sir John Moore and Arthur Wellesley ideal battlegrounds. Backed by British naval power and by the fierce guerrilla fighters of Spain, they kept large French forces preoccupied and subject to steady losses when Napoleon was sadly in need of them elsewhere in Europe. In 1810 the Spanish parliament (*Cortes*) was summoned in response to popular demands, and it proceeded to draft a new constitution on the pattern of the French revolutionary constitution of 1791. It prescribed a single assembly based on universal manhood suffrage; it rested on the principles of the sovereignty of the people, freedom of the press, and individual liberty. This Constitution of 1812 was to become the ideal of nineteenth-century liberals in many countries besides Spain. It served to accentuate the contrast between the original revolutionary ideals and the autocratic despotism of Napoleon.

The Peninsular War placed Napoleon at every disadvantage. Although when he himself led his troops in Spain he was able to win victories, his generals with smaller forces found their task hopeless. The dispersed nature of the fighting, the guerrilla tactics of the Spaniards, the backing of British naval superiority, all prevented his usual tactics from reaping their usual reward. He could not by concentration of overwhelming force and mastery of strategy inflict decisive defeats on his enemies. The irregular warfare and the difficult terrain compelled a dispersal of forces amid a hostile population. His natural impulse, to throw in superior weight and crush resistance, was inhibited by difficulties he was encountering in other parts of his empire, which were

in turn stirred to fresh energies by news of his reverses in the Iberian peninsula.

These other difficulties were ubiquitous. They arose in France itself, where his chief diplomatic agent, Talleyrand, and his chief of police, Fouché, were making preparations for their own future careers should Napoleon be overthrown. Both these supple and unscrupulous individuals, who had served the prerevolutionary monarchy and the Revolution with equal impartiality, as they were to serve the restored Bourbons after Napoleon's fall, were men of great abilities whose treachery was to contribute to his downfall. It is a measure of how fragile his empire was that, at the very first hints of adversity, his highest servants were ready to abandon him. The price of its survival was continuous and unfaltering success—a price that even the genius of Napoleon could not pay. The next difficulty arose in Austria, where moves were afoot by 1809 to resist any further French aggressions. Napoleon declared war on Austria in March and, after temporary reverses, defeated her at the cost of great losses to both sides at the battle of Wagram in July. But the victory had ominous features. While the French armies had deteriorated in quality, being heterogeneous and with less *élan* than the old French armies, the generals of Europe had learned a lot from the previous tactics of Napoleon himself. The balance was evening up. And the Tsar, in spite of his formal alliance with Napoleon and in spite of the lavish protestations of friendship between them at the great celebrations at Erfurt in 1808, had lent him no real support against Austria.

Napoleon's friends were deserting him in Europe as well as in France, just when his needs were becoming greatest. The case of Marshal Bernadotte was symbolic. Bernadotte, like Bonaparte himself, had been a soldier under the Republic, and, although disliking the *coup d'état* of Brumaire, he had served Napoleon faithfully and with outstanding success. After Austerlitz he was given the title of prince. In 1809 the Swedish king, Gustavus IV, was deposed by revolution and succeeded by his childless uncle, Charles XIII. When the Swedish Diet, in default of an heir, elected Prince Bernadotte to succeed Charles XIII, it hoped to stake out for Sweden a more favorable position in Napoleon's empire. The country suffered severely from the Continental System, having lost most of its Baltic and British trade, and was in considerable distress. To have as its ruler a marshal of France seemed a good way to improve its economic conditions. But Bernadotte, who in 1810 became heir apparent to the Swedish throne and held highest place in her government, joined the allies against Napoleon in 1812 and played a large part, as a military commander, in the final campaigns against the Empire.

It was from the direction of Russia that the greatest threat came, and it was in the east that Napoleon's empire suffered its first shattering blow. The French-Russian alliance rested on no common interests, only on temporary convenience. The ambitions of Napoleon and Alexander were ultimately in complete conflict, for both wanted to dominate the Near East and to control Constantinople and the Mediterranean. The famous campaign of 1812, in which Napoleon undertook to invade and defeat Russia, shows to what extent power had corrupted Napoleon's judgment and how far he had lost his former sense of what was possible. To embark on so vast an undertaking in the east while Britain remained unconquered in the west was a mistake that Hitler was to repeat 130 years later.

Yet the very repetition of history suggests that both would-be conquerors of Europe were confronted with an identical dilemma. Even a united Europe depends not upon its own will or that of its ruler, but upon the acquiescence of its two great flanking powers, Britain and Russia. Unless a European ruler comes to terms with one of these peripheral and semi-European powers, he must face this disastrous dilemma. Napoleon faced it, as did Hitler, by accepting naval inferiority in the west and gambling on winning land superiority in the east—a decision natural to a continental land power. Each precipitated an east-west alliance and was then crushed, as in a nutcracker, by a devastating war on two fronts.

The ostensible reason for Napoleon's attack on Russia was the Tsar's refusal to accept the Continental System and co-operate in the blockade of Britain. Napoleon's creation of the Duchy of Warsaw out of most of the former Polish territories taken from Prussia and Austria was regarded as a standing threat to the Tsar's retention of his Polish territories. But these reasons only masked the irreconcilable conflict between rival empires coveting supremacy in the Near East. In 1812–13 Britain and Sweden allied with Russia, and the nucleus of a fourth coalition existed. Prussia and Austria, it was known, would join it as soon as the moment was ripe. At the end of June Napoleon sent his Grand Army of some 450,000 men across the Niemen river, against a Russian army much less than half its size. His aim was to defeat this army and strike at Moscow, some five hundred miles from the Niemen. But, as in Spain, the improved generalship of his opponents, combined with peculiarly difficult country and extremes of climate, robbed him of success. The Russian commander avoided battle and retreated; when battle was engaged at Borodino, it cost Napoleon heavy and irreplaceable losses; when he reached Moscow, he found it abandoned and soon in flames. Winter approached with no sign of Russian surrender, no decision reached, lengthy communications to maintain, and vast areas

to control against the savage attacks of Cossack cavalry. Disease and desertions as well as battle losses depleted his forces. He could not afford to stay on in Moscow. The bitter Russian winter set in as his weary troops continued their retreat from Moscow back to the Niemen, through a countryside of "scorched earth" and devastation. He lost some 250,000 killed and 100,000 taken prisoner. It was his most dramatic and costly defeat.

Never did Napoleon's resources of energy and will show themselves to greater advantage than in 1813. He squeezed more men and resources from France and his subject territories. He mustered again half a million men. But now Prussia too was stirring restively. With her civil administration and her army overhauled by the great reformers Stein and Hardenberg, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, with a youthful patriotic movement fermenting among her students and intellectuals, Prussian popular sentiment was more ready to resist than was the government of the cautious Frederick William III. But even he, in January, 1813, made alliance with Russia and agreed not to make a separate peace; and this alliance began to attract Austrian support. The Fourth Coalition took shape as the drama reached its climax. The Russians and Prussians drove Napoleon west of the Elbe, back to the borders of his more firmly consolidated empire. Even now he won important victories, at Lützen and at Bautzen, against the Russians and Prussians. Metternich, the chancellor of Austria since 1810, proposed an armistice that would prepare for a general peace conference. Napoleon signed it in June, 1813, but negotiations broke down and Austria declared war. With close on a million men the new alliance heavily outnumbered Napoleon's forces.

Napoleon began with yet another victory, at Dresden. But few now believed in his final victory. Metternich by skillful diplomacy won over most of the states in the Confederation of the Rhine. In October, 1813, Napoleon suffered one of his greatest defeats at the battle of Leipzig, in which he lost 50,000 men and had to fall back to the Rhine. While French troops were cleared from the east of the Rhine, Wellesley entered France from the south, from Spain. The ring was closing, and for the first time since 1793 France was herself invaded. But as the war became again a patriotic war for national defense against invasion, and as the invaders behaved cruelly and stupidly, they encountered in France a tide of popular resistance. Napoleon inflicted a couple of costly defeats on the Prussians, the allied commanders acted with little real agreement on strategy, and even now it seemed possible that Napoleon at bay might hold his own. But he was too heavily outnumbered, his resources were too exhausted, the loyalty of his subordinates was too shaky. When Paris capitulated, he signed, on April 7, 1814, his abdica-

tion as Emperor of the French. He also renounced his other claims in Europe and retired as sovereign lord of the tiny island of Elba. The brother of Louis XVI returned to the throne of France as Louis XVIII, agreeing to a constitutional charter guaranteeing certain liberties and rights. A general settlement of the problems of Europe was to be undertaken at a congress to be held in Vienna, and it was agreed that France should be given the frontiers she had in 1792, before the revolutionary wars began.

But Louis XVIII had barely begun to establish his rule, the diplomats at Vienna had scarcely involved themselves in the tangle of petty jealousies which were evoked by the prospect of a general settlement, when the thunderbolt struck. After only ten months Napoleon escaped from Elba, and in March, 1815, he landed in the south of France. The bulk of the army deserted Louis XVIII, who fled. The masses of Frenchmen joyfully welcomed Napoleon back. One great victory might even yet serve to restore Napoleon to power, for the diplomatic squabbles at Vienna had already helped to disrupt the Fourth Coalition. Such seems to have been his hope. But Europe had in fact outgrown Napoleon. The powers at Vienna declared him an outlaw. They had suffered too much at his hands to turn back now, and it is likely that the campaign that culminated in Waterloo was foredoomed to failure. The "Hundred Days" that elapsed between Napoleon's return to France and his second abdication in June, 1815, have an interest in showing the smouldering survival of Bonapartist enthusiasm among the French peasants and soldiers, in giving yet a further example of the amazing vigor and versatility of the conqueror, and in affording him an opportunity to pose as the misunderstood liberal whose enlightened schemes for a federation of Europe had been frustrated only by Britain. These were all to become of importance later in the century. But at the time the outcome was in little doubt, for Napoleon was denied even the military victory that he needed to grasp power. This is the significance of the battle of Waterloo: it was the end of a very great adventure; not merely of the wild escapade of the "Hundred Days," but of the whole vast adventure that had begun when King Louis XVI, in the spring of the year 1789, summoned the Estates-General of France. "What a tragedy," remarked Talleyrand of Napoleon, "that he gave his name to adventures instead of to the age."

The immediate consequences of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo were simple and important enough: his own permanent exile to the storm-swept Atlantic island of St. Helena; the second restoration, on July 8, of Louis XVIII and his court; the completion of a general settlement of Europe at the Congress of Vienna. A whole chapter was ended, though like the chapters of all good stories it contained the beginnings of later chapters.

The Napoleonic Era

THE PROBLEM remains of how far the inner history of this epic period was itself an inevitable and predetermined process. Was there indeed an inherent fatalism linking Revolution with Empire through the mediations of War and Dictatorship? A great French historian has suggested that although there was no active republicanism in France until 1792, there was, in the improvised arrangements of the constitutional monarchy, a "republican allure"—an intrinsic bias toward outright republicanism to which the behavior of the king gave added impetus. So, it might be said, there was in the course of the Revolution a bias toward dictatorship which made itself apparent in the rise of Robespierre and the power of the Directory, and to which the needs of the war gave added impetus. Likewise, in the Consulate, which was born of republican victories in war, there was perhaps a certain bias toward empire, a tendency for a reinvigorated and ebullient nation to seek expansion and prestige in continental conquests. The social and economic revolution in France released dynamic and explosive forces that caused general upheaval in Europe, now taking the form of destroying old political systems, now of launching invasion and war, now of a creative energy devoted to building more efficient social and political organizations. But in shaping the course that events actually took, individuals of genius played a striking part, and to exaggerate the predetermined bias of events is to neglect the role of masterful men. Revolutionary victories without Carnot, Jacobinism without Robespierre, are as difficult to imagine as the Empire without Napoleon. The battle of Trafalgar may only have made obvious what existed: British superiority over France at sea. Yet it was important that it was fought, and events would certainly have been very different had Nelson not been there to win it.

In assessing the place of the whole epic in European or world history, there is likewise need for caution. It is certain that the nineteenth century in Europe would have been a period of profound change and great expansion even if the French Revolution had never happened, or if Napoleon Bonaparte had never been born. American independence had been won before the French Revolution began, and that was full of significance for the future of Europe and of the world. The tide of radical and democratic opinion was strong and forceful in both Britain and America before 1789, and that too would have produced great liberal changes. The industrial revolution, irresistible in its impetus, had begun. The revolutions in science and in culture, which are also the very roots of nineteenth-century changes, were already well advanced

before 1789. The French scientist, Antoine Lavoisier, published in 1789 his revolutionary theories, which made him the father of modern chemistry; and at the same time the English utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, published his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. The basis of classical economics was laid by Adam Smith as early as 1776. The romantic movement in art and literature preceded the Revolution and did much to shape its character. The period was one of giants in the arts whose work was profoundly affected by events but whose genius would surely have flourished without the upheavals of revolution. In Germany, Ludwig van Beethoven was nineteen, Wolfgang Goethe forty, when revolution began in France. Their importance is quite unaffected by their relation to Napoleon. Beethoven first dedicated his *Eroica* Symphony to Bonaparte, but angrily struck out his name when he heard that he had proclaimed himself Emperor in 1804. Goethe attended the festivities at Erfurt in 1808, where he was decorated and flattered by Napoleon, who was at the height of his prestige, and admired him in return. Beethoven and Goethe outlived Napoleon (who died at last on St. Helena in 1821) both in their own lives and in the grandeur of their contributions to human civilization. In the longest perspectives of history, even the most shattering political, military, and diplomatic events of the period seem but limited factors among the many that mold the history of man. The men who shaped Europe's future were not only the leading participants in these heroic events but also men such as Antoine Lavoisier and Adam Smith, James Watt and Jeremy Bentham. When the thud and smoke of gunfire had died away, more permanent forces of human destiny could be seen, shaping nations and states and the fate of individuals.

Perhaps the final significance of the quarter century of turmoil is that too much history happened in too short a time. The old order would have died anyhow, but it could have died more slowly and peacefully. The explosion of pent-up forces in revolution, the long agony of wars, the dynamism of successive forms of dictatorship, the prodigies of empire, were all so congested in time, and overlapped so closely in their happening, that they mangled and disrupted the processes of historical change. The time was overprolific of energies, overrich in epic incidents, and exercised for later generations a strange spell and fascination. Frenchmen, as if despairing of ever again being original, thought only of a restored monarchy, a Second Republic, a Second Empire. Liberals everywhere in Europe clamored for the Jacobin Constitution of 1793 or the Spanish Constitution of 1812. The champions of legitimism, Jacobinism, anticlericalism, Bonapartism, went on fighting their battles in Europe for another half century and more to come—even when these battles came to be old-fashioned and of small relevance to the more urgent problems and more novel needs of the nineteenth

century. Legitimism soon became a lost cause, Jacobinism a dogma, anticlericalism a republican scarecrow, Bonapartism a bogey; but men went on fighting for them, or at least arguing about them, as if they could never allow anything that had happened in that magic age to pass away.

Meanwhile the problems created by a fast-growing population, by industrialization and technology, by the growth of democracy and of science itself, went on accumulating only half noticed on the periphery of politics, and fresh revolutionary situations built up. It was a peculiarity of European politics, for the next half century at least, to be out-of-date. Party loyalties and party alignments were often irrelevant or only semirelevant to contemporary issues, political systems lagged behind vital changes in social structure, and it became fashionable to think of politics as something separate from economics. Yet after 1815 these things did not need to happen. The explanation of why they happened lies in the balance of forces of continuity and change which existed after 1815.

PART *TWO*

EUROPE
IN
1815

5. *The Unity and Disunity of
Europe in 1815*
6. *The Forces of Continuity*
7. *The Forces of Change*



HAT MUST WE THINK of when we think of "Europe" in 1815? Of a mere collection of separate and quarrelsome states, so distinct in character and so separate in organization that the continent of Europe was no more than what Metternich called Italy of that time, "a mere geographical expression"? Or can we think of a civilization, a community of peoples with enough in common to justify our regarding Europe as a more organic entity, sharing a culture, an economy, a complex of traditions which made it in a real sense one?

Neither of these images would be accurate. Each would be flat, distorted, at best two-dimensional. To get a more vivid and realistic three-dimensional impression, we must contrive to superimpose one of these images on the other. Just as nineteenth-century diplomats thought of a "balance of power" in Europe which, by holding a certain equilibrium between the largest states, allowed all states to co-exist peacefully, so we may picture the cohesion of Europe as being compatible with its great diversities by a sort of internal balance of forces. In some important respects it was one thing; in other equally important respects it was many things. And from the tensions between these two contrary qualities came much of that inherent impetus to development, change, and greatness, which made Europe the most important and dynamic continent in the world of the nineteenth century.

There existed within Europe a further tension between forces of continuity and forces of change. The former included the institutions of monarchy, Church, landowning aristocracy, and a widespread desire for peace and stability after a quarter century of revolutionary turmoil and war. The latter included such long-term trends as the rapid growth of population and the spread of industrialism and urban life, as well as the ferment of nationalism and of political ideas disseminated throughout Europe by the French Revolution and the conquests of Napoleon. The conflicts between these opposing forces were to dominate the generation after Waterloo.

CHAPTER 5

THE UNITY AND DISUNITY OF EUROPE IN 1815

Internal Cohesion and Diversity

BENEATH the patchwork design suggested by a political map showing the division of Europe into states (*see* Map 2), there was a vast substratum of historical heritage and continuity. Unlike America or Australasia, Europe is an old continent, in the sense that it has a long and continuous history of some two thousand years. Even when it suffered severe changes and considerable disintegration, as during the barbarian invasions of the fifth century, enough of its past always survived to provide real continuity. The greatest turbulence never destroyed all elements of the old order. Whereas the primitive civilizations of the North American continent contributed virtually nothing to the later development of the United States or Canada, European civilization has been built of layer upon layer of deposits from each phase of its history. Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the Frankish kingdoms, the Roman Catholic Church took over in turn this accumulating heritage, absorbing and often greatly transforming it, yet never losing its essentials. From the sixteenth century onward, even while Europe itself was dividing with increasing sharpness into separate territorial kingdoms and different religious beliefs, much of this common heritage was transported and disseminated to the New World. At no time was it possible to wipe the slate clean and start afresh. It was the discovery that this was impossible in Europe that drove many people to migrate to the New World, where it was hoped this might be done. The double process, of speedy internal change and simultaneous dissemination overseas, not only continued in the years after 1815 but immensely quickened in pace.

Some of this historical heritage therefore came from the remote past, some from the very recent past. In the ancient world much of Europe was included within the Roman Empire. Medieval Europe in-

herited from Rome systems of law and institutions of government which provided some common elements in Italy, France, and Germany. By the sixteenth century the shadow of medieval political unity was destroyed. But some of the reality remained in the general pattern of dynastic hereditary monarchy, now territorial in basis and without universalist pretensions. And insofar as the Roman Catholic Church was the substantial heir and transmitter of medieval dreams of the unity of Christendom and a universal canon law, it emerged even as late as 1815 as a more militant and powerful force transcending state frontiers. Rome claimed the loyalty of millions of men and women in every European state.¹

Other living relics from earlier ages were the landed aristocracy, either cherishing their feudal rights of administering justice and exacting dues from their vassals, as in Austria and Russia, or reasserting with all their might claims to a restoration of such rights in countries like France and Germany. The economy of every European country still rested, as it had rested in the Middle Ages, on the labors of peasants in the fields. The peasantry were the mass of the population. Except in parts of northwestern Europe, they worked the land using methods and tools that were little different from those used by their medieval ancestors. Much of the political history of the nineteenth century is concerned with the activities of the nonpeasant sections of the population; but it must be constantly recalled that these activities were peripheral and at the time even superficial, as compared with the daily productive toil of the millions of peasant families spread throughout the continent. Some, as in western Europe, were now rapidly improving their social and legal status. They were unburdening themselves of feudal services and payments, as well as improving their economic status by new methods of farming. Others, especially in eastern Europe, made little advance of either kind until nearer the end of the century. But whatever their fortunes in these respects they were, as a class, the foundations and fabric of European economy.

Behind the patchwork political map there existed, too, a general monarchical dynastic system which reduced conflicts between states to somewhat simpler categories of rivalries between a few large families. For some three centuries before 1815, the Bourbons of France and the Habsburgs of Austria had disputed possessions in Spain and Italy. Between them these two families, at many points intermarried, provided most of the states of Europe with their ruling monarchs. This "cousinhood of kings" remained, even in 1815, an important factor in European diplomacy. The era of great dynastic wars, of wars for the Austrian or Spanish succession which had dominated the previous century, was now past. But the political shape of Europe had

¹ See p. 83.

been molded by generations of dynastic alliances, marriages, disputes, and wars. In eastern Europe the chief basis of political unity remained the organizations needed to rule from Vienna the sprawling and diversified lands accumulated by the Habsburgs; to rule from St. Petersburg the territories acquired by the Romanovs; and to rule from Constantinople the vast Balkan domains conquered by the Ottoman Turks. Until 1837 such links joined the United Kingdom with Hanover, and so with the intricacies of German politics. Even in 1887, when Queen Victoria celebrated the fiftieth year of her reign, most of the rulers of Europe who attended the Golden Jubilee were related to her, either through her own ancestors or by marriage to members of her own large family.

At a cultural level, too, there was a great common heritage, much of which was very recent and French. For centuries Christianity had set a pattern of worship, of morals, of conceptions of justice and law. Greek philosophy had penetrated much of the thinking of Europe. But during the eighteenth century it was rationalism, as interpreted by the *philosophes* of France like Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists, which determined a great deal of the intellectual activity of all countries. Just as French, since the days of Louis XIV a century before, had replaced Latin as the normal language of diplomacy and as an international tongue, so the rationalism of French thought, deriving from the mathematician René Descartes, conquered the minds of Europe. Englishmen such as Edward Gibbon the great historian, and Jeremy Bentham the great radical, wrote and spoke in French as readily as in their mother tongue. The greatest "enlightened despots" of eighteenth century Europe, Frederick the Great of Prussia and Catherine the Great of Russia, adopted French writers and artists with enthusiasm. Members of the aristocracy all over the continent were familiar with the writings and ideas of France. Not since the great days of chivalry, *courtoisie*, and crusades in the high Middle Ages had Europe been so united in its Frenchness. More recently still, during the Napoleonic Empire of 1800-14, French laws, institutions, administrative methods, and systems of weights and measures had been spread throughout western and central Europe. Much of the material and cultural unity of European civilization came from France, the greatest of the continental states.

After the territorial settlement reached by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (see Map 3), the political map of Europe showed in certain areas more simplicity and greater unification than is shown on a modern map. In both the northwest and southeast of Europe the frontiers between states were less chequered than they are now. Norway and Sweden were combined into one kingdom, as were Belgium and the Netherlands. France, Portugal, and Spain had broadly their present boundaries. In the east the Russian frontier included within it Finland and part of Poland. The whole of the Balkan peninsula, except Montenegro which is part

of present-day Yugoslavia, was ruled by the Turkish Empire. The Austrian Empire comprised not only Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia but large parts of modern Poland, Italy, Germany, and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the territories of Italy and Germany were then a mosaic of little states and principalities; and the repeated efforts to unify each of these areas into their more modern shape were to dominate much of the history of Europe during the following fifty years.


External Pressures and Connections

THE DEGREE of cohesion and unity in Europe can be measured not only in terms of internal conditions, but also in terms of the relations between European states as a whole and other parts of the world. In 1815 no western European power held any of North Africa, except for Spain's control of Tangier on the northern tip of Morocco. The Mediterranean, for practical purposes, was the frontier between Europe and Islam except for the deep encroachment of Turkish power into the Balkans. For centuries the frontiers of Christendom against Islam had been held in the southwest by Spain, after the expulsion of the Moors, and in the southeast by the Habsburgs, against the Turks. These defensive points were now stabilized, and some of the cohesion and general prestige of the Habsburg Empire derived from these frontier, defensive functions that it performed for the benefit of the whole of Christendom. As Metternich put it, Asia began at the *Landstrasse*—the road running out of Vienna toward the east.

Overseas connections were almost restricted to the western maritime powers, in particular to Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands; and the relative importance of powers within this group had recently been greatly changed. In the course of the eighteenth century Great Britain lost control over her former American colonies but consolidated her ties with Canada by ousting the French; she also

MAP 3. EUROPE, 1815. See following pages.

The frontiers shown were drawn by the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15. The relatively simple design of northwestern and south-eastern Europe was soon to be broken by the separation of Belgium from Holland, by the independence of Serbia and Greece, and the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia. The very complex pattern of central Europe was, within the next half century, to be simplified by the unification of Italy and of Germany. The black areas show the new size and importance conferred upon Prussia by the settlement of 1815. For the racial complexity of Austria-Hungary, which was eventually to disrupt that state, see Map 4. In the period 1815-48 the Austrian Empire under Metternich remained, however, the dominant power in central Europe.



EUROPE, 1815

500 MILES



confirmed her connection with India, and established new colonial footholds in Australia though not yet in New Zealand. Despite the independence of the American colonies, in 1815 Great Britain was already the greatest colonial power in the world, with territories or bases in all continents. Most of this empire was not administered directly by the British government. In northern Canada the Hudson Bay Company, in India the East India Company, were the chief administrative authorities. The most prized and prosperous part of the empire was the West Indies. The slave trade had been abolished throughout the empire since 1807. This greatly diminished the importance of the west African territories of the Gold Coast and Gambia, which had been the chief source of slaves. Cape Colony, gained in 1814, was valued chiefly as a stopping place on the long route to India, and Australia as a dumping ground for convicts. At home interest in the colonies was slight; it was lively only among missionary societies and certain trading interests. The radicals, becoming increasingly influential in English politics after 1815, were opposed to colonial connections, which they condemned as merely strengthening the aristocratic influence in the constitution. Free traders were not only opposed to efforts to regulate overseas trade, but looked to the emancipation of all colonies as a natural development. The greatest colonial power was paradoxically anticolonial in spirit.

The rupture of European political connections with the American continent was completed by the loss of the vast Spanish empire in South America, which began during the Napoleonic Wars and was completed by 1823; by the separation of Brazil from Portugal, completed in 1825; and by the Monroe Doctrine, formulated by President James Monroe in December, 1823, and reinforced as regards Latin America by the power of the British navy. The French, who throughout the previous century had rivaled the British in India, Canada, and West Africa, had now lost many colonial territories. Their overseas connections were limited to a few small areas of India, and to Guadeloupe and parts of the West Indies. In 1815 France was obliged to cede to Britain the island of Mauritius as a naval base on the way to India; in the West Indies, Tobago and St. Lucia, which were of strategic importance; and in the Mediterranean, Malta, which Napoleon had conquered but which Britain had taken from him. Her losses were more naval and strategic than commercial, for she kept her fishing rights in the St. Lawrence and off Newfoundland, and her trading stations and trading privileges in India.

Besides settlements in South Africa, the Netherlands had an immensely rich overseas empire in the Dutch East Indies; though only the island of Java was at all fully occupied and developed. With Australasia still mostly unexplored and undeveloped, and colonial territories in Africa limited mostly to mere coastal belts and ports, the colonial world

was still fragmentary and undeveloped. In this, as in so many other fields, the expansion of Europe during the nineteenth century was to effect a complete transformation.

Regional Differences

GEOGRAPHY has always broken up the continent of Europe into fairly distinct regions: the northwestern maritime nations, the almost closed sea of the Baltic, the great northern plain of Germany and Holland, the Mediterranean region south of the Alps, the mountainous peninsulas of the Balkans and Iberia. These in some instances coincide with the historic political divisions, as in Spain and Italy, in the Habsburg dominions of the Danube valley, and in the kingdom of France with its strongly marked natural frontiers of Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines and the Pyrenees. In others they cut across the political frontiers, as in the great disputed areas of the Rhineland and the eastern marchlands of Poland. Events between 1789 and 1815 deeply accentuated the difference between the countries of the northwestern maritime region and all other regions of Europe; for whereas the rest of Europe remained wedded to a traditional agrarian economy, the maritime states were already beginning to enjoy all the economic advantages of more efficient agriculture, more extensive industrial production, and the use of world markets and overseas investments. These advantages they owed, in part, to their favorable geographical position and to the great developments in shipping, banking, and commercial organization by Dutch, British, and French during the previous centuries. The concentration in their hands of overseas connections gave them rich opportunities to exploit these advantages in the generation of relative international peace which the settlement of 1815 ensured.

In a continent where railways and even good roads were unknown, and where the chief means of transport were by river and canal, by horse-drawn vehicles and coastal vessels, such regional differences were pronounced. The bulk of trade was still internal and domestic, and the removal of internal barriers to trade which Britain had enjoyed in the eighteenth century and which France now enjoyed after Napoleon was in itself a great stimulus to trade. Because Italy and Germany were splintered into many little states, they were robbed of this advantage; though the growth of customs unions and the lowering of barriers to trade were to be a feature of German development in the next twenty years. The Austrian empire, because of its predominantly primitive peasant agriculture and its strong provincialisms, fared little better than Germany.

The Continental System imposed on Europe by Napoleon, combined

with the blockade imposed on it by Great Britain, had tended to destroy the overseas trade of the continental nations. Most of this trade was monopolized by Britain, whose superior naval power gave her an open door to it. Her foreign export trade trebled between 1789 and 1815, and after 1815 her trade tended to become more and more predominantly a maritime, overseas trade; while France, weaker than before in her transatlantic and far-eastern connections, tended to develop her trade with continental Europe and with the Near East. Such a change was characteristic of the new twist given to relations between Europe and the rest of the world by the preceding twenty years of war. The Dutch continued to play a considerable part in the shipping and finance of international trade. The modernization of the French financial system and the establishment of the Bank of France in 1800 were soon to make Paris an important rival to London and Amsterdam as a financial center of western Europe. But in 1815 the Bank of England was the largest center of deposit in the world, and London became the banking capital of Europe.

The underestimated colonies, and especially the commercial connection with India, were to help Britain to gain an easy supremacy over all her western neighbors within the next generation. Here was a vast market capable of absorbing the goods that Britain could most cheaply and efficiently produce in the early phases of her industrial revolution—cotton yarns and cloths. It was probably the greatest single impetus to mechanization of production. The goods most demanded by these overseas markets, such as the cotton cloths worn in India, were of the kind most suitable to mass production by relatively simple machinery. Already, in the eighteenth century, these demands of overseas markets had stimulated such inventions as Hargreaves's spinning jenny, Arkwright's water frame, and Crompton's mule. Only with access to a market capable of absorbing cotton products in very large quantities did it pay to use such machines. The "dark, satanic mills" deplored by the poet William Blake, which grew up so fast in Lancashire in the early nineteenth century, were the result of exporting to these almost insatiable overseas markets. In return, Britain imported food and raw materials to feed and employ her fast-growing population. Once the circuit of manufacture and trade had been established, it spun the wheels of industry faster and faster, leading to ever more specialization of labor. Because Britain turned herself into "the workshop of the world," she relied increasingly upon imports from abroad to supply her raw materials and her essential foods.

For half a century to come this exchange of manufactures for food and raw materials remained particularly profitable. Agricultural produce stayed cheaper than manufactures, even when manufactured goods became cheap. The rate of exchange was favorable to the industrialist.

France, the country most likely to rival Britain, was inhibited by a factor that was otherwise an asset: the ability of her agriculture to feed her people. Not having to buy food, she did not need to sell manufactures. The total amount of her foreign trade was inevitably less than that of Britain, and so she drew less profit from the exchange of manufactures for agricultural products during the period when such an exchange was especially profitable.

For these reasons, the industrial revolution in western Europe brought about a redistribution of wealth, power, and political influence. So long as the two essentials of a nation's prosperity had been fertile soil and a large population, France was inherently stronger than Britain. (Even in 1815, her population was more than half again as large as that of the United Kingdom.) But as soon as prosperity demanded access to large overseas markets and to mineral resources such as coal and iron, the situation was reversed. This fact, more than any political events, underlay the rise of British power and the decline of French in the first half of the century. Germany, which had the relevant assets of coal and iron, was for half a century impeded by her political disunity and by exclusion from overseas markets. So, until at least the 1860's, Britain enjoyed an easy economic supremacy as against her most serious continental rivals. Toward the end of the century the loss of that lead marked a further revolution in the power relationships of all European nations, and began a new era in European history.

Rival Conceptions of European Order

THE EMPIRE of Napoleon had given Europe, for a time, one form of order and unity: that imposed from above by conquest. In common resistance to this French domination the governments of Britain and Europe had evolved another form of unity: that of concerted alliance for the single purpose of defeating France. At the Treaty of Chaumont, made between the United Kingdom, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in March, 1814, these allies undertook to remain in alliance for twenty years. The immediate purpose of overthrowing Napoleon was in this way widened into the long-term purpose of preventing any similar domination of the continent by a single power. The aim of the allies was to preserve the political division of Europe into dynastic states; but at the same time to find some means of settling disputes between them and of concerting action among the largest powers of the continent. Out of this double purpose arose the territorial settlement of Europe agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and the "Congress System," which was intended to embody and perpetuate the idea of a "Concert of Europe." This settlement was the most

thoroughgoing attempt made, until then, to construct new organizations for keeping the peace among the great powers of modern Europe. Not since the Congress of Westphalia, which met in 1648 at the end of the Thirty Years' War, had an assembly so representative of all Europe met to consider issues of general European importance. The settlement as a whole was embodied in four different yet interlocked arrangements: the Treaty of Chaumont, the two Treaties of Paris, the Treaty of Vienna, and the Quadruple Alliance. Taken together these treaties shaped the course of European history for the next half century. A fifth arrangement, the Holy Alliance, expressed yet another conception of European unity and order, to which Britain never acceded.

1. **Treaty of Chaumont, March, 1814.** Made as the formal culmination of the military alliance of the United Kingdom, Austria, Russia, and Prussia against France, this treaty bound the signatories first to overthrow Napoleon and then to remain in alliance for twenty years, in order to maintain the territorial and political settlement to be reached as soon as Napoleon should be defeated. They agreed to restore the Bourbon dynasty to France, and proceeded, by the end of March, 1814, to occupy Paris. The next month Napoleon abdicated. The peace terms with France were then embodied in the First Treaty of Paris of May, 1814.

2. **The Treaties of Paris, May, 1814 and November, 1815.** By the first Treaty of Paris the boundaries of France were fixed at those of 1792, with some slight additions later. This meant that France had to give up Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, which she had held for more than twenty years. She also surrendered several colonial possessions. But she was not to be disarmed or occupied or made to pay any indemnity; treatment of her was remarkably generous as compared with either the previous or the subsequent treatment of defeated powers in similar postwar settlements. As a respectable legitimist monarchy, France was able to claim representation at subsequent congresses of the powers, and her brilliant representative Talleyrand proceeded to manipulate the balance of power to his own advantage. Negotiation of a more general settlement in Europe was abruptly interrupted by the escape of Napoleon from the island of Elba to which he had been exiled, and his triumphant return to France. After his final defeat at Waterloo and his safer imprisonment on St. Helena, the allies made more severe terms for France.

The second Treaty of Paris, signed after Waterloo, pushed back the frontiers of France from those of 1792 to those of 1790; this meant that she lost further points of strategic importance on her northeastern frontier. She narrowly escaped having to cede Alsace and Lorraine. She had to submit to occupation by an allied garrison until 1818, and was made to pay a large indemnity.

3. **Treaty of Vienna, June, 1815.** The plenipotentiaries to the general

congress of European powers which met at Vienna in the fall of 1814 included Talleyrand, for it was not technically a peace conference. Peace had been made by the first Treaty of Paris, and it was assumed that the issues between France and her victors had been settled. There was no reason why she should not now be admitted to the assembly of European powers as an equal. The Treaty of Vienna was signed in June, before the Battle of Waterloo, and it remained substantially unaltered save for the provisions of the second Treaty of Paris. The settlement reached at Vienna was concerned with the continent as a whole, and was intended to settle all outstanding issues.

It was made, in effect, by the representatives of the five major powers. These were the Tsar Alexander I of Russia who usually acted personally; Metternich the chancellor of Austria, who had constant help from the secretary, Gentz; Hardenberg, who usually acted for King Frederick William III of Prussia; Lord Castlereagh (and in later stages the Duke of Wellington), who represented the United Kingdom; and Talleyrand, the skillful and wily spokesman of France. Although practically every European state and principality was represented and the congress was in form a general assembly of Europe, all important decisions were made by the Big Five. Throughout the eight months of its duration, the Austrian government sustained in Vienna an elaborate system of spies and secret agents who opened letters, collected backstairs gossip, and surrounded the gathering with a fog of mutual suspicions and distrust.

Among the oddly assorted assemblage of characters, the Tsar was the most enigmatic and aroused the most utopian hopes of a liberal settlement; Metternich was the most consistently conservative and stubbornly hostile to all liberal hopes; Castlereagh was the most anxious to achieve a moderate and generally agreed settlement, because British interests lay in a peaceful Europe with which trade could be established; Talleyrand was the most insinuating and clear-sighted, having the simple objective of promoting and safeguarding French interests. Over the future of Poland and Saxony, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand were driven to make a secret alliance, preparatory to war against Russia and Prussia should these persist in an arrangement which, it was felt, would upset the balance of power.

In retrospect the Big Five might be thought of as grouped differently. Great Britain and Russia were alike in that both were great powers flanking Europe but not in it. Each had growing areas of interest outside Europe, vast hinterlands of space into which they were to move, in the course of the next century, by settlement, trade, and economic expansion. Although the British hinterland was oceanic and Russia's Asiatic, the pull away from Europe was for both so strong that the full and concerted weight of these peripheral powers was not to be felt again in

Europe until 1914.⁴ They tended for the next century to intervene in Europe only when there was question of the Ottoman Empire—the power which held the key position between three continents, where Anglo-Russian interests clashed. France and Austria were alike in that both were essentially continental European powers, whose orbits of influence touched in Germany and Italy, the two main storm centers of the next half century. Neither had important extra-European interests. It was because of this neat balance of forces, in which Britain and Russia averted their attentions or neutralized one another, and France and Austria served as mutual counterweights, that the fifth power, Prussia, was given a unique opportunity for consolidation and aggrandizement during the ensuing half century. The least among the Big Five in 1815, limited in size, resources, and influence, she held the key to the future in her central concentration of European interests. But in 1815 these groupings were masked and blurred by the more short-term fears and policies of the governments concerned.

In the end, the territorial settlement included drastic safeguards against a resurgence of France (*see* Map 3). The Austrian Netherlands (later to become Belgium) and Luxembourg were combined with Holland to make a buffer state in the north; Prussia was given the Rhineland; Genoa and part of Savoy went to the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont). The territories of Germany were shared out to meet the interests of Prussia and Austria, and a German Confederation, comprising the 39 states to which Germany was now reduced, was set up under the presidency of Austria. In Italy, Austria rewon Lombardy and took Venetia as compensation for the loss of the Austrian Netherlands; the Papal States went back to the Pope; the Bourbons were restored in Naples; and the three little duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany were placed under Austrian princes. In the Baltic, Norway was transferred from Denmark to Sweden, Finland from Sweden to Russia. The Treaty guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Switzerland. Various agreements were made, under British pressure, to abolish the slave trade.

✓ Like any general settlement of the kind, the settlement of Vienna was a network of bargains and negotiated compromises. But so far as any general principles ran through its provisions, they were—in addition to the building of bulwarks against further French aggression—the two principles of legitimism and of balance of power. In the domestic settlement of Europe the source of political authority most generally favored was that of hereditary dynastic monarchy. As far as possible legitimist monarchs were restored and supported, especially in Spain, France, and Italy. On the other hand, for the purposes of international pacification, it was felt wise to establish some system of a balance of power.⁵ For this reason Russian ambitions in eastern Europe were resisted by Britain and

Austria, the German settlement included both Prussia and Austria in the new Confederation, Bourbon princes were reinstated as well as Habsburgs, and periodic congresses were planned in which the five major powers would seek to settle any disputes that might arise. The aim was to find and keep a balance among themselves which would prevent any one of them from dominating too large an area of Europe.

It was, on the whole, a reasonable and statesmanlike arrangement, of which (the chief defect was that it underestimated the dynamism of nationalism. Territories such as Norway, Finland, and Belgium were used as pawns in the calculations of the treaty makers, regardless of the wishes of their inhabitants. Considerations of strategy, power, and dynastic convenience took priority over national or economic interests.) It was a settlement framed by monarchs and aristocratic diplomats of the old order, and it was infused with the spirit of the eighteenth century. As such, it could have only limited applicability and longevity in the faster-moving world of the nineteenth century. But it would be wrong to blame the makers of the settlement for failing to appreciate the power of nationalism or liberalism, which few realized in 1815; nor can they be regarded as having had a free hand to achieve more than they did achieve. They were bound not only by agreements previously reached among themselves, but still more by the need to reach some compromise between the conflicting political interests of the major participants. Vienna had the practical merit of giving Europe nearly half a century of comparative peace, and this was what most Europeans most fervently wanted in 1815.

4. **The Quadruple Alliance, November, 1815.** The peacemakers realized that force must be put behind the settlement if it were to be preserved. Accordingly, on the same day as the second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815) the four allied powers signed a further treaty perpetuating the Quadruple Alliance. They pledged themselves to maintain by force, for a period of twenty years, the arrangements reached at Chaumont, Vienna, and Paris. This undertaking created the so-called "Concert of Europe," because the four powers also agreed to periodic meetings of their representatives "for the purpose of consulting upon their common interest and for the consideration of the measures most salutary for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." From the outset, however, Castlereagh made it clear that while Britain would join in keeping the settlement of frontiers and in excluding a Bonaparte from the throne of France, she would not undertake to support Louis XVIII as against any other form of regime in France, nor would she back intervention in the internal affairs of any other state. When the Tsar pressed for an undertaking to intervene in support of Louis XVIII, Castlereagh refused. This difference of principle was to become the main bone of contention between Britain and her partners in the ensuing years, and

the cause of her eventual withdrawal from the Congress System. The sharpening differentiation of Britain from the rest of Europe, based on her new economic advantages, led to diplomatic separation.

5. *The Holy Alliance, September, 1815.* Britain was equally firm in her refusal to join the Holy Alliance which the Tsar set up in 1815, and which came to be popularly confused with the Quadruple Alliance. By this extraordinary document the rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria bound themselves together in a Christian union of charity, peace, and love. They undertook "to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation, the three princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of One Family, namely Austria, Prussia, and Russia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign but Him to whom power alone really belongs." It seems likely that this appeal to the Christian foundations of European civilization was sincere on the part of the Tsar, and that it was prompted by a sense of the great revival of religious faith which, in reaction against the rationalism and skepticism of the Enlightenment, marked these years.² It was eventually endorsed by every monarch in Europe except the Prince Regent of England and Pope Pius VII who refused to sign, and the Sultan of Turkey who, as an infidel, could hardly be invited to sign. It was even signed by the President of the Swiss Republic.

If the tsar Alexander intended it seriously, few of his colleagues did. Metternich dismissed it as "a high-sounding Nothing," Talleyrand as "a ludicrous contract," Castlereagh as "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." In his memoirs Metternich asserted that the main motive of Austria and Prussia in signing was "to please the Tsar," which they could afford to do because of the meaninglessness of the whole scheme. Castlereagh warned the British prime minister that "the Emperor's mind is not completely sound." The general reception of the scheme by other governments was that it would lead to little but could do no harm; its interpretation by liberal opinion was soon to be that, combined with the more realistic Quadruple Alliance, it represented a sinister and far-reaching attempt to justify universal interference by despotic monarchs in the internal governments of smaller nations. Its historical importance is that it shows how weak was a sense of Christendom, even in this time of religious revival, as compared with the realistic politics of balance of power.

The settlement as a whole reflected that mixture of elements of unity and diversity which has been described above. The principles of legitimism, which were made the basis for the internal government

² See p. 83.

of states, had their counterpart in the Tsar's scheme for a Holy Alliance. The Holy Alliance, appealing to the old notion of the unity of Christendom, presupposed a community of like-minded states, with legitimist, monarchical government within each. It was workable only on the assumption of a fairly uniform pattern of this kind. On the other hand the principle of establishing a balance of power between states, which underlay the territorial terms of the settlement, did not presuppose or imply like-minded monarchies. On the contrary it assumed recurrent rivalries and tensions between states, and was applicable to interstate relations however diverse might be their internal forms of government. The Quadruple Alliance, with its scheme for periodic congresses of the major powers to readjust the balance of power and settle possible disputes among them, was in conformity with these notions of territorial balance. It was compatible with different internal regimes, and left room for divergent political developments. The British attitude was therefore logical, in signing the Quadruple Alliance but not the Holy Alliance; and in repudiating the doctrine of joint intervention in internal affairs which the Tsar, from his point of view, was equally logical in demanding.

These two different sets of principle and outlook have, indeed, haunted every attempt at a general European settlement. In 1919 it was assumed that all European states would in future be democratic in structure, and therefore sufficiently like-minded and peace-loving to make the machinery of the League of Nations work effectively.³ The League was regarded not as a supplement to the balance of power—a notion then discredited by the prewar system of alliances which had precipitated war in 1914—but rather as a substitute for it, a sort of permanent and universal congress system, systematically removing all disputes liable to lead to war. Among the chief reasons for its failure was the fact that an increasing number of states ceased to be democratic in structure or peace-loving in purpose. The Congress System of 1815 was more realistic in this respect, that it did not presuppose a greater degree of unity and uniformity in Europe than actually existed. It provided machinery for peaceful change by means of periodic consultations between the greatest power-units in Europe. Its misfortune was that it came to be manipulated by Metternich for the almost exclusively conservative purpose of preventing change, in an age when the forces of change were rapidly gaining in strength as against the forces of order and continuity.

From the outset the postwar years were haunted by economic distress. The years 1815 and 1816 were both years of bad harvests and of economic hardship throughout Britain and Europe. The depression spread to industry and business, thousands of banks and commercial companies failed, taxes remained high, and there was widespread

³ See p. 601.

unemployment. These facts in themselves undermined popular confidence in the new order, and soon encouraged demands for radical reforms, which the legitimist governments were too frightened to attempt. There was no interlude of real stability following Waterloo and the Vienna settlement. The nineteenth century was destined from the start to be one of unusual restlessness, mobility, and revolution.

Most of the drama and interest, as well as much of the unity, of European history in the hundred years between 1815 and 1914 derives from the fluctuations of balance between the forces of continuity and the forces of change; or, in their most extreme and dynamic forms, between the forces of reaction and the forces of revolution. To set the stage, then, for the great events of that century, the components of the two sides of this balance must be described.

CHAPTER 6

THE FORCES OF CONTINUITY

The Institutions of Monarchy

THE TRADITIONAL and most generally accepted focus of loyalty for all whose interests and sentiments lay on the side of order and conservatism was a monarch. Even the French revolutionaries of 1789 had no intention, at first, of overthrowing the monarchy, and it was 1792 before they took the daring step of setting up a republic. The only republics in Europe were Switzerland, Venice and Genoa, and they seemed to be exceptions that proved the rule. The experience of the federal republic of the United States was short and offered little example for the peoples of Europe. The traditions of dynastic absolutism, on the other hand, were deep-rooted and well-tested. It is wrong to think of the *ancien régime* as having been totally destroyed by the French Revolution⁷ and the conquests of Napoleon. It is unlikely that a form of government which had evolved and prospered so extensively during the previous hundred and fifty years should have been obliterated within twenty-five. Not only did many of the ideas and institutions of the old monarchies survive throughout the upheavals of the period 1789-1815; they enjoyed a new popularity and struck fresh roots in the generation after Waterloo.

The basic idea of monarchy was the idea that hereditary right gave the best title to political power. The tasks and scope of government were still thought of as severely restricted. They were mainly the elementary functions of organizing security for the whole of the kingdom at home and abroad. But these tasks were, in themselves, difficult enough, and seemed best left to the men especially fitted and most expert in them. The twin dangers to public peace and order were, traditionally, the challenge of overmighty subjects and invasion or subjection to foreign powers. Any king who succeeded in repelling these dangers attracted the general loyalty of his subjects. The dangers of disputed succession were best avoided by hereditary succession: ruling families had a natural interest in passing on to their descendants enhanced power

and prestige. While conceptions of a "nation" and even of "a state" were still only dimly formed and slightly appreciated, the personal allegiance rendered to a monarch seemed the best possible kind of political cement and social cohesion. Monarchy was to most people the most natural form of government in the world.

To the traditions and institutions of monarchy, the rulers of Europe since the late seventeenth century had added the ideas and the practice of absolutism. These rested on the success with which many kings and their ministers had crushed or bypassed the limitations on royal power which had previously been imposed by great feudal factions, local assemblies and corporations, and the Church. The pattern of this new type of absolute monarchy had been set by Louis XIV of France. He inherited a throne that was strong because the squabbling feudal and religious factions in France had exhausted themselves to a point where they could be subdued by royal power. Louis kept the nobles weak by offering them the unattractive choice between impoverishing themselves at the costly court of Versailles, or exiling themselves to their estates in the provinces, far from the fountainhead of pensions and honors. He also subordinated the Church in France to his control, and took from the French Protestant communities, the Huguenots, the rights and liberties they had formerly enjoyed.

The preponderance of French wealth, power, and influence during his reign (1660-1715) tempted eighteenth-century monarchs all over Europe to imitate his methods, to adopt French culture and even the French language, and to claim for themselves comparable absolute powers. Frederick the Great of Prussia, Catherine the Great of Russia, Maria Theresa of Austria, were alike infatuated with the idea of strengthening their power, centralizing government in their own hands as against local and feudal privileges, and so acquiring more absolute authority in the state. Moreover, the very dynastic rivalries and conflicts between these eighteenth-century monarchs drove them to look for ever more efficient methods of government: their increased expenditure on government called for more systematic methods of taxation, and the wars to which their rivalries gave rise demanded better organization and systems of administration. A would-be absolute monarch had to be a more efficient ruler; and he had to seek popular support against nobles and Church, support that he tended to buy with experiments in popular reform and enlightened government. So absolute monarchy became "enlightened" or "benevolent despotism," anxious to justify its existence by fostering material progress and adopting more enlightened methods of government.

The French Revolution had not been regarded as a threat to such forms of government so long as it tried only to create a constitutional monarchy, with royal power buttressed by a national assembly repre-

sentative of the whole kingdom. Many of the reforms achieved in France between 1789 and 1792 were only more thoroughgoing versions of reforms which the enlightened despots had been trying to achieve elsewhere. But when the Revolution had gone on, in disillusion with the king, to attack the Church, establish a republic, and threaten to spread revolution throughout Europe, absolutism was bound to react violently against it.

So strong were the traditions of dynastic monarchy that even Napoleon, feeling himself a usurper, took care to marry into the greatest of the old dynastic families, the Habsburgs. He was not opposed to the institutions of monarchy, but aimed at making himself head of a new and grander dynasty. He made his eldest brother Joseph, king of Naples; a younger brother Louis, king of Holland; and his youngest and most frivolous brother Jérôme, king of Westphalia. Even after the upheavals of the Revolution, and perhaps even because of the upheavals of the Revolution, legitimism was still felt to offer the best possible credentials for claiming political authority. It is hardly surprising that when the statesmen of the Vienna Congress in 1815 wanted to re-establish order in Europe, it was to the principle of legitimism, shrewdly suggested to them by Talleyrand, that they instinctively turned. As a result of the settlement at Vienna the ideas and institutions of hereditary, absolute monarchy were given a new lease of life throughout Europe.

The scene was dominated by rulers of the governments that had not been overthrown by either the Revolution or Napoleon, but had weathered the storm: pre-eminently the Tsar Alexander I of Russia, whose mystical sense of the dangers of revolution gave birth to the Holy Alliance; the king of Prussia, Frederick William III, whose power had come near to extinction by Napoleon at the time of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, but who had survived as a strategic buffer between France and Russia; the emperor of Austria, Francis I, who clung to the negative policy, "Govern and change nothing," and who relied on his energetic chancellor, Prince Metternich, to hold his ramshackle and diversified dominions together. Among this trio the representatives of Great Britain, first Lord Castlereagh and at later congresses George Canning, who ranked as conservatives at home, appeared as liberal rebels. At first the triumph of monarchy, and all that it stood for, seemed complete.

It was later to become the fashion, especially among liberal historians, to ascribe the downfall of Napoleon's ambitions to the rising dynamism of the new national and liberal forces in Europe, and to make much of the resistance to his rule put up by popular movements of revolt in Germany and Russia, and by guerrilla fighters in Spain. These indeed had played their part. But in the end what had defeated Napoleon was an efficient coalition of the great powers of Europe, launching against him the concerted attacks of their professional armies, led by the royalist

generals of Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain. In 1815 few had any doubts that the defeat of Napoleon was a victory for the allied monarchical governments acting in a grand alliance; and that Waterloo had not been won by popular uprising or guerrilla fighters, but by the hard-bitten, tough soldiers of the British and Prussian armies.

Under the auspices of the victorious monarchs, the little kings came out into the sun again. In Germany the Holy Roman Empire had been abolished in 1806, and no attempt was possible to revive that shadowy ghost. Nor was it thought possible or desirable to restore all of the 396 tiny principalities, ecclesiastical states, and free cities that Napoleon, during his occupation, had so thoroughly demolished. From the old multitude of states there emerged 39, the largest of which were Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria. These were formed into a loose Germanic confederation (*Bund*). Though decimated in number, they effectively kept Germany disunited, for they were widely diverse in character. To each returned its monarch or princeling, reclaiming his absolutist powers and reviving all the old courtly pomp, extravagance, officialdom, and inefficiency. With each monarch came most of the old aristocracy, more assertive than ever of its social privileges and political rights. The chief instrument of co-ordination in the Confederation was the Diet (*Bundestag*), which sat in Frankfurt and was presided over by Austria. Its members represented only the governments of the states, and they were bound by government instructions. The Diet as a whole had no executive authority, and was indeed devised to preserve intact the sovereignty of the princes. In the eyes of Metternich, its chief creator and manipulator, it was a body for the defense of German sovereigns against French interference and against liberal forces internally.

To the throne of Spain returned Ferdinand VII, who set to work to undo the revolutionary changes introduced by the Cortes of Cadiz since 1812. He annulled the Constitution of 1812 and resumed all the prerogatives of the absolutist monarchy. He produced a "confusion of abuses" which shocked his more astute cousin Louis XVIII of France. In Italy the restoration took a form similar to that in Germany, with various arrangements designed to secure the predominant influence of Austria. While Bourbons returned to France and Spain, Habsburgs or Habsburg family connections returned to Italy. In the north, Lombardy and Venetia, the richest and most strategically important parts of Italy, were governed directly from Vienna by the emperor of Austria. The king of Sardinia was his cousin, as was Francis IV, the duke of Modena. His brother, Archduke Ferdinand III, became duke of Tuscany; and his aunt, the queen of Naples. Ferdinand I, king of Naples and Sicily, behaved in as blindly reactionary a manner as did his Bourbon nephew, the king of Spain. The administration of the Papal States, which geographically cut the long peninsula of Italy in half, was among the worst

in Italy. By 1821 the powers were even obliged to issue a complaint against the abuses, which included at one extreme an uncontrollable brigandage and at the other an oppressive political police. The Kingdom of Piedmont, ruled by Victor Emmanuel I, was destined to assume a role corresponding to that of Prussia in Germany: each evolved an unusually efficient system of administration and devoted considerable attention to its army. These qualities were later to make each of them the leader of a successful campaign for national unification of these sadly disunited countries.

Despite these almost universal restorations of monarchy, the traditions of kingship had been badly shaken. Much of the magic of monarchy had gone, since kings had been bowled over like skittles by French armies, and moved about like chessmen by an autocratic emperor. Many of the kings who climbed back to their thrones in 1814—and none more so than Louis XVIII of France—suffered from the disadvantage that they had been patently imported in the baggage of the allies. The uncere- monious scuttling of Louis during the Hundred Days when the great Napoleon returned, and his second and even more humiliating restoration after Waterloo, emphasized still more sharply how fragile royal authority might be. Legitimism alone seemed an ineffective basis for government, when force of arms loomed so large in the foreground. But other elements combined to make the next generation in Europe an age of restored and revived monarchy. What were these other forces?

The Church

ONE was the revival of religious faith and the restoration of the power of the Roman Catholic Church. A close alliance between throne and altar was traditional in Europe. The Church, especially in France, had suffered from the attacks of the Revolution as much as had the feudal nobility and the monarchy. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790 had reduced the Church in France to the position of a department of state, and many higher clergy had joined the aristocratic and royal *émigrés* in exile abroad. Napoleon had, for expediency's sake, come to terms with the Church in his Concordat with the Papacy in 1802. But that bargain had left him in considerable control over the clergy in France, and with the growth of state universities and schools the Church lost most of its former grip over education.

By 1815 the Roman Catholic Church was beginning to reap some of the ultimate advantages of being persecuted, and of the inevitable reaction that set in against the rationalism and freethinking of the eighteenth century, now widely identified with the ideals of the Revolution. The violence and extremism of the Revolution bred a revival of faith and

a renewal of clericalist sympathies, most strongly among the royalist and aristocratic classes that now dominated European politics: In 1815 the Roman Church regained a highly privileged position. Where, as in France, it was impossible to restore to it the lands and property that the Revolution had taken away, it was supported by generous grants from the government and resumed its control over education. In other countries it retained its lands and regained influence. Even Protestant powers, such as Britain and Prussia, were prepared to support the revival of papal power in Europe; and they were backed in this by the other great non-Catholic power, Russia. Pope Pius VII¹ enjoyed the personal sympathy that had been aroused by his humiliation at the hands of Napoleon,¹ and in 1814 he made a triumphal return to Rome. The Jesuit Order won official favor at the Vatican, and set about reorganizing its power throughout Europe. The Pope re-established the Index, and even the Inquisition reappeared in Rome and in Spain. It was like a second counter-Reformation. By a series of concordats the Church recovered much of its freedom of action in Spain, Sardinia, Bavaria, and Naples. The ultramontane policy it followed soon met with some official opposition in the greater powers, and in France and Austria even the monarchical governments were forced to resist its full claims. They especially disliked the spread of the Jesuits. The Jesuits organized societies of Catholic laymen, especially in France, Spain, and Italy, and through the activities of these congregations clericalist influence penetrated into politics, administration, and education. Within a few years France was passing legislation to restrict Jesuit activities, and the Tsar was expelling the Order from Russia. But the recovery of Catholicism after its low ebb at the end of the eighteenth century was rapid and remarkable. This decade of militant ultramontanist goes far toward explaining the resurgence of violent anticlericalism by the middle of the nineteenth century.

In England the Anglican Church still enjoyed a highly privileged position, and its influence at this time was predominantly conservative. Until 1828 Protestant dissenters remained subject to many disabilities. They were excluded by law from all important civil and military offices, as well as from teaching offices in the universities. Even the evangelical wing of the Church, concerned with missionary work at home and abroad and with attacking slavery, remained broadly conservative in politics. Churchmen lent little support to movements for reform, even for such humanitarian causes as reform of the prisons and of the penal code. They belonged to the forces of established order; and an Anglican cleric, the Whig wit, Sydney Smith, suffered loss of preferment for the more generous views he so pungently and courageously expressed.

These reassertions of clerical powers and the consolidation of

¹ See p. 40.

Church establishments were accompanied, and indeed made possible, by a broader revival of religious faith. Rationalist ideas of the natural rights of man, secularist doctrines of state power, were tarnished by the excesses of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era. Many of the greatest intellects in Europe, and some of the most biting pens, devoted themselves to affirming the dogmas of Christianity and old religious beliefs. Edmund Burke, whose tremendous literary attack on the ideas of the French Revolution in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* of 1790 made him the spokesman of conservatism throughout Europe, had stated eloquently the case for traditionalism and reverence for established institutions. In France Joseph de Maistre and the Vicomte de Bonald linked insistence on the supreme need for order with support for the legitimist monarchy and the power of the Papacy. Their brilliant polemics seemed for a time to demolish the ideas and arguments of liberalism, and their influence spread outside France to Italy and Germany. Their ideas were further popularized by Lamennais, who showed the connections between religious faith and social and political order; though in his later writings he tried to separate the cause of the Church from that of the monarchy, and argued that the excessively close alliance of altar and throne was bringing the Church into unnecessary disrepute. The keynote of their thought was the demand for authority—authority both in state and in church, as the only bulwark against revolution and atheism.

Before 1800 the most influential intellectuals had been on the side of rationalism, democratic ideals, and anticlericalism. Now, for over a decade, the greatest intellects supported traditionalism, conservatism, and the Church. To all who had been frightened by the experience of revolution, this appeal to history and tradition, to old establishments and creeds, was strong. It seemed to tap the only source of authority rich enough to withstand the disturbing notions of democracy and nationalism on one hand, and the upstart claims of military dictatorship on the other. For at least a decade after Waterloo these forces of conservatism enjoyed more positive prestige and power than at any time since the reign of Louis XIV.

The Landowners

TO THE powerful conservative forces of monarchy and religion must be added a third: the universal conservative tendencies of all whose wealth lay mostly in land. The ultimate foundation, both in theory and practice, of the prerevolutionary absolutist monarchy had been the feudal system of landownership. In an age that knew only the beginnings of an industrial revolution and little mechanization

of production and transport, land was still the most important form of property and carried with it an implicit right to social importance and political power.

The upheavals of the years between 1789 and 1815 in France brought an unprecedented transference of landed property from great landowners and great corporations (particularly the Church) to a number of smaller property owners. It is not known how extensive was this redistribution of land, nor just how much of it was regained by the aristocracy at the restoration. But the larger estates, along with those of the Church, were declared national property and either put up for sale or exchanged for the paper bonds (*assignats*) which were issued on the security of the confiscated Church lands. Many middle-class folk—financiers, lawyers, millers, brewers—made fortunes by speculating in the *assignats*. Sometimes existing tenant farmers took the opportunity to buy their land, and sometimes peasants added to their existing holdings.

When Napoleon came to power he found large stocks of land still not sold or granted away, and from this he endowed a new Napoleonic aristocracy. It was drawn mainly from middle-class people who as soldiers, lawyers, or bureaucrats served his dictatorship. Usually these new landowners simply stepped into the shoes of the old, and leased the land for rent to farmers who cultivated it. The general effect seems to have been considerable acquisitions of land by the middle classes, and some acquisition by the peasants. The peasants enjoyed the further immense gain of being relieved of their old burden of paying feudal dues and tithes. At the restoration there were still unsold national lands, and these were mostly returned to their former aristocratic owners. It was impossible for the king to meet the nobles' demands that their property rights be completely restored, for even to attempt this would have alienated too large a proportion of the population. But by repurchase and regrant, it is thought that by 1820 the old nobility had made good about half its losses—a proportion big enough to give the returned *émigrés* great political power.

The limited diffusion of landed property involved a correspondingly limited extension of political rights. The equation between land and political power remained intact. It was, on the whole, the old aristocracy, the wealthy capitalist bourgeoisie, and the most substantial peasant proprietors who gained from the redistribution of land. The bulk of the land of France was still, therefore, owned by a relatively small class, though it was a differently constituted and somewhat larger class than in 1789. Political power was confined to this class by the simple device of fixing the qualification for voting for the new French parliament in terms of the amount of money paid annually in direct taxation. The vote for the Chamber of Deputies went only to citizens who were 30 years of age or more and paid at least 300 francs a year in direct taxation. The

electorate was thus only some 90,000 in a population of 30 million. To be a deputy a man had to be over 40 and pay at least 1000 francs a year in direct taxation, and he was indirectly elected. In addition, parliamentary power was shared with an upper chamber, the House of Peers, in which sat the higher aristocracy and clergy. The rights of landed wealth were in these ways deeply entrenched in the new monarchy, and this was a guarantee that its whole policy would be intensely conservative. The king's ministers were drawn mainly from the aristocracy, and his chief ministers were at first the Duc de Richelieu and the Comte Decazes, whose reactionary tendencies were moderated by a political sense of the practical unwisdom of trying to turn the clock back too far. Between 1814 and 1830 the restored monarchy rested on a balance between the powers of the old aristocracy, now much depleted and impoverished, and the power of the new business oligarchy, rapidly growing in power. The *milliard des émigrés*, granted as indemnity in 1825 to those whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution, more often went into industrial and commercial investment than into land. The aristocracy became more an officeholding than a landowning class. It shared power, in effect with the wealthy bourgeois who owned a landed estate on which he paid heavy taxes, and the wealthier manufacturer who paid taxes on his membership in a corporation.

The regime represented a balance and a compromise between aristocracy and oligarchy, and the working of the corrupt parliament held little interest for the mass of the nation. The Chamber of Deputies had a permanent majority on the right, and a permanent minority on the left. No party system was possible; and opposition had to content itself with spasmodic attacks and a running fire of verbal criticism of the government, without prospect of assuming ministerial responsibilities. As under the *ancien régime*, government remained exclusively the job of the king and his ministers, and the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament was neither fully understood nor practically possible.

In Britain, where demands for parliamentary reform had been smothered by the exigencies of the long wars against France and by the reaction against the ideas of Jacobinism, similar arrangements existed. There, too, the landed aristocracy of the eighteenth century, reinforced by the ennobled generals, admirals, and administrators of the war years and by the faster-growing class of financiers, merchants, and manufacturers, virtually monopolized state power. The House of Lords, from which most ministers of the Crown were still drawn, preserved its control over legislation. Through individual influence and patronage the aristocracy controlled a large share of the borough representation in the House of Commons. The electorate was determined by an antiquated and complicated system of property qualifications which gave the vote to only some 400,000 men, and effective power to the landed gentry in

the countryside and the large landowners and men of wealth in the towns. The regular system of patronage, corruption, and intimidation secured the return of a high proportion of placemen and younger sons of the nobility. The Landed Property Qualification Acts stipulated that members of Parliament for the counties must own a landed estate of at least £600 a year; and for the boroughs, a landed estate of £300 a year.

The larger part played by trade and industry in the life of Britain than in the life of France was reflected in the fact that in Britain the *bourgeoisie* had staked for themselves a larger share in power, alongside the aristocracy. But the principles on which the regime rested were very similar. Parliament existed to represent not persons but property: despite the clamor of radical reformers, the changes made before 1815 had merely admitted certain forms of wealth other than landed property to a very limited share in power. The predominance of the landed and agricultural interests in 1815 is shown well enough by the Corn Law passed in that year; it gave farmers protection by prohibiting the import of corn from abroad until the price at home had reached the high level of 80 shillings a quarter. It is shown, too, by the maintenance of the harsh Game Laws, which made it illegal for anyone who was not a squire or a squire's eldest son to kill game, and for anyone to buy and sell game. In 1816 these old restrictions were added to; a new law provided that the cottager caught with his snares at night, in quest of a hare or a rabbit, could be transported for seven years. Pheasant preserves could be protected by spring guns and man traps, and the practice was upheld by the law courts until 1827.

Great Britain and France were, politically as well as economically, among the most advanced and liberal countries in Europe. In much of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Austrian empire, the landed aristocracy held on to most of their estates and the political predominance that went with them. Lacking a middle class of merchants and business people as strong as in Great Britain or France, these countries remained more completely a mere perpetuation of the *ancien régime*. Yet even here there were significant changes, most of which derived from the sheer impossibility of undoing some of the things Napoleon had done. In the Rhineland and in Belgium, French rule had meant confiscation of Church lands, abolition of feudal exactions and dues, and considerable redistribution of the land to small owners who cultivated it. The system of landholding in Germany west of the Elbe was already, for historical reasons, very different from that east of the Elbe. Large seignorial domains were almost unknown. Peasants enjoyed rights of life tenancy and hereditary tenancy, subject to payments of quit rent, so that they had effective control over cultivation. Holdings were on the average small. East of the Elbe, where the Germans had been originally a conquering race with a subject population of Slavs, lay an area of mainly large estates,

cultivated by servile labor. The Prussian Junkers, like the English squires, were enterprising and progressive in their methods, and tended to expropriate the peasants and build up ever larger estates: unlike the English landowners, they did not let the land out to be cultivated by tenant farmers but organized its use under their own supervision. The emancipation of the peasantry in Prussia from heavy feudal obligations and servitude, decreed by edicts of the monarchy between 1807 and 1816, proceeded slowly. It often resulted in the economic subjection of the peasants and the surrender of large portions of their land to the Junkers as compensation. For these reasons Germany remained, throughout the century, divided into two fairly distinct regions, with an even greater concentration of landed wealth in the hands of the conservative Junker class. It was this class that provided the Prussian monarchy with many of its ablest administrators and officers.

In Poland and Russia the power, both economic and political, of the landowning aristocracy remained more intact in 1815. They showed themselves not hostile to emancipation of the serfs who provided the labor on their lands, provided it could be carried out on the model of the Prussian Junkers. But the peasants were bitterly opposed to achieving their personal emancipation from serfdom at the cost of losing land; it was a common saying, "We are yours, but the land is ours." Eventually, in 1861, they were to be emancipated by an edict of the tsar, but both nobles and peasants were left dissatisfied with the process. Until then Poland and Russia remained essentially under the *ancien régime*, with the persistent disadvantage that the aristocracy of these lands had none of the flair for efficient estate management shown by the landowners of Britain and Prussia; while the peasants remained more impervious than the peasants of these countries to the progressive methods of cultivation and husbandry increasingly adopted in the western nations.

The Popularity of Peace

TO THESE three main components in the forces of conservatism in 1815 must be added a fourth, latent yet powerful, which operated throughout Europe. Almost every country had known more than two decades of recurrent war. Except in France, warfare did not yet involve a total mobilization of national resources. But great campaigns such as those of the French wars imposed unusual strains on all the combatants. The continental blockade had affected standards of living throughout Europe; and Britain, as Napoleon's most remorseless enemy, had endured heavy burdens and strains. To the fears aroused in all governments by the ideas of Jacobinism must be added the

war-weariness and longing for peace and stability induced in all men by the incessant fighting. France herself knew great exhaustion, especially after the disasters of the Russian campaign. As usual, prewar conditions seemed rosier in retrospect, and all who merely wanted peace and freedom to live their own lives welcomed a substantial reversion to conditions of peace. With such conditions, monarchical rule and even clericalist influence were inseparably connected. This mood of exhaustion and indifference was unlikely to last very long. It was always likely that the errors and excesses of returned *émigrés* would, in turn, make the exciting ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity more attractive again. But the interval, at least, belonged to the old order, and the prevailing mood favored the forces of conservatism.

Only this mood can explain the relative ease with which the western conservative governments could get parliaments to adopt measures of repression which, before 1789, would have evoked violent protest. In 1817 the Tory government of Britain suspended the Habeas Corpus act, bulwark of individual rights. In 1819 it passed Sidmouth's Six Acts, which were designed to prevent large public meetings, undermine the whole movement for radical reform, and kill or at least control the radical press. Although both measures aroused some vigorous protests in the country, they passed through Parliament without much difficulty. In France the Chamber of 1815, dominated by ultraroyalists in a mood for revenge, passed a series of acts giving the king power to suspend the liberties of the individual and the freedom of the press newly guaranteed in the Charter of his restoration. It authorized savage laws of proscription which sent many of the most eminent Frenchmen of the previous years into exile. In Austria, Metternich organized his famous "system," designed to keep public order by a network of spies, secret police, and terrorists. It reached a climax of repression in the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, which applied throughout Germany. In every country governments relied ominously on informers and *agents provocateurs*, on secret police and military repression. In lands like Naples and Sicily the poorest elements in the population could be mobilized against middle-class liberals; elsewhere the fears of propertied classes could be exploited to justify repression of popular disturbances. Such excessive repression, though resisted by shrewd monarchs like Louis XVIII of France and by moderate aristocrats like the Whigs in England, went far enough to ensure a violent resurgence of liberal and radical movements in the 1820's. It meant that the generation after Waterloo, which was in England to become known as an age of reform, would in Europe be an age of revolution.

But though the years between 1815 and 1854 were an era of revolutions, they were not an era of war. Indeed, by comparison with the hundred years after 1854, this period was remarkable for the absence of

large-scale fighting in Europe. It was one of the longest interludes of peace known to modern Europe, and no period since has equaled it, either in length or in peacefulness. It was followed by a period equally remarkable for its wars. Between 1854 and 1878 there were no fewer than six important wars in which major powers took part. These were the Crimean War (1854-56), involving Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey; the War of 1859, involving France and Austria; the War waged by Prussia and Austria against Denmark (1864); the Austro-Prussian War of 1866; the Franco-Prussian War of 1870; and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, which almost turned into a general European conflict.

The contrast between the forty years before 1854 and the twenty-four years after it is so striking that it prompts the suggestion that revolutions had served as a kind of substitute for war; or, more precisely, that one of the reasons for international peace after 1815 was the endemic civil war that produced the great outbreaks of insurrection in 1830 and 1848, as well as a host of intermediate revolts. National cohesion was not yet strong enough to override sectional interests and the conflicts of political principle: human energies were devoted more to seeking an overhaul of internal political and social systems than to pursuing the nationalist causes of war against foreign states. Governments, conscious of revolutionary threats at home, received no encouragement to engage in battle with other states. Peace was popular not only with governments aware of their own fragility, and not only because exhausted peoples welcomed a respite from war, but also because enemies at home seemed more immediate and more menacing than enemies abroad, and civil war absorbed belligerent spirits later to be diverted into the cause of militant nationalism.

CHAPTER 7

THE FORCES OF CHANGE

FOR the combination of reasons just described, the years after Waterloo were marked by the almost universal ascendancy of the forces of continuity, order, and resistance to change. Yet it was from the first certain that Europe had entered upon an era of rapid and fundamental change. The consequences of this change for the political and social systems of the continent were, of course, still indefinable. But even before 1789 there were detectable powerful currents, flowing like rivers that run beneath the surface of apparently calm oceans. They would have transformed life in Europe even had there been no French Revolution, no Napoleonic Empire, and no wars. These events lent such currents a new significance, and may even have in some ways diverted the direction of their flow—but they in no way created the currents.

Growth of Population

THE MOST momentous and far-reaching of all these long-term forces of change was the new rate at which the population of Europe as a whole had begun to increase since about the middle of the eighteenth century. Between 1750 and 1950 the population grew at roughly the following rate:

| Year | 1750 | 1800 | 1850 | 1900 |
|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Population (in millions) | 140 | 180 | 266 | 401 |

It increased nearly fourfold in two centuries. The speed of this growth was a completely new phenomenon. During the twelve centuries before 1800, Europe's population had slowly climbed to 180 million; then within one century it more than doubled itself. No social and political order could have remained unaffected by so immense an increase of humanity; and the events of the nineteenth century remain unintelligible unless

this greatest revolution of all is kept constantly in mind. It changed the course of world history, for between 1815 and 1914 some 40 million Europeans migrated to the other continents. The United States, Canada, Australia, and many other parts of the globe were populated mainly from the overflow of Europe. In 1815 the whole population of Europe was only 200 million; by 1914 that number of people of European birth or stock existed outside Europe, while the population of Europe itself had risen to 460 million. The smallest of the continents had provided about one third of the human race, and European civilization was spread throughout the earth.

Many different reasons for this growth have been suggested, though their relative importance is impossible to fix. It was certainly due much more to a decrease in death rates than to an increase in birth rates. Populations grew not so much because more people were born as because more survived, and more stayed alive longer. The probable reasons for lower death rates include the improvements in public order and security which came with the stronger monarchies set up throughout most of Europe by the beginning of the eighteenth century; these ended civil and religious wars, destroyed some of the brigandage and violence that had marred human existence in earlier centuries, and did much to relieve famine, plague, and destitution. The reasons certainly include the striking advances in medical science which came in the eighteenth century. These freed western countries from the worst endemic diseases and plagues that had taken a constant and heavy toll of all populations down to the seventeenth century. Infant death rates fell, fewer mothers died in childbirth, and more people lived to a more advanced age. Diseases that had formerly struck cattle and crops began likewise to be conquered, so food supplied improved. Better transport, first by road and canal and later by railway and steamship, made it possible to end localized famine and shortages.

From 1800 onward there took place an agricultural revolution that vastly increased food production, and so made possible the feeding of this increasing number of mouths. The even more striking increase of population in the United States in the same period raised no problems of food supply, because there was always an abundance of new land to bring under cultivation. But in Europe, where all the best land available was already under cultivation, greater supplies of food could be obtained in only two ways: by more intensive cultivation or by importation. Europeans used both methods. By use of winter root crops such as turnips and beetroot, and of green crops such as clover and alfalfa, the old method of three-field rotation in which one third of the land was left fallow each year could be replaced by a four-course rotation. This utilized all the land each year and provided enough cattle

food to keep larger stocks of cattle alive through the winter. The increased stock of cattle not only yielded more meat and milk for human consumption, but provided more manure to keep the land fertile. By use of cheaper means of transport during the nineteenth century, the great food reservoirs of the United States, Canada, and latterly Australasia were made available to feed Europe.

The growth of population varied, naturally enough, from one country to another, as did the readiness with which the new methods of farming were adopted. The pace was set in both by the United Kingdom (constituted in 1801 by the union of Ireland with Great Britain). Its population stood at about 18½ million in 1811, and at more than double that figure in 1891. France, which in the previous century ranked as the largest European power, grew more slowly than her neighbors. She had a population of just over 29 million in 1806, and of 38½ million in 1896. Germany, like the United Kingdom, doubled from nearly 25 million in 1815 to nearly 50 million in 1890; and Belgium from 3¾ million in 1831 to nearly 7½ million by 1910. It was in these countries that the new methods of more efficient farming were adopted soonest and most readily.

Italy and Spain grew less rapidly, though in the end they too doubled in population between 1815 and the 1920's. The only European country that exceeded the British rate of growth was Russia, which roughly doubled in population during the first half of the nineteenth century, and doubled again during the second half; a fact that helps to explain not only her vast expansion eastward into Asiatic Russia during the century, but also her pressure on southeastern Europe during most of the period. Part cause and part effect of the slowness of Russia to adopt more intensive agriculture was the possibility of expansion and settlement of new land in the forests and the steppes. This expansion much enhanced both the territories and the power of the tsars, who were impelled to defend new frontiers against nomadic tribes and so to annex more and more territory.

If nineteenth-century Europe appears in history as unusually restless, explosive, and prone to revolution, this remarkable demographic fact is at least one explanation. Against this tide no social and political order could stand intact. No mere "restoration" of old institutions and traditions could suffice to meet the needs of the new masses of humanity which so abruptly made their appearance on the old soil of Europe. Only constant inventiveness, reorganization, and experiment in new forms of social life could sustain civilization. In the sphere of economic production and distribution, this inventiveness and reorganization took the form of what is traditionally called the "industrial revolution"; in the sphere of social life and organization, it took the form of urbanism and, eventually, suburbanism.

Industrialism and Urbanism

IT IS unnecessary to accept a materialistic or Marxist conception of history in order to hold that changes in how people make a living and in the environment in which they live are among the most important changes in human history. People who earn a wage by working regular weekly hours in a mine, business office, or factory and who live in crowded cities will have different needs, interests, and outlooks from people who till fields, tend flocks, and live in tiny isolated villages. It was the century between 1815 and 1914 which saw the transformation of one national community after another, throughout Europe, from a situation where the last of these conditions predominated to one where the former predominated. The ancient continent, where so much of its long past still survived in Roman law, Greek culture, Christian religion, feudal and monarchical institutions, had not only to provide quite suddenly a home and a livelihood for hundreds of millions more people; it had at the same time to suffer the adjustment of its traditions and its civilization to the new world of machinery and steam, of factories and towns. This immense process had begun in the United Kingdom and western Europe by 1815; it was soon to spread, with increasing impetus, eastward to Germany, Italy, and eventually Russia. It was a more intensive and fundamental process of transformation than had ever been known before. A European born in 1815, who lived to the age of eighty-five, lived through greater changes than had any of his ancestors—though perhaps not through greater changes than his descendants would experience. Not the least important fact about the acceleration of historical development that began around 1800 is that it still continues.

The basis of the industrial revolution was the application of steam power to machinery for purposes first of production and then of transport. Instead of making things by means of tools, set in motion by man's physical strength, it became more and more common to make things by machinery, set in motion by steam. Previously machinery had been worked mainly by animal power or by wind and water power. But animal power is not basically different or markedly greater than human strength, wind was cheap but unreliable, and water was very much limited by natural conditions. What made the use of machinery more generally possible was the invention of the steam engine. It suffered from none of these limitations. For decades stationary steam engines had been used for such purposes as pumping water out of mines. It was only when James Watt, in the later eighteenth century, greatly improved the mechanism of the steam engine and adapted the piston

to rotary motion that its immense possibilities became apparent. Before 1789 the firm of Boulton and Watt was busy making steam engines, some of them for export.

The needs of the steam engine created a new demand for iron to make it from and for coal to make the steam. Countries rich in these two commodities were thereafter best equipped to make industrial progress; this gave Britain a great natural advantage over France. At the same time the increasing use of expensive machinery for making cloth or metal goods necessitated the concentration of workers in larger units and factories. Hitherto, although a large proportion of the population was engaged in industry, the use of cheap tools had made possible the domestic system (where workers worked in their own homes) and the system of small workshops (where a few worked together using simple tools or machinery). Shuttles and spinning jennies could be used at home. Even extensive industrial activity, such as prevailed in Britain before 1800, had not brought extensive urbanization because it did not involve large factories and the concentration of workers.

But mechanized industry did involve urbanism, first in textile production, then in the heavy industries of coal, iron, and steel. For working the new machines, unskilled labor was mostly good enough. Not only did skilled workers find themselves lowered in status and in less demand, but women and children could often be employed, at wages lower than those of men, and this revolutionized the whole character of the labor market. In overcrowded homes in drab factory towns lived thousands of families, overworked and underpaid, creating a new social problem of immense proportions. Their employers, engaged in fierce competition with rival firms and uncontrolled by any effective legislation, forced conditions of work and wages down to the lowest possible level. Economic life took on a ruthlessness, a spirit of inhumanity and fatalism, that it had not known before.

It was, in general, this transformation of industrial life—which began in England in the later eighteenth century, continued throughout the wars, and resumed its course with renewed speed after Waterloo—that during the next century was to spread eastward into Europe. Its impact and repercussions varied according to the conditions and character of each country, and according to the precise time and stage at which it operated most fully in each country. When after 1830 steam power was extended from production to transportation, it caused yet further profound changes in economic life and in the balance of advantages between the different European states.¹ While this whole process was going on, each government was confronted, in quick succession, with a host of novel social problems. A great variety of new kinds of organization appeared, ranging from big capitalist enterprises to trade

¹ See p. 263.

unions, from railway companies to municipal councils. The law and administration of every state had to accommodate themselves to dealing with such organizations. The restricted, paternal, or aristocratic traditions and institutions of monarchical government were seldom well suited to dealing with problems and conflicts of this kind. In one country after another revolutions were precipitated by the discontent of manufacturers and workers alike with the inadequacy of the existing regimes.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate either the earliness or the speed of these great changes. Even in Britain in 1815, only a relatively small proportion of all the industrial workers were engaged in large factories, and most Englishmen lived in little towns and villages. In France industrial units remained mostly comparatively small in size until the twentieth century, and only in this century have large parts of eastern Europe become industrialized. Big cities became common in Europe only after 1870. The whole process was prolonged, complex, and variable. It gained fresh impetus and new twists of direction from the use of steamships in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and from the use of the internal combustion engine and electricity at the end of the century. The demands of wars deeply affected it in the twentieth century. But industrialization had begun in Britain to a significant extent by 1815; and it remained until the present day one of the greatest forces of fundamental change in social life, constantly creating new problems that only strong governments and efficient administrations, enjoying general popular support, could effectively solve. The growth of technology has continued to revolutionize European civilization in all its aspects.

The chief way in which industrialism affected government and politics was in its conferring new wealth and power upon the growing middle class of enterprising traders, manufacturers, and financiers, and in its creation of a new industrial proletariat. Just as the landowners were in general a bulwark of conservatism, so the middle classes were one of the prime movers of change. The "captains of industry," the self-made millowners of Lancashire, the energetic, thrifty, and hard-working manufacturers of northern England, the Netherlands, and France, were still in 1815 a small minority. They were the new men, the first generation of a new class which would inevitably resent the old aristocratic idleness and contempt for earned incomes. They were increasingly taking their place alongside the older families of business and industry. The established financial groups—such as the Rothschilds, Barings, Laffittes, and Hopes—assumed a new pre-eminence in a world where capital and credit were in immense and profitable demand. Western Europe was fast becoming one commercial, industrial, and financial society, as was made evident by the international repercussions of the financial panics of 1816–17, 1819, and 1825–26. Within this economic

community, transcending the frontiers of politics, grew both interdependence and common impulses. Restrictions imposed on trade or manufacture by conservative governments in the interests of agriculture were resented and attacked. The new wealth demanded greater political representation and power, the removal of petty restrictions and out-of-date laws, social recognition for the men whose energies and enterprise brought employment to millions. The result was a tide of liberal opinion hostile to the existing order. It was the most potent force of change in mid-nineteenth century Europe.

Meanwhile industrialism also created the new wage-earning classes of the factories, mills, and mines. Their interests coincided, in some respects, with the interests of their employers. Both wanted food to be cheap, trade unimpeded, business to prosper. But confronted with the harsh conditions imposed upon them by the industrialists, with their own weak bargaining power in an overcrowded labor market, and with the bad living conditions of the new industrial towns, these wage-earning classes were soon to look to the state for protection of their interests also. When it became clear that governments would concern themselves with working-class interests only when compelled by political pressure, they, too, demanded votes and rights of free association. Thus the forces of conservatism were faced with a double demand: from the middle classes and from the working classes. Fearing the second more than the first, they often contrived to win middle-class support by timely concessions, so as to resist effectively the more far-reaching and radical demands of the workers. To the tide of liberal opinion was added a tide of democratic and eventually socialist opinion, both alike beating strongly against the entrenched positions of the forces of conservatism.

The total effect was to revolutionize the whole meaning and function of government and politics. Instead of being concerned only with general matters of public order and national security, government had to act at the deepest levels of social and economic life. What modern Europe was groping for was a completely new kind of state, a state in close mutual relationship and constant interplay with the community. The old dynastic conception of ruler and subjects had to be totally replaced by the conception of a state and its citizens. This notion of government and society as mutually interdependent and enmeshed, with a state emanating from the community it governs and the community demanding the constant service of its state, was the most revolutionary notion of modern history. It was utterly incompatible with the old order, and with the sharp dynastic distinctions between ruler and subjects. It was the common basis of all the greatest movements of nineteenth-century Europe: on the one hand nationalism, and on the other liberalism, democracy, and socialism.

Nationalism

A NATION may be described as a community of people whose sense of belonging together derives from their belief that they have a common homeland and from experience of common traditions and historical development. In this broad sense nations had certainly existed many centuries before 1815. A lively sense of nationality existed in England of the Tudors in the sixteenth century, and France under her strong central monarchy developed a similar sense of community feeling. But European nationalism in its modern sense, of the desire of such a community to assert its unity and independence vis-à-vis other communities or groups, is mainly a product of the nineteenth century. It was first launched upon its course of triumphant development throughout Europe by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire.

The Jacobin doctrine of the "sovereignty of the people" was double-edged. It asserted, on one hand, the claims of the nation as a whole against its monarch, and the right of a people to determine its own form of government and to control the conduct of that government. It implied, on the other hand, the democratic doctrine that government should be the voice of "the people" and not merely of "a people"; that is, in conjunction with the revolutionary ideals of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, it proclaimed the rights of all citizens, regardless of wealth or status, to have an equal voice in the decisions of politics. Whereas the excesses of Jacobin rule during the Reign of Terror (1793-94) discredited the democratic ideas of the Revolution, the conquests of Napoleon in Europe strengthened the ideas and sentiments of nationalism. So by 1815 nationalism was a much livelier force in Europe than was democracy.

The countries where nationalist feelings were most vigorously stirred were Germany and Italy, though Napoleonic imperialism had similar effects in Spain, Poland, Russia, and Belgium. At first nationalism was a spirit of resistance to the exactions and heavy-fisted domination of foreigners, and it was therefore anti-French. New value was attached to local institutions, native customs, traditional culture, and national language. French rationalism and "enlightenment" were cosmopolitan, universalist, antinationalist in flavor. In reaction against them the new nationalism was romantic, particularist, exclusive in character.

It happened that Germany at the time was enjoying a great cultural renaissance, and could justly claim pre-eminence for her musicians, men of letters, and philosophers. It was the age of Beethoven, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, and Hegel. This enabled Germany in the nine-

teenth century to oust France from the cultural predominance and intellectual leadership that she had enjoyed in the eighteenth. The philosophers Herder and Fichte taught Germans to cherish and reverence the *Volksgeist*, or peculiar national character, which they presented as the foundation of all good culture and civilization. Prussia, after her defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806, which almost extinguished her as a power, drastically reorganized her army under the guidance of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Her machinery of government was overhauled by Stein and Hardenberg. After 1815 she emerged as the chief focus of German nationalist hopes, in contrast with Austria, whose ascendancy in the new Confederation was used to keep Germany politically disunited. The chief intellectual support for the regeneration of Prussia and the growth of nationalism in Germany came from the new University of Berlin, in the city that Napoleon had occupied after his victory at Jena. There G. W. F. Hegel was to expound a new philosophy of authority and state power which captivated many German, Italian, and even English thinkers during the nineteenth century.

Much of the reorganization of the Prussian state, which was guided by the dual motive of military recovery and internal efficiency, was but an imitation of French revolutionary reforms. As Hardenberg wrote to the Prussian king in 1807, "We must do from above what the French have done from below." He especially envied the success of Carnot's *levée en masse*, the conscription of the whole of French manhood and its inspiration with a sense of national mission. The reformers of Prussia, impressed by French successes, were particularly struck by "what endless forces not developed and not utilized slumber in the bosom of a nation." They valued most the creative and irresistible energy that could be generated by a people in arms. They set about building a strong central authority, a truly national army, and a system of national education designed to infuse a common spirit into the whole people, a patriotic reverence for the German heritage and a devotion to the cause of German nationalism.

Meanwhile Napoleon had been unwittingly paving the way for greater unification in Germany by his destruction in 1806 of the Holy Roman Empire; by his assembling Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Saxony, and twelve other smaller states into the Confederation of the Rhine; and by his introduction into all western Germany of the *Code napoléon*, to replace the tangle of antiquated laws and judicial procedures. In every aspect German nationalism began as a strange mixture of benefits derived from adopting French methods or institutions, and resentful reactions against French thought, domination, and victories.

At a more popular level German nationalism was further aroused by the Prussian victory at Leipzig in 1813. It was interpreted as the

fruit and the justification of all that nationalists had been preaching and reformers doing to regenerate Prussia. It became a patriotic legend. The battle forced Napoleon out of most of Germany, and even freed the left bank of the Rhine. It was in fact an allied victory, and it was made possible in part by Napoleon's disastrous campaign in Russia the year before. But it consoled German national pride, heartened German patriots, and gave a new fillip to ideas of total liberation.

The nationalistic spirit aroused by Napoleon in Italy offers certain contrasts with the effects in Germany. In Italy his regime was longer and more continuous, for it lasted from 1796 until 1814. It was also more acceptable. Italian sentiment was less anti-French than was German or Spanish. Middle classes in the towns welcomed the greater efficiency and the weakening of clericalist influence which came with the demolition of the power of petty princes and of the Pope himself. As in Germany, Napoleon's reduction in the number of states to three encouraged ideas of ultimate unification. Murat, while ruler of Naples, conceived the idea of uniting the whole of Italy in his own hands, and in 1815 he proclaimed the Union of Italy. He was soon defeated and shot, but this dramatic gesture was not forgotten by Italian patriots.

In Germany and Italy, and in Germany more than in Italy, the effect of French rule was to stimulate directly a new and more pervasive spirit of nationalist pride and hope. It was significantly the unification of these two countries which loomed largest in general European affairs between 1850 and 1870. In other countries the effects of French rule were less clear-cut and more indirect.

"The Spanish ulcer destroyed me," Napoleon later complained. At the Battle of Baylen in July, 1808, two French divisions capitulated to Spanish forces, and Spanish guerrilla bands played an important part in French defeats in the Peninsular War. Such achievements were later glorified as expressions of Spanish national spirit. In fact the forces in Spain most actively hostile to Napoleon were the royalist and clerical elements in the country. The insurrectionary Juntas, which organized local resistance, were mostly run by nobles and priests, who were enraged by Napoleon's treatment of the monarchy and by the French efforts to secularize Church property. Popular resistance was led by the lower clergy and the monks, and was not at all typical of nationalist uprisings. Without the military genius of Wellington and the efficiency of the British infantry the Spanish guerrillas would soon have collapsed before the Grand Army. The strongest stimulus to a real nationalist spirit was the savagery of the fighting in the Peninsular War, immortalized in the pictures of Goya. But Spain had no large or important liberal middle class, which was the characteristic basis for nineteenth-century movements of national unity and independence.

Poland was the center of aggrieved nationalism in eastern Europe.

Between 1772 and 1795 the former Polish state had been obliterated from the map and partitioned among the empires of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. When Napoleon, in 1807, set up the Grand Duchy of Warsaw with a new constitution, it was welcomed by Poles as a step toward restoration and independence. But he kept it subservient to himself, and it soon became clear that he was interested in it only as a pawn in his relations with Russia. When he began his Russian campaign in 1812, he gave the Poles only vague promises of future independence. The victory of the eastern empires in 1814 again obliterated Poland as a state. But the *Code napoléon*, with the ideas of the French Revolution embedded in it, had been introduced into the territory; and even bitter disappointment only added fuel to the burning resolve of Polish patriots to regain national unity and independence. That resolve persisted for another century, until it achieved its aim in another peace settlement in 1919 (see Map 14).

The impact on Russian national feeling was even more diffuse and remote. The heroic resistance that led to the burning of Smolensk and Moscow and the epic retreat of the Grand Army through the snows had all the makings of a supreme national legend. The pillaging and devastations of the French troops consolidated the resistance of all classes in Russia as nothing else could have done. The Tsar dared not think of negotiating, so thoroughly roused was the hatred of Napoleon among nobles and peasants alike. The virtual destruction of the Grand Army was the most devastating blow Napoleon ever suffered. Just as Germany made a patriotic legend out of the Battle of Leipzig, so could Russian patriots from the Moscow campaign. But so backward was national feeling in Russia, so divorced from popular life was the regime, that these events had little immediate effect on nationalism.

In all his relations with Europe, Napoleon probably had little coherent policy, beyond a desire to make conquered countries satellites of France and adjuncts to his own dynastic ambitions. He certainly followed no consistent policy of arousing nationalities against their governments, doing so only as expediency dictated. He worked out no principles for organizing his empire, beyond the general introduction of the French legal codes and administrative system. How he organized it in fact varied according to the military needs of the moment and the requirements of his Continental System, and as he was never at peace for long, the pressure of these necessities was constant and decisive. Likewise the results of his conquests varied according to the conditions of each country; and to the existing diversities of European states he added not uniformity, but merely further complexity. During the interlude of the Hundred Days he posed as having liberal and constitutional aims, and it was part of the Bonapartist legend concocted on St. Helena that he had had the interests of national independence at heart.

His greatest contributions to the growth of nationalism were, in fact, unwitting. They were—as in Germany and Italy—more the outcome of revolt against his empire than the deliberate intention of it. The most important result of this was that the first half of the century saw an alliance, which now seemed natural, between nationalism and liberalism.

Liberalism, Democracy, Socialism

LIBERALISM, in its continental European sense more clearly than in its English or American sense, was like nationalism in that it rested on the belief that there should be a more organic and complete relationship between government and the community, between state and society, than existed under the dynastic regimes of the eighteenth century. Instead of government and administration existing above and in many respects apart from society—the exclusive affair of kings and their ministers and officials—they should rest on the organized consent of at least the most important sections of the community, and they ought to concern themselves with the interests of the whole community. The ideas that Americans had asserted in 1776 had still not been accepted by European governments: ideas that “governments are instituted among men” to secure individual rights, and derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” European liberals stood, fundamentally, for these American ideals. The biggest obstacles to a broader basis of government were the powers and privileges of the aristocracy and the Church, and the lack of privileges of the merchant, business, and manufacturing classes. Thus the spear-head of the liberal attack against feudal rights and clericalist power was, in each European country, the underprivileged middle and professional classes. It was these classes, backed in the course of events by the peasants and by the Paris mob, that had been the central driving force of the French Revolution, and the chief gainers from it.

In doctrine, therefore, continental liberalism derived from the rationalist movement of the eighteenth century which had made so corrosive an attack upon inequality and arbitrary power. Its most characteristic method was parliamentary government; it sought in constitutional arrangements and in the rule of law a means of expressing middle-class interests and opinion, a vehicle of social reform, and a safeguard against absolutist government. It was distinct from democracy, or radicalism, in that it favored ideas of the sovereignty of parliamentary assemblies rather than of the sovereignty of the people; it wanted an extension of the franchise to include all men of property but to exclude men without property; it valued liberty more highly than equality; and it appealed to broadly the same classes as the growing sense of nationalism.

To liberals, the French Revolution had condemned itself by its excesses: the Reign of Terror and mob democracy had bred the era of reaction and led to military dictatorship. The most desirable regime was either a constitutional monarchy, guaranteeing certain rights equally to all citizens, or a parliamentary republic, resting on a restricted franchise but upholding the equality of all before the law. Their objections to the settlement of 1815 were less that it violated nationality than that it restored absolutism and threatened to restore aristocratic and clerical privileges.

Democracy resembled liberalism in that it derived its ideals from eighteenth-century rationalism and was equally opposed to the inequalities of the old order. It differed from it in holding to the view that sovereignty lay not in constitutional systems or in representative parliamentary assemblies, but in the "general will" of the whole people, as Rousseau had taught. It favored universal male suffrage, the subordination of parliamentary bodies to the will of the electorate as a whole, and even devices of direct democracy such as the plebiscite or the referendum. It was devoted to the ideal of equality of political and civil rights. In its more extreme forms it even demanded greater social and economic equality. Like liberals, democrats demanded equality of all before the law and equality of opportunity for all; but unlike liberals, they wanted to secure these rights even at the cost of greater economic leveling. For this reason, in the first half of the century democracy was treated as a more revolutionary and frightening doctrine than liberalism. The fear of Jacobinism, which haunted the conservative governments of Europe between 1815 and 1848, was partly the fear of the resurgence of French power; it was even more the fear of radical democracy. To resist this menace, liberals were often ready to join with conservatives to crush popular movements and uprisings that favored democratic ideals. The nearest twentieth-century counterpart to this fear was the universal fear of bolshevism after 1917: a fear irrational enough to produce strange alliances of otherwise incompatible and hostile forces, yet well enough founded to create a series of violent revolutions and savage repressions. Democracy, even more than liberalism, was a central cause of change and revolution in the century after Waterloo.

Until after 1848 and the rise of Marxism, the word "socialism" had a somewhat less frightening sound to established authorities than the word "democracy." In its early, vaguer, utopian, and humanitarian stages, socialism was connected in men's minds either with relatively harmless if picturesque cranks, or with the multitude of pietist Christian communities which fled to the United States in order to lead a simple community life, free from the complexities of the old order in Europe and from the strife of industrialism and national war. Until after 1850 or so, socialism and communism (at first hardly distinguishable as po-

litical ideas) found their natural home not in Europe but in the United States, where abundance of land and free immigration offered a new mode of life to all who wanted to escape from the restored monarchies of Europe. Such experiments as Robert Owen's New Harmony in Indiana or Étienne Cabet's Icarian Community in Illinois were the dream worlds of early socialism. Based on a system of complete human equality and self-government, they expressed exactly what socialism and communism, before Marx, would have liked to create in Europe. Their migration to the New World was a tacit admission of growing despair that such an order could ever be built in the old world.

Socialist ideas, too, derived from the doctrines of Rousseau and from the ideals of the French Revolution. Just as liberals placed greatest emphasis on the ideal of liberty, and democrats on the ideal of equality, so socialists cherished particularly the ideal of fraternity. Men are by nature good, and without the artificial distortions of social inequality and poverty they would naturally behave to one another as brothers. Co-operation rather than competition would be their instinctive desire. Press the ideals of liberty and equality far enough—even to the point of establishing complete freedom of self-expression and complete equality of opportunity and of wealth—and the reign of fraternity would begin. Often protesting against industrialism as a new cause of poverty and inequality, early socialist movements could never find roots or room in Europe. It was only when socialist theory had been transformed at the hands of state socialists like Louis Blanc and of more scientific economic theorists like Karl Marx that it could accommodate itself to the necessities of life in the increasingly industrialized nations of Europe.

There was enough common ground among liberals, democrats, and socialists for them to join forces on the barricades at great revolutionary moments, such as in 1848 and 1871. Not only were all traveling for at least a certain distance along the same road and finding themselves obstructed by the same forces of conservatism, but all had the common desire to make government, in varying degrees, an organ and agency of society. The socialists, from Louis Blanc to Lenin, found themselves constantly confronted with the problem of how they could co-operate with liberals and democrats, and at what point in the common journey they might suddenly find the liberals and democrats changing front and fighting on the other side of the barricades. Similarly, none of the three could depend upon a reliable alliance with the forces of nationalism. Until 1848 liberals and nationalists seemed to be in natural harmony and alliance. To make a constitutional system work satisfactorily, liberals felt that they needed the natural cohesion in community life which came from nationality. To achieve national unity and independence, patriots felt that they needed the support of all classes which liberalism

or democracy could enlist. The fiasco of the liberal-nationalist alliance in 1848 led to a drastic realignment of forces.²

Likewise socialism, cosmopolitan and internationalist in its early phases mainly because of its affinities with liberalism and democracy, came by the end of the century to seek closer alliance with authoritarian nationalist governments and undemocratic regimes. The German socialist leader, Ferdinand Lassalle, was prepared to come to terms with Bismarck; socialists in all countries supported their national governments at the outbreak of war in 1914; and bolshevism in Russia created a new combination of nationalism and communism within a single-party dictatorship, under the guise of "socialism in a single country." Combinations and permutations of movements of this kind are one of the most significant themes of modern European history, and indeed of world history. They will be one of the recurrent themes of this book.

² See p. 208.

PART THREE

THE
AGE
OF
REVOLUTIONS
1815–50

8. *The Phase of Conservatism, 1815–30*
9. *The Liberal Revolutions of 1830–33*
10. *The Economic Revolution of 1830–48*
11. *The National Revolutions of 1848–50*



THE GENERATION between 1815 and 1849, as already suggested, was a time of endemic civil war. The forces of conservatism triumphed with the restoration of the old order in 1815 and then proceeded to entrench themselves in power in most of the states of Europe. Their strength is measured by the tenacity and the partial success with which they held the forces of change at bay for another whole generation. But their greatest strength lay at the level of political power; and political power alone became less and less sufficient to resist the most powerful forces of change. These were basically the rapid increase in population and the growth of industrialism, but they soon assumed political shape in the movements of nationalism and liberalism. The kind of social and economic order for which the institutions of dynastic monarchy and privileged aristocracy were peculiarly fitted was a more static order, based on landed property and agriculture, on religious faith and political inactivity. The kind of social and economic order which was coming into existence, first in western Europe and later in central and eastern Europe, was based on commercial and industrial wealth, on faith in science and seething popular energy. The old bottles could not indefinitely hold the new wine.

By 1848 it became obvious that the forces of conservatism were fighting a rear-guard action and a losing battle. New forms of government, better adapted to the needs of the new society, were set up. New political and social ideals, springing from the inherent nature of an industrial capitalist economy, fermented first in men's minds and then in movements of political and social revolt. Revolutions happened mainly because the spreading roots of a new system for producing wealth first cracked the hard foundations of the old order. The policies of governments were left behind by the quick advance of the human societies they purported to rule.

CHAPTER 8

THE PHASE OF CONSERVATISM, 1815-30

The System of Metternich

MOST fully characteristic of both the ideals and the arrangements of conservative government was the Austrian Empire of the Habsburgs. It lacked a strong middle class of merchants, businessmen, and manufacturers. A landed aristocracy was the predominant class, and the bulk of the population were peasants. The Austrian provinces themselves, as well as the more peripheral parts of the empire inhabited by Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Rumanians, and Poles, usually had provincial diets or "estates" on the medieval model, but these met rarely and irregularly and had no real power. So far as government and administration were carried on at all, it was by local nobles and by the police, army, and bureaucracy controlled from Vienna. Since the central administration was itself only loosely co-ordinated and slackly directed, the hand of government was light in every respect save in its systematic suppression of any forces which might send the whole intricate structure tumbling to the ground.

After 1815 these forces were pre-eminently those of liberalism and nationalism. They were most active in the universities, among a few army officers, in the small commercial middle classes, and above all on the periphery of the territories ultimately controlled by Austria. After the settlement of Vienna these included the Italian areas of Lombardy and Venetia, and most of the German Confederation over which Austria presided. Both the internal condition and the general European situation of Austria destined her government to be the avowed enemy of liberalism and nationalism throughout Europe. In Germany, Italy, and Poland especially, she stood as the major obstruction to movements of change. And these were the three countries where, as shown above, nationalist feeling had been especially stimulated.

The Austrian chancellor, Prince Metternich, devised his famous

"system" as the master plan for the preservation of Habsburg dominion. His system was no attempt to bring the motley territories of Austria into greater unity. That was accepted as being impossible. It rested, rather, on the exploitation of their disunity, on the time-honored Habsburg principle of "divide and rule." It meant stationing German regiments in Bohemia, and Hungarian troops in Lombardy. It meant keeping the German Confederation (*Bund*) a loose organization of princes such as Austria could dominate.

When the Diet of the Bund first met at Frankfurt in 1816, it was clear from the outset that here was no fulfillment of German nationalist hopes, but rather the deliberate frustration of them. In September, 1819, this body, at Metternich's instigation, ratified the Carlsbad Decrees. These decrees attacked particularly the patriotic student societies (*Burschenschaften*) that had appeared at most German universities after 1815, dissolving them and setting up inspectors for each university. They also enforced a more rigid and general censorship of the press. The following year Metternich persuaded all the German states to limit the subjects that might be discussed in parliamentary assemblies and to recognize the right of the federal authority to intervene in even the more liberal states of the Bund. In the southern states, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Saxe-Weimar, the rulers had recently set up new constitutions (*see* Map 6). In the most liberal of these the vote was narrowly limited, as in France, to men of wealth, and elected assemblies enjoyed slender control over the governments. But even this degree of liberalism was highly suspect to Metternich.

In 1817, through his agent Prince Wittgenstein, he succeeded in frightening King Frederick William III out of granting a similar constitution to Prussia, and so delayed the moment when Prussia might replace Austria in the leadership of Germany. It is anyhow doubtful whether a more constitutional and less bureaucratic regime could have governed the diverse and sprawling lands incorporated into the Prussian kingdom after 1815. In return for the loss of some Polish territory, Prussia gained at Vienna large slices of Saxony, Westphalia, and the Rhineland provinces. The latter, Catholic in religion and geographically detached from the rest of Prussia, presented very special problems of administration. They were traditionally linked more with the west than with the east, and had enjoyed the benefits of French law and government. In outlook, traditions, and interests they were particularly difficult for Prussia to assimilate, and they resented the new authority exercised over them from Berlin. The kingdom as a whole had more than doubled its population by the addition of $5\frac{1}{2}$ million subjects in the new territories. The Prussian government found its power enhanced, both by the excuses for greater centralization provided by these changes and by its sheer size in relation to other German states. But for some

years to come it was kept preoccupied with the tasks of administration and reorganization involved, and throughout the Bund as a whole Austrian influence was left predominant.

✓ Italy had not even the loose federal structure of the German Bund, and there Metternich made his influence felt partly through the Habsburg princes restored to power in 1815, partly through the ubiquitous secret police.) It was resented more in Italy than in the German states, because Italy had fared better under Napoleon. She had enjoyed a longer period of national cohesion, and had a more considerable middle class, at least in the northern provinces most directly subjected to Vienna. ✓ Habsburg methods proved particularly irritating in Lombardy and Venetia. To install Germans and Slavs in all the most important administrative posts and to refuse any real local autonomy were, in Italian eyes, unforgivable errors. Napoleon had taught the merits of a "career open to talents"; now Metternich closed all such doors.)

His influence in the smaller Italian states is well illustrated by the example of the little duchy of Parma. There ruled Marie Louise, the Habsburg princess who had married Napoleon for her country's good. She had neither hated nor loved him, and her chief emotion when news of Waterloo arrived was one of delight that the messenger admired the beauty of her ankles. Already the Austrian government had taken the precaution of giving her as a lover a dashing but one-eyed cavalry officer, and through him it now controlled her duchy of Parma. In the south, in Naples and Sicily, ruled the Bourbon Ferdinand I, intent upon keeping his autocratic powers discreetly masked behind a façade of benevolence. ✓ Everywhere there was censorship, popular ignorance, illiteracy, and economic squalor. The strength of Metternich's system in Italy lay in the divisions so carefully maintained in the peninsula. They gave great natural safeguards against any concerted nationalist movement of independence. There was no forceful Italian leadership, for the king of Piedmont and Sardinia, the most likely candidate for that role, was even more intent on eliminating French influences than on resisting Austrian.)

Yet Metternich's control over Italy was never as complete as over Germany. When he tried to form a confederation of Italian states corresponding, both in form and purpose, to the German Bund, Piedmont and the Pope successfully resisted this attempt to make them more dependent on Austria. They equally held out against his efforts to entice them into making separate treaties with Austria. Victor Emmanuel, the king of Piedmont and Sardinia, even tried to form a league of small states to oppose Austrian power in Italy. It was to include Piedmont, the Papal States, Bavaria, and Naples, but this too came to nothing because Naples and the Papacy refused to join. For these reasons Italy

was the Achilles' heel in the system of Metternich, and it was to impose some of the earliest and most severe strains on his ingenuity.

✓ In all his negotiations and arrangements the Austrian chancellor usually included a request that looked innocent but was a crucial part of his system. He proposed postal conventions that would enable foreign correspondence to pass through Austria. In Vienna he set up a special office for opening, decoding, and resealing all correspondence that came through the post. Everything of interest was copied and passed on to the Chancellery. This gave Metternich an astonishing amount of information about all foreign governments, and it was supplemented by constant reports from his army of spies and secret agents, as well as from the police. } To know in intimate detail what was going on everywhere became something of an obsession with him. He occasionally shocked foreign ambassadors by careless revelations of how much he knew, and pride in his own omniscience was one of his greatest weaknesses. But it was often well founded.

The lasting tensions bequeathed to the empires of Austria, Russia, and Prussia by their partitioning of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century had made it necessary to shelve the eastern question at Vienna in 1815. No agreement among them could have been reached had that explosive issue been handled. Austria held the large Polish province of Galicia. It resembled Italy in being the only other Austrian province to have a strong native nobility. The Polish landed nobility did not owe their position to the Habsburgs, and never forgot that they were Poles. } Polish nationalism—the desire to reunite the territories torn apart in the partitions—was stimulated when the tsar Alexander I in 1815 created a small and sadly truncated “Kingdom of Poland.” Though this area was entirely within Russian territory, and enjoyed little effective autonomy under tsarist overlordship, it served as a constant reminder of future possibilities. Metternich, inevitably, disapproved strongly of even this much concession to Polish memories and aspirations.

✓ The Polish revolt of 1830 was one of the most serious of that year of revolutions. It was a revolt of the Polish nobles and intellectuals of Galicia which, in 1846, was to give the first warning of the more general European revolutions of 1848. ✓ The revolt of 1846 was checked by the characteristic Austrian method: the peasants of the area were incited to rise against their landowners, and the revolt was converted into a *jacquerie* of Polish peasants against Polish landlords, which could then be easily and ruthlessly suppressed. } But during the peasant revolt the Austrian authorities had to abolish the hated *Robot*, or labor rent, the last legal tie that held the peasant to the soil. It was generally abolished in 1848. In this way, Habsburg methods of holding the territories

in subjection carried within themselves the seeds of their own destruction.

To sustain Habsburg domination by so intricate and subtle a balance between rival nationalities in the Austrian empire was an exacting and strenuous task of statecraft. It called for constant vigilance and remorseless determination. Both of these qualities Metternich had. But it was not only the needs of Austria which made him the master of the conservative forces in Europe. He had a vision that stretched beyond the boundaries of Austria. Metternich was by birth a west German—a Rhinelander—and he understood the interests of stability in Germany as a whole. He also had a philosophy of conservatism, a theory of how balance might best be kept in Europe as a continent. The contention of Metternich was that internal and international affairs were inseparable: that what happens inside one state is of some concern to other states, and entitles other states to take notice of, and even concerted action against, certain internal developments. Alexander stated this same doctrine in its most extreme form. He wanted a standing alliance of rulers to crush revolution anywhere. Metternich resisted this extreme version of his own doctrine, because he was also concerned for the over-all balance of power in Europe. But both wanted governmental action to extend horizontally and not merely vertically. Nationalists and liberals were alike opposed to this doctrine; and asserted instead the contrary doctrine that a government should be in specially close and mutual relationship with the people whom it governed. They wanted governmental action to be completely vertical, in the double sense that a government should rest upon national solidarity and unity, and should also express the wishes and serve the interests of the nation as a whole. They opposed its being horizontal because this violated the ideal of national independence and self-determination, and because it sacrificed a people's wishes and interests to those of foreign governments. Here were two totally contrasted conceptions of European order and policy. Between 1815 and 1848 they were fought out between Metternich and the revolutionaries of Europe, and there could be no compromise.

✓ Viewing the international scene in Europe after Waterloo, Metternich reached the conclusion that the restored monarchs must hang together if they were not to hang separately. There must be some machinery for concerted action. France, the traditional enemy of Habsburg power in Europe, had just been defeated. Safeguards against an early revival of French power had been erected at Vienna. But disputes which he knew French diplomacy would certainly exploit—disputes between Austria and her eastern neighbors, Russia and Turkey; disputes between Austria and her rivals in Germany and Italy, Prussia and Piedmont—would surely arise. So these must be settled as promptly and as smoothly as he could contrive. The means of settling them should

be a "concert of Europe" of the kind that had defeated Napoleon, and which must somehow be kept in existence after the immediate threat of Napoleon had been dispersed. Periodic congresses, at which the governments of the major powers could agree to a settlement of all disputes that might endanger the settlement and the peace of Europe, were the device that he, more than anyone else, invented. Four such congresses, shadows of the great Congress of Vienna, met—at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Laibach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822. The "congress system" reveals both the aims and methods of the forces of conservatism, and the increasing tensions that opened the doors to liberal and nationalist revolts.)

Congress Diplomacy

Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818. The first of the series, the Congress held at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, was concerned primarily with the full reinstatement of France. Since 1815 an ambassadorial conference in Paris, under the Duke of Wellington, had watched over France. It supervised the forces of occupation and arranged for the collection of the indemnity. By 1818 this work was completed and representatives of the major powers met to agree upon their future relations with France. They invited France to join a Quintuple Alliance to preserve the peace, but at the same time secretly renewed the old Quadruple Alliance as a safeguard against her. The tsar Alexander seized the opportunity to put forward some of his favorite idealistic projects—a scheme for disarmament, the formation of an international army, a general union to protect existing governments against revolution. Lord Castlereagh for Britain and Metternich for Austria opposed these schemes and conspired to block them. They placated Alexander by adopting a general slogan of "moral solidarity," and secured the substantial gain of readmitting France to a status of diplomatic equality with the other great powers of Europe. The indemnity was paid; the troops of occupation were withdrawn. The only other result of the Congress was to emphasize the continued contrast between the "balance of power" policies of Metternich and Britain, and the "Holy Alliance" policies of concerted intervention favored by Russia. The tsar's attempt to organize collective help for the Spanish king against the South American colonies met with no support. It was Lord Castlereagh who induced the Congress to refuse such help; and he was eventually joined by Metternich, who preferred subtler intervention to so defiant and sensational a way of supporting absolutism.

Troppau and Laibach, 1820-21. The same divergence of policies was the occasion for the Congress of Troppau in 1820 and its continuation at Laibach the following year, and again it was Spain that provided the

bone of contention. A successful military revolution in Madrid forced the king of Spain to revive the very democratic Constitution of 1812. The tsar Alexander took fright at the news. He circularized the monarchs of Europe calling for a congress to crush this constitution, if need be by armed intervention. This evoked a rejoinder from Lord Castlereagh, in his famous State Paper of May 5, 1820, which became the basis for future British foreign policy. He insisted that the Spanish revolution was entirely an internal concern of Spain, and to set up a system for automatic and collective intervention by other states in the internal affairs of any country undergoing revolutionary change was "impracticable and objectionable." He appealed to the governments concerned to keep the alliance "within its common-sense limits." Metternich, too, was at first opposed to summoning a congress for such purposes, but he agreed to one when revolutions broke out in Portugal, Piedmont, and Naples, each demanding likewise the Constitution of 1812. Britain and France agreed only to send observers to the congress.

At Troppau, Alexander persuaded the rulers of Austria and Prussia to join with him in threatening to make war on revolutions in the interests of kings. They jointly announced that they could never agree to recognizing the right of a people to restrict the power of its king. Despite further protests from Britain, Metternich undertook to suppress the constitutions of Piedmont and Naples. In March, 1821, the Austrian armies moved into these states and restored the power of their kings. Until September, 1822, an Austrian army 12,000 strong remained in Piedmont. Rebels were hunted down in the neighboring states, and thousands of patriots and liberals escaped abroad.

In Portugal a revolutionary situation had arisen because of the long absence of the royal family in Brazil. From 1809 to 1820 Portugal was in effect governed by the British soldier, Marshal Beresford, whose rule was resented by the upper and middle classes on both nationalist and liberal grounds. Encouraged by the Spanish revolution, the Portuguese army led a revolt in Oporto, which quickly spread to other towns. A provisional government was set up, demanding the return of the monarch from Brazil. A national assembly drafted a new constitution on the Spanish model. The aims of the movement are shown clearly enough by the new constitution. It established a single-chamber parliament, abolished feudalism, and guaranteed freedom of the press and the equality of all citizens. The new liberal government suppressed the Inquisition and some religious orders, and confiscated some of the Church lands. In October, 1822, King John VI swore allegiance to the new constitution, which he was soon to abrogate—in 1826 and 1827 even Britain was obliged to interfere in Portugal to preserve the forms of constitutional government. Meanwhile his eldest son, Dom Pedro, whom he had left

as regent of Brazil, proclaimed its independence from Portugal and accepted the title of Emperor. By 1825 Portugal was compelled to recognize the loss of Brazil. Combined with the successful breakaway of the Spanish South American colonies, this severed the direct dynastic and governmental links between Europe and the whole of Latin America, save for the Spanish territories in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the small British, Dutch, and French possessions in Guiana.

Verona, 1822. The Congress of Verona in 1822 was occasioned by revolution in yet another part of Europe. In March, 1821, the Greeks revolted against the Turks. It was a national movement of Christian Greeks against the tyranny of Moslem Turkey. The immediate danger, from the point of view of Metternich, Castlereagh, and all who wanted to keep the peace in Europe, was that the tsar Alexander would go to war with Turkey in support of the Christian Greeks. To Metternich the interests of monarchy and of the balance of power took precedence over all such religious affinities. He accordingly pressed for one more congress, to meet in the autumn of 1822. But during the summer disturbances in Spain continued and France showed signs of interfering there; and when the Congress met at Verona it had to give even more attention to the affairs of Spain than to those of Greece. By then Castlereagh had committed suicide and was succeeded by George Canning, whose hostility to congresses and projects of armed intervention in other states was even more vehement than Castlereagh's. His firm resistance to intervention prevented any joint action in Spain, although France in 1823 separately invaded Spain, abolished the constitution, and restored King Ferdinand. The danger of Russian intervention in Greece was avoided by Britain's extracting a promise from the Turkish government that it would institute reforms, and for a time the Greek revolt continued without any interference. Verona marked the completion of the breach between Britain and her partners in the Quadruple and Quintuple Alliances. Canning had less knowledge than Castlereagh of European affairs. He was a more impetuous and intransigent man, and felt stronger sympathies with liberal movements abroad. On October 30, 1822, when the Duke of Wellington communicated to the Congress Canning's firm refusal to intervene in Spain, it was received as a bombshell. It meant the end of the alliance so far as the western powers were concerned. "Things are getting back to a wholesome state again," remarked Canning, "every nation for itself and God for us all."

By 1823 the outcome of the Congress system was the disintegration of the diplomatic alliances made in 1814 and the hardening of the positions of both the forces of conservatism and the forces of change. On one hand, the successful suppression of movements of revolt in Italy and Spain left Austria stronger than ever in Europe, and with her

triumphed the cause of absolutist monarchies. On the other hand, the old order had been more successfully challenged in Portugal and Greece, and Britain had come out openly as the champion of movements for national independence and constitutional government. These revolts were not, it must be noted, in any sense connected with the growth of population or of industrialism. They were characteristically nationalist revolutions, protests against foreign influences and interference and against the excesses of absolutist and clericalist government. They were strongly tinged with liberalism and constitutionalism, but not always with democracy and never with socialism.

In two major ways the outcome was of great importance for the future of nationalism and liberalism. One was that the independence of the Spanish colonies was confirmed. The successful intervention of France in Spain in 1823, and the ferocious reaction that Ferdinand led after his restoration in Madrid, prompted Canning to look elsewhere for revenge. To forestall any plan to bring the South American colonies back to Spanish rule, and to promote the growing trade between England and these colonies, Canning encouraged President Monroe to throw the weight of the United States on to their side. Monroe's famous Message to Congress of December, 1823, did this; and it was delivered with the knowledge that British naval power would ensure that the policy of proclaiming "hands off South America" had some sanction behind it. In 1822 the United States had already recognized the new republics of South America, and in 1825 Britain recognized the independence of Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico. By 1830 the present states of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela had been formed by the division of the independent colonies. The five central American states joined in 1823 to form the Confederation of the United Provinces of Central America, which survived until 1838. Canning flamboyantly declared that he had "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

The other impetus to nationalist and liberal movements came from the successful Greek War of Independence. From 1820 until 1825 the Greek patriots fought alone, and the only help they got from sympathetic powers was the withholding of help from both sides in the struggle. Russia was restrained from helping the Greeks by Austrian and British pressure. Metternich wanted to let the revolt burn itself out "beyond the pale of civilization." But in 1825, when the sultan of Turkey received highly successful help from Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt, Russia could be held back no longer. Britain joined with her in putting pressure on Turkey to grant the Greeks an armistice and some degree of independence. The reluctance to use force caused further delay until 1827, when France joined them in making a treaty (July 6, 1827) to use force if necessary in order to get Turkish agreement. In October, soon after

Canning's death, squadrons of the British, French, and Russian fleets destroyed the Turkish and Egyptian navies at the Battle of Navarino. The following year Russia formally declared war on Turkey, and France sent troops to compel Turkish withdrawal from the Morea. Turkey made peace in the Treaty of Adrianople (September, 1829). In 1830 Greek independence was ensured, and was guaranteed by Russia, France, and Britain. The new state became a monarchy in 1833 when a Bavarian prince was crowned as Otto I, King of the Hellenes. The long and desperate struggle of the Greeks enlisted immense enthusiasm among liberals everywhere in Europe. It was a heroic and epic struggle, and became a token of nationalist success. Philhellenism was the special form that nationalism took in this age of romanticism; its victory gave inspiration to the revolutionaries of 1830.

Insofar as the congress system meant that the great powers of Europe could usefully meet together from time to time to resolve disputes among them and to preserve a certain balance of power in the continent, it met with partial success and helped to keep the peace. At successive congresses such questions as the abolition of slavery, navigation of the Danube, and arbitration of disputes were considered. But insofar as it came to serve the purposes of the Holy Alliance and of at least some partners of the Quadruple Alliance, it was a disturbing force in Europe. The principle of joint intervention, generally accepted in reference to the ex-enemy state of France, became an excuse for a universal meddlesomeness that chimed with the real interests neither of Metternich nor of Britain. Each power in turn was prompted to intervene: Austria in Piedmont and Naples, France in Spain and Greece, Britain in Portugal and Greece, Russia in Greece. Britain, alarmed by the interventions of reactionary monarchs and by the ambiguous aims of Russia in Turkey, found herself committed to the paradoxical policy of "intervening to prevent intervention." Even the long and tense achievement of "holding the ring" during the Greek revolution broke down in the end, and meanwhile brought terrible losses to the Greeks. The protest of the Monroe Doctrine against the practice of intervention for or against existing regimes helped to force upon public attention this fundamental issue of international relationships. Neither the forces of conservatism nor those of nationalism and liberalism derived unmitigated benefits from it. Intervention favored monarchs in Spain and Naples, liberal rebels in Portugal and Greece; but neither dynastic monarchy nor national independence stood to gain in the long run from accepting the doctrine that external powers might properly intervene in the internal affairs of states. It was discovered by experience that the congress system could mean generalizing, and so magnifying, every dispute; it meant alerting governments everywhere whenever there was an insurrection anywhere. By making peace "indivisible" it made peace more fragile, for the rival

interests of the major powers were implicated in each revolutionary crisis. The "concert of Europe," viewed by the conservative powers as a dam against revolution, was thought of by Britain rather as a sluice gate, allowing for a measured flow of national and liberal progress. This conflict of purposes was to last for half a century.¹

The Romantic Revolutionaries

THE SUPPRESSION of revolutions in the 1820's drove the most enthusiastic nationalists and liberals underground or into exile. It inaugurated an age of secret societies and conspiracies, of which the epidemics of revolution in 1830 were the direct consequence. The dispersal of Italian, Spanish, and Greek patriots throughout Europe—mostly to the more tolerant countries of Britain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands—made liberalism more of an international movement. The concerted action of the governments to crush revolution, organized in the system of Metternich and the congresses, produced a similar concerted action of revolutionaries. The cousinhood of kings fostered the brotherhood of rebels; and ferocity of repression gave rise to an equal fanaticism of resistance.

Secret Societies. The ultimate models for most secret societies were the Lodges of eighteenth-century Freemasonry, and from them was derived much of the ritual, ceremonies of initiation, secret signs and passwords. The more immediate models were the secret societies formed in Italy and Germany to resist the rule of Napoleon: especially the *Tugendbund* (League of Virtue) in Germany and the *Carbonari* (charcoal burners) of Italy, both founded by 1810. But a rich variety of similar organizations appeared throughout Europe: the *Federati* of Piedmont and the *Adelphi* in Lombardy, the Spanish liberal societies after 1815, the Philomathians of Poland modeled on the German students' *Burschenschaften*, the Russian Union of Salvation of 1816 and the republican Society of the South.

These societies were in very much less close touch with one another than Metternich and most governments believed. They nursed very different aims and rested on widely varied social bases. Some attracted army officers; others students, professional people, and intellectuals; others the lower clergy or small proprietors. They inevitably included some adventurers and even criminals, and it was seldom difficult to get spies inserted into their ranks. Their most common feature was a spirit of patriotic and nationalist independence, a desire to throw off foreign rule or break the bonds of absolutist monarchy. But within that common characteristic they might be constitutionalist or republican, clericalist

¹ See pp. 155 and 295.

or anticlericalist, aristocratic or plebeian. Even when they kept in communication with one another, and partially concerted action as in 1820 and 1830, they seldom acted with real unanimity. Attracting desperate and usually brave men, compelled to work under conditions of secrecy and mystery—for they risked their lives if they failed—they favored heroic insurrections and the wildest hopes. It was the perfect breeding ground for idealists and dreamers, no less than for charlatans and ruffians. No project was too fantastic, no vision too unrealistic, to attract their enthusiasm. The revolutionary movements between 1815 and 1848 are incomprehensible until it is recalled that these were the years of the romantic movement in Europe, and they were indeed one facet of that movement.

Romantic Movement. It is true that some of the greatest romantic writers of the early nineteenth century were in temperament religious and conservative. Sir Walter Scott in Britain revived, in his great series of Waverley novels, an interest in the Middle Ages and so in traditionalism, and was an ardent Tory. His novels were widely read in Europe, and the tsar Nicholas I of Russia read them aloud to his Prussian wife. The Lake poets, William Wordsworth, Robert Southey, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, had all in their day been enthusiastic in support of the French Revolution; by 1815 they were all supporters of conservatism, traditionalism, and religion. In France, until 1824, the novelist and poet René Chateaubriand supported the restoration of the Bourbons; he represented Louis XVIII at the Congress of Verona, and even served as minister of foreign affairs. His *Génie du Christianisme* of 1802 was a glorification of ultramontane Roman Catholicism. His royalism was tempered by a desire for constitutional monarchy, and under Charles X of France he joined the opposition to the absolutist policies of that monarch. But he remained ultramontane in belief, and never became republican. His influence on French literature was almost supreme in his generation, and it was in general a conservative influence. In Germany, the great romantics Friedrich Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel repeated the spiritual and political pilgrimage of the English Lake poets. Both came to attack the rationalism and "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century, to defend authoritarian and paternalist government, and to idealize the Middle Ages. The Roman Church had no more devoted apologists. The greatest of all German literary figures, Wolfgang Goethe, was aged sixty-six in 1815, though he lived until 1832. He had admired Napoleon, and lent no support to the liberal or insurrectionist movements.

Despite the extent to which all these romantic writers of the decade after 1815 shared in the conservative and clericalist trends of the times, the romantic movement as a whole corroded the cosmopolitan and non-nationalist outlook on which absolutism had prospered. Even when their

works did not directly spread liberal ideas, the romantic writers did promote nationalist sentiments. As the Germany of Goethe, Novalis, and Schlegel replaced France as the focus of cultural and intellectual interests, so emphasis shifted to pride in nationalism and *Volksgeist*, the particular genius of a people, and away from rationalism and cosmopolitanism. The romantic movement, in all its cultural forms, emphasized emotion and sentiment rather than reason and intellect. By turning attention to a misty past, it stirred pride in folk tales and past heroisms. By its very traditionalism, it appealed to sentiments of separatism: it reminded men of all that was special, individual, and personal. By its emphasis on creative and 'original genius, it made human personality seem more important than society and implicitly condemned restrictions on individual freedom of expression; and in its search for the creative genius of an age or of a people it nourished belief in the supreme value of popular traditions and national development. It made it easy to abandon rationalism for nationalism.

Moreover, the younger generation of romantic artists and writers who took the stage after about 1820 had more affinities with liberalism and democracy than with conservatism. For a time the greatest figures in European romanticism were again French and English rather than German. Victor Hugo, Alphonse de Lamartine, Prosper Mérimée, Honoré de Balzac, Percy Bysshe Shelley, John Keats, and Lord Byron began to dominate the scene. This new generation saw romanticism as the literature of emancipation, and were not averse to allying their artistic revolt with political revolution. Byron proclaimed, "I have simplified my politics into a detestation of all existing governments," and he became an immense personal influence throughout Europe in support of nationalist and liberal causes. Hugo put it simply that "Romanticism is liberalism in literature." Even the widespread influence of the German romantic movement in eastern and northern Europe flowed partly through the medium of *De l'Allemagne*, the remarkable study of German nationalism by the Frenchwoman, Madame de Staël. In Russia the poet and dramatist, Alexander Pushkin, wrote his two greatest works, *Boris Godunov* and *Eugen Onegin*, in the 1820's; and in Poland the young liberal Adam Mickiewicz produced his great epic of the Polish nation, *Conrad Wallenrod*, in 1828. Both showed the impact of Byronic themes and spirit. Among the Austrian subjects of the Balkans appeared Czech, Magyar, and Serbian poets to revive popular interest in the folk legends and wistful memories of past glories. In the Scandinavian lands collections were made of legends and folk songs.

The strongest link between the revolutionaries and the romantic movement was the movement of Philhellenism, formed by all throughout the continent who sympathized with the long Homeric struggle of the

Greeks against their Turkish rulers. The Greek war for independence aroused every impulse behind the romantic movement. It recalled the crusades in its heroism and in its struggle between Cross and Crescent. It sufficiently evoked the old sense of the unity of Christendom for both the Pope and Louis XVIII of France to contribute money to the cause. As committees in nearly every country, including the United States, raised funds to help the Greeks, the new generation of romantic writers threw its influence into the struggle. Chateaubriand and Hugo in France, above all Shelley and Byron in England, sponsored the cause. "We are all Greeks," exclaimed Shelley, and the young Lord Byron, dying in Greece in 1824, became the symbol of the new spirit. Philhellenism created a new current of European opinion—a great flow of opinion in favor of nationalism and liberalism—running counter to the policies and practices of most existing governments. It won its greatest triumph when it compelled the governments of Britain, France, and Russia to intervene on behalf of the Greeks in 1827.²

Mazzini and Buonarroti. Typical of the romantic enthusiasm infused into the new revolutionary movements was the career of Giuseppe Mazzini. He was the son of a doctor and professor of anatomy in Genoa. From very early youth he was brought into the nationalist and democratic movement in Italy. In 1815 when he was only ten years old, Genoa was put under the uncongenial rule of Piedmont, and Genoa as a city bitterly resented this forfeiture of its republican liberties. When the *Carbonari* risings of 1820-21 were crushed, the city was filled with defeated Piedmontese liberals, and their plight left a deep impression on the young Mazzini. As a student in the 1820's he devoured most of the great works of the romantic writers of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany. He claimed later that his favorite books were the Bible and Dante, Shakespeare and Byron; but he read, too, Goethe and Schiller, Scott and Hugo, Herdér and Mickiewicz. His life is one of the best examples of how close became the affinities between romanticism and revolution. Mazzini and his friends saturated themselves in contemporary romanticism, with a good leavening of the greatest Italian writers of the past—Dante and Machiavelli especially—who embodied traditions of Italian patriotism. Devotion to literature competed, throughout Mazzini's life, with service of politics. In his journalistic writings of this decade, mostly contriving to cheat the censorship by concealing political arguments behind literary essays, he drifted more and more into the work of a liberal agitator. He joined the *Carbonari*, though he was well aware of its defects and its relative ineffectiveness. From these experiences he derived the idea of a new movement of his own, appealing more directly to the younger generation. By 1831 this idea bore fruit in the

² See p. 118.

"Young Italy" movement.³ It was men of Mazzini's generation and outlook who were to make the European revolutions of 1848.

It was amid this stirring of nationalist sentiments and in this swiftly changing scene that the secret societies and conspirators went to work. The *Carbonari* spread its activities throughout Europe and gave rise in 1821 to its French counterpart, the *Charbonnerie*. In 1828 there appeared in Brussels a work, written by a veteran French revolutionary, Philippe Buonarroti, that was to become a textbook of revolutionaries. This strange man had shared in the famous plot led by Gracchus Babeuf in 1796.⁴ Buonarroti's book now made it the basis of a great republican legend. He had promised his fellow conspirators that he would eventually tell the full story of the plotters and their aims, and this task was fulfilled in his two volumes on *Conspiration pour l'égalité dite de Babeuf*. It gave the revived liberal movement a direct and symbolic link with the great Revolution. Since 1815 Buonarroti, who was by birth an Italian, had turned his attention to the liberation and unification of Italy through republicanism. This preoccupation brought him into touch with the *Carbonari* and with Mazzini's "Young Italy" movement. He tried to found a Society of *Sublimes-Maitres-Parfaits*, or trained revolutionary *élite*, and urged the use of Freemasonry as a façade for conspiracy. He lived in Geneva until 1823, when he moved to the Netherlands. He did not return to France until after the July Revolution of 1830. But meanwhile, through the *Carbonari* and through his book, he acquired the respect and attention of the new generation of young revolutionaries of western Europe. This influence grew rapidly in France after 1830.

The combination of internal and international tensions during the 1820's gave nationalist and liberal movements a new leverage for gaining their ends against conservatism. Whether this new leverage produced piecemeal reforms and concessions, or a more disruptive accumulation of grievances liable to explode in violent revolution, depended chiefly on the policies followed by each state. A parliamentary and constitutional regime like the British fostered a moderate and even liberal toryism, and marked the beginning of an age of reform. A semiparliamentary and semiconstitutional regime like the French raised more hopes than it could satisfy, and ended in a change of monarch but little change of national policy. A completely unparliamentary and absolutist regime like the Austrian or Russian produced violent revolution, which the forces of conservatism were still powerful enough to crush. There was a sense in which each regime got the kind of liberal revolutionaries it deserved. The differing characters and outcomes of the upheavals of 1830-32 in each country were determined by the nature of the policies pursued by

³ See p. 150.

⁴ See p. 25.

the governments between 1815 and 1830; and it is necessary to examine these before considering the events of 1830.

New Wine in Old Bottles

The Restored Monarchy. The failure of the restored monarchy in France was by no means a foregone conclusion. The restoration rested on a Charter, granted by Louis XVIII in 1814, and in this respect it was fundamentally different from the monarchy of Louis XVI. The existing Legislature drew up a draft constitution that, on May 2, 1814, Louis XVIII accepted in principle. He announced that he was returning to his ancestral throne, but that he would invite members of the Senate and the Legislative Body to help him to draw up a constitution. This was duly done by June 4. Its first articles guaranteed certain fundamental liberties: equality before the law and equal eligibility for civil and military office; freedom from arbitrary arrest and trial; freedom of conscience, worship, and expression; inviolability of private property, including purchases of the national lands. Political opinions and actions prior to the restoration would not be inquired into. France was given a system of parliamentary government with two chambers and responsibility of ministers. The restored monarchy was in form a constitutional, parliamentary regime, designed to safeguard individual rights.

On the other hand, the forms and ideas of an absolute and hereditary monarchy were also preserved alongside these provisions. Louis claimed that he had really been king since his brother's execution, and referred to 1814 as "the nineteenth year of our reign." He insisted in the preamble to the constitution that it was granted "voluntarily, and by the free exercise of our royal authority." Whereas royalists could point out that what the king had given he could also take away, constitutionalists could point to the king's oath that he would keep the conditions laid down in it. These ambiguities and inconsistencies of the new regime betray its effort to find a compromise between monarchy and liberalism.

Divine right and constitutional limitations were uneasy bedfellows. Yet they might have reached eventual harmony had Louis been succeeded by a monarch of equal tact and similar determination not to go on his travels again. The Bourbon restoration in France repeated the story of the Stuart restoration in England after 1660. Just as Charles II was succeeded by his more intransigent brother, James II, who forfeited the throne after three years, so Louis XVIII was succeeded in 1824 by his unstatesmanlike brother, Charles X, who forfeited the throne after six years. In each case a combination of ultraroyalist principles and extremist religious policies led to violations of the constitution, un-

scrupulous political maneuvers, and eventual revolution. But there was nothing inevitable about this revolution in 1830, as so many liberal historians have assumed. It was the result of policies which could have been different had the factors of royal personality or even of governmental behavior been other than they were. Republicanism was not strong after 1815, nor was Bonapartism; and many liberals were content enough with a Bourbon monarchy provided it loyally accepted constitutional limitations on absolute power and worked through parliamentary institutions.

A further factor of importance was France's relative inexperience with working parliamentary institutions. In this respect France was very different from Great Britain. British constitutional government was able to develop, even during the period of die-hard conservatism and repression, because behind it lay centuries of practical experience in how representative institutions could impose controls on kings and parliamentary procedures on their ministers. French parliamentary traditions were only a quarter of a century old in 1815, and the record of representative assemblies in France was broken, turbulent, and inconclusive. In Britain a series of subtle conventions, not laid down in any charter, determined the conditions on which governments could secure a reliable parliamentary majority, the circumstances in which they must resign or in which they could expect the monarch to dissolve parliament and appeal to the electorate, the procedures of parliamentary debate, and above all the responsibilities of ministers, individually and collectively, to the House of Commons. Some of these conventions and almost tacit understandings were of fairly recent date; but by 1815 they were accepted without challenge. In France precedents were contradictory and indecisive. The Charter merely stipulated that although the executive power belonged to the king, "his ministers are responsible." It provided no clear ways in which the legislature could make them responsible to it. At first there was no party system, and ministers were not questioned in the Chamber. France, like Britain, had a certain number of skilled and experienced parliamentarians, with an instinctive understanding of how to work large assemblies; but they were not the men who found most favor in the Chamber after 1815, nor among those who surrounded the king. Nor was their role in opposition to the ministry at all well defined, whereas it was in 1826 that the English radical M.P., John Cam Hobhouse, first coined amid parliamentary laughter the significant phrase, "His Majesty's Opposition."

Apart from these important differences, the governments of France and Britain between 1815 and 1830 rested on similar foundations. In each country the vote was restricted to a small and wealthy section of the population; in each the government of these years was predominantly conservative in policy. Compared with most other monarchies in Europe,

they were constitutionalist and parliamentary. In their general policy in Europe they found a good deal in common, for both resisted the attempts of Metternich to manage European affairs from Vienna. The liberal-tory ministries that governed Britain in the 1820's were sensitive to the needs and the demands of the growing business and commercial interests. At the Board of Trade Thomas Huskisson and F. J. Robinson (later Lord Goderich) relaxed the restrictions on shipping and simplified and reduced duties on imports and exports. These measures were typical of the gradual liberalizing of domestic policy in England during these years. The governments of Louis XVIII were equally responsive to business interests. They were honest and prudent in their financial policy, and gave the country solid prosperity while they put the state on a sounder financial footing than it had ever known under the old monarchy. Public loans were raised with such striking success that leading bankers, who had distrusted Bourbon loans and leaned toward the opposition, before long begged the government for a share in the profitable business. In both countries the trend of conservative parliamentary government was toward enlisting the support of the rising *bourgeoisie*. To this extent Louis XVIII and Charles X had a more solid basis for their power than their brother Louis XVI had ever had.

The men who served the restored Bourbons as ministers were partly *grands seigneurs* of the old order, like the Duc de Richelieu, the Vicomte de Martignac, who held power in 1828-29, and the Prince de Polignac, whose ultraconservative temperament appealed particularly to Charles X. They were partly, too, new men of more humble origin whose fortunes and abilities had brought them to the forefront. Pre-eminent among these was the Comte de Villèle, who led the government for nearly seven years (1821-28). During the French Revolution he had settled in the French colonies in the Indian Ocean, married the daughter of a rich planter, and made a fortune under the Empire by selling indigo and other colonial exports in France. Another minister who had risen suddenly was the Duc Decazes, favorite of Louis XVIII. He had begun his career as secretary to Napoleon's mother, and entered politics through the bureaucracy. In general the new men served the restored monarchy rather better than did the men of the old aristocracy. They had a more instinctive and businesslike sense of the country's needs, and were more in tune with the interests of the restive *bourgeoisie*. Another category, making a more direct link of continuity with the Napoleonic regime, included those old unfaithfuls, Talleyrand and Fouché, who had served in turn the Revolution and Napoleon, and were resolved not to allow their careers to be interrupted by such minor intrusions as a royalist restoration. Baron Louis who took charge of finance and Baron Pasquier who took the Ministry of Justice were likewise Napoleonic functionaries who had survived the events of 1815.

The restored monarchy enjoyed other continuities with the Empire besides those of personalities. Louis kept intact the legal codes and judicial procedures, the centralized administrative system resting on the prefects and subprefects in each *département*, the whole system of direct and indirect taxation with the machinery for collecting it, including even the protective duties designed to benefit the big landowners and manufacturers. All this gave the restored Bourbons a degree of strength, efficiency, and centralized authority unknown to their royal predecessors. The crucial question was whether this enhanced power of the central government would be used in conformity with the principles of constitutional government, or whether it would come to be used as a weapon against constitutionalism. It was, as Napoleon had designed it to be, the machinery of despotism, and it lost little of its strength by the mere change of personages on the throne. When the first elections of July, 1815, gave the extreme royalists a majority of 350 out of 420 in the Chamber of Deputies, and 100 new peers were added to the upper house, the ultraroyalists hoped to use their power to exceed even the king's wishes for a counterrevolution. Hence the paradox that in the early years it was the extreme right that was most insistent that ministers should be subject to the wishes of the Chamber, and that government policy should be shaped in accordance with the wishes of the majority in parliament; it was the moderates who wanted the milder policy of the king to prevail. The ultras, being more royalist than the king, were also more parliamentary than the constitutionalists—but only so long as they could rely on the "Incomparable Chamber" (*Chambre introuvable*) of 1815.

Their earliest use of this power was to pass laws setting up special military tribunals, laws against seditious writings, and laws of proscription which sent into exile many of the most eminent men of the Empire. The result was that in September, 1816, the king dissolved the Chamber, and the elections gave the moderates a majority. Led by Decazes, Pasquier, Royer-Collard, and Guizot, these moderate royalists followed the policy of "royalizing the nation, nationalizing the Crown." Winning the confidence and support of the wealthier *bourgeoisie* by an efficient financial policy aimed at restoring stability and balance to state finances, they made possible the rise of a still more liberal group of moderate parliamentarians, calling themselves "Independents." These included bankers like Laffitte and the Delessert brothers, merchants like Ternaux, and businessmen like Casimir-Périer. To the left of them again appeared a republican group, led by the veteran Lafayette, and including such famous names as Voyer d'Argenson, Benjamin Constant, Godefroy Cavaignac, and Hippolyte Carnot. By 1818 these Independents and Republicans combined with unrepentant Bonapartists like General Thiard, a former aide-de-camp of Napoleon, to form a more concerted

opposition party. The moderate governments of the Duc de Richelieu, General Dessolle, and Duc Decazes which held power between 1817 and 1821 had therefore to steer a middle course between the pressure of the ultras from the right and the demands of this new opposition on the left. When they failed, because of a resurgence of ultraroyalism in 1821, their place was taken by the more extreme right ministry of Villèle.

Villèle, always the shrewd and realistic man of business, pursued the aims of the extremists with the prudence and studied caution of the moderates. His policy was to restrain the impatient ultras but to win France to their cause by making her drowsy with material prosperity, peace, and good business. Using the machinery of public order even more systematically but also more wisely than did his predecessors, he skillfully kept bourgeois opinion just apprehensive enough of risings and conspiracies to preserve its support. Every actual attempt of the romantic revolutionaries to spread republicanism was exposed and exploited to the full; and even more tenuous plots could always be exaggerated when there were no serious conspiracies to suit his convenience. If real culprits could not be caught and savagely punished, victims could be found to serve the same purpose. This insidious and clever policy was bearing fruit, despite the growing feud between Villèle and Chateaubriand about the latter's desire for a more active and interventionist foreign policy, when Louis XVIII died in August, 1824. His hopes of reconciling Crown and nation had by no means been achieved. The accession of Charles X, who as Comte d'Artois had been for fifty years the favorite of the ultras, meant that it would never be fulfilled.

The Chamber of 1824, elected at the end of the previous year in elections that were thoroughly "managed" by the prefects and other government officials, was so reminiscent of the original *Chambre introuvable* that it was christened the *Chambre retrouvée* (Comparable Chamber). When Charles X succeeded to the throne in September, the ultras felt that they had a free hand. The new king was the king of a party in a sense that his brother had not been. They proceeded to carry out much of their original program. Control of education was given to the Church by making a bishop minister of education. An indemnity, amounting in practice to some 650,000 francs, was paid to the *émigrés* who had lost their estates. The first of these measures flouted the anticlericalist sentiments of the *bourgeoisie*, the second attacked their pockets. The money was found by converting 5 per cent annuities into annuities of 3 per cent.

Charles insisted on being crowned at Reims with the elaborate ritual of the *ancien régime*, and this was taken as symbolic of his intention to revive the whole of the prerevolutionary order. When the Jesuits reappeared and sacrilege was made a crime punishable by death, wide-

spread fears of an extreme clericalist reaction were aroused. The government's attacks on its liberal critics, the prosecutions of publishers and the imprisonment of journalists, solidified liberal opposition. Though opposition was not strong inside parliament, it gained in strength in the country. The extremist policy, moreover, split the ranks of the royalists themselves, for many churchmen feared and opposed the power of the Jesuits. At the elections of 1827 the opposition gained a majority of 60, and in January, 1828, Villèle was obliged to resign. The loss of his ability and astuteness was a prelude to the downfall of the king himself.

His successor, the Vicomte de Martignac, adopted a more conciliatory policy. He abolished the censorship of the press and checked the growth of clericalist control over education. This policy eased the tension but was disliked by the king. In 1829 Charles X replaced Martignac by the Prince de Polignac, a former *émigré* and an ultraroyalist of the most extravagant kind. Polignac formed a ministry of the extreme right, which was bound to be in complete conflict with the existing Chamber. The open clash came in March, 1830, when the Chamber reminded the king that "the permanent harmony of the political views of your Government with the wishes of your people is the indispensable condition for the conduct of public affairs." That was the permanent constitutional issue of the restoration: should ministers be responsible to the king alone, or to parliament? When Charles dissolved the Chamber, he was asserting that they must be responsible to him alone; and when the elections of July returned an opposition that was 53 stronger than before, the king was obliged to fall back on royal prerogatives and attempt a virtual *coup d'état*. In itself an admission that constitutional monarchy had failed in France under a Bourbon king, this was a signal for open battle between king and country. The result, the Revolution of July, is described below.⁵

The Bourbons, it was often said, had "learned nothing and forgotten nothing." This is less than just. Louis XVIII had learned that royal power had to be reconciled, partly by kingly prudence and partly by acceptance of parliamentary rules, with the new forces of liberalism and the interests of the wealthier *bourgeoisie*. He had chosen ministers whose abilities and statecraft restored French prestige in Europe while they brought speedy national recovery in economic life and in financial stability. Until the depression of 1825 France's commercial prosperity was great and her credit high. Her population grew by 3 million in the fifteen years between 1815 and 1830. Her material progress, in agriculture, industry, and transport, was solid. By 1829 gas lighting had become general in the city of Paris. The age of railways was just beginning. In the very month of revolution, July, 1830, the completion of the conquest of Algiers marked the beginning of a great new colonial empire in Africa. But the

⁵ See p. 144.

Bourbons, and especially Charles X, had not learned that in nineteenth-century conditions material prosperity and progress were no substitute for constitutional liberties and responsible government. The restored monarchy failed because it accommodated itself to nationalism but not to liberalism.

Liberal Toryism in Britain. The comparison with contemporary happenings in Britain is illuminating. There, with parliamentary traditions, conventions, and habits well established and generally accepted, constitutional government worked more smoothly. Tory governments held power under Lord Liverpool until 1827, and then under George Canning, Lord Goderich, and the Duke of Wellington until 1830. Prudent financial policies and the businesslike handling of public affairs encouraged a revival of economic prosperity after the agricultural depression of 1815-16 and the commercial crisis of 1819. In Britain, as in France, more liberal and radical reforms were stubbornly resisted. But conservatism in Britain was more ready than was royalism in France to make timely concessions and to place public welfare above party interests.

It was not that monarchy was particularly popular. Until 1830 the regency and then the reign of George IV brought it no enhanced prestige, for neither in personal behavior nor in political shrewdness was he admirable. When he died in 1830 *The Times* commented, "There never was an individual less regretted by his fellow-creatures than this deceased King. What eye has wept for him? What heart has heaved one sigh of unmercenary sorrow?" His brother William IV, who succeeded him until 1837, was considerably more popular but was held in little respect. As *The Spectator* wrote on his death, "His late Majesty, though at times a jovial and, for a king, an honest man, was a weak, ignorant, commonplace sort of person. . . . His very popularity was acquired at the price of something like public contempt." The monarchy, before the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837, was surviving in spite of the monarchs.

Two enactments of these years express precisely the cautious reformism of the new conservatism in Britain. One was abolition of the Combination Laws in 1824, the other the giving of civil equality to Protestant dissenters in 1828 and to Roman Catholics in 1829. The Combination Laws had been passed in 1799 and 1800, at the height of the wartime repression. They had forbidden associations of various kinds, and in particular had made working-class organization illegal and laid trade unions open to the charge of conspiracy. Manufacturers came to believe that this prohibition caused trouble rather than prevented it. Francis Place, the "Radical tailor of Charing Cross," led a movement for the repeal of these laws. He believed that once workers had the legal freedom to form trade unions and conduct collective bargaining with their employers, they would not need to do so and trade unions would die a

natural death. Place and his chief agent in Parliament, the radical Joseph Hume, steered through the Commons a bill putting trade unions on a status of legal equality with employers' associations. As soon as the bill was passed, there was an epidemic of strikes accompanied by violence. In 1825 a second act was therefore passed, severely restricting the use of intimidation and violence but accepting the legality of trade unions for regulating wages and hours of labor. Using this moderate freedom, trade unions during the following decade greatly extended their activities. They were freed from the need to behave like secret societies. New unions were formed, with open constitutions and published books of rules. They could freely bargain about conditions of work.

The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 made it possible for Protestant dissenters to hold legally most of the highest offices in civil government, and commissions in the armed services, which had hitherto been a monopoly of members of the Church of England. Although dissenters had come to enjoy a large measure of practical toleration, it was the denial of religious and legal equality which rankled, and which had come to seem out of tune with nineteenth-century ideas. The growing strength and numbers of Methodism reinforced the demand. Nonconformists now numbered some 2 million out of a population of 15 million. This victory for the principle of religious equality paved the way for tackling the more difficult issue of Roman Catholic emancipation. Roman Catholics in England numbered only some 60,000. It was in Ireland that the issue was most burning. Since 1801 Ireland had had no parliament of its own, but had the right to elect members to the United Kingdom parliament in Westminster. The legal disabilities imposed on Roman Catholics did not prevent them from voting but kept the great majority of the Irish population from holding responsible civil or political office. Daniel O'Connell revived an older "Catholic Association," with wide popular membership and a subscription of a penny a month, nicknamed the "Catholic rent." Its aim was to promote the candidature of members of Parliament pledged to support Catholic emancipation at Westminster; but all such members had to be Protestants, since Catholics could not sit in parliament.

Because 200,000 Irishmen had a vote and because freedom of association was legally permitted, the Association was able to avoid all the characteristic weaknesses of the secret conspiracies of contemporary Europe. Its meetings and proceedings were open, its methods peaceful. In 1828 O'Connell was elected member of parliament for County Clare, and the election was accompanied by no disorder or illegality. The government of the Duke of Wellington was confronted with the dilemma that the Association had so skillfully created. Because O'Connell was a Roman Catholic he was legally incapable of taking his seat at Westminster. Either the government must remove this legal incapacity, or

find one Irish constituency after another following the example of County Clare, with the increasing likelihood of deadlock and civil war. George IV tried to prevent any proposal for Catholic emancipation from being put before parliament, but when the ministry offered its resignation, he gave way. While Sir Robert Peel moved the bill in the Commons, the Duke of Wellington in the Lords pointed out that the alternative would be civil war. The Tory government forced the bill through parliament, making Roman Catholics eligible for all but a few specified offices in the United Kingdom and giving them equality of civil rights with Protestant dissenters. Like the growth of trade unions, it was a triumph for the methods of constitutional and law-abiding popular associations, and an example that others were soon to imitate.

But there are three features of the whole matter which have to be noted. First, it was an important liberal reform granted by a strongly Tory government, contrary to the vested privileges of the Church of England which normally expected the Tory party to safeguard its interests. It was the "Victor of Waterloo" who "let the Papists into Parliament." Conservatism in Europe seldom showed this spirit of compromise and concession. Secondly, this concession was nevertheless made late and only in face of a situation threatening great disorder and violence. It won little respect or good will. The spirit of liberalism still did not prevail strongly enough to win such reforms easily. Thirdly, conservative fears were strong enough as regards Ireland to prompt the government to take away with one hand a lot that they had given with the other. The Emancipation Act was accompanied by disfranchisement of the mass of small Irish freeholders, which reduced the electorate in Ireland to only 26,000 voters, and by suppression of the Catholic Association. Religious equality was given but civil and political liberties were taken away. Good will was lost, and a rankling grievance remained to poison Anglo-Irish relations for another half century.

Radicalism in Britain. The moderate freedom given to popular associations, whether economic such as trade unions or religious such as the Catholic Association, was shared also by political movements of radicalism. From these movements was to come much of the pressure that eventually secured the Reform Act of 1832. Before 1815 the veteran radical, Major John Cartwright, had founded Hampden Clubs, which demanded the reform of parliament and eventually universal suffrage. Their membership was small and scattered, mostly in the larger towns. They extended their activities during the economic crisis of 1815-16. The tactics of the radicals were to create the illusion that every expression of distress and discontent was linked with one common tide of political opinion demanding political reform. In fact even the London radicals, who took the lead, were divided among themselves, and moderate men like Francis Place distrusted and despised more demagogic

characters like Cartwright, Henry "Orator" Hunt, and William Cobbett, who worked to arouse discontent in the country. The methods common to all the English radicals were not so much mass meetings or even popular associations, as devices like simultaneous petitioning, which rested on the ancient right of any subject to petition king and parliament for redress of grievances. Although an Act of 1661 against Tumultuous Petitioning restricted the conditions in which more than 20 signatures could be lawfully solicited for a petition, this did not prevent the simultaneous preparation of a large number of identical petitions. Similarly, although the same Act forbade that the petition be presented to parliament by more than 10 persons, it remained lawful for each of several petitions to be presented by 10 persons. By keeping within the law, it was still possible for radical clubs to arouse public opinion and bring it to bear upon the government. This safety valve was usually lacking in European countries at that time.

Radical leaders like Cartwright and sympathetic Whigs like Sir Francis Burdett became adept at using every lawful means for this end. Union Societies began to be formed—first at Oldham in Lancashire in 1816, and soon in many other towns throughout the industrial and distressed northern counties. Their membership was small; their aim, the political education of the people; their most practical achievements, the organization of petitions. They agitated against the Corn Law of 1815 on the grounds that it made bread dear, and they soon joined forces with the Hampden Clubs. At the same time William Cobbett, in his *Political Register*, mobilized the resources of the press and of his own biting pen in their cause. The virulence of his attacks on the government, however, alienated moderate reforming Whigs. Whigs like Burdett and Lord Brougham were prepared to urge household suffrage but not universal suffrage.

Repressive measures were passed by the government in 1819, after the "Peterloo massacre," when a crowd of some 60,000 at Manchester was charged by the mounted yeomanry with the result that 11 people were killed and about 400 wounded. Although the severity of the Six Acts and the general measures of repression checked radicalism for a time, "Peterloo" passed into popular mythology as an outrage on popular freedom and did much to offset the Tory credit for Waterloo. In its treatment of political radicalism, conservatism in England repeated the story of its treatment of trade unions and of the Irish Catholics: it forfeited good will despite its concessions, and showed that its fears of democracy exceeded its respect for constitutional liberties.

Yet the fears of toryism were not without some foundation in experience. In the later eighteenth century large meetings had often led to riots, and with no reliable machinery for keeping public order until after 1829, when Sir Robert Peel first instituted the metropolitan police

in London, the government justifiably distrusted any large assembly of ill-educated people. The crust of law and order was very thin. During the French Revolution popular clubs and societies had spread extreme radical and Jacobin ideas, and like all its European contemporaries the British government regarded Jacobinism as a species of plague which would bring disaster unless stern preventive measures were taken. Statesmen were haunted by still fresh memories of the Reign of Terror.

Toryism had, too, a certain philosophy. It regarded social distress and economic depression as evils entirely divorced from politics—as afflictions that any society must from time to time suffer because of bad harvest or disturbance of trade. Political agitation that played upon conditions of social distress and held out hopes of betterment through political reform seemed, therefore, both irresponsible (since it might endanger public order) and hypocritical (since it raised false hopes). The purpose of the Six Acts and of repression in general was to prevent political agitation from penetrating lower socially than the relatively well-educated middle classes. For popular orators to preach radicalism to mass meetings of hungry and ill-educated men in the winter of their distress was little short of revolutionary activity. This attitude was shared by Tories and Whigs alike: the growing mass of the laboring classes were unfit to take any responsible or intelligent part in politics; in time, with prudent government, their lot might improve; but radicalism and democracy bred only dangerous delusions.

In the 1820's radicalism in England became more quiescent. The harshness of repression had scared off many agitators. Improvements in material prosperity softened the economic distress that had nourished popular excitement. A generous though wasteful system of poor relief, administered locally and financed by poor rates, saved the most destitute from starvation. Interest in parliamentary reform declined until 1830, when the revolution in France and the fall of the Bourbon monarchy revived hopes of democratic advance. George IV died on June 26, 1830, and the general elections that followed took place amid the exciting news from Paris.

The London Radical Reform Association and the Birmingham Political Union directed the excitement toward hopes of parliamentary reform in England. Once again conservatives came to feel that some kind of overhaul of the electoral system could not much longer be postponed. When that autumn the Duke of Wellington went out of his way to defend the existing constitution, his government was defeated within a fortnight. The Whig ministry headed by Lord Grey, which succeeded him, was from the outset pledged to a reform bill. Grey held that timely concession to a sustained and widespread popular demand was the right policy, not in the sense that it should be a first step toward broader democracy but rather that it should be a final settlement and reconcilia-

tion between the governing aristocracy and the nation. His ministry was solidly aristocratic in its composition, and when rural disturbances and urban strikes broke out the government repressed them with all the old severity. The Whigs were at one with the Tories in resisting democracy and in crushing popular movements; they differed from the Tories only in a more realistic readiness to forestall more violent pressures by the timely granting of moderate reforms, which would "afford sure ground of resistance to further innovation."⁶

The Restoration in Europe. In most other countries before 1830 the old bottles proved strong enough to contain the new wine, though at times there was violent fermentation. Victor Emmanuel I of Piedmont was confronted, in March, 1821, with the simultaneous revolt of several military units. The revolt was engineered by a small group of aristocratic army officers, demanding war with Austria under a constitutional national government. Half the army remained loyal to the king, but Victor Emmanuel lost his nerve and abdicated in favor of his brother, Charles Felix. His abdication was followed by the resignation of all his ministers, one man with unconscious humor pleading as excuse the death of his grandmother. Prince Charles Albert was declared Regent, and under strong popular pressure fomented by the *Carbonari* he proclaimed the famous constitution of 1812. Charles Felix appealed for Austrian help, which was readily given, and Charles Albert was sent into exile while the Austrians crushed the revolt and installed the more resolutely reactionary Charles Felix on the throne. He held it, with little further resistance, until his death in 1831, when Charles Albert succeeded him.

In Russia the turning point in relations between the monarchy and the nation came in 1825, with the so-called Decembrist Revolt: Tsar Alexander I had extended his liberalism to include grants of self-government and partial independence to the two most sharply defined national groups within his dominions, the Finns and Poles. In 1809 when he became grand duke of Finland, he kept the constitution Finland had previously enjoyed under Swedish rule. This left the Finns with their own laws and law courts, their own army and administrative system, all staffed by Swedes or Finns but not by Russians. Under these arrangements the country suffered little change because of its compulsory transference in 1815, and remained prosperous and generally contented. In the Kingdom of Poland, which comprised little more than a fifth of Russian Poland, he set up a similar constitutional system that guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press, and rights of free association, and included a Diet, or parliament, based on the most liberal franchise in Europe. The army and civil administration were staffed by Poles. But in practice the regime proved less liberal. The army was kept under Russian control and the Tsar, in his capacity as king of Poland, could

⁶ See p. 151.

dominate the proceedings of the Diet. His brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, headed the army; and the Tsar's special "Commissioner for the Kingdom," Novosiltsev, acquired a degree of personal local power inconsistent with the intentions of the constitution.

In Polish territories the Tsar's hesitant liberalism was closely comparable to the spirit that guided the actions of Louis XVIII in France or of liberal toryism in Britain. In 1819 censorship was set up. The session of the Diet in 1820 was hastily ended when it rejected bills proposed by the government. Clericalist influences and the Jesuits supported Novosiltsev in his repressive policy. From 1821 onward Lubecki, a Polish aristocrat entrusted with public finance, brought sound administrative methods and considerable commercial and financial prosperity to the country. He began the solid industrial development of Poland. As in France and Britain, political conservatism was accompanied by prudent finance and material prosperity. In 1825 the third session of the Diet was again abruptly ended, and that year Alexander died. He had intended that his younger brother, Nicholas, should succeed him, although Constantine was next in the line of succession. The absurd situation arose in which Nicholas, at St. Petersburg, proclaimed Constantine Tsar; while Constantine, at Warsaw, proclaimed Nicholas. For nearly three weeks in December, 1825, the throne remained vacant. The secret societies seized the chance to stage a revolt of the army at St. Petersburg, with the aim of summoning a national assembly. But the plotters had no clear plan or organization, and had made no adequate preparations. They were crushed with great severity. The only consequences of importance were that Nicholas, who now succeeded to the throne, was haunted for the rest of his days by the specter of revolution, while the "Decembrist Revolt" entered into the mythology of the secret societies as a romantic legend.

The next thirty years of Russian history, which constituted the reign of Nicholas, were predominantly a time of more complete separation of monarchy from nation. Despite some administrative and legal reforms the tsarist government relied more than ever on the army and police, now fortified by the notorious "Third Section," or political police. By 1830, when liberal and constitutionalist risings broke out in most of Europe, Russia remained within the grip of the bureaucracy and the police dictatorship of Tsardom. Only in Poland was there a revolt powerful enough to expel Constantine and set up a provisional government; but within a year that was savagely crushed, and Russian Poland reduced to complete subjection.⁷

The policies followed in these years by other restored monarchies were but reflections and repetitions of those already described. The lines in which Lord Byron pilloried Alexander's character and policy

⁷ See p. 150.

might well apply to the policies pursued by conservative monarchies and governments everywhere between 1815 and 1830.

*Now half dissolving to a liberal thaw,
But hardened back whene'er the morning's raw;
With no objection to true liberty,
Except that it would make the nations free.*

Sensitive to the precariousness of their own position, haunted by memories and fears of revolution, monarchs of the restoration wavered between partial concessions and panicky repression. Where, as in England and to some extent in France, an outlet for opposition was provided through constitutional procedures, the concessions were consolidated. Where, as in Piedmont or Russia, there was no such outlet, there were sporadic revolts led by small groups of army officers, journalists, or students, followed by severe reprisals and bitterness. But everywhere the forces of change remained both dissatisfied and more resolute by 1830.

CHAPTER 9

THE LIBERAL REVOLUTIONS OF 1830-33

Economic Conditions

IN 1830 Europe stood on the brink of the railway age. Within the succeeding generation the building of railroad networks throughout the continent would revolutionize international relations as well as internal economic systems. The economic progress achieved between 1815 and 1830 was of the more elementary and less revolutionary character consonant with the political characteristics of these years. Agricultural change was slow and unspectacular; improvements in means of transport were limited to improvements in roads and canals, and to the growth of ocean-going shipping, which was still predominantly sail rather than steam; industrial progress was more striking, but almost confined to certain trades (particularly textiles) and greatest in western Europe; commercial policies were still (other than in Britain and France) more concerned with lowering internal customs barriers than with establishing freer trade between states. The sound financial policies followed by the governments of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Prussia brought these countries a real prosperity, interrupted only by years of bad harvest and periodic depressions in trade.

Western Europe. The most characteristic economic achievement of the restored Bourbons in France was the systematic extension of the system of canals. They continued the admirable traditions of their royal predecessors and of Napoleon in attending to roads and canals; this was of special importance to the welfare of a country whose trade was still predominantly internal. (In 1830 the whole foreign trade of France amounted to only about 6 dollars—30 shillings—per head of the population in a year.) In 1818, as soon as the forces of occupation were withdrawn from French soil, the government drew up a program of systematic canal building, financed by special loans. By 1830 it added more than 900 kilometers to the 1,200 kilometers previously in existence. In

addition to cheapening transport, this program of public works stimulated national recovery. It has been suggested that by the 1830's the facilities for transport by road and canal in France were so good and so well managed by the state that they retarded the development of railroads; the relatively poorer conditions of transport in the United Kingdom meant that railroads were welcomed more eagerly. Elsewhere in Europe roads were good mainly where administrative or military considerations required them to be. In Prussia the length of made-up roads maintained by the state more than doubled—from some 420 (Prussian) miles in 1816 to 902 in 1831—mostly in the central and western territories. In Russia the main communications were, by rivers (many of which had the defect of running shallow in summer and freezing in winter) and by roads (which being only of earth turned to mud in spring and autumn). Although Alexander I set up, in 1809, the Institute of Means of Communication, run by French engineers specially lent by Napoleon, these conditions improved little until the extensive railway construction of the decades 1840-70. Then the new possibilities were seized upon all the more avidly, and by 1900 they had completely changed Russian economic life. The role of improved communications and transport in welding a country more closely together, and so promoting feelings of nationalism, is undoubted although it is difficult to assess.

The extent of industrial change in the economically most developed countries—Britain, France, and the Netherlands—can best be gauged by a few figures of the growth of their major industries. Britain's most booming textile industry, cotton, expanded immensely in these years. Wooden spinning jennies, turned by hand, remained in very common use; but for weaving it was estimated in 1830 that in England and Scotland there were maybe 60,000 power looms to 240,000 hand looms. In France power looms were not introduced until long after they were in general use in Britain, partly because hand labor was cheaper and partly because the capital cost was greater. Yet in Alsace there was a highly localized introduction of power looms during the 1820's, and 2,000 were in use there by 1830. French coal production was sharply reduced by the Vienna settlement, because most of her best working mines were in territory that in 1815 became Dutch and in 1830 Belgian. Her annual output was less than 900,000 tons in 1815, though this rose to nearly 2 million tons by 1830. By 1830 Belgium was producing three times as much coal as France. Britain's coal production doubled from 15 million tons to 30 million tons between 1815 and 1829. So far as there was social distress in these years, it was due much less to the introduction of machinery, which at this time created new occupations almost as fast as it displaced old ones, than to the aftermath of the wars and to years of bad harvest and high food prices. Industrialization, in the more drastic forms it was

to take during the next two decades, was little known even in Britain before 1830. Bad housing conditions, low wages, long hours of work, and employment of women and children in conditions of sweated labor existed in countries where little or no machinery had been introduced. They were normal, not a novelty, and throughout Europe they were as common in agriculture as they were in industry.

By 1830 the main social and political consequence of economic change was a strengthening of the numbers, wealth, and influence of the men who were engaged in manufacturing, business, and trade. It is here that there is a more direct connection between the early phases of the industrial revolution and the growth of liberalism. The new men who grew rich on Lancashire and Alsatian textiles and on Belgian coal claimed a policy more favorable to their interests, and therefore a form of government more sensitive to their opinions. Resenting Corn Laws, which had been passed to protect the landed and farming interests, because they impeded trade with which they were more directly concerned, first the merchants and later the manufacturers of the United Kingdom pressed for the repeal of such regulations. The gospel preached half a century earlier by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* lay ready to their hand. In 1820 the London Merchants presented to parliament a petition embodying its principles. Two of the most important were:

That freedom from restraint is calculated to give the utmost extension to foreign trade, and the best direction to the capital and industry of the country.

That the maxim of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, which regulates every merchant in his individual dealings, is strictly applicable as the best rule for the trade of the whole nation.

In its report the committee of the House of Commons, set up to consider the matter, agreed with the general principles of the merchants. But despite piecemeal reforms and simplification of duties, no substantial relaxation of protective measures took place until after 1832, when the reform of the electoral system gave greater power to the big towns and to the middle classes.

European Trade. In France, where no large section of the community was directly involved in foreign trade, a policy of protection was continued and even intensified. During the period following 1790 internal tariffs and regional restrictions had been swept away, but this opening of the home market was accompanied by the raising of even higher barriers to foreign trade. After 1815 the Bourbons dared not expose French manufacturers and merchants to the competition of the more highly industrialized production of Britain. In 1816, 1820, 1822, and 1826 tariffs

were raised on agricultural produce, to please the landed interests which dominated parliament, and on coal, iron, and cotton goods to please the industrialists. Industrial and trading interests were strong enough in France to demand this much consideration.

Because British goods were increasingly finding European markets, similar anxieties to protect home industries against British competition governed the commercial policies of most other European states. Prussian policy was of special significance for the future. Prussia's two chief exports were corn and linen, and both were directly affected by British policy. She turned to the task of freeing the German home market from internal obstructions, partly in order to ensure easier sale for these goods. In 1818 the government removed the internal customs boundaries dividing one province of Prussia from the other and set up a uniform tariff against the rest of the world. By 1826 several of the smaller German states enclosed by Prussia's sprawling territories joined the system, and by negotiations with other states a large North German area of internal free trade grew up. Similar unions were next set up between Bavaria and Württemberg in the south, and between Hanover and Saxony in the north. By 1834 the three unions merged into the *Zollverein*, or customs union, comprising 17 states and some 26 million people. The chief German power excluded from this great new free-trade area was Austria, which consistently refused to join and so left to Prussia a new role of economic leadership and domination in German territory.

Russia's chief export to Britain was corn, and the government met with constant outcry from Russian manufacturers and merchants that because Britain, France, and Austria had high tariffs and prohibitions on trade, Russian industries were being discouraged or ruined, while agriculture could find no foreign market. Even when the tsar favored, as did Alexander I, a general freeing of trade, the governments were so anxious to collect revenue and prevent money from flowing out of the country that they readily gave way to these pressures. The result was a series of measures in 1816, 1819, 1822, 1825, and 1830 which fluctuated between absolute prohibition of imports of iron and textiles, and very high protective duties on all imports except such raw materials and foodstuffs as were regarded as essential. Least affected by the tariff policies of Britain, France, and Russia was Austria, which enjoyed a large and somewhat freer home market and had an outlet for her exports in the Mediterranean. But Italian trade remained heavily hampered by state frontiers, and by internal customs barriers and tolls.

The conditions of European trade by 1830 were, therefore, in an intermediate phase of development closely comparable with the partial and localized growth of transport and communications, and of mechanization in industry. What had been achieved was a very considerable freeing of the movement of goods within each country, by the removal

of internal barriers and tolls. The resulting creation of larger home markets was in itself a change of great importance for the national development of France, Austria, Russia, and above all Prussia in Germany. But as regards trade between states the general pattern of European policy was still highly protectionist. While enlarged free-trade areas fostered national growth, the hampering of interstate trade helped to account for periodic trade depressions, which in turn fostered movements of democratic and socialist discontent. The outstanding exception to the general pattern was the United Kingdom. After the union with Ireland in 1801 the United Kingdom had become for a time the largest single area within which trade could be carried on without running into any artificial barriers that increased costs and delays. By 1830 it was losing this unique advantage, which had greatly helped its rapid commercial expansion. It was now, therefore, moving on to seek corresponding freedom for its foreign trade. British merchants and manufacturers, fearing no competition, pressed for the United Kingdom to set the example and the pace in world free trade—a policy that triumphed during the generation after 1830, but found little support from European governments until the 1860's.

Business and Finance. The growing social and political power of merchants and manufacturers was reinforced by the development of business and financial organizations with similar interests and antipathies. While trade between states was still so limited in scope both by the absorptive capacity of home markets and by tariff barriers, the wholesale exporter was extremely rare, and the further east one went the less important he became. But bankers everywhere assumed new importance, and with the growth of large national debts and foreign loans and investments, financial organization became the basis of a class with new wealth and importance. In 1815 the national debt of the United Kingdom stood at more than £800 million, much more burdensome than that of defeated France; nor was this much reduced by 1830. Even so, the Bank of England was well able to organize foreign loans, and continued to do so on a large and profitable scale. The Bank of France, founded in 1800, was likewise in close relations with the government, and enjoyed the exclusive right of issuing notes until 1817, when banks in Rouen, Nantes, and Bordeaux were also given the privilege. The Netherlands Bank, founded in 1814, had the same monopoly in the Netherlands and Belgium until, in 1822, Belgium gained the right for its new *Société générale*, a joint-stock banking company. In addition to this growth of national banks, great international financial families had built up their organization and wealth by handling the £57 million subsidies and loans that Britain had made to her allies during the French wars. After 1815 men like Nathan Meyer Rothschild and the Baring brothers floated foreign state loans on the London market, and the Hopes did the same in Amsterdam. The

Rothschilds had members in all the key centers of London, Paris, Vienna, Naples, and Frankfurt. They were the leading organizers of the new type of international investment, which brought an increasing interlocking of the nations of Europe, and eventually of the world. Until the railroad boom after 1830 this did not develop much, though it was already beginning. In the 1820's there was a bubble of crazy speculation and overtrading. Loans were floated in aid of a quite fictitious South American republic, and skates and warming pans were being exported to Rio. It is significant of the new international solidarity of bankers that in 1825, when this bubble burst and there was financial crisis, the Bank of France readily lent its rival, the Bank of England, nearly £2 million to save it from difficulties. The financiers played a new role in politics even by 1830, as is shown by Laffitte and Casimir-Périer, the bankers who backed the monarchy of Louis Philippe and became in turn prime minister. But this group was still small in number and somewhat restricted in its influence. In finance, as in industrialization, transport, and trade, Europe was still only on the brink of a new stage of economic expansion.

The Revolutionary Tide

THE SECOND half of the year 1830 saw revolutions in France, Belgium, parts of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, and in Poland. In Portugal and Spain civil war began, which lasted in Spain until 1840. These revolutions were unlike the risings of 1820, which had been essentially nationalist risings led by military groups, in that they were liberal revolts led by broader elements of the wealthy middle classes. They were primarily protests against the rigidities and shortcomings of the conservative policies adopted since 1815; and the limited extent of their purposes and their success derived from the economic conditions already described. What they had in common was a desire to bring governments into closer relationship with society, as society had developed up to that date. When the course of events carried the revolutionary movements beyond that point, they lost impetus and were checked.

The July Revolution in France. In France the liberal opposition to the ultraconservative government of Charles X was able to take its stand on the Charter of 1814. As a result of the elections of July, 1830, the liberal opposition in the Chamber grew from 221 to 274. Polignac's ministry decided on a *coup d'état*. It took the legitimist royalist form of issuing a set of five Ordinances on July 25. These dissolved the newly elected Chamber before it could meet, reduced the electorate from 100,000 to 25,000, called for new elections on this basis, and forbade any publication not authorized by the government. In spirit, if not entirely in the letter,

they destroyed the Charter and the existing constitution. The liberal politicians and journalists, led by men like Adolphe Thiers, François Guizot, and the banker Jacques Laffitte, met to draw up protests, defy the prohibition of free publication, and bring the force of public opinion to bear upon the king. On the day after the fateful Ordinances appeared, crowds formed in the streets of Paris; and on the day after that the republican groups, led by Raspail and Cavaignac, organized bands of students and workers to throw up the barricades. On July 28 these groups captured the Hôtel de Ville (seizure of the city hall being the traditional prelude to Paris revolutions). They raised the tricolor flag, the red white and blue of the revolution, and paraded in the boulevards. The royal troops were without guidance or direction because of the inaction of the king and his ministers, and lost control of the city. By July 30 the rebels had complete mastery of the capital, and Charles X abdicated in favor of his grandson, the Duke of Bordeaux, henceforth known to his supporters as "Henry V." The downfall of the Bourbons was almost bloodless.

The insurgents were divided as to what to do next. The more democratic republicans, with headquarters at the Hôtel de Ville, wanted to set up a republic under the presidency of the eminent Lafayette, now 74, the "hero of two worlds" and idol of the National Guard. The liberal politicians and journalists, as the parliamentary majority under the existing constitution, wanted to make the Duke of Orleans king. Orleans, backed not only by the parliamentary majority but also by the astuteness of Thiers, the diplomacy of Talleyrand, and the wealth of Laffitte, was by far the strongest candidate. Descended from a younger brother of Louis XIV, the Orleans family had been the traditional rivals to the Bourbon kings. The Duke's father, "Equality Philip" (*Philippe Egalité*) had conspired against Louis XVI, and during the Revolution he had adopted republican and revolutionary ideas—though these had not saved him from the guillotine in 1793. The Duke himself had known poverty and exile, but was now a wealthy, thrifty man of 57. He resolved to play the role of citizen king, model of bourgeois virtues and respectful of constitutional liberties. He gained formal power by accepting the office of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, first from a group of the parliamentarians and then from Charles X himself. He captured republican support by visiting Lafayette at the Hôtel de Ville on July 31, relying on the fact that that conservatively minded hero preferred monarchy to Jacobinism. When he appeared on the balcony with Lafayette and the two men embraced one another wrapped in an enormous tricolor, the Paris crowds went mad with delight. This kiss won him republican support as well as the support of the National Guard, of which Lafayette was now commander. Charles X fled to England, prudently taking his grandson with him, and a week later parliament declared the throne to

be vacant. Within two days it proclaimed Orleans king as Louis Philippe, "King of the French by the Grace of God and the will of the nation." Consolidation of the constitutional monarchy seemed complete, and the revolution, skillfully manufactured in Paris, was accepted with little resistance by the whole of France.

With the form of the regime so quickly settled by the "Three Glorious Days" (July 27-29) the parliament now proceeded to revise the Charter and impose it upon the new king. The revisions indicate clearly the liberal ideals of the majority. The Chamber of Peers was weakened in its hereditary character by being turned into an upper house of life members only, nominated by the king, and a batch of new peers were created to guarantee the change. The electorate was widened by lowering the age qualification for voters to 25 instead of 30, and the property qualification from 300 francs to 200. Citizens were eligible to become deputies at the age of 30 instead of 40. Censorship was abolished, cases involving the press were referred to trial by jury, and extraordinary tribunals or judicial commissions were prohibited. Roman Catholicism was recognized as the religion of "the majority of Frenchmen," but the connection between altar and throne was ended, some religious orders were expelled, and provision was made for state-aided primary schools to be set up in each commune.

The men who imposed these conditions on the king had clear ideas of what they wanted. They did not want universal suffrage or democracy; they did not want a republic, too closely associated in France with Jacobinism and extreme democracy; they did not want to found the new regime on revolution, or even on a plebiscite—hence the maneuvers, engineered by Laffitte and his friends, to place on the throne a man who combined the necessary credentials of royal descent with a personal readiness to accept the restraints of the Charter and of ministerial responsibility to parliament. The merit of the new regime, in their eyes, was that it got rid of the absolutist and clericalist proclivities of the Bourbons while guaranteeing property and public order against the encroachments of democracy and republicanism. It held a balance between liberty and order, parliamentarism and authority. It would from the outset have bitter enemies—the clerical and the legitimist royalists, who regarded Louis Philippe and his supporters as traitors; the republicans, who felt cheated; the surviving enthusiasts for Bonapartism. Like every other regime France has had since 1815, it was confronted with a large and disloyal opposition, which regarded it as a fraud and a betrayal. But it would, its supporters hoped, give France a period of peace, prosperity, and settled order in which trade and industry could flourish and men could grow rich in security. This, the king knew, was the commission he had been given. His personal tastes and inclinations coincided happily

with these expectations. His chief interests were to stay on the throne and to stay rich.

Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the greatest liberal writers of the century, wrote a description of the new king:

He had most of the qualities and defects which belong more particularly to the subaltern orders of society. He had regular habits and wanted those around him to have them too. He was orderly in his conduct, simple in his habits, his tastes were tempered; he was a born friend of the law, an enemy of all excesses, sober in his ways except in his desires. He was human without being sentimental, greedy and soft. He had no flaming passions, no ruinous weaknesses, no striking vices, and only one kingly virtue: courage. He was extremely polite, but without discrimination or greatness, the politeness of a merchant rather than of a prince. He hardly appreciated literature or art, but he passionately loved industry. His memory was prodigious and capable of retaining the most minute detail. His conversation was prolix, diffuse, original and trivial, anecdotal, full of small facts, of salt and significance. . . . He was enlightened, subtle, flexible: because he was open only to what was useful, he was full of proud disdain for the truth, and he believed so little in virtue that his sight was darkened. . . . He was an unbeliever in religion like the eighteenth century, and skeptical in politics like the nineteenth; having no belief in himself, he had none in the belief of others.

He was, in short, everything that a liberal king in 1830 could be expected to be: middle class, respectable, and unspectacular.

Belgian Independence. The July Revolution in Paris had great repercussions in Belgium. The resentment of the Catholic, French, and Flemish sections of the southern Netherlands against their domination by the Dutch since the compulsory union of 1815 had steadily grown in strength. It rested as much on nationalist desires for independence as on liberal opposition to the rule of William I. Within the union Belgians outnumbered the Dutch by two to one, yet they had only equal representation in the States-General. The country was run mainly in the interests of the Dutch minority, and mainly by Dutch officials. By 1828 the two main sections of opposition, the conservative Catholics and the Liberals, united to resist Dutch domination. The fall of the legitimist monarchy in France and the victory of liberalism there overthrew one main pillar of the restoration settlement of 1815. Might not Belgian revolt destroy another?

On August 25 occurred demonstrations at the Opera House in Brus-

sels, and as though by prearranged signal there were at once revolts in the provincial towns. The wealthy classes in the towns, fearing street disorders, organized themselves into Committees of Safety and armed Civil Guards to protect property. The king dared not use troops, but sent his two sons, the popular Prince of Orange and Prince Frederick, to Brussels with a few thousand men. The Prince of Orange, finding barricades in the streets, courageously entered the city alone and undertook to support the liberal program of complete separation of Belgium from Holland "leaving no point of contact except through the reigning dynasty." The king agreed to summon the States-General, which on September 29 voted for separation. But meanwhile the insurrection in Brussels, backed by bands of volunteers from other towns, had taken control. Dutch troops, 14,000 strong, were driven away. A provisional government was set up, uniting the old Catholic nobility with the younger middle-class Liberals. On October 4 it proclaimed the complete independence of Belgium, and by October 28 signed an armistice with the Dutch.

Elections for a new National Congress were held on November 3. Out of a population of some 4 million, 30,000 electors chose 200 deputies. The National Congress met a week later, and on November 18 it unanimously confirmed Belgian independence. It then proceeded to declare members of the Dutch family of Orange-Nassau ineligible to hold any office. By February, 1831, it promulgated a new constitution, which was the most liberal in Europe at that time. It declared that "all powers have their source in the nation," and established a constitutional monarchy with strictly limited royal powers. The king was to be chosen by the representatives of the people, and the organ of popular will was to be parliament, elected on direct and frequent elections by secret ballot, but by an electorate limited by certain property qualifications. The monarch chosen by the congress in June was Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who in July took the oath to maintain the constitution and became King Leopold I.

The new regime was, however, conditioned more by the action of the other European powers than this simple account would suggest. The governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia wanted to check the Belgian revolution and preserve the position of 1815. The governments of Britain and France wanted to prevent intervention, and took the initiative in summoning a conference of the five powers in London to protect the peace of Europe. It met on November 4, 1830, just as the elections to the Belgian National Congress were taking place. At the same time a gale of liberty blew through Europe. Poland and Italy began to stir, and in England the Tory government of Wellington was replaced by the Whig government of Grey. In December the conference recognized the principle of Belgian independence, and in January it issued a protocol pro-

claiming that "Belgium forms a perpetually neutral state." Under force of circumstances, Belgium won international recognition of her independence and her neutrality.

Accordingly, when in 1831 the Dutch invaded Belgian territory in a last effort to regain it and in ten days defeated the Belgian forces, France sent troops and forced the Dutch to withdraw. The London Conference regulated Dutch-Belgian relations by the Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles, establishing Belgian frontiers, which the Belgians accepted in November. Britain and France blockaded the coast of Holland to force the Dutch to agree, and a French force blockaded the Dutch troops holding out in Antwerp. It was May, 1833, before the Dutch and Belgians reached agreement, although it left each in control of territories which the Conference had allocated differently; and it was 1838 before the Dutch accepted the Treaty of 1831 and so recognized Belgian independence. The status of Belgium as independent and neutral was finally determined by agreement of the powers in 1839. Leopold I, who was aged 40 when he accepted the Belgian throne, was to rule the country with skill and good sense for the next 34 years. The youngest son of a petty German prince, he belonged to the class of the ruling dynastic families of Europe. In 1831 he married the eldest daughter of Louis Philippe, and so consolidated his position among the western powers. Under his guidance Belgium was set to follow a course of development closely parallel to that of France, reconciling nationalism with constitutional government, Catholicism with liberalism, in a spirit of bourgeois moderation.

Central Europe. Meanwhile, throughout the lands of central Europe, ripples of revolution were spreading, even to the cantons of Switzerland. The governments of the 22 cantons were mostly in the hands of local aristocracies, and until 1825 they were solidly conservative. Since that year a few had won more liberal and democratic constitutions. Between 1830 and 1833 most of the others gained similar constitutions, under the pressure of small liberal groups who were influenced by the course of events in Greece, France, and Belgium. Students, journalists, and the men of wealth connected with the growth of local industries backed these movements. They regarded the new constitutions as preliminary to an overhaul of the national federation which, since its reorganization in 1815, had little real power. But that further change did not come until 1848.

In the German Confederation, likewise, local revolts occurred. In Brunswick the ruling duke was driven out and his successor compelled to grant a more liberal constitution. In Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel similar concessions were forced from the rulers. In Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, where parliamentary systems existed, liberal oppositions gained in strength at elections and the press became more critical

of the governments. By 1832 Austria and Prussia felt constrained to get the Diet at Frankfurt to pass the Six Acts, which re-established repressive measures throughout all German states, strengthened the hands of princes against parliamentary assemblies, and curbed the more outspoken sections of the press. In 1833 a party of German students and Polish exiles seized the guardhouse in Frankfurt and tried to overawe the Diet. They were defeated, and the Diet set up a special commission to round up such agitators, now beginning to form themselves into a "Young German" movement. In Germany, by 1835, reaction was again triumphant. In Austria, where Metternich's system for preserving order was at its strongest, the breath of revolution was hardly felt at all.

But in Italy, the home of secret societies, which were now establishing more regular contact with liberals in France and Belgium, revolutions took place on a more concerted plan. At the end of 1830 Francis IV of Modena was driven from his capital by a revolt, and within a few weeks Marie Louise of Parma suffered the same fate. In the papal territories east of the Apennines other revolutions set up a provisional government. It was certain that Austria, backed by Prussia and Russia, would intervene to crush any insurrection so close to her own provinces in northern Italy, and the chief hope of the revolutionaries was that Louis Philippe would send them help. This help was not forthcoming from either the Chamber or the more cautiously liberal ministry of Casimir-Périer. Austria, unimpeded, sent her troops into Italy to restore the rulers to their thrones and support them in the severe repressions that accompanied their return. But Mazzini, who in 1830 was imprisoned for his Carbonarist activities, settled in Marseilles and founded the "Young Italy" movement, designed to arouse the whole of Italy to greater unity in the cause of national independence. By 1833 the movement had attracted 60,000 supporters, with local committees in all the main Italian cities. The following year he also founded a "Young Europe" movement, to run national committees for similar patriotic agitation in Germany, Poland, and Switzerland. Despite their immediate failures, the revolutions of 1830 thus gave birth not only to the Italian *Risorgimento*, or movement for national regeneration, but also to a wider European movement that was to bear fruit in 1848.¹

In Poland revolution began at the end of November, 1830, led by a secret society and by university students. It was no very formidable force, but Constantine, leader of the army in Poland, panicked and left the country. The rebels set up a provisional government chiefly of members of the landed aristocracy of Poland, which tried to bargain with the tsar for reforms. But the rebels split, the tsar refused to grant reform, and in February, 1831, he sent a Russian army into Poland. Again, the only hope was western intervention, but that was no more forth-

¹ See p. 181.

coming for Poland than for Italy. By the autumn of 1831 the revolution was crushed and the Russians took ferocious revenge. Warsaw, where the more extreme democrats had triumphed and which had been the center of Polish cultural life, was turned into a military garrison town and its university closed. Poland was subjected to severe suppression and military government for another generation. Many hundreds of her intellectual leaders were driven into exile, and they took refuge mainly in the western countries and America.

In Portugal and Spain constitutional regimes were preserved against counterrevolutions only by British and French intervention. Each country had a pretender to the throne: Dom Miguel, the queen's uncle, in Portugal and Don Carlos, brother of King Ferdinand VII, in Spain. These pretenders were both leaders of the most extreme reactionary and ultraroyalist forces. Dom Miguel seized the throne in 1828 and proceeded to crush all liberal movements. When Pedro, recently deposed emperor of Brazil, came to defend the rights of his daughter, the young Queen Maria, civil war ensued. Then in 1833, when Ferdinand VII died and his daughter became queen, her Liberal ministers drew up a new constitution modeled on the French. Dom Miguel and Don Carlos joined forces against their queens, and civil war began in Spain. The pretenders were driven into exile only when France and Britain intervened on behalf of the liberal monarchs. Their intervention preserved at least the forms of constitutional government in the Iberian peninsula.

Parliamentary Reform in Britain. The British counterpart to the liberal revolutions of these years was the great parliamentary Reform Bill passed in 1832. As already described,² the ministry of Lord Grey came to power in the autumn of 1830 pledged to promote a bill for reform of the electoral system. The first bill he introduced passed the House of Commons by a majority of only one vote, and Grey demanded fresh elections, which were fought amid great excitement on the main issue of parliamentary reform. This reference of a major constitutional issue to the electorate was itself an implicit concession to liberal ideas. These elections gave the Whigs, led by Grey, a majority in the House of Commons, but the bill was twice defeated in the House of Lords, which had a Tory majority. It was only after Grey had forced the Lords into passing the bill, by the threat that the king would create enough new peers to give the Whigs a majority in the Lords, that they gave way; William IV had agreed to so drastic a threat only because there was no other practicable alternative; Grey had already resigned and Wellington, the Tory leader, not having the confidence of the country, had refused to take office. The bill was in this way prefaced by events that vividly coerced both king and Lords into bowing to the wishes of the Commons and of public opinion. This was but a more sensational continuation of

² See p. 135.

that yielding of conservatism in face of immediate threat of violence and civil strife which has already been noted in relation to the grant of freedom of association and of religious equality during the previous decade.

The "Act to amend the representation of the people in England and Wales," which eventually passed through parliament in 1832, was very much less democratic in effect than either its title or the stormy events that preceded its enactment might suggest. The most substantial change it made was to redistribute the strength of the constituencies. The House of Commons consisted, as before, of 658 members elected for boroughs and counties. But whereas 262 boroughs had returned 465 members, only 257 now returned 399; and whereas county members had been 188 they now numbered 253. The universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin each returned two representatives. These changes, which strengthened the power of the country gentry and the big towns at the expense of the landed proprietors and boroughmongers who had controlled scores of small borough constituencies, gave more weight in politics to the wealthy business and commercial classes of the large northern towns, hitherto greatly underrepresented in parliament. Of the small towns, 86 lost the right to return either one or two members to the Commons. These included some, such as the notorious Old Sarum, which had long ceased to be towns at all and whose representatives had been virtually nominated by the "borough owner." At the same time 22 new boroughs were allowed to return two members each, and 21 others one member each; and these were the big new towns, mostly in the north, which had grown up around the ports, industries, and mines. These changes were not great enough to destroy the preponderance of the landed interest. There remained nearly 50 boroughs and well over 60 members still directly dependent on the peers and landowners of England and Wales. But the men whose wealth depended on trade and manufacturing were given a share of parliamentary power alongside the old landed interest—a share large enough to enable them to assert their interests, as subsequent legislation was to show.

At the same time the Act protected both landed and industrial interests against the dangers of democracy by a host of other provisions, the chief of which were the changes in the qualification for voting. These remained complex, but all depended on property qualifications. In the boroughs a voter had to be owner or tenant of a property worth at least £10 annual value. This effectively kept out of the electorate all the working classes, confined it to men of some wealth and social standing. The old electorate of less than half a million was increased by about 50 per cent in England and Wales. No provision was made for secret ballot, which meant that the old methods of bribery, influence, and intimidation at elections remained as effective as ever. The detailed ar-

rangements laid down in the Act for the keeping of registers of electors in each constituency gave party organizations a new incentive to spread their efforts into every constituency. With a larger body of voters to be canvassed, sharper competition between party organizations, more frequently contested elections, and no effective restraint on bribery and intimidation, electioneering in England became more costly, corrupt, and disorderly than ever before. Yet the electoral system succeeded in returning to the Commons, now enhanced in its prestige and powers in relation to king or Lords, men who broadly represented the main interests and opinions of the country. The radical democrats, whose agitation had done so much to bring about the reform, remained as bitterly disappointed as were the contemporary republicans of France after the July Revolution. It was the Whigs who had won the day; though by effecting this first deliberate overhaul of the parliamentary system they had made it more difficult, in future, to resist further such changes when the mass of opinion in the country demanded them.

One of the first acts of the reformed parliament of 1833 was to carry out a further liberal revolution, no less momentous in its consequences and significance than any other revolution of the period. It abolished slavery as an institution throughout the whole of the British Empire. The trade in slaves had been prohibited since 1807, and an Abolition Society, headed by Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton and Zachary Macaulay, had ever since pressed for abolition. In 1833 Lord Stanley, backed by Buxton, steered through parliament a bill that ended slavery in all British territories and provided for compensation to slave owners, from the pockets of the British taxpayer, to the extent of £20 million. Critics of the emancipating enthusiasts of the liberal parliament pointed out that their consciences were less tender as regards the sweated labor of women and children in mines and factories nearer home. But with the growing tide of liberalism reaching its height, these abuses, too, were soon to be tackled. The British example in abolishing slavery was followed by most other countries in the next fifty years: by France in 1848, Argentina in 1853, the United States in 1862-65, the Netherlands in 1863-69, Portugal between 1858 and 1878, Brazil in 1871-88.

"Now Half Dissolving to a Liberal Thaw"

THE PASSING of the great Reform Bill in Britain consolidated the new alignment of political forces in Europe. From the revolutions and other changes of 1830-33 Europe emerged divided more sharply than ever into two political regions. In Germany, Italy, and Poland the forces of conservatism triumphed over those of liberalism, and revolutions were crushed by the concerted actions of

Austria, Russia, and Prussia. In France, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain liberalism triumphed, backed at times by the power of France and Britain. Europe roughly west of the Rhine was moving toward a pattern of liberal, constitutional, parliamentary government geared to the special interests of a growing commercial and industrial middle class. Europe east of the Rhine preserved all the main lines of its economic and political pattern of 1815. This remained the basic fact in international relations until 1848.

The maintenance and development of constitutional government in the western nations had involved a tightening alliance between the movements of nationalism and the movements of liberalism. The more monarchs isolated themselves from the nation, as did Charles X in France or William I in the Netherlands, the more liberalism stood on the side of the nation. Belgian achievement of national independence was a liberal achievement, enlisting the cause of constitutionalism against the power of the Dutch. In Italy, Mazzini preached liberalism as the necessary path to national unification and independence. Similarly, the triumphs of dynasticism in eastern Europe involved royal denials of both nationalist and liberal aspirations in Germany, Italy, and Poland. Because, as in France, Portugal, and Spain, ultraroyalists in politics were usually also ultramontanes in religion, they were opposed by all who regarded clerical power as an obstacle to both national independence and liberal reforms.

The revolutions that took place all over Europe between 1815 and 1830 made considerable breaches in the political and the territorial settlements of 1815. The overthrow of the legitimist Bourbon monarchy in France and the separation of Belgium from Holland were direct reversals of the treaty arrangements. Norway, which had been allotted to Sweden in 1814, had contrived to assert a greater degree of real independence and self-government than had been contemplated at Vienna. She had accepted her place in a dual monarchy under Crown Prince Bernadotte of Sweden, but contrived to keep her Eidsvold constitution of May, 1814, which gave her a single-chamber parliament, able to defy the royal veto by passing a bill in three successive assemblies. This little nation of less than a million fisherfolk and farmers decided to abolish its nobility by an act of parliament. When the king rejected the bill in 1815, it was passed again in 1818 and in 1821, and became law in spite of Bernadotte. Friction between king and parliament continued because Bernadotte tried to extend the Swedish system of government to Norway. But by 1830 he was compelled to give up his attempts to change the Eidsvold constitution, and accepted the virtual self-government of Norway. The chief result of the union was a growing nationalist movement in Norway, soon spreading even to the adoption of a full national language, Landsmaal, with a literature of its own. These developments had certainly not been an intention of the settlement of 1815. In other ways, too, the political

landscape of Europe had changed: most strikingly with the independence of Greece, and with the development of the *Zollverein* in Germany by 1834. Even where rulers had been reinstated by force, as in the Italian and German states, their temporary overthrow had reminded kings everywhere how fragile was their position, and how dependent they were on the general system of Metternich, already under attack from so many directions.

That system, however, remained at least formally intact and almost invulnerable. The provinces of Austria were kept completely subject to Vienna in government and administration. In Russia, with the resubjection of Poland, and the rule of Nicholas I, reaction reigned triumphant. In Prussia, too, no substantial progress had been made toward more constitutional or liberal government, despite the more liberal economic expedients of the *Zollverein*. By concerted diplomatic action in 1830 and 1831 the three eastern powers had successfully held off any attempts by the western powers to intervene in Italy or Poland. In 1833 they even made a formal treaty of alliance, the Convention of Münchengrätz, which gave to any sovereign threatened with revolution the right to call on them for help to repress it. In the international settlement of the Belgian question, as of the Greek, the old idea of a "concert of Europe" remained operative. But in nearly every other respect the idea of a general concert had given way to the new reality of rival groups, each acting with concert but in hostility to one another. When France and Britain undertook joint intervention to preserve constitutionalism in Portugal and Spain, Lord Palmerston hailed this action as a new counterpoise to the solidarity of the eastern powers. "The treaty," he declared, "establishes among the constitutional states of the West a Quadruple Alliance which will serve as a counterpoise against the Holy Alliance of the East." This double "concert of Europe" was, however, an admission that any hope of a general concert was at an end. It implied, instead, a new "balance of power," with the rival sides divided by conflict between liberal and nationalist ideologies on one hand, and the preservation of the old order on the other. These conditions allowed more opportunities for the pursuit of separate national interests and for the progress of liberal movements than the restoration settlement, contrived at Vienna, could ever have permitted. The consequences soon became apparent between 1833 and 1848.

CHAPTER 10

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION OF 1830-48

Western Economic Expansion

THE CONSTITUTIONAL and political adjustments to new needs, achieved in the western nations by 1833, were followed by a new era of rapid expansion in industrial production and trade. The lead in this expansion was taken by Britain and Belgium, though France and the Scandinavian countries shared in it too. Elsewhere in Europe economic advance was slowed down by the subordination of the enterprising classes of manufacturing and business to the interests of landowners and aristocracies.

Transport and Industry. In Britain these years were pre-eminently the heroic age of railway building. At first railroads were stubbornly resisted by the existing interests of roads and canals. What, it was asked, was to be done to safeguard all those who had advanced money for making and repairing the turnpike roads and the canals? Or the large number of people who made a living as coachmakers, harness makers, horse dealers, innkeepers? The first attempt to get through parliament a bill permitting the making of the railroad between Liverpool and Manchester failed because one noble duke protested that it would spoil his fox covers; and it cost £70,000 to secure parliamentary permission in 1826 even before starting the heavy capital outlay needed to buy the land and construct the line. Because British railroad builders were pioneers, they incurred the costs and burdens of all pioneers, and paid the price for technical experiments and mistakes that other countries were able to avoid. The opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1830, using the steam locomotive, inaugurated the new era. By 1838, when Russia was building her first railroad, there were 490 miles of railroad in England and Wales, and 50 in Scotland; and their construction had cost more than £13 million. By the end of 1850 there were 6,621 miles in operation. The two boom periods of building came in 1836 and, much more spec-

tacularly, in the years 1844-47. Despite wild speculations and financial disasters in 1847, there was considerable consolidation of lines which had been built piecemeal and often wastefully. The British "Railway King," George Hudson, devoted his business and administrative skill to bring about extensive amalgamations and improvements in their general running.

The revolution in transport which came with the railroads brought with it vast new demands for coal and iron, and stimulated a counterpart revolution in the heavy industries, especially in mining and metallurgy. Britain's coal output, only some sixteen million tons in 1815, rose to thirty million by 1835 and fifty million by 1848. Her output of iron doubled from one million tons in 1835 to two million in 1848; and by the middle of the century probably half the whole world's production of pig iron took place in Great Britain. Engineering proper, and the industries devoted to making machines, were still small-scale even in 1848, and the main progress in engineering techniques came only after that date. The railroads also encouraged the rise of big contractors, and offered employment to thousands ranging from the gangs of navvies who laid the tracks to the drivers, firemen, and other staff who ran the lines. A great new industry was born in little more than twenty years, and fears of unemployment among those who worked on the systems of roads and canals proved unfounded. There was a general stimulus to the whole economic system, and better facilities for quick and cheaper transport in turn stimulated other industries, such as textiles.

In British economy this was, indeed, almost as much the age of cotton as of coal and iron. It was cotton above all other commodities which was linked with the expansion of British overseas trade. Already in 1830 three quarters of the raw cotton came from the United States, and in 1849 the total import was as high as 346,000 tons, estimated to be worth £15 million. By the middle of the century more than half a million people were engaged in the cotton industry alone, and textiles as a whole employed well over one million. Textile manufacture was the industry most representative of the age of machinery and power. Although mechanization was still slow, cotton set the pace in factory production. The cotton trade boosted shipping. Between 1827 and 1848 the total tonnage of British shipping, both sail and steam, rose from two and a half to four million tons. At the middle of the century 60 per cent of the world's ocean-going tonnage was British; and the tonnage of all shipping entered and cleared from ports in the United Kingdom (excluding coastal trade and trade between Britain and Ireland) rose from six million tons in 1834 to more than fourteen million tons in 1847. This is perhaps the most vivid index of how much the prosperity of the country had come to depend on overseas trade. By 1850 the United Kingdom had triumphantly established itself as not only "the workshop

of the world" but also as the shipper, trader, and to a great extent the banker, of the world.

In continental Europe, Belgium set the pace in railroad-building. Her rich supplies of coal and the spirit of national enterprise released by her newly won independence made possible an industrial revolution comparable in intensity, if not in scale, with Great Britain's. The line from Brussels to Malines, opened in 1835, carried in its first year more than half a million passengers; this was more than were carried by all the British lines in 1835. Belgium was ahead of Britain in having a railway policy and in planning railroad construction as a national concern to serve national needs. Designed to take full advantage of Belgium's geographical and economic position as a land of passage, the lines were planned to link up England, France, Germany, and Holland, and make Belgium the commercial entrepôt of western Europe. The plan, begun in 1834, was completed within ten years. Throughout this period Belgium produced more coal than France, mainly because in 1815 she had inherited mines that had been among France's greatest. Liège and Southern Hainault were the first developed coal-mining areas of the continent, and the Liège district was a well-established metallurgical center. Belgium sent machinery all over Holland, Germany, and even Russia. Her spirit of national enterprise and traditions of craftsmanship, her urban society and her new network of transport, conspired to give her an economic lead in Europe second only to Britain's.

French economic development was more gradual, though it was real. Under the Orleanist monarchy greater freedom and encouragement were given to industry and trade. The first railway worth the name was opened between Paris and Saint-Germain in 1837, and by 1848 France had some two thousand miles of track: a third as much as Britain, in a country double the size. Local roads were immensely improved as a result of the law of 1836, and this led to a widening of the areas within which farmers could profitably sell their produce—a change of special importance in view of the supremacy of the home market in France. The problems, social and political, caused by large industrial towns loom large in French discussions of these years—larger, in fact, than the development of large-scale industry seems to warrant. By 1846 there were hardly more than a million workers employed in large-scale industries. But they were congested into a few big towns and industrial areas—the cotton and textile areas of Alsace, Normandy and the Nord, the metallurgical areas of Lorraine and the basin of the Loire, the silk area around Lyons. This meant the quite abnormal growth of a few towns. In the ten years 1831-41, Saint-Étienne grew from a population of 16,000 to one of 54,000; Roubaix from 8,000 to 34,000. The unregulated employment of women and children for excessive hours and in bad factory conditions exposed the growing class of industrial workers not only to in-

sanitary living conditions and hardship, but also to widespread tuberculosis and epidemics of the cholera, which ravaged both France and Britain in 1831-32, and again in 1847-48. It was found, in 1840, that out of every 10,000 young men drafted for military service in the ten most industrialized departments of France, 9,000 had to be rejected as medically unfit. This severe toll on human well-being was the price paid for such growth, and is an explanation of the rise, in these years, of social revolutionary movements in France.¹

East of the Rhine, railways came more slowly and piecemeal, and the corresponding advances in manufacturing spread gradually. The first German railway opened in 1835 in Bavaria, and already the economist Friedrich List, just back from America, was pressing the idea of a general German system of railways. At first he succeeded in having a line built in Saxony from Leipzig to Dresden, which began in 1839. In its first year it carried 412,000 people, some lady travelers keeping needles in their mouths to prevent familiarity in the darkness of its single tunnel. List's persuasive propaganda played a part in overcoming the doubts, hesitations, and frank hostility of many of the existing forces in Germany, and the crown prince of Prussia (the future Frederick William IV) became an enthusiastic supporter. By 1840 the line ran from Leipzig to Magdeburg, and companies had been formed to build more lines radiating from Berlin. By 1848 there were 1,500 miles of track on Prussian territory, and meanwhile other German states—following the Belgian planned system rather than the more hesitant Prussian model—had begun to build. As a result, by 1849-50 Germany's total of more than 3,000 miles matched France's 2,000 miles, and compared very favorably with Austria's 1,000 miles. Italy and Russia still had very few and very fragmentary lines. But it was now possible to travel by rail throughout the whole of northern Europe from Paris to Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin, Vienna, Warsaw. Apart from gaps in southeastern Europe, rail links were by now nearly complete from the Baltic and the North Seas to the Adriatic.

The revolutionary effect of the railway was even greater in some respects on German life than on life in more industrialized countries like Britain and Belgium. With a road system that was so imperfect, and towns still small and semirural, the changes brought by both the constructing and the running of the railways were more obvious and more spectacular. Country people were shaken more abruptly out of their traditional outlooks and habits. Germany was set to become the center of the continental system of transport and distribution in a way inconceivable hitherto. Her natural geographical and political characteristics had operated in the opposite direction: a small coastline discouraged shipping; the flow of many of her rivers to the closed sea of the Baltic, the

¹ See p. 172.

freezing of her canals in winter, her backward roads, had all made transport difficult, while her tangle of internal customs and tolls had made it expensive. The new iron tracks opened up the interior lands of Germany as they were opening up the interior of America, exposing them to new forces, bringing a new stimulus to trade, offering new opportunities to men of enterprise in every sphere of business. Just as the *Zollverein* removed the artificial impediments, so the railways removed the natural impediments to German integration and prosperity. They made possible the rapid expansion of the German economy after 1850, and paved the way for the political unification of Germany in 1871. At the same time they gave her an enhanced importance in Europe, as the central power par excellence, and within that new area Prussia held all the advantages as against Austria, for future leadership and domination.

Yet, despite this revolution, economic and social conditions in most of Germany were still backward as compared with the more western countries. Agriculture still employed more than two thirds of the whole population. The middle classes were relatively small, and consisted mainly of small manufacturers, merchants, officials, and professional people, and the more well-to-do peasants. The centers of industry were sparse and scattered. The most important industry was textiles, manufactured mainly by small handicraft plants with little use of powered machinery. Metallurgy was growing with the construction of railways, but although the Krupp works had been founded in 1810, it still employed only 140 workers in 1846. Even by 1850 Germany was producing little more than 200,000 tons of iron. The country in general was poor, and at the middle of the century expansion still remained potential rather than actual.

Trade. The overwhelming preponderance of the United Kingdom in overseas shipping and commerce helped to block the expansion of overseas trade in western Europe. French commerce did not recover until 1825 the volume of foreign trade it had enjoyed in 1789. Even in 1848 most European trade was domestic and continental. But the expansion of means of overseas transport was beginning to open new doors there too. In 1839 the Peninsula and Oriental Line set up a regular steamship service between England and Alexandria. The following year Samuel Cunard founded the Cunard Steamship Line, which twelve years later was running a regular weekly service between Liverpool and New York. Steamers, which had for some years been used for river and coastal transport, came increasingly into use as ocean-going ships; though here, too, they assumed major importance only two decades later.

Overseas trade had become important enough for some major British industries to demand a drastic change in Britain's commercial policy. Controversy centered on two issues: the Corn Laws, resented by the manufacturers and merchants because they hampered free exports, and

the Navigation Laws, resented by the same interests because they hampered transport. Between 1846 and 1849 both these protective measures were repealed, though the manner in which their repeal took place shows the tenacity and strength of old ideas and interests in even the most industrialized of European states. In 1836, when the price of corn was high, London radicals formed the first Anti-Corn Law Association; but Lancashire of the cotton mills was the natural home of the free trade movement. Raw cotton had to be imported; cotton goods formed a large proportion of exports. The prosperity of Lancashire depended directly on foreign trade; and the main impediment to foreign trade was the Corn Laws, designed to protect home-grown corn and keep its price high. The cry for cheap food was both simple and popular.

In the 1830's Richard Cobden, himself a cotton manufacturer, became the leading parliamentary spokesman of the movement, and was joined by the Quaker, John Bright. They wanted free trade in general, and "Cobdenism" developed into a whole philosophy of the benefits of peace, order, and prosperity which could accrue from freedom of international trade. But it was natural first to concentrate their fire on the hated Corn Laws. On this issue the conflict between the conservative agricultural interest and the liberal manufacturing and commercial interests reached its height. An Anti-Corn Law League was founded, with headquarters in Manchester. Its propaganda through pamphlets, press, mass meetings, parliamentary oratory and pressure, set a new model for high-powered, intensive, and simple popular agitation. In 1843 its weekly publication, *The League*, reached a circulation of over 20,000 and in London twenty-four mass meetings were held at Covent Garden theater. At some moments, as in 1842, the movement became almost revolutionary in character. As its activities spread to the countryside, rick burning and agrarian unrest spread too. In 1845 the harvest was bad, and a devastating disease ruined the potato crop. Since potatoes rather than corn were the staple diet of Ireland, this brought acute famine in Ireland. The League demanded the immediate and complete repeal of the laws which kept out imported food when families were starving.

Confusion prevailed among both the political parties. The Tory, Sir Robert Peel, resigned, but the Whig, Lord John Russell, failed to form a minority government. Peel formed a new cabinet, little different from the old, and tackled an overhaul of the whole fiscal system. His previous budgets of 1842 and 1845 had already almost abolished duties on the import of raw materials. He now completed the process by abolishing the duty on maize, greatly reducing the duties on other grains, including wheat, and permitting free importation of most foodstuffs. It was ten years after the first Anti-Corn Law Association had been formed before the Corn Laws were abolished. It took a hectic decade of incessant clamor to get them repealed; and only famine eventually forced the gov-

ernment's hand even in the reformed parliament. But the manufacturing and commercial interests, backed by widespread popular support, in the end won total victory.

In 1849 with considerably less agitation the Navigation Laws, which had been designed to protect British shipping in much the same way as the Corn Laws had been intended to protect British farming, were abandoned. The shipping interests by then enjoyed so great a natural superiority in the world that they, like the cotton manufacturers and traders, had nothing to fear from competition. By the middle of the century in Britain, duties remained on imports and exports primarily for reasons of revenue, and not for purposes of protection. The United Kingdom had become an industrial state, in policy as well as in internal development. In 1831 agriculture had directly engaged some 275,000 families in Great Britain. At the middle of the century the number was still roughly the same. It was not that agriculture positively declined in these years, but that in a larger population the proportion that made a living out of industry, trade, and the great new occupations of transport and communication immensely increased. In short, industry and trade virtually absorbed the whole of the four and a half million increase in population between 1830 and 1850.

There was no comparably drastic change in the commercial policy of European countries in these years. Most remained unrepentantly protectionist, largely out of fear of British competition. In Germany the freeing of internal trade continued, with the extension of the *Zollverein* to include the northern and southern states originally excluded. But between 1834 and 1848 there was a tendency for the duties imposed on manufactures by the whole *Zollverein* to become much heavier, especially on English pig iron and cotton yarn. In France there were interests, enjoying enhanced power after 1830, which favored a certain freeing of trade. Winegrowers, shippers, consumers of large quantities of iron and steel such as the new railroad companies, and academic economists wanted some relaxation in the severely protectionist measures of the restored monarchy. But in general French farmers and manufacturers joined hands in wanting protection. The economic crisis of 1831, when the price of wheat soared, brought down the tariff against grain imports but only for one year to tide over the crisis. Free transit of goods through France was permitted to boost the carrying trade. The governments tended to be more favorable to the lowering and the simplification of duties than was the general body of manufacturers and farmers, but they were sufficiently subject to their parliamentary pressures to take no step likely to alienate their support. The chamber of 1836, for example, included as deputies 45 industrialists, bankers, or commercial men, and 116 *rentiers* or proprietors. In addition, most deputies represented the wealthier proprietors of rural constituencies. In 1840 Guizot, who served as

Louis Philippe's chief minister from then until 1848, wrote to Lord Palmerston:

Another class, that of great manufacturers, metallurgists, and merchants, is favorably disposed toward the government of the king, and has supported and continues to support it on every possible occasion with its energy, its intelligence, its wealth, and its social influence. It is impossible for the government of the king not to be attentive to the interests and desires of the class of the population which has become attached to it. . . .

This was a precise and apt description of the working of the "bourgeois monarchy," and it could have applied equally well to the governments and policies of Britain and Belgium in these years.

In eastern Europe governments remained broadly protectionist in policy for the traditional reasons. In Russia under the ministry of Count Cancrin, between 1823 and 1844, a series of rearrangements of the tariffs took place in order to help home trade and raise revenue. The general effect was that many duties were lowered, and protection took the place of prohibition. In 1846 began a new phase of freer trade, partly as a result of English negotiations; by 1850 there was a very substantial freeing of both import and export trade, and the former customs barriers between Poland and Russia were broken down.

Economic Crisis. One consequence of the growth of international and overseas trade was that Europe as a whole experienced periods of acute and general economic crisis. The story of the crises of 1818-19 and of 1825 were repeated in the much greater crises of 1838-39 and of 1846-47. The fluctuations of cotton prices in the United States in 1837, and the winding up of the Bank of the United States which involved the loss of £6 million of European capital invested in America, had severe repercussions in Europe. In Britain and Belgium companies failed, banks ran into difficulties, and again as in 1825, the Bank of England was given help through the Barings from the Bank of France. In 1845 and 1846 corn harvests in Britain and Europe were bad; and in 1847, although the English harvest was better, those of France and Germany were again bad. The effect on food supplies and prices was intensified by the failure of potato crops, especially in Ireland. Food had to be imported from further away, from America and southern Russia, and payment for it drained away gold. Speculative dealings in foodstuffs, especially in Britain, caused still further financial difficulties. There were large-scale mercantile failures, bankruptcies, and closures of banks.

These sharp but short-period ups and downs in the cost of living caused great social distress in the semi-industrialized condition of Europe. When added to the consequences of actual famine, the human misery caused by an uncontrolled exploitation of cheap labor, and the growing

tide of political discontent, they helped to make the year 1848 a year of remarkable social and political revolution throughout Europe. Just as conservative governments of the years before 1830 had been generally too inhibited by their outlook and interests to handle effectively the movements of liberal discontent, so now the liberal governments after 1830 were too inhibited by their dependence upon mercantile and manufacturing interests to handle effectively the social distress of their peoples. It became evident, in one country after another, that governments had still not been brought into sensitive enough relationship with the needs of the whole of society to serve those needs efficiently. The inevitable result was a swelling demand for still further liberal reforms and for immediate extensions of democratic and even socialist policies. To understand the pent-up forces that brought almost universal revolution in 1848-49, the limited extent of liberal reforms between 1830 and 1848 must be examined, and the movements for more radical social revolution must be described.

Liberal Reforms

THE REFORM of the electoral and parliamentary systems in 1832 helped to make legislative enactment the normal means of administrative and social changes in Great Britain. Just as the abolitionists succeeded in getting the reformed parliament, now more sensitive to currents of organized opinion, to end slavery, and just as the free traders induced parliament to repeal corn laws and navigation laws, so a host of other zealous improving movements now concentrated upon parliamentary action as the road to reform. These movements of parliamentary pressure were of all political colorings and of none. Leaders of these movements might be individual philanthropists and aristocratic Tory humanitarians, like Lord Shaftesbury, who took up the cause of improving factory conditions, shortening working hours, checking the labor of women and children in mines, and ventilating the hardships suffered by little boy chimney sweeps. They might be evangelicals, interested in Christianizing industrialism. They might be reforming Whig lawyers, like those who put through the municipal reform act of 1835, replacing the old borough corporations, many of which had been exclusive and sometimes corrupt oligarchies, with new municipal councils elected by ratepaying householders of three years' standing. They might be humanitarians, who kept up a steady demand for the reform of the penal law and conditions in prisons. But most often they were radicals of diverse hues, ranging from Chartists seeking democratic reorganization of the electorate and parliament, to "philosophical radicals" like Edwin Chadwick and John Stuart Mill, disciples of Jeremy Bentham, who

sought to remodel public administration and the system of justice in terms of greater efficiency and responsibility to the people. On some issues, such as humanizing the penal code and methods of punishment, these different movements would combine forces; on others they would fall into dispute. But the common framework within which all worked was constitutional government, and the purpose of most of their activities was to get a bill through parliament. They turned parliament into an instrument of social welfare.

Although radicalism in general remained frustrated and dissatisfied with the extent of parliamentary and electoral reform accomplished in 1832, it began to exert a strong influence on administrative reform. The utilitarian philosophy expounded by Jeremy Bentham and his followers proved to be a particularly corrosive force when it was applied to the antiquated methods of judicial procedure, the confusion of laws on the statute book, and the wasteful and corrupt habits of public administration. Bentham was not himself a Liberal, in that he urged the prior claims of efficiency and social utility, even against the ideals of individual rights and freedoms. But the outcome of his campaign for substituting the test of usefulness for that of mere antiquity when judging the value of legislation and procedure was a loosening and undermining of the established order. Holding the unheroic view that men are guided in their actions by the desire to avoid pain and seek pleasure, he contended that the aim of government should be to use this fact in order to promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Because they shun pain, men can be induced to obey the law by inflicting upon them more pain than they derive pleasure or advantage by breaking it; but because pain is in itself bad, the penal law should inflict no more pain than is necessary to deter men from breaking the law. Benthamism thus became the sworn enemy of the excessive punishments commonly inflicted on lawbreakers, either by transportation or capital punishment for petty thefts, or by the brutal conditions of nineteenth-century prisons. It also became the philosophy underlying the important reform of that system of poor relief which had grown up in England during the previous generation.

Poor Relief. The practice of giving outdoor relief to supplement wages and in proportion to the number of dependents had done something to save the poor from destitution during years of economic depression, and had gone far to mitigate the rigors of the early industrial revolution. But it had been wastefully and often corruptly administered, and the methods of raising the money from poor rates levied in each parish and of subsidizing the wage bills of unscrupulous employers had led to widespread abuses. The radical reformers succeeded in getting through parliament, in 1834, an act to reform the whole system. It checked payments to supplement wages, reorganized the running of the workhouses,

and set up a central Poor Law Commission to supervise the system. Workhouses were to be run by local Boards of Guardians elected by the ratepayers, who would have a natural interest in keeping down the total expenditure on relief. Outdoor relief was to be eliminated by a "workhouse test," which meant that since conditions inside the workhouse were always to be harsher than those outside, only those in real need of assistance would enter the workhouse. Ratepayers' money would no longer be squandered on the lazy able-bodied or on needlessly subsidizing employers; but the needy poor, unable to do work, would be cared for.

The reorganization did not work out as had been intended by its most enthusiastic supporters. They had meant a distinction to be kept between the aged, the sick, and orphans, who could not work, and the able-bodied who could. The harsh workhouse test was meant to apply only to the latter. In effect, for reasons of economy and because of local insensitivity to human suffering, it was too often applied indiscriminately to all. The hated "bastilles," as the workhouses came to be called, played a fearsome part in the life of the poor for the next generation. They were apt to be run by bullies and sharpers, such as Charles Dickens satirized in *Oliver Twist*. But the effect in the end was to yield a system of poor relief more efficient in its working and more subject to democratic control than the old. The principle of delegating tasks of national administration to specially created authorities subject to locally representative bodies was imitated for subsequent reforms—most significantly for the protection of public health.

Public Health. The many problems of street paving and lighting, drainage and sanitation, water supply and fire precautions, the prevention of epidemics and an adequate medical service, had hitherto been left to be tackled by local authorities. This meant that usually they had not been tackled at all, or had been tackled badly; and the situation was worst of all in the large and growing industrial towns where these problems were especially acute but where local pride and civic responsibilities were weakest. In 1846 parliament set up a commission of inquiry into the health of towns. It reported that of fifty large towns the water supply was good in six, indifferent in thirteen, and in thirty-one insufficient or impure. In Newcastle eleven out of twelve houses were without water supply. An act of 1848 set up a central board of health on the lines of the Poor Law Commissioners, with power to create local boards on the petition of 10 per cent of the inhabitants of a district, and to enforce the setting up of local boards wherever the annual death rate was above 23 per thousand. The long struggle for better organization of town life owed its success to two factors in particular. One was sheer necessity, caused by the recurrence of the dreaded cholera in 1831-33 and in

1847-48, but local boards of health set up in the first epidemic soon lapsed and had to be re-created in the second. The other cause was the persistence of Edwin Chadwick and his disciples, who fought the battle for systematic protection of public health with an enthusiasm, skill, and insistence that in the end wore down all the obstructions of official apathy, vested interests which objected to expenditure of money on such purposes, and parliamentary reluctance to undertake so vast a task.

Social and administrative reforms of this kind in the first half of the century revealed all the faults of the time. They came slowly, belatedly, and only after their complete necessity had been abundantly proved. They encountered apathy and timidity, greedy self-interests and officious bumbledom, local resentment of central authority, and central hesitation in face of tasks that were formidable for a state which still had no expert and impartial civil service at its command. But their accomplishment, despite these obstacles, revealed also the great qualities of British life at that time. They reflected a growing conscience about social ills; a readiness to treat poverty, disease, squalor, and human suffering as remediable; and a willingness to try new ideas and embark on novel experiments in public administration. The social evils they attacked were not new in kind but they were new in scale and social importance. Politics came to be concerned more urgently and more continuously with the welfare of the community as a whole, and with the organized provision, through state legislation and state action, of the minimum conditions of a civilized life. The nation and the state had found one another, and British life was enriched by their meeting.

France and Belgium. In France the July Monarchy brought a move in the same direction. Just as the British parliament in 1833 passed Althorp's Act regulating conditions for employing young people in textile factories, so in 1841 the French parliament passed a factory act restricting the use of child labor in undertakings employing more than 20 persons. But whereas the merit of the British act was that it instituted factory inspectors to enforce the law, the French act did not, and its provisions were consequently largely ineffectual. It was 1848 before an inspectorate was set up, and then the February Revolution of that year prevented the scheme from operating. Just as the English Whigs reformed municipal government, so the French Liberals in 1831 set up general and district councils on which elected members could sit beside others nominated by the government. Although such elected departmental councils remained henceforth a permanent feature of local administration in France, at this time they had little real power.

But they were entrusted with the care of certain social welfare activities. In 1838 they were made responsible for the maintenance of public asylums for the insane. Although the first cholera epidemic of 1832

killed some twenty thousand people, including the prime minister Casimir-Périer, little was done to improve public health in the big towns. In 1828 the state undertook a general supervision of the work of local poor law authorities, which varied from that of charitable voluntary bodies to local administrative provisions. But the French state was slower than the British to take any direct share in poor law administration, and it was a national tradition that such poor relief, where undertaken at all apart from the family, was the duty of private or ecclesiastical charity.

In education, however, the opposite was true. In 1833, when the British parliament voted the first meager grant of £30,000 from public funds for the promotion of elementary education, the government of Louis Philippe passed its Education Act, planning to set up state-aided primary schools in every commune. In Britain the parliamentary grant was shared between the National Society (which was Anglican) and the British and Foreign School Society (which was undenominational), and both used it mainly for building schools. In France the purpose of the act, as defined by Guizot, who presented the bill, was "to calm and quench the people's thirst for action, as dangerous for itself as for society, to restore in their minds the inner sense of moral peace without which social peace would never return." Both measures, in short, were concessions by the middle classes to encourage moral improvement and thereby social peace.

The wealthy *bourgeoisie* of Belgium in these years showed even less concern for social problems, though conditions in mines and factories in Belgium were no better, nor the effects of economic depression any less severe, than in Britain or France. Liberal and Catholic parliamentarians, representing the same social class, were in agreement that social questions did not matter politically. Wages were determined by the laws of supply and demand, and the poor had no rights save to appeal to charity. In 1842 the government passed a law requiring each community to support a primary school, but in most cases the former Catholic Church schools were merely adopted by local authorities, with even the same clerical teachers and supervisors in charge.

Germany. The most industrialized part of Germany was the Rhine provinces of Prussia, and as early as 1824 the Prussian minister of education tried, though with little success, to restrict the hours of child workers in factories. The consideration that characteristically induced the Prussian government to take sterner action was the discovery in 1828 that the industrial Rhine regions were unable to contribute their full contingents to the army because of the physical deterioration of the population. Even then there was further delay, until in 1839 a factory law was passed prohibiting the employment of children under nine and restricting the working day of children between nine and sixteen to ten hours. The law was not fully enforced, and even when a factory inspec-

torate on the English model was instituted in 1853, the work of inspectors was limited to a few areas and was stubbornly resisted by employers and local authorities.

In German traditions, especially in the Protestant states, the work of poor relief was left to the communes. But it was of small effect, and it was only in Prussia and only after 1840 that more systematic efforts were made to tackle the problems of poverty through the reformed system of local government authorities. In other respects the Prussian traditions of state paternalism led to readier state action on behalf of social progress. Between 1810 and 1845 the guilds were shorn of their powers insofar as these restricted the development of industry, but they were left in charge of apprenticeship. From the middle of the century onward they were entrusted with new functions of social insurance. Throughout the period the state system of education continued to develop, and its benefits were made more and more accessible to the people. But elsewhere in Germany the relatively backward economic conditions were reflected in little effort to achieve social reforms. Small firms and handicraft trades persisted, and governments were scarcely conscious of the pressure of more modern industrial problems.

Resistance to Reform. Similarly, elsewhere in Europe no pattern of liberal reform could be detected. In Scandinavia the Danish kings, Frederick VI (1808-39) and Christian VIII (1839-48), preserved their absolutist powers virtually intact; but the Swedish king, Charles XIV (Bernadotte), had by 1840 liberalized his government both in Sweden and in Norway. In 1840 William I of the Netherlands had so used his autocratic powers that he was forced to abdicate in favor of his more popular son, William II; and in 1843 Otto I, king of the Hellenes, was compelled by insurrection to grant a new constitution. But in general the forces of conservatism remained dominant and usually repressive. The doctrines of Metternich were generally accepted, and social peace was preserved more by suppression of disturbing elements than by timely concession to their demands. Years of bad harvest and acute distress were endured with a medieval sufferance and fatalism; poverty was regarded as irremediable, and to be alleviated only by private charity. Only among agitators and extremists was the exciting notion coming to be accepted: that human suffering could be limited by better administration, greater inventiveness and ingenuity, and more strenuous public action, and that governments might be capable of performing for their subjects tasks of emancipation and material improvement far beyond anything so far dreamed of. In the next two generations, as industrialism spread from the west throughout Europe, this startling notion was to captivate opinion in one country after another, until in the twentieth century it proved irresistible everywhere. But in 1848 it was still a revolutionary idea which no existing government welcomed with noticeable enthusiasm.

Movements for Social Revolution

THE OUTCOME of the revolutions of 1830-33 left reasons enough for active discontent. Governments that had made concessions had without exception been careful to keep in their hands effective ways of turning the edge of real democratic movements. Everywhere the right to vote was defined in terms of property qualifications, and such qualifications were fixed high enough to keep out of political power all save the wealthier middle classes. Everywhere facilities for rigging elections and handicapping parties in opposition to the government remained quite adequate to protect the power of established authority. In Britain the limited franchise, the preservation of boroughs which could be bought or influenced, the lack of secret ballot, kept the Whigs safe from excessive radical pressure. In France the limited franchise and the whole machinery of administrative influence over elections served a similar purpose. The Ministry of the Interior, through its prefects at the head of each *département*, was expected to manage or "make" elections favorable to official candidates, and it usually succeeded admirably.

In 1831 Casimir-Périer set the tone of the whole regime when he instructed his prefects: "The Government insists . . . that the electoral law be executed with the most rigorous impartiality. At the same time, the Government wishes it to be known that the distance between impartiality and administrative indifference is infinite. The Government is convinced that its continuance in office is vital to the interests of the Nation." Occasionally prefects would resort to heroic measures to carry out such orders. In 1837 the prefect of Morbihan discovered with consternation that the "reliable" candidate in the forthcoming elections, M. Hello, was not eligible because he had not resided in the *département* for the necessary six months. Three days before the polls the opposition candidate learned this fact and placarded the information round the town. The electoral registers were stored in the subprefecture. The prefect opportunely burned it down, and by return of post the minister of the interior agreed that elections could not possibly be held without proper registers. By the time the new registers had been compiled M. Hello had resided for the statutory six months and all was well.

Given such blatant manipulations of electoral and parliamentary machinery in even the most constitutional states of Europe, radicals and democrats had abundant grounds for claiming that abuses of this kind could be removed only by universal suffrage and more drastic overhauls of electoral procedures. Given, too, the growth of industrialism and ur-

banization in western Europe² and the recurrence of economic depression and crisis for which the social reforms carried out by governments were quite inadequate, it was natural that radical clamor for political and constitutional reform should link up with movements for more drastic social and economic reform. The Tory-Whig thesis, that political agitation and reform could have no relevance to the alleviation of social distress, became very threadbare in face of the timid experiments actually made to alleviate it and of the growing conviction that poverty might be in fact remediable by new methods of administration and vigorous action. Democratic political reforms were urged as the first and necessary step toward social and economic reforms. Daily evidence of how the middle classes were able to use their enhanced political power to promote and protect their own economic interests robbed them of the pretence that democracy would not bring broader material advantages to the working classes. The shrewdness of the common man taught him that what was sauce for the bourgeois goose was likely to be sauce for the proletarian gander.

Chartism. This radical pursuit of democratic rights in order to improve social conditions was especially clearly illustrated by the Chartist movement of these years in Great Britain. Its roots were partly political and partly economic. It arose out of popular discontent with the Reform Act of 1832, out of the failures of early experiments in trade unionism, and out of movements of mass discontent in Lancashire and Yorkshire caused by economic depression and industrial exploitation. These different movements fused together into one of the most dynamic outbursts of working-class agitation so far known in England. In 1838 the cabinet-maker William Lovett and the tailor Francis Place drew up the "People's Charter" as a common political program. Its famous "Six Points" called for universal male suffrage, equal electoral districts, removal of the property qualification for members of parliament, payment of members of parliament, secret ballot, and annual general elections. The first five of these six demands were granted between 1858 and 1918, but the sixth indicates the radical character of the program. It was intended to make parliament entirely subject to the will of the people. Against the Whig doctrine of the sovereignty of parliament, the radicals raised the principle of the sovereignty of the people.

Although Chartism, in this political form, originated among the respectable artisans and radicals of London, it found its mass support, as did the free-trade movement, among the industrial populations of northern England. The Birmingham Union, dating from 1816, and the radicals of Leeds soon joined it and imported into it an element of mass agitation and extremism. Fiery popular orators like the Irishmen Bronterre

² See pp. 156-60.

O'Brien and Feargus O'Connor staged exciting torchlight processions at night, harangued huge meetings of hungry men and women, and conducted violent propaganda through O'Connor's paper, the *Northern Star*. "The Charter" became the battle cry for a nation-wide movement, rallying to its support currency reformers like Thomas Attwood of Birmingham and European refugees who saw in it a cause for which they had themselves suffered exile.

The climax of the agitation was the calling of a National Convention, to meet in Westminster Palace Yard very near the Houses of Parliament, and the presentation to parliament of a monster petition for which hundreds of thousands of signatures had been collected. The Convention was deeply split over what it should next do if the petition were rejected. Lovett, Place, and their southern followers were in favor of constitutional methods only, and urged a further campaign of peaceful agitation and popular education. O'Connor and his more extreme revolutionary northern supporters wanted to resort to violence and a general strike. One Polish exile published articles on revolutionary tactics, and pamphlets were sold on how best to build barricades. There was a tang of civil war in the air. In July, 1839, the petition with one and a quarter million signatures was rejected by the House of Commons. Riots, strikes, and even insurrections followed, but not revolution. The moderate Chartists resorted to peaceful propaganda, the extremists persisted with their agitation during the 1840's.

In 1842 and again in 1848 further petitions were presented, and each time rejected by parliament. Latterly only the cranks and fanatics, the rabble, and a few sections of the working classes remained faithful to Chartism. Middle-class sympathizers were diverted to the Anti-Corn Law agitation of these years, the artisans reverted to peaceful agitation, and the working classes began to turn to trade unionism. But, throughout, the fortunes of the movement fluctuated with changes in material conditions. Its periods of greatest activity coincided with periods of economic depression and distress. It declined in times of reviving prosperity. The rise and fall of Chartism were a barometer of industrial and agricultural conditions. It shook the hardening complacency of Victorian England more profoundly than did any other comparable movement, fostered a new social conscience and national consciousness about the ills of industrial Britain, and gave an eventual impetus to further reforms.

The Revolutionary Tradition. In France radical action took less public and more conspiratorial shapes. The secret societies of the restoration period and the revolutionary tradition of mob violence combined to make democratic movements more violent. The first five years of the reign of Louis Philippe were particularly rich in revolts, strikes, and demonstrations, prompted largely by the republicans' sense of having been cheated in 1830. In the silk center of Lyons wages were unduly

low, and there had been experiments in collective bargaining with employers for minimum wage scales. In November, 1831, the silk workers broke out into open insurrection. The immediate provocation was that 104 of the 1,400 manufacturers in the area refused to observe the agreements and threatened to close their works. The government, fearing the spread of revolt from a city where the weavers were for a time in control, stepped in and not only crushed the rising but declared collective bargaining illegal.

The incident dispelled working-class hopes that the new regime might protect their interests, and drove them to support the secret republican societies. Such societies abounded, and ranged from fairly open associations like the Society of the Rights of Man, to the traditional type of conspiracy, such as the "Families" or the "Seasons." Even the more moderate societies, like that of the Rights of Man, tended in the propaganda they aimed at the working classes to conjure up the vision of a republic in which economic inequalities would be less. Others, especially those influenced by Philippe Buonarroti or Auguste Blanqui, were more frankly and thoroughly socialistic or communistic in their aims.

Auguste Blanqui deserves special mention as one of the most outstanding of the professional revolutionaries who haunted Paris under the July Monarchy. He inherited the role and many of the ideas of Buonarroti, who died in 1837.³ Blanqui was the son of a Napoleonic official and was born in 1805. He had joined the *Charbonnerie* as a student, and for his part in the rising of 1830, which eventually brought Louis Philippe to the throne, he was awarded a medal by the new government. This was the only official recognition, apart from sentences of imprisonment and death, that his activities were ever to receive. He spent nearly half his long life in 15 different prisons, and much of that time was spent in solitary confinement. In April, 1834, the government passed a law restricting the rights of association, and in Lyons, which had just endured one of its periodic strikes, protests against the new law resulted in six days of bitter fighting. In the eastern districts of Paris there was, almost simultaneously, a rising planned by the Society of the Rights of Man. Adolphe Thiers who directed its suppression was ever after hated by the republicans for what came to be known as the "massacre of the Rue Transnonain."

These events induced Blanqui to set about organizing a new secret society, powerful enough to secure political ends but secret enough to evade police espionage. The result was the Society of Families (*Société des Familles*), modeled on Carbonarist principles and with the immediate purpose of military action. A unit of six members was called a Family; five or six Families, under one Chief, constituted a Section; two or three Sections made up a Quarter. It was so organized that its leaders

³ See pp. 26 and 124.

would remain unknown until the moment for action should come, and orders were issued by a central committee of unknown membership. By 1836 it numbered some 1,200 people, had infiltrated two regiments of the garrison of Paris, and owned dumps of arms and a factory for making gunpowder. To evade the attentions of the police, it then had to be dissolved, but was almost immediately reconstituted as the Society of the Seasons (*Société des Saisons*), with even more picturesque labels. Each group of six was known as a week, commanded by a Sunday; four weeks formed a month, under the orders of July; three months a season, led by Spring; and four seasons a year, directed by a special agent of the central committee. It was led by Blanqui, Martin Bernard, and Armand Barbès. They timed the rising for the spring of 1839.

The Society published clandestine newspapers and organized working-class support in Paris, Lyons, and Carcassonne. Economic distress was bringing unemployment among the town workers and discontent among the peasants, and this swelled the Society's ranks. On Sunday mornings, marching in formation but unobserved because they mingled so skillfully with the Sunday crowds, they were "reviewed" by Blanqui from some secluded spot. On a fine warm spring morning of May 12, 1839, they were at last summoned to action stations. The police, it was hoped, would be preoccupied controlling the crowds at the races at the Champs de Mars. The conspirators' forces concentrated around the gunsmiths' shops and stores in the Paris districts of Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin. The stores were duly raided—the inevitable prelude to rioting—and barricades were thrown up. The Palais de Justice and the Hôtel de Ville were occupied and the Republic was proclaimed while the mob shouted the *Marseillaise*. A few soldiers were killed. Then the National and Municipal Guards were called out, the military garrisons stood to arms, and the insurgents were driven back behind the barricades in the working-class districts. By nightfall they had been completely routed and most of their leaders captured. Blanqui himself was caught after five months of living in cellars, attics, and sewers, and sent to prison for the next eight and a half years—until the revolution of 1848 set him free again. The conspirators failed utterly, chiefly because they had wrongly relied on the readiness of the mass of Parisians to support them spontaneously once the initial *coup* had been made.

This and the comparable failure of other risings during the 1830's served to discredit the men and methods of the secret societies, and in spite of even more acute social distress at certain times during the "Hungry Forties," the government was freed from the standing threat of insurrection. But even in prison the social revolutionaries were incessantly active. Between 1815 and 1848 people of all kinds and creeds were liable to find themselves together in prison, and therefore prison life became one of the main breeding grounds for republican propaganda and social-

ist ideas. Several descriptions have been given, by inmates, of the prison of Sainte-Pélagie where political prisoners were mainly housed. A whole section of it was reserved for "politicals," whether legitimist royalists or republicans. But there were strict divisions between middle-class and working-class prisoners, though Raspail the republican would at times give the workers lessons on hygiene or the principles of science, and the Vicomte Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld, imprisoned for writing a legitimist pamphlet, organized weekly concerts at the governor's house to which he invited prisoners of both parties. Though prolonged imprisonment evoked remarkable stoicism, it did not encourage realistic political thinking. The social revolutionary movement in France, deprived for long periods of its most militant leaders, fell out of touch with real working-class life.

What was true, in this respect, of France was no less true for the rest of continental Europe. Republican, nationalist, and revolutionary movements stayed alive, and at moments flared up into local insurrections. But nowhere, until 1848, did they succeed in turning revolt into revolution. In countries where industrialism was less developed, liberal or democratic fervor weaker, and the oppressive power of governments stronger, they had even less hope of success than in France. But though revolutionary action was, in general, paralyzed, revolutionary thinking flourished. Most important of all for the future, there grew up in these years new and diverse schools of socialist thought, more closely adapted than the more old-fashioned radical democracy to the novel needs and sentiments of an industrial society. The decade after 1830 was especially the birth-time of socialism.

Early Socialism. As already shown,⁴ socialist ideals and doctrines stemmed from Rousseau, from extreme Jacobinism during the French Revolution, and from the general tendency to extend the ideals of liberty, equality, and, above all, fraternity to social and economic life no less than to politics. There was a certain infusion of socialism into Chartism, and Bronterre O'Brien in 1836 produced an abridged English translation of Buonarroti's book on the conspiracy of Babeuf. But in Britain socialism first became of some importance with the activities and writings of Robert Owen. As early as 1800 he had begun the experiment of creating a model factory at New Lanark, and attracted international attention by its apparent proof that workers could be treated well, even generously, without their employer's failing to make a profit. His fellow millowners were impressed. If even philanthropy could make profits, then the men of Manchester were interested in philanthropy. His more ambitious experiment of "New Harmony" in Indiana in 1825, designed as a voluntary and freely self-governing co-operative community, was a failure though not without its value in spreading an ideal. Like many

⁴ See p. 104.

other self-made and spectacularly successful business men, Owen became a dreamer of dreams. His writings became more and more unrealistic and visionary. But the core of his message was clear enough. It was that the condition of men would improve if they would replace competition by co-operation as the mainspring of their economic activities and their social life. If social conditions are bad they can be changed. Insofar as they are bad because men are bad and behave inhumanely to their fellow men, then men can undergo a change of heart. The great need is for education, social and moral. By molding men's minds to the truth of co-operation, society and even human nature can be transformed for the better.

Robert Owen had a decisive influence on the two most successful working-class movements in his day, trade unionism and the co-operative movement—though neither had shed its growing pains before he died in 1858. Impressed by the potentialities of trade unions, as they developed after gaining legal rights in 1825, Owen set up a Grand National Consolidated Trades Union that was intended to raise unionism to the level of one comprehensive national organization. It was much too ambitious a project, given the state of industry in his day. Under its inspiration or example countless schemes for the complete reorganization of economic life on co-operative lines were put forward. A Grand National Union of Builders was proposed, to take over and run the entire building trade of Britain. By the use of labor exchanges and "labor notes" as currency, Owen proposed to build a new labor commonwealth. By 1834 the project collapsed. It culminated not, as planned, in one vast general strike but in many local, sporadic, and usually futile strikes. Its death-blow came with the trial and punishment of a handful of Dorsetshire agricultural laborers for taking "unlawful oaths" as members of a union which was to be part of the Grand National Consolidated Union. These ignorant and unfortunate men, known thenceforth as the "Tolpuddle Martyrs," were sentenced to transportation, as a savage warning to others.

The pathetic incident turned the enthusiasm of Owen and his followers away from unionism toward co-operative movements. In 1844 twenty-eight Lancashire working men, inspired by Owenism, opened a little store in Toad Lane, Rochdale. The idea of self-help through common ownership and management of a little shop caught on, and by 1851 there were some one hundred and thirty co-operative stores on a similar pattern in the north of England and in Scotland. The idea was to become, by the end of the century, the origin of an organization nation-wide and even, through British emigration overseas, empire-wide. The principle of distributing dividends, according to purchases, among registered members of the society kept it very democratic in shape, and gave it a strong appeal to thrifty housewives.

France was even more fertile than Britain in producing new socialistic theories and movements, though they bore less concrete results in France than in Britain. The two leading French socialist thinkers were Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon, and Charles Fourier. Both, like Owen, belonged to an age when the romantic movement was at its most influential, and their thought had a correspondingly idealistic and emotional flavor.⁵ Saint-Simon was by birth an aristocrat, and even claimed descent from Charlemagne. He had renounced his title during the French Revolution of 1789 and then made a fortune through speculating in church lands. His life was spent in the quest for a new source of authority and faith in an industrial age. He preached the gospel of work—"man must work"—and insisted that property rights must depend on their social utility, not on any imprescriptible individual rights. He coined the slogan that was to become so popular with later socialism: "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his work." But he remained skeptical of democracy, and wanted rule by an intellectual aristocracy. His chief influence came after his death in 1825, when a band of his disciples formed a Saint-Simonian Church, with six departmental churches throughout France and considerable influence in Germany.

Charles Fourier, the slightly younger contemporary of Owen and Saint-Simon, was the son of a well-to-do draper who came to regard commerce as the great enemy. He attacked above all the ills of a commercial civilization which made vice more profitable than virtue and set men in enmity with one another. The great sources of evil are cut-throat competition, deceit, greed, and inhumanity; and the great remedy is association and co-operation to restore harmony to human life. To make work attractive each worker must share in its produce and be guaranteed a sufficient minimum to free him from anxiety. Fourier's ideas were invariably wrapped up in a mass of fantastic speculation and dogmatic theorizing which concealed the grains of shrewdness and common sense which they contained. Thus the dirty and unattractive work of the community would be done, he suggested, by "little hordes" of children, who at a certain age have been providentially endowed with a love of being dirty. They would be "passionately attracted" to scavenging, and would be always on foot (or riding on their Shetland ponies) at 3 a.m. even in the depths of winter, repairing roads, killing vermin, attending to animals, and working in the slaughterhouses. But the core of his thought—the argument that co-operation should replace competition—had a wide appeal. Fourierist communities were set up during the 1840's in New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts, and he was eagerly read in Russia as well as in France.

The ideas common to these early socialist writers all hinged upon the concept of harmony in social life. Their protest was against the deg-

⁵ See p. 121.

radation of human labor in the early phases of industrialism, against inhuman capitalist treatment of labor as merely a marketable commodity used to bring profit, against the demoralization of social life by cut-throat competition and the unrestrained devotion to the purpose of making profits regardless of human suffering. Their concern, therefore, was to reassert the moral values of co-operation among men, the dignity and function of work, the need for a harmonious society to regenerate mankind. Their romanticism and their visionary qualities deserved the label that Marxists were later to affix to them, of "utopian socialists." Their very perfectionism doomed them to disillusionment. But they had a profound influence on the seething discontent of the mass of working people in their day, and it was no bad thing that human values should be so prolifically reasserted in these years of ruthless industrial expansion. Their work meant that, when the revolutions of 1848 broke out throughout Europe, there were usually small but active groups of socialist-minded men seeking to use the moment to demand political and social rights for working men. By then, too, more practical-minded thinkers such as Louis Blanc in France and John Stuart Mill in England were proposing more immediate and concrete measures to alleviate working-class conditions.

Blanc in 1839 published his famous book on the *Organization of Labor* (*L'organisation du travail*), which almost at once became a best seller. He argued downrightly that political reform is the only means to achieve social reform, and that socialism must be state socialism. If the state is not used as an instrument, it becomes an obstacle. The state must acknowledge and implement the "right to work," and must in every other way protect the weak and the poor. As the "supreme regulator of production" the government should, for example, set up "social workshops" (or *ateliers sociaux*) in the most important branches of industry, and these will treat their workers fairly and be eventually run democratically by the workers themselves. In initial competition with private employers they will attract the best workers and in the end will put unscrupulous employers out of business, defeating them by their own principles of free competition. With Blanc, socialism came nearer to the earth and entered more practicable politics. His ideas were welcomed with widespread enthusiasm by French workers, who knew only too well from experience the hardships of a laissez-faire state. That was why Louis Blanc was able to play a prominent role in the revolution of 1848 in France.⁶

Karl Marx. Meanwhile other men, of German origin, were taking a place in the strange medley of extremist socialist and communist groups which worked mostly in exile in Paris, Brussels, London, and Switzerland. A group of German refugees in Paris founded, in the 1830's, a so-

⁶ See p. 184.

ciety linked with the working-class movements of Buonarroti and the other disciples of Babeuf. They called it the League of the Just, and it was joined by a young tailor, Wilhelm Weitling. In 1842 he published a communist book called *Guarantees of Harmony and Freedom* and established himself as one of the most important German working-class leaders. In 1846 he attended in Brussels a meeting held "for the purpose of agreeing, if possible, in a common tactic for the working-class movement." There he met two very forceful men engaged in devising such a tactic. These were described by a young Russian traveler, Annenkov, who was present at the meeting. Of one, he wrote:

A type of man all compact of energy, force of character, and unshakeable conviction—a type who was highly remarkable in his outward appearance as well. With a thick black mane of hair, his hands all covered with hair and his coat buttoned up askew, he gave one the impression of a man who had the right and the power to command respect, even though his aspect and his behavior might seem to be rather odd. . . . He never spoke at all except in judgments that brooked no denial and that were rendered even sharper, and rather disagreeable, by the harsh tone of everything he said. This note expressed his firm conviction of his mission to impress himself on men's minds, to dominate their wills, and to compel them to follow in his train. . . .

The other man he described as tall and erect, "with English distinction and gravity." The former was Karl Marx, then aged 28; the latter his devoted friend and collaborator, Friedrich Engels.

Marx joined the League of the Just, now rechristened the Communist League, in the spring of 1847. It was a time of the worst economic depression modern Europe had known, when bad harvests coincided with a business slump after the boom in railroad-building. That fall Marx and Engels jointly composed a manifesto for the little Communist League, which was destined to replace the utopian and visionary socialism of Owen and Saint-Simon, Fourier and Blanc, by a new dynamic doctrine of class war and world revolution. The *Communist Manifesto* for the first time delineated not only a complete doctrine of social revolution, but also a strategy of social revolution. It substituted for the old slogan of the League of the Just, that "All men are brothers," the single purpose of "the forcible overthrow of the whole existing social order."

The Manifesto dramatically presents all history as the story of class struggles and depicts modern society in the grip of great revolutionary forces. Technical advances in the methods of producing wealth change the nature and the balance of social classes. Modern industry and commerce give power to the *bourgeoisie*, the industrial, commercial, and financial capitalists who own the means of production and whose ruthless

exploitation of the world's resources and of the labor of those who do not own the means of production (the *proletariat* or wage-slaves) shapes contemporary history. This dominant, enterprising class controls the liberal state and uses it for exploiting and repressing more fully those who have only their labor to sell. The proletariat is destined, by the remorseless process of history, to grow in size, misery, and self-consciousness, until it is able to overthrow its oppressors. "What the bourgeoisie produces, above all, are its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."

It follows that democracy is a sham, for parliamentary government is only a mask for the class-rule of the capitalists; that the workers should have no national loyalties, since they have common interests with the oppressed wage-slaves of other lands but none at all with their own employers; and that the destined proletarian revolution will be also a world revolution, inevitably triumphant, inaugurating first a proletarian state (the "dictatorship of the proletariat") and eventually a truly classless society. Marx and Engels end with their famous plea: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains: they have a world to win. Workers of all countries, unite!"

The *Manifesto* first appeared in London in February, 1848, the month of revolution in France. It played no part in precipitating that revolution, and at the time it was little read. But within the next two decades it permeated Europe, twelve editions appearing in Germany alone. It preached a gospel that a century later had become the official political creed of half the human race, and it is beyond doubt one of the most important documents of modern history. Its appearance in 1848 would alone make that year memorable in the history of Europe. But, for the moment, events took charge, and by June the whole face of Europe was changed by a series of eruptions caused primarily by the accumulated economic hardships of the previous two years, and by the stirring of nationalist aspirations for unity. The "Year of Revolutions" had come, and the "Age of Revolutions" had reached its climax.

CHAPTER

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONS OF 1848-50

The Sequence of Revolutions, 1848

ON JANUARY 12, 1848, the people of Palermo in Sicily came out into the streets in open rebellion against the misrule of Ferdinand II of Naples. Within a month there were similar riots in nearly all the large Italian cities. On February 12, 1848, the liberal opposition to the conservative government of Guizot in France reduced the government's majority to only 43 in the Chamber of Deputies, and forthwith proclaimed their intention to hold a propaganda banquet on February 22. When the government in panic banned the banquet, the people of Paris came out into the streets to demonstrate and by nightfall the barricades were thrown up in the working-class streets. These two incidents touched off the two different kinds of popular insurrection which in the course of the year started a series of revolutions all over Europe. Most of the revolutions in Italy, Germany, Austria, and Hungary were on the pattern of Palermo—nationalist and popular insurrections against foreign rule and against the dreary repressive policy of Metternich and his allies. The revolution in Switzerland and the disturbances in Belgium and Britain were on the French pattern—democratic protests against the exclusiveness and inadequacies of middle-class government and a demand for social and democratic reforms. Despite these important differences the risings merged into one great European upheaval, a tide of exasperation and discontent, taking diverse forms and suffering diverse fates in different countries. Its greatest political achievement in Europe was to end the rule of Metternich and secure the overthrow of his "system," which had prevailed since 1815. Its greatest social and economic consequence was to destroy feudalism in most of eastern Europe.

Italian Initiative. At first the initiative lay with Italy. The hopes of Italian liberals had come to center upon two men: Charles Albert of Savoy, who in 1831 had succeeded to the throne of Piedmont-Sardinia

and was more actively sympathetic than his predecessor had been to nationalist hopes; and Pope Pius IX, who in June, 1846, had succeeded Gregory XVI and had shown liberal sympathies by conceding a partial political amnesty and permitting the formation of a Civic Guard in Rome. Either or both, it was thought, might take a lead in ending Austrian domination of the Italian peninsula. With these more favorable auspices, the secret societies (*Carbonari* and the rest) and the Mazzinian republican movements were active everywhere. The earliest popular risings, in Palermo and Milan, were directly due to them, and without the dynamism provided by these popular movements it is doubtful whether revolution would have begun in Italy in 1848.

Charles Albert, in his reorganization of his composite kingdom of Piedmont, Sardinia, and Savoy, reformed the finances and the army, promoted agriculture, and lowered tariffs. But he ruled as an absolutist monarch, and police and spies were as active in repression in his kingdom as they were anywhere else in Italy. He made the mistake of thinking he could be enlightened in economics and reactionary in politics; and when he permitted meetings of local agricultural societies, he found it impossible to stop their talking politics. It was easy to move from talk of cabbages to talk of kings, and the kingdom of Piedmont became one of the most politically conscious and active parts of Italy. At the same time Pope Pius IX seemed bent on fulfilling liberal expectations; so much so that when, in 1847, papal liberalism began to be imitated in Tuscany, Metternich occupied the papal city of Ferrara. The Pope at once circularized the powers of Europe, there was an outcry in the press, and Charles Albert put his forces at the Pope's disposal for the defense of his states. By December, 1847, Metternich was obliged to withdraw the Austrian troops from Ferrara and to admit diplomatic defeat.

These early skirmishes were forewarning of the troubles to come. The weakness of the Italian nationalist forces in general was that because there were three possible national leaders—Charles Albert, the Pope, and Mazzini—there were also three quite different political programs and movements for national liberation. These were widely canvassed during the later 1840's by influential Italian writers. Massimo d'Azeglio attacked papal rule and urged that since Italy would have to fight Austria to win her independence, all Italian patriots should rally behind the king of Piedmont, as the most independent ruler with resources enough to fight Austria. On the other hand the Abbé Gioberti appealed to moderate conservatives and intellectuals in Lombardy with his plea, in *Il Primato* of 1843, for a federation of all Italian states under the Papacy, with a college of princes as its executive authority. Mazzini opposed both, and was the most influential advocate of republicanism. He urged the expulsion of Austria by a mass popular uprising, the

abolition of the temporal power of the Papacy, and the union of all Italy under a democratic republic. It was clear that little compromise and no union was possible between these three fundamentally different programs. The choice between them was, in the end, decided by the course of events.

Mazzinian enthusiasts not only touched off the revolution by the revolt at Palermo; they won a victory of immense moral importance by compelling Ferdinand II of Naples to grant Sicily the Constitution of 1812 which democrats had always demanded, and with it independence from Naples. By the end of January, 1848, Ferdinand had tried to substitute a new constitution for his whole kingdom of Naples and Sicily, on the model of the French constitution of 1830, with two chambers, a free press, and guarantees of individual liberty and rights. But the island of Sicily held out for its complete independence, and its example was infectious. In Piedmont, Tuscany, and Rome similar constitutions were hastily granted by their rulers in a last-minute effort to stave off revolution. The joint pressure of liberal constitutionalists and democratic republicans seemed, by the end of February, to have opened a new era of liberal government in Italy.

Second French Republic. But now the initiative reverted to France and it was to Paris, the traditional prompter for revolutionary performances, that rebels everywhere in Europe began to look. Faced with the popular rising in Paris on February 22, Louis Philippe decided to dismiss Guizot and his ministry. But the Paris mobs were fast getting out of hand, and the mischance of a volley from a company of regular troops which killed or wounded 52 of the crowd tipped the scale. Barricades were erected everywhere, gunsmiths' shops were looted, and Paris found itself in total revolution. The middle-class National Guard turned against the king. It was supported by moderate socialists like Louis Blanc and by extremist social revolutionaries, the disciples of Blanqui. On February 24 Louis Philippe was forced to abdicate, and in the Chamber of Deputies the poet Lamartine announced a list of liberal parliamentarians to form a new provisional government. They adjourned to the Hôtel de Ville to agree on the allocation of offices. Lamartine himself took Foreign Affairs, the democratic radical Ledru-Rollin Home Affairs, with the aged Dupont de l'Eure as President. But it was one thing to set up a provisional government on paper, quite another to establish its authority in Paris and in the rest of France.

This group of moderate parliamentarians formed a self-constituted provisional government, acclaimed by the mob at the city hall. They were largely the journalistic staff of *Le National*, the liberal opposition paper founded in January, 1830, which had helped to undermine the rule of Charles X and had remained the chief opposition journal under the July Monarchy. Now a rival group formed around the contributors

and staff of the more radical and socialistic journal *La Réforme*, which included Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc. The inclusion of Ledru-Rollin in the government proved insufficient to placate popular feeling in Paris, and after hectic negotiation the government was widened still further to include Louis Blanc and other lesser men, such as Albert, a working man included as a gesture to the mob. By midnight on February 24 enough agreement had been patched up between the two factions to produce the statement: "The Provisional Government gives its vote for the Republic, subject to ratification by the People who will be consulted forthwith." This formula reflected the divergent points of view within the new government; for the moderate liberals wanted merely to establish constitutional parliamentary government and were anxious above all to prevent relapse to mob disorder, whereas the radical democrats and socialists demanded universal suffrage and wanted to ensure a republic that would tackle social reforms. All the individual members, save Albert, were middle-class and professional men, lawyers, intellectuals, and journalists, and none wanted a new reign of terror. Yet on February 25 only Lamartine's eloquence prevented the republican tricolor from being replaced by the red flag of the extreme left; and throughout its existence the provisional government was under heavy pressure from the force of the mob, roused and directed by extremists of the secret societies and disciples of Blanqui, whom the revolution now released from prison.

Under the double pressure of the radical democrats within and the armed mob without, the government proceeded to arrange hasty measures of social and political reform. It reduced the daily working hours to ten in Paris and eleven in the provinces. It recognized the "right to work," and in order to deal with unemployment in Paris set up so-called "National Workshops," whose first task was really poor relief rather than the socialist experiments in co-operation advocated by Louis Blanc. It set up a permanent commission at the Luxembourg Palace under the presidency of Louis Blanc himself to examine labor problems. It removed restrictions on the press and on the liberty of the citizen, and on March 5 decreed that in elections to a National Constituent Assembly, to be held in April, every Frenchman over 21 should be entitled to vote. At one stroke it thus increased the electorate from two hundred thousand to some nine million, most of whom were illiterate and had no experience of political responsibility.

Deferment of the elections until April 23 meant that two months passed between the original revolution in Paris and the polling in the provinces. During that interval the instinctively conservative mass of small rural proprietors had ample time to be alarmed by news of the disorders and the social experiments in the capital. They used their vote—and 84 per cent of the new electorate voted—to inflict a severe

defeat on the radicals and socialists. Out of 876 seats these parties won only 100. The majority of the new assembly were either legitimist royalists, former supporters of Louis Philippe, or moderate Liberals and Republicans. To this assembly, when it met in May, the provisional government surrendered its executive power, which was then entrusted to a new Executive Council. It included Lamartine and a few other members of the late government, but it excluded Louis Blanc and Albert.

It was not long before the assembly and its Executive Council were subjected to a further attempt at a *coup* from the extreme left. On May 15, after three days of demonstrations, the assembly was invaded by a mob, its dissolution proclaimed, and a new emergency government set up at the Hôtel de Ville. Blanqui, Barbès, and the socialist clubs were attempting a second revolution, designed to reassert the revolutionary leadership of the Paris mob against the express wishes of the rest of France. But this time they failed. The National Guard took the side of the assembly against the mob. The new Mobile Guards, formed by the middle classes to protect property, cleared the assembly. Not only were Blanqui and Barbès promptly thrown into prison and their clubs and societies disbanded, but Louis Blanc fled and Albert was arrested. The Hôtel de Ville was reoccupied. By challenging the existence of the Republic, newly endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the largest electorate yet in French history, the social revolutionaries had seriously injured their own cause and made a conservative reaction almost inevitable. The Blanquist traditions of violent *coups* and fighting on the barricades had rashly been turned against the institutions of parliamentary constitutional government; and the forces of republicanism in France began to neutralize one another, leaving the door open to conservative reprisals.

Germany and Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile the example of these events in France stirred revolutionary hopes throughout Europe. In February, three days after the abdication of Louis Philippe, there were big popular demonstrations at Mannheim in the Rhineland, followed by disturbances throughout Germany. German liberalism, as it was understood by the middle and professional classes and the new industrialists, was a national liberalism favoring internal free trade as represented by the *Zollverein* but with little tincture of democratic ideas. Social revolutionaries, active enough in the industrial Rhineland, were elsewhere very small in numbers and unimportant. Germany had neither a liberal parliamentary tradition like the British, nor a violent social revolutionary tradition like the French. The central revolutionary impulse was one of nationalism—for the overthrow of Austrian domination and of the princely sovereignties which served that domination, and for the unification of German territories into one state.

Liberal hopes had been roused in Prussia in 1847 when the Prussian king, Frederick William IV, summoned in Berlin the *Landtag*, representative of the various Prussian territories, to secure authority for a loan to build railways; they were dashed when he dissolved it. This irresolute behavior was characteristic of that romantic mystic who had come to the throne in 1840. He had relaxed the censorship, and then restored it when journalists criticized him. He had released political prisoners, and then denounced them when they refused to recant. But throughout the states with more liberal forms of government—in Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, and Bavaria—Liberal ministers began to be included in the governments and the press was granted more freedom. Ludwig I of Bavaria was even obliged to abdicate.

The very particularism of the German states made it impossible for Prussia and Austria to check so many scattered revolts. The hesitations of the Prussian government produced riots in Berlin, and on March 17 the king decided to try to make enough concessions to stem revolt. He declared himself in favor of a federal German *Reich* to replace the existing Confederation, with an elected parliament, freedom of the press, one national citizenship, and a national army. As in France less than a month before, a clash between troops and mob provoked civil war in the capital. Barricades were thrown up in the working-class areas, and Berlin imitated Paris. The king formed a liberal government under Ludolf Camphausen, one of the best-known Liberal leaders from the Rhineland, and a constituent assembly was elected which apathetically pursued its labors of constitution-making during the summer until the revolutionary moment had passed. Within Prussia things never got completely out of hand.

It was otherwise in Austria and Hungary. When news of the downfall of Louis Philippe reached Vienna in the first week of March, 1848, the opposition to the long rule of Prince Metternich reached its climax. It was drawn from all social classes, and included court factions and liberal aristocrats who had come to detest his rule, middle-class and professional people who resented their long exclusion from political power, and working-class folk whose conditions of life and work had deteriorated during the recent years of depression. On March 13 demonstrations in Vienna forced the resignation of Metternich, and won permission for the middle classes to form a National Guard; two days later the Emperor Ferdinand undertook to summon the Diet, with additional middle-class members, to discuss a new constitution. In Hungary, which the emperor of Austria ruled as king and which had an aristocratic Diet of its own, a great national leader appeared in the person of Louis Kossuth. A lawyer and journalist, with a talent for popular oratory as great as that of O'Connell or Lamartine, he persuaded the country gentry of Hungary to lead the antifeudal movement so as

to preserve the unity of the nation. On March 14 Kossuth harangued the Hungarian Diet meeting at Pressburg. The next day the crowds of peasants, gathered in Budapest for the great annual fair on the Ides of March, took matters into their own hands under the guidance of students and the young radical poet, Alexander Petöfi.

In this way events moved too fast in both countries, between March 13 and 15, for the government of Vienna to refuse concessions. In both Hungary and Austria moderate governments were set up, making piecemeal concessions to liberal demands but determined not to give way to social revolution. Kossuth's demands for virtual Hungarian home rule were granted by the "March Laws." The court and the ruling aristocracy of Vienna played a waiting game, like that of the Prussian government: the main thing was to let the revolutionary moment pass, holding on to enough power to ensure decisive reaction later.

The remarkable simultaneity and initial successes of the revolutionary movements in Prussia, Austria, Hungary, and most of the smaller German states made possible a new phase in the effort to win German unity through one central representative body. A *Vorparlament*, or provisional general assembly, met at Frankfurt at the end of March. It consisted of 500 members drawn from the parliamentary assemblies of the different German states. By its very nature it represented particularism, and achieved no results of any importance save to arrange for the election of an all-German assembly. This new assembly was elected so as to bypass the existing governments of the states, and met at Frankfurt-on-the-Main in the Rhineland, in May, 1848. This famous body, which sat for a whole year, represented the aspirations and feelings of all more nationally-minded Germans, but it suffered the initial handicap of having no sort of executive authority or executive organs. It was the voice of the embryonic German nation, echoed through its intellectual and professional classes, but it was a voice crying in a void. The delegates to Frankfurt could discuss, which they did at great length; but since there was no one to whom they could give orders, and nothing could be done except insofar as the separate state governments chose to act, the new-found unity was peculiarly impotent. The Frankfurt Assembly was, in effect, as much bound by particularism as the Diet of the old Confederation or even the *Vorparlament* itself.

The delegates to the Frankfurt Assembly were politically like the reforming Whigs of England or the moderate constitutional Liberals of France and Belgium. They were mostly university professors and business men, lawyers and judges, civil servants and clergy. In outlook they were mild, legalistic, and immensely earnest, opposed to violence and to social revolution. They wanted Germany to be federal, liberal, constitutional, and united. One of their leading spokesmen who drew up the first draft of the new German constitution was, characteristically,

the eminent historian Friedrich Dahlmann, who in 1837 had been expelled from his professorship at the University of Göttingen for upholding liberal principles. As in Italy, so in Germany, the ranks of nationalists were deeply divided about how these agreed ends were to be achieved. Before long the debates of the assembly revealed two main conflicting programs of unification; and because it could never reach solid agreement about the choice between these two schemes, the Frankfurt assembly was doomed to frustration.

At bottom it was a dispute about what the notion of "Germany" amounted to on the map. The existing *Bund* had very hazy borders. East Prussia was not within it, though the bulk of Prussia was. The duchy of Holstein was within it, though it belonged to the Danish king; and Denmark as a whole, including the neighboring duchy of Schleswig, was not in the *Bund*. It included a large part of the Austrian Empire but not Hungary; and the part of Austria within its boundaries included non-German peoples like the Czechs of Bohemia, while German-speaking communities existed in Hungary and Switzerland, beyond its frontiers. Neither the existing Confederation nor the test of German language offered any clear guide. What principle, then, could be used to define the geographical limits of a new "Germany"? It was almost inevitable that there should be two answers, one more ambitious and inclusive, and the other more cautious and exclusive; and accordingly the assembly divided into a majority of "Great Germans" and a minority of "Little Germans."

The Great Germans argued that the new federal state should include the Austrian lands except Hungary, even though that would incorporate many different Slav peoples. These they regarded as anyhow destined to be Germanized, and they were impatient at any separatist Slav nationalisms, such as the Polish and Czech, which obstructed their project. Their policy necessitated offering the federal crown to the Habsburgs and accepting Austrian leadership, and their predominance led to the appointment of the liberal Archduke John as Imperial Regent (*Reichs-Verweser*). The Little Germans were willing to leave out the mixed races of Austria in order to unify the rest of Germany more tightly, and wanted to include the whole of Prussia, which meant looking to the Prussian king for leadership. Roman Catholics tended to look to Austria as the leading Catholic power in Germany, Protestants to look to Prussia as the leading Protestant power; so the religious division also affected the alignment of opinions in this crucial issue. The dispute dragged on inconclusively until, again, the revolutionary moment was well past.

By the end of May, 1848, the general position in Europe was that the first wave of revolutionary movements had won initial victories, but had spent its main force. In Italy liberal constitutions had been extorted

from the kings and princes and when, in March, Austria had tried to suppress the revolts in Milan and Venice, Charles Albert of Piedmont had successfully intervened with armed force to uphold their freedom. But by the end of May the war reached a position of stalemate. No help came from France, where the Second Republic was being installed resting on universal suffrage, but where the large conservative majority in the Constituent Assembly represented provincial resistance to the revolutionary elements in Paris. In Prussia the situation was similar, and in Austria and Hungary, Metternich had gone but moderate governments were in the saddle. In Germany as a whole the liberal movement for national unification had become bogged in the disputes of the Frankfurt Assembly. Nor was there sign of new revolutionary successes elsewhere in Europe. In Britain the last great Chartist demonstration failed in April, and Chartism ended in an atmosphere of ridicule when it was found that the petition included not the boasted five or six million names, but only two million, and many of these were plainly bogus since they included the signatures of Queen Victoria and the Duke of Wellington. In Ireland the "Young Ireland" movement, which had indulged in a great deal of revolutionary and nationalist talk, found no broad popular backing, and as in the rest of the United Kingdom the government was well able to deal with isolated cases of violence and disorder. Spain, which had generated so much revolutionary energy since 1815, registered no more response to the European upheavals than an ill-timed revolt in Madrid at the end of March, which was quickly and easily suppressed by the government, and another at Seville in May which suffered the same fate. In Belgian cities there were sporadic riots throughout March, but they never assumed the character of a revolutionary movement. The dominant middle classes, ruling through an exceptionally liberal constitution, made enough concessions and showed enough solidarity to keep revolution at arm's length. They lowered the property qualification for voters, and increased the electorate enough to appease the lower middle classes. They instituted public works and gave more poor relief to rescue unemployed industrial workers from destitution. The elections of June brought a sharp defeat for the Belgian radicals.

Switzerland. In Switzerland alone had liberals and radicals won a victory that was to prove permanent; and they won it partly because the revolutions in Europe prevented intervention by the eastern powers. Since 1845 the seven Catholic cantons (Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, Lucerne, and Valais) had formed themselves, in violation of the Federal Pact of 1815, into a separate political and military league, or *Sonderbund*. In the last two months of 1847 civil war had broken out between the *Sonderbund* and the forces of the Federal Diet, supported by the other, predominantly Protestant, cantons and by liberals


and radicals everywhere in the country. It was, like the American War between the States, a war for the preservation of the union, and the overwhelming strength of the federal forces under the skilled generalship of William Henry Dufour of Geneva ended the struggle in twenty-five days. The intervention planned by Austria, Prussia, and France was prevented by the speedy end of the war and by the outbreak of revolutions in Italy and France. A new constitution was created by September, 1848, which transformed the Swiss "League of States" into a real Federal State. It guaranteed republican forms of government in all cantons, equality of all before the law, and liberty of conscience, speech, press, and public meeting. The power of legislation was now invested in a Federal legislature on the pattern of the United States Congress. Within the next few years unified national systems of coinage, postage, and weights and measures were introduced, and internal customs barriers were removed. The material life of the country thrived in consequence, and the new constitution lasted until 1874, when it was replaced by the present system.

Counterrevolution. The summer of 1848 brought a completely new phase in the European revolutionary movement. It was marked in most countries by counterrevolution, led in some by the moderate liberals and conservatives, in others by the more extreme forces of reaction. On June 12 the capture of Vicenza by the Austrian troops under Radetzky began the counteroffensive against Piedmont and the Italian nationalists. It culminated in an Austrian victory at Custozza on July 23. By August 9 Charles Albert was obliged to make an armistice. This first war of Italian independence ended in defeat, because it was less a concerted effort to attain peninsular unity than a purely anti-Austrian campaign, conceived by Charles Albert as having the limited aim of forming a kingdom of Northern Italy. Only the prompt me-

MAP 4. THE HABSBURG EMPIRE, 1848

The three main racial and linguistic groups within the patchwork Empire were the Germans, who predominated in the west; the Magyars, who predominated in Hungary; and various Slav peoples who existed in two large blocs—in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, and Galicia, in the north; and in Carniola, Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia in the south. But everywhere there was liable to be intermixture, and in certain areas (e.g., Lombardy and Transylvania) Latin peoples such as Italians and Rumanians dwelt in large numbers. The political structure of the Empire hinged upon the ascendancy of Germans in the west, of Magyars in the east. The nations of contemporary Europe emerged from the disruption of the whole Empire, in the course of which the northern Slavs (Czechs and Slovaks) cohered together, and the Slavs south of the Danube found a nucleus of unity in Serbia (compare Map 15).

HABSBURG EMPIRE 1848



diation of Britain and France saved Piedmont from invasion. In France the government decided to close the national workshops in Paris, and precipitated that still mysterious outburst of popular fury known as the "June Days."

On June 21, when the decree abolishing the national workshops was issued, bands of workers swarmed through the streets shouting the *Marseillaise*. Large open-air meetings were held. Two days later barricades sprang up everywhere, and by June 24 a state of siege was declared. It seems to have been a virtually spontaneous popular rising, born of desperation and exasperation, without known leaders or clear organization. Opposed to the insurgents were the formidable forces of the army, the National Guard, and the new Mobile Guards, under the command of the African veteran, General Cavaignac. Pitched battles took place on June 24 and 25, when guns were trained on the barricades and workers were mercilessly massacred. By the evening of the 25th the fighting was over, but it was followed by summary executions and the judicial punishment of more than eleven thousand prisoners. The ferocity on both sides gave the most vivid support so far to the theories of unlimited class warfare put forward by Marx and Engels. The "June Days" killed all hopes of a social and democratic republic, and drove the parliamentary government into the arms of reaction. The new constitution of the Second Republic, at last adopted in November, included no mention of the much-discussed "right to work," and it entrusted all executive power to a president to be directly elected by the people. At the presidential elections the following month, out of 7½ million votes 5½ million went to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the great Napoleon. Lamartine gained less than 21,000. This marks the swing of opinion in France between the beginning and end of 1848. Out of terror of a social republic, French democracy doomed even the liberal republic; for with a Bonaparte in the saddle a military dictatorship was not far off.

With the turning of the tide in Italy and France during the second half of 1848, it was events within the borders of the Austrian Empire itself that now became crucial. Here still was the ultimate bastion of conservatism in Europe. If revolution triumphed in Austria and Hungary, the whole balance of advantages would be permanently tilted in favor of nationalism, liberalism, and democracy. If revolution here were crushed, it could also be crushed eventually in Germany and Italy. The situation, as usual in the Habsburg dominions, was immensely complex (see Map 4). In its simplest terms it was a triangular contest between the three main racial groups of Germans, Magyars, and Slavs, each reluctant to concede to the other the national rights and ambitions which it claimed for itself. But not only was each racial group sharply divided within itself among those championing different views of the future;

each provincial area suffered further internal conflicts of interest between landowners great and small, middle and professional classes, and peasants. Faced with this situation, the Habsburg ministers and generals were able to follow cheerfully their policy of playing off one group against the other in order to survive and dominate them all. The novelty of the eastern revolutions of 1848-49 was, however, that this time a permanent residue of change was left; these territories underwent some of the basic legal, social, and political changes effected in western nations before 1815.¹

The Slav peoples were stimulated to find some common policy by the movement for German unification. The "Great German" program of including Austria (though not Hungary) in a more unified German *Reich* was opposed by the Czechs, whose moderate leaders preferred to keep the loose Habsburg structure within which they sought greater autonomy, and by the Slovaks who had no desire to be left separately under Magyar rule. In April, 1848, the Czech leader, Frantisek Palacký, declined to attend the Frankfurt Assembly and declared that had the Austrian state not already existed for centuries, it would have been necessary to create it. In May the German radicals resigned from the National Council in Prague, and the cleavage between Slav and German nationalists widened. In June a Slav Congress was held at Prague, as the Slav rejoinder to Frankfurt. Presided over by Palacký, it consisted of three sections: Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, Poles and Ruthenians. This threefold division foreshadowed the Slav states of 1919—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland.

Like Italian and German nationalists, Slav nationalists were deeply divided as to policy. While extremists dreamed mystically of a great confederation uniting all the scattered fragments of the Slav race (which aroused fresh fears of Russian leadership in the Balkans) most of them were primarily concerned with preventing the mere partition of subjected Slav peoples between Germans and Magyars. While the more moderate Czech politicians wanted to remain within a liberalized Austrian federation, in which they hoped Slavs would eventually predominate, the Poles wanted to recreate an independent Polish state. The Yugoslavs wanted complete independence from Hungary, while the Slovaks wanted only equal rights. The Imperial Court, which in May had fled from Vienna to Innsbruck to escape popular pressure in the capital, busily encouraged Czech resistance to Germans and Slovak resistance to Magyars. It was the old policy of "divide and rule" which had so often proved its effectiveness. On June 12 the people of Prague imitated the people of Vienna, and broke out in revolution led by students and workers. In five days General Windischgrätz, the Austrian

¹ See pp. 31 and 37.

commander, foreshadowed the work of Cavaignac in Paris a week later and of Radetzky in Milan seven weeks later. He crushed the revolutionary popular movement bloodily and decisively.

The provincial diets, which had revived in most provinces of the Austrian and Hungarian territories during the 1840's, in general proved unable to serve the cause of liberal nationalism. They voiced prevalent discontent with the central government and represented the great landowners, the smaller landed gentry, and the professional middle classes, whose desire was broadly for greater autonomy and local privilege, rather than for national or racial independence or for social revolution. In Bohemia the Diet stood for the patriotism of the landowners. The Bohemian middle classes, like the French, mostly wanted greater constitutional liberties, but they did not want social revolution. The rising in Prague attracted, therefore, no general national enthusiasm.

Kossuth. At first it seemed likely that a similar situation would occur in Hungary. The Pressburg Diet of March, and even the new Assembly which met at the beginning of July, included large majorities that wanted to avoid a complete break with Austria. The Hungarian nationalist movement could not make common cause with the Slavs. The Croats and Slovaks, under Magyar rule, saw independence from Magyars as more important than freedom from German rule; and just as the Austrian government could find an ally in Czech fears of social revolution in its effort to suppress popular revolution in Prague, so it could find an ally in Croat and Slovak fears of Magyar domination to resist the chauvinistic claims of Magyar nationalism. Moreover, Hungarian politics were increasingly governed by the remarkable personality of Louis Kossuth. A petty nobleman by birth, he stood for the lesser nobility or gentry, roughly a third of a million strong, buried in the countryside, as against the great Magyar nobles. He therefore favored racial and linguistic Magyarism, rather than landownership or territorial rights, as a basis of Hungarian national claims. He became a popular hero, not only within Hungary but throughout Europe, though his radicalism was more completely dominated by intransigent nationalism than was radicalism in the west. His closest counterpart, perhaps, was Mazzini. Under his influence during the 1840's Magyar had replaced Latin as the exclusive language used in Hungary for laws, government business, and public education. Magyar language became, for the gentry, the double protection against German imperial officials and upstart Slav nationalists. This group backed Kossuth's ideal of making Hungary a Magyar national state, although large tracts of it were inhabited by Slav peasants and Magyars were actually a minority of its total population. For these reasons Magyar nationalism was inevitably even more at cross purposes with Slav nationalist movements than with German; and indeed the Great German program, which would leave

Magyars in control of Hungary, suited them admirably. They had a "Great Hungarian" program of their own claiming extended authority over Transylvania and Croatia.

The "March Laws" that Kossuth had piloted through the Diet, and that the events of March in Vienna and Budapest had obliged the Austrian government to accept, provided for Hungarian home rule under nominal kingship of the Habsburgs, with a separate parliament at Budapest elected on a restricted suffrage. The nobility lost their exemption from taxation, and the towns were given representation in parliament. This new assembly met in July, 1848. The same events had forced the Austrian government to create a *Reichstag* for the Austrian half of the Empire, and this also met in Vienna in July. It was the only full imperial parliament in the history of the Austrian Empire, and represented an attempt to meet simultaneously the Czech fears of "Great German" nationalism, the German fears of Slav nationalism, the general autocratic and middle-class fears of social revolution, and the Habsburg need for broader backing against Hungarian nationalism. Both the Austrian and the Hungarian parliaments represented mainly the gentry and the middle classes. As in France and Prussia, the moderates were by July well established in power; and it remained to be discovered how far they could retain that power against radical revolution from below and military reaction from above.

Only eight hours after the Hungarian assembly met on July 4, Kossuth had to proclaim "the country in danger," because the subject Slav races were already in revolt in Croatia and Serbia, encouraged by the Austrians. If Slav nationalism should mean Russian intrusion into the Balkans, then Magyar nationalism must prefer an alliance with Vienna and even with Frankfurt. Kossuth appealed for, and was granted, power to raise an army of 200,000 men to enable Hungary to defend herself. But in the end 40,000 of these were sent to support Austria on condition that they should not be used "against the freedom of the Italian nation." By the end of August, Radetzky had defeated Charles Albert at Custozza and taken Milan and all Lombardy; and Windischgrätz had crushed Prague. The Austrian government now felt able to settle things with Hungary, and tried to revoke the "March Laws."

On September 11 the imperial army from Croatia invaded Hungary, and Kossuth appealed to the Constituent Assembly of Vienna to mediate between Hungary and the Habsburgs. But in that assembly German and Slav sentiment combined against Magyar claims, and gave the government a majority. The deadlock precipitated a second mass rising in Vienna in October, aimed at creating a national Germany and a national Hungary. The democrats of Vienna were now, however, crushed by Windischgrätz as decisively as had been those of Prague; and with both popular movements suppressed, the way was at last clear for general

reaction. In November, Felix Schwarzenberg was made Austrian prime minister, backed by a cabinet composed of a mixture of liberals and radicals. Schwarzenberg was brother-in-law of Windischgrätz and had been adviser of Radetzky in Italy. He was a man of violence whose chief aim was to accumulate power and use it boldly to restore order and central authority in the Austrian Empire. In December the feeble and imbecile Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph, whose aims were likewise the preservation of the prestige and military power of the monarchy. By the end of 1848, although Kossuth was yet to gain further temporary successes in 1849, the Habsburgs were back in the saddle and the Magyar nationalist movement was doomed.

Turkey. With so much unrest in the Habsburg territories it was inevitable that their neighbors and traditional enemies, the Ottoman Turks, should experience some repercussions. The Turkish Empire, which had already suffered the loss of Greece,² was from 1839 to 1861 ruled by the reforming Sultan Abdul-Medjid. In 1839 he had promulgated a charter that gave equality before the law to all classes of Ottoman subjects and guaranteed their lives and property. Although proclaimed with great solemnity throughout the provinces of the empire, this enlightened policy encountered enormous local resistance, which was often effective. The provinces most affected by the revolutionary movements were those of Moldavia and Wallachia which, together with Transylvania then under Habsburg rule, came after 1919 to form the bulk of modern Rumania. By the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 Russia had occupied these provinces, where she had previously established certain treaty rights, as a guarantee that Turkey would pay the war indemnity. During her occupation Russia had set up in each province assemblies representative of the landowning classes (*Boyars*), and during the 1840's limited economic and social reforms were carried out. Schools were set up and customs barriers between the two provinces were abolished. From 1830 onward there grew up in these two provinces a strong desire for union not only with each other but also with Transylvania on the western slope of the Carpathians, inhabited by Rumans similar in language and race.

Transylvanian resistance to Magyar rule in 1848 stimulated nationalist enthusiasm in Moldavia and Wallachia, where there were riots and local insurrections. In Bucharest, chief town of Wallachia, a provisional government was set up in June on the European pattern. Here, too, it was mainly the work of a nationalist intellectual, the historian Nicholas Balcesco, leader of a secret society. But moderates quickly gained control of it, as in France, and the problem of emancipating the serfs was shelved by appointing an Agrarian Commission, which never reached

² See p. 119.

any decision. On the advice of the tsar, Nicholas I, the Turks sent an army into Wallachia and dissolved the provisional government. By the end of the year the two provinces were again subjected to joint Russo-Turkish occupation, and meanwhile in Transylvania the Habsburg policy of playing off Rumanian forces against Hungarian brought its reward in the collapse of nationalist hopes in that territory too. The story of the Rumanian revolt is a repetition, in miniature, of the European revolutionary movement as a whole. In March, 1848, the Society of Rumanian Students in Paris sent a delegation to the French provisional government. It voiced the claim which, in so many other forms, re-echoed throughout the continent that year. "The Wallachians, the Moldavians and the Transylvanians all declare that they are Rumanians, and that their land, which has so long been witness of their distress, is called Rumania." It was 1919 before such claims were satisfied for Czechs and Poles, Slovenes, and Rumanians, and during the intervening sixty years many nationalist aspirations fermented and turned sour.

Collapse of Revolution. The year of revolutions ended, then, with the suppression of democratic radical movements in the crucial areas of Italy, France, Austria, Prussia, and Turkey, and with the triumphs of moderate liberals in Belgium and Britain. The ascendancy of these forces, all alike opposed to social revolution, was consolidated in various ways. In Naples, Ferdinand II had already suspended the constitution and reverted to his normal reactionary methods of government. In Frankfurt there was a popular rising against the Assembly in September, and it was crushed by the use of Prussian and Austrian troops. Henceforth the Assembly suffered under the insuperable handicap that it had forfeited popular support and made clear that it existed only by grace of Prussia and Austria. In November, Frederick William IV appointed as his chief minister Count Brandenburg, a cavalry officer who had recently restored order at Breslau, and in December he dissolved the Prussian Constituent Assembly, which had failed to devise a new and more liberal constitution for Prussia. The Civic Guard was disbanded, clubs were closed, public meetings banned. The governments of Brandenburg in Prussia, Schwarzenberg in Austria, and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in France were the paradoxical culmination of the year of revolutions, and an omen of the next phase in Europe's history.

Among the major forces of counterrevolution must be included fate itself, in the form of cholera. The year of revolutions was also the year of plague in Europe. Filling people with fear akin to the modern terror of cancer or polio, this particular epidemic had begun in China in 1844, reached Russia by 1847, and in the fall of 1848 began to spread rapidly and devastatingly westward across Europe. It reached Britain in October and went thence to the United States. What had begun in Turk-
estan ended on the Mississippi. Producing hundreds of deaths each day,

it struck especially at the towns, the very centers of revolution. It left behind a heavy death toll and great social dislocation. Among the living it left physical exhaustion and a dispirited apathy that quenched the fires of revolt. All known treatments were almost ineffective, and the physical and psychological condition of survivors made prolonged effort of any kind impossible—least of all the building of barricades and the raising of revolt. The year of revolutions was bounded by calamity, and the embers that had been partly kindled by hunger were partly quenched by disease.

The Sequel of Revolution, 1849-50

AT THE beginning of 1849 revolutionary nationalist movements remained active in only two main areas: Italy and Hungary. Elsewhere in Europe power was securely held by moderate liberals or by conservatives, and in places (such as France and Prussia) a current of more severe authoritarian reaction set in. But in Italy and in Hungary the struggle between revolutionary nationalists and moderates continued until the autumn of 1849, and this prolonged sequel to the great "Year of Revolutions" throws further light on the nature of the revolutionary movement as a whole.

Italy. In Italy the crucial new fact was that, at the beginning of 1849, it was impossible to look for national leadership to either Piedmont or the Papacy. Charles Albert, having been forced to make an armistice with Austria in August after Custoza, had been accused by the more militant Milanese of betraying the national cause; and although democratic government and enthusiasms continued at Turin, his army was in no condition yet to renew the fight. In November, finding republicanism in Rome so strong and disorder so great, Pius IX had fled from the Vatican to Gaeta, in the Kingdom of Naples. With both Piedmont and the Papacy out of the running for leadership of the anti-Austrian movement, initiative lapsed to the republicans, led by Mazzini in Rome and by Daniele Manin in Venice. Mazzini proclaimed that now the war of kings was over; the war of the people must begin. He clung to his ideal of national liberation and unification through a mass democratic rising and the creation of an Italian republic. Since June, 1848, he had been joined by the colorful figure of Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had been training his red-shirted Italian Legion in Uruguay and with it defending the republican liberties of Montevideo. Garibaldi had reached Leghorn only in June, too late to take any important part in the war; but he withdrew to the hills to plan guerrilla warfare, in which his red-shirted volunteers excelled. The republicans were resolved to continue the fight even in isolation and against the heaviest odds.

In its new phase the Italian revolutionary movement hinged upon the three pivots of Florence, Rome, and Turin, with the independent island republic of Venice, under Manin, as an isolated outpost of defiance. In Tuscany, the Papal States, and Piedmont strong and vocal radical movements still demanded constituent assemblies elected on universal suffrage, more republican forms of government, and the renewal of the war against Austria. In their chief cities of Florence, Rome, and Turin relatively democratic governments already existed, and the crucial question was how far they could achieve any concerted action for one common policy. In February, 1849, a Constituent Assembly met at Rome, elected on universal suffrage and including thirty-seven deputies sent to represent Tuscany, whose Grand Duke Leopold had fled in January to join Pius IX at Gaeta. On February 9 this Assembly voted that "the form of government is a pure democracy, with the glorious title of the Roman Republic." But despite Mazzini's efforts Tuscany was not persuaded to unite with Rome as one Republic, mainly because its country districts remained loyal to Leopold. Nor could Gioberti, now premier of Piedmont, be induced to send representatives to the Assembly in Rome. Opinion in Piedmont was, indeed, predominantly faithful to its monarchy and against a republicanism imposed on Italy from Rome. But it favored ending the truce with Austria, and on March 20 Charles Albert embarked on the ill-conceived campaign that, within six days, resulted in his defeat by Radetzky at Novara. Departing in humiliation to Portugal, he lived for four months in seclusion, and died on July 28.

Novara made possible an Austrian reconquest of Italy. Venice was under blockade. In April the moderate constitutionalists in Florence suppressed the Tuscan assembly and invited Leopold to return. He was duly restored by Austrian armies, though only after bitter fighting in the radical port of Leghorn on July 28, and he never regained the respect of his people. Restoration of the Pope was a more complex issue, for it affected not only Italy but all the Catholic powers of Europe. At the end of March a conference of representatives of France, Austria, Spain, and Naples met at Gaeta, to consider ways and means. France was particularly concerned to prevent the unconditional reinstatement of the Pope by Austrian arms, and in April forced the issue by sending General Oudinot with 10,000 men to occupy Civitavecchia as the gateway to Rome. The other three states thereupon sent armies too, and at the end of the month the Roman Republic found itself isolated with four foreign armies converging upon it. Under the leadership of Mazzini and Garibaldi the city decided to resist, and went into a state of siege.

When Oudinot first advanced, he was soundly beaten by Garibaldi and retreated to Civitavecchia to demand large French reinforcements.

On June 3, with 30,000 men and full siege equipment, he again advanced. The city held out for a month, in a desperate and heroic defense that became an epic in the story of Italian nationhood. At the beginning of July, Garibaldi left the city with some 5,000 of his men and, pursued by four armies, defied capture in the hills and at last found refuge in Tuscany. Behind French bayonets the cardinals and the Pope returned, and when in August Venice, too, was forced to surrender, the last foothold of republicanism in Italy was destroyed. There Daniele Manin, since the proclamation of the Republic at Venice in March, 1848, had assumed a role that was the counterpart to Mazzini's in Rome. The defense of Venice revealed an equal heroism. These final phases bred a new legend of republicanism, strong in the great cities but not in the countryside. It was a legend that inspired fresh efforts a decade later. But it also, paradoxically, meant that the republican solution for Italy's problems could now be discounted. The failure of the Roman Republic to command wider support in Italy revived faith in constitutional monarchy as the only generally acceptable solution. Papal federalism was killed by Pius IX's reversion to absolutism and by his reliance on foreign force. Only Piedmont could now command support, and the last desperate attempt at Novara had restored Piedmont's prestige. It was henceforth plain that only force kept Italy politically disunited; and it was equally plain that only a national army, under the House of Savoy, was likely to expel that intrusive foreign force of disruption.

Hungary. Strangely parallel events had meanwhile been taking place in Hungary. There, too, the nationalist cause found fresh reserves of popular enthusiasm and heroic powers of resistance evoked by Kossuth. But Hungary had to improvise an army, and to crush irregular forces of Serbs and Slovaks within her own territory. She could look for no help from liberal forces in Austria, because early in March, 1849, Schwarzenberg overthrew the new constitution and dissolved the ill-fated Austrian *Reichstag*. But Kossuth, faced with anti-Magyar risings of Slovaks in the north, Serbs in the south, Rumanians and Germans in the east, and Croats in the southwest, whipped up Magyar national feeling to a frenzy at the end of 1848. Although Windischgrätz, in the winter of 1848, advanced into Hungary and even occupied Budapest, he was compelled to withdraw again by April, 1849. On April 14 the Hungarian parliament deposed the Habsburgs and elected Kossuth as Governor. He issued a declaration of Hungarian independence, and on June 6 entered Budapest in triumph.

But his rule lasted only a few weeks. As in Italy, popular feeling began to turn against republicanism and revolutionary excesses, and there was no real agreement among leaders of the movement for independence. And, as in Italy, it was the intervention of a foreign army which ended the revolution. Nicolas, tsar of Russia, believed that

monarchs must help one another against revolutionaries. He disliked the successes of the Polish generals who had become so prominent in the Hungarian army. Since March, when Russian troops had been driven back out of Transylvania, a Hungarian division had sat near the Galician frontier to encourage the Poles to rebel against Austria; and he was very sensitive about the effect of Hungarian example on Galicia, since the troubles there only two years before. In May he decided to send military help to the Habsburgs, and a Russian army invaded Hungary. In August the Hungarian army surrendered to the tsar at Világos. Kossuth buried the Hungarian crown near the frontier and fled to Turkey.

For nearly fifty years he sustained a virulent anti-Habsburg propaganda in Britain and in the United States. The Austrian general, Haynau, who had replaced Windischgrätz, exercised and permitted the most extreme brutalities in his ruthless suppression of the defeated kingdom. Kossuth had a final moral victory over Haynau some years later. Known in England as the "Hyena" for his cruelties, which Kossuth had publicized, Haynau was mobbed and severely handled by the draymen of Barclay and Perkins breweries when he visited Britain. Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary, sympathized with the workmen. He angered Queen Victoria, but added to his popularity in the country, by refusing more than a perfunctory apology for the rough treatment of the General, and proceeded soon after to extend a very friendly welcome to Kossuth.

Reaction. By August, 1849, therefore, with the fall of Rome and Venice and the collapse of the Hungarian revolution, the hectic period of revolutions was at an end. There was still sporadic unrest, but no new revolutionary movement took shape. The feeble and dilatory Frankfurt Assembly received its deathblow in April, when at last it decided to offer the Imperial Crown of a united Germany to the king of Prussia. Since Schwarzenberg had made it clear at Frankfurt in December, 1848, that he intended to keep Austria-Hungary as one state and to revive the old German *Bund*, the Assembly turned of necessity to Prussia. But Frederick William IV, now more secure in his own autocratic powers in Prussia, refused the offer. Both Austria and Prussia withdrew their representatives from Frankfurt, leaving the Assembly a mere rump of small states which formally approved a new German constitution. In September, 1849, Austria and Prussia jointly killed the whole project and took upon themselves the functions of a central German authority. Already in April and May, when revolts occurred in Baden, Bavaria, and Saxony, Prussian troops had promptly been sent into these states to restore order. Determined to prevent further acquisitions of Prussian power, Schwarzenberg took the first opportunity to check this tendency. In 1850 disturbances in Hesse-Cassel prompted him to send in 200,000

Austrian troops. Prussia mobilized in reply, and a few clashes occurred. But Frederick William as usual gave way, and in November, by the pact of Olmütz, Schwarzenberg dictated a settlement of the dispute and left Prussia completely humiliated. He then completed his plan of reinstituting the old *Bund*, intact and as much under Austrian presidency and control as in the great days of Prince Metternich.

By the end of 1850 the clock seemed to have been firmly put back. The turbulent movements for Italian and German unification had been as totally frustrated as had the movements for Slav, Hungarian, and Rumanian independence. Throughout central and eastern Europe the old order had been restored. Naturally enough, even the moderate achievements of more liberal constitutions within Austria and Prussia were among the next casualties. In January, 1850, a new Prussian constitution paid lip service but made no substantial concession to liberal ideas. At the end of 1851 the Austrian constitution reverted to a form of complete absolutism. More unexpectedly, even France moved in the same direction. In December, 1851, Louis Napoleon secured by a *coup d'état* the extension of his presidency of the Second Republic for another ten years; and one year later he was to give his already autocratic power full Bonapartist form by proclaiming the Second Empire. All these events, too, were the sequel to the year of revolutions. The sense in which they were the true aftermath can be seen if the variegated pattern of revolutionary activity is examined more closely.

The Pattern of Revolutionary Activity

ALTHOUGH the revolutions of 1848 and their sequels in 1849 and 1850 are so diversified, they are also of one piece; and their origins and aims, their course and their outcomes, have certain common features. Their special characteristics derive from that balance of unity and disunity in European civilization already described,³ as well as from the impact of the great economic and political changes of the generation between 1815 and 1848.

Revolutionary situations arise when established authorities find themselves challenged by movements that are superior either in numbers and strength, or in organization and resources, or in both. The reasons why the governments of so many European states found themselves simultaneously challenged by formidable revolutionary movements in 1848 varied considerably from place to place. Disloyalty was created more by a sense of political frustration in France and in Italy than in Germany or Austria: more by an economic revulsion against feudalism in Austria and Hungary than in France or Italy. In eastern Europe industrialism

³ See pp. 61-5.

and socialism had little share in causing political disturbances, though the coming of railways had some effect. The extent to which intellectuals, journalists, and students concerted their activities internationally was greatly exaggerated by the frightened governments, just as the rebels frequently exaggerated their own capacity to organize revolutionary mass movements of peasants or working men. It seems likely that the work of secret societies was more important in Italy than in France, and more important in both Italy and France than in Germany or Austria. For a complex of causes modern Europe had reached a critical stage in its political, social, and economic development, which governments little understood and in which they found themselves so impoverished in popular allegiance that they could survive or recover only by the use of extreme violence. Events therefore tended to follow a certain sequence, and to end in similar results. Yet there is no simple or unitary pattern, but rather several interwoven designs.

1. **The Pattern of Time and Place.** First, and most strikingly, revolutionary movements occurred a generation after the great settlement of Europe in 1815, and in their general character they were all protests against that settlement, all attempts to destroy it. In France the revolution of 1848, much more than the revolution of 1830, was a self-conscious re-enactment of the great Revolution of 1789: a revival of rationalist and democratic idealism, an abandonment of the attempts to reconcile with monarchical government the traditions and aspirations of the revolutionary tradition, a hasty reassertion of French initiative in the art of revolution and of French leadership in Europe. In Italy and Germany the revolutions were even more directly an onslaught on the territorial and dynastic settlement of Vienna and on the hegemony of the Habsburgs which Metternich's "system" had clamped upon Europe. Simultaneously seeking to overthrow absolutist and conservative government in the several Italian and German states, and to end the dynastic partition of power which kept aspirations for national unification at bay, they involved a natural union of liberalism with patriotism. Through representative institutions and new constitutional arrangements it was hoped to integrate the peoples of Italy and of Germany into self-governing and independent political units. In Hungary the comparable movement was internally involved in the rival struggles for independence of Magyars and Slavs. In Austria and Prussia, on the other hand, movements for liberal self-government and greater constitutional liberties could exist apart from patriotic struggles for national unification and were correspondingly less dynamic. Outside Austria itself, the revolutions shared the common characteristic of being anti-absolutist, anti-conservative, anti-Austrian. Beyond this unanimity about negatives, they were deeply divided as to the most desirable procedures, methods, and aims of liberal nationalism. That was one reason why they failed.

Secondly, the sequence of the revolutions in time and their incidence in place suggest that there were ultimately two separate storm centers from which the hurricane originated, France and Italy; and the greater of these (contrary to contemporary expectation and subsequent belief) was Italy rather than France. The rising in Palermo and in other Italian cities preceded the outbreak of the February Revolution in Paris, and the real initiative lay with Italy. Again, in 1849, it was in Italy that republicanism found its second wind and demonstrated its most heroic and epic qualities. But France was still thought of so universally as the prompter of revolutions and Paris remained so pre-eminent as the headquarters of expert revolutionaries, that events there gave stimulus and inspiration to the European movement in general. If Italy set the example, it was France that gave the signal for a more general activity; and in Germany, Austria, and Hungary the risings of March came only after the proclamation of the Second Republic in France. Once revolutionary action had become general, the crucial points were not in Paris, where Lamartine and the cautious assembly failed to produce the support that foreign revolutionaries had hoped for, but in Vienna and Budapest, Turin and Rome, Florence and Venice. This relegation of France to a second place in the leadership of European revolutions was symptomatic of her already declining demographic and diplomatic importance, and suggestive of the basically nationalist character of the revolutionary movements themselves. France, like the United Kingdom, was already a united nation and had no irredentist claims; Italy was engaged in her *Risorgimento*. Her patriotic dreams of national unity and independence chimed more with the corresponding aspirations of Germany or Hungary, Poland or Rumania, than with the more conservative and satisfied spirit of France or Britain.

Thirdly, of considerable significance, is the list of countries which escaped revolution and knew nothing more than disturbances while the rest of Europe was ablaze. It includes the United Kingdom and Belgium in the west, Poland and Russia in the east: two of the most industrialized and two of the least industrialized of European states. The revolutions were pre-eminently central European events. They happened in the only slightly industrialized territories of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, and in the predominantly agrarian and peasant countries of the Balkans. Revolution did not happen in Britain and Belgium because these countries already had flexible constitutional systems of government which could absorb the attacks of radical and democratic movements without being shattered; because their industrial systems were far enough advanced to absorb the rapidly growing population in new forms of employment; and because facilities for emigration eased the pressure on both their internal economies and their internal political systems.

That revolution did not happen in Poland surprised most liberals of

the time because, next to Greek independence, the restoration of a free and united Poland was the most cherished cause of the international revolutionaries. But the Poles, unlike the Italians, had no single common enemy. To Polish patriots Prussia, Austria, and Russia were all alike enemies because each held in subjection a part of the body of the Polish nation. Moreover the recent abolition of the *Robot* in the Austrian-held province of Galicia, the area most likely to revolt in the conditions of 1848, had taken the basic impulse from peasant revolt; while the Russian portion, since the crushing of revolt in 1831, was held in a military subjection too tight to permit of serious rising. Only in Prussia were Poles encouraged to hope for more liberal treatment, and this not for long. That revolution did not come within Russia itself is perhaps explained chiefly by the eastward migration of Russians into Asia during the first half of the century, which absorbed the growing population just as westward expansion absorbed that of the United Kingdom. It is likely that movement east acted as a safety valve, offering more food and more freedom than could be found in European Russia where both were restricted and in short supply.

2. **The Economic and Social Pattern.** The connection between the revolutions of 1848 and the economic expansion of Europe during the previous generation is no less close than their connection with the political idealism and radicalism inherited from the French Revolution.⁴ Basically the revolutionary mood was conditioned by a combination of three things: by the ferment of new ideas and ideals, deriving from the years before 1815 and sustained by the secret societies and the various liberal and democratic revolutionary parties of the continent; by the demographic restlessness caused by the unprecedented growth of population; and by the economic developments in transport and industry which were changing the whole outlook of society. The relative importance of these three factors varied greatly from country to country; and if central Europe rather than France is regarded as the major storm center, then the most important of these factors were the last two rather than the first.

It was in the economically more backward and agrarian lands of Austria and Hungary that the pressure of the growth of population was felt most acutely. During the first half of the nineteenth century the population of Austria probably increased at about the same rate as that of France—that is, by roughly 30 per cent—that of Hungary grew even faster. Not only was agriculture primitive in methods and medieval in organization, but feudal privileges and powers survived throughout most of the Habsburg lands. The Act of Emancipation passed on September 7, 1848, by the Constituent Assembly of Vienna was probably the greatest and most durable achievement of the year of revolutions. It abolished, without compensation, the hereditary rights of landlords in

⁴ See pp. 156–80.

jurisdiction and administration. To the peasant who occupied the land of a noble, it gave security of tenure. It abolished the labor service (*Robot*), which had been abolished in Hungary in March, and in Galicia in 1847.

Because the landowners had no interest now in keeping large numbers of peasants on the land, the smaller peasants tended to sell their land to the wealthier and move into the towns; so easing class tensions between nobles and peasants in the country while intensifying nationalist tensions in the towns between the predominantly German townsfolk and the mainly Slav immigrants. Freed from the burden of the *Robot* the larger estates could be run more economically and more productively. With greater security of tenure and more land of their own, the remaining peasant farmers became wealthier, more independent, and more nationalistic. Peasant parties in future were conservative in social affairs and nationalistic in politics, like the French. The compensation paid for abolition of the *Robot* made the aristocracy more capitalistic, for the landowners tended to invest it in industrial enterprises. The poorer peasants who drifted into the towns provided them with a new labor supply, and the basic conditions that had boosted industrialism in Britain half a century earlier now prevailed in much of eastern Europe. The sudden ending of feudalism brought the beginnings of a real agrarian and industrial revolution to the eastern marchlands of Europe.

The revolutions of 1848 were, in origin and impetus, the work of towns. Throughout the whole of Europe the course of events at first turned upon the actions of town dwellers: it was London and Birmingham, Paris and Brussels, Rome and Berlin, Vienna and Budapest, that set the pace. But again this universal pattern conceals a basic difference. Paris and Brussels were in revolutionary mood because they were industrial cities. Vienna and Rome were revolutionary because they were capital cities, not because they were industrial. It has been pointed out that in 1848 a revolution occurred in eastern Europe wherever there was a town with more than 100,000 inhabitants; and that north of the Alps there were only three such Austrian towns, Vienna, Budapest, and Prague. Vienna, with over 400,000 inhabitants, had almost doubled in size since 1815. The increase came largely from immigration from the countryside, and industrial development was not sufficiently advanced to absorb this rapid increase. Before 1848 the labor supply grew faster than industry, with the result that the towns experienced a declining standard of life and a phase of acute hardship and unemployment. These conditions bred the revolutionary spirit and provided the concentration of numbers and strength which a revolutionary movement needed in order to challenge established authority. Similar conditions existed in Milan, Florence, and Rome, and to a lesser extent in Berlin; they did not exist in Budapest or Prague, which were smaller and were growing more slowly.

Within the towns leadership came from the intellectuals—from uni-

versity professors and students, journalists and poets; and the events of 1848 in Germany have been called "the revolution of the intellectuals." This, again, was a universal characteristic, outside Britain. Poets like Lamartine and Petöfi, journalists like Mazzini and Kossuth, historians like Palacký, Dahlmann, and Balcesco, brought to the movements their peculiarly romantic, academic, and intellectualist flavor. They lent inspiration and infused nationalism. But as leaders of political movements they were weak because they were men of ideas rather than the responsible spokesmen of broad social interests or groups. It is their leadership that gave the revolutions their fragility and brittleness; if also their brilliance and heroism.

In Germany, where the dominance of intellectuals was particularly heavy and prolonged, the endless debates of the Frankfurt Assembly are their chief monument. Lamartine was to a large extent responsible for the lack of French support for revolutionary movements abroad, and his "Manifesto to Europe" in March, 1848, was designed to reassure the governments of Europe that the Second Republic would not embark upon war despite all its professions of sympathy for liberalism and nationalism. Where, as in Prague, the revolution remained in the hands of intellectuals and university students and failed to enlist the mass support of either peasants or town proletariat, it suffered early defeat. Where, as in Hungary through the mediation of Kossuth, the revolution was captured by the gentry, it lasted longest and proved the most difficult to crush.

But although the initiative in revolution lay with the intellectuals and the populace of the towns, its ultimate fate lay in the hands of the peasants. Where, as in France and Austria, the conservative interests of land-owning peasants made themselves felt, counterrevolutionary forces quickly triumphed. In such lands universal suffrage proved to be a decisively conservative weapon, and liberal expectations were frustrated by the operations of democracy. In Habsburg territories, once feudalism had been destroyed and peasant lands freed, the wealthier peasants lost interest in further revolutionary activity and the poorer peasants lacked any common purpose. Only in Italy and Germany, where there was a more considerable middle class, did the yearning for national integration voiced by the intellectuals linger on in a form capable of resurrection into an effective political movement.

In the more advanced industrial nations, pre-eminently Britain, France, and Belgium, but also to an extent Germany and Italy, socialism had found roots in the industrial working classes. It was henceforth associated on the continent with the desperate attempts at a "second revolution," expressed in the "June Days" in Paris and Prague, and the October revolt in Vienna. This association was not altogether justified, though socialists and communists claimed credit for these mass revolts of a desperate town populace. Karl Marx proceeded to analyze in detail

the events of these years in *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850* and in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. He wrote:

The workers were left no choice: they had to starve or let fly. They answered on June 22 with the tremendous insurrection in which the first great battle was fought between the two classes that split modern society. It was a fight for the preservation or annihilation of the *bourgeois* order. The veil that shrouded the republic was torn asunder.

Certainly, as a result of 1848, liberal constitutionalists ceased to fear universal suffrage as a gateway to socialism, though they began to fear it as an introduction to dictatorship; and there appeared a wider gap than hitherto between democracy and socialism.

3. **The Political Pattern.** The events of these years demonstrated that nationalism, in the sense of the demands of self-conscious peoples for self-determination, was the most potent general force in European politics. It might mean the demand that governments holding parts of a nation separate, as in the states of Germany and Italy, should be destroyed in favor of new comprehensive nation-states. It might mean the demand that comprehensive dynastic states, like the Habsburg Empire in Austria or the Kingdom of Hungary, should be destroyed in favor of smaller, more intensive nation-states. But whether it involved the integration or disintegration of existing states, it had been shown to be an impulse that could evoke a loyalty and a spirit of self-sacrifice vastly more intense than the allegiance normally accorded to existing governments. That it was likely to introduce great complexity and confusion into European affairs was already suggested by the distinction that had appeared in 1848 between the so-called "historic nations" such as Greece, Poland, Hungary, and (more arguably) Italy and Germany, and the Rumans or various Slav peoples such as the Croats, Serbs, and Slovaks which had been previously submerged by their German, Hungarian, or Turkish conquerors. Of the Slav peoples, indeed, only Russians, Poles, and Czechs could plausibly claim any past record of unity or independence; the nationalist claims of others had to rest on ethnography and philology rather than on history. Mutual jealousies and squabbles were inevitable even among nationalists, for German patriots were committed to denying Czech autonomy; Hungarian, to resisting Croatian and Serbian independence. The dreams of fraternal rose-water revolutions cherished by western nationalists like Lamartine and Mazzini were rudely dispelled.

The prevalence of nationalism meant that movements aiming at the creation of new states (as in Italy and Germany) became linked with movements aiming merely at capturing control of existing states (such as liberalism and democracy). It was the contention of men like Mazzini and Kossuth that the states they wanted must be new not only in ter-

ritorial frontiers and population, but also in structure and institutions. It was also the contention of liberals like Count Camillo Cavour in Piedmont that only in territorially larger and more homogeneous states could the kind of political arrangements that they wanted be successfully established. There was an important difference of purpose between those who saw liberalism or democracy as the essential steps toward national self-determination, and those who saw national unification as the necessary prelude to liberalism and democracy. Until the disillusionments of 1848-50 both could work together, and it seemed as natural for patriots to be liberals or democrats as for liberals and democrats to be patriots. The strength of "a people" lay in "the people."

After 1850 some nationalists came to believe that what liberalism or democracy had failed to give them might be got from more authoritarian sources and by more militaristic means. Cavour, who in 1850 became the Piedmontese minister of agriculture, commerce and marine, held that only by the economic and military strengthening of Piedmont and by timely alliance with foreign powers could Italy be united. Diplomacy and force must be used to expel Austria and weld together the divided peninsula. This change of mood and outlook, a transition from reliance upon liberal idealism and popular enthusiasm to reliance upon realism and power, was perhaps the most important political result of the failures of 1848. In Germany distrust of liberalism and of parliamentary methods went further and deeper, because the failure of 1848 in Germany had been even more complete than in Italy; though Prussia needed another decade of reorganization before she could become more clearly the hard core of a new Germany. After 1850 France, too, under the guidance of her Bonapartist ruler became once again an authoritarian, militaristic state, temporarily abandoning her enthusiasm for republican ideas and parliamentary rights.

Throughout most of Europe the two decades after 1850 were, therefore, another era of conservatism and reaction. As after 1815 the power of the Roman Church revived. The Papacy made new concordats with Spain and Austria. The Church's role in education grew after 1850 in France and England. But in character this new phase differed profoundly from the previous phase of conservatism between 1815 and 1830. Outside Prussia and Russia dynastic monarchy had suffered crippling blows. The system of Metternich seemed old-fashioned—even more old-fashioned than the heroics of Lamartine and the secret societies—and could never return. France was never again to have a monarchy after 1848, and even at the height of his imperial power Napoleon III based his empire on a broader popular and parliamentary foundation than had Louis Philippe. Henceforth greater lip service, at least, had to be paid to the ideas of liberal constitutionalism and the dreams of democracy. Men won and held power to the extent that they represented (or could per-

suade others that they represented) broad sectional interests or national purposes, and not to the extent that they could claim hereditary right or legitimist authority, or in proportion to their intellectual eminence. In this ultimate sense most governments became increasingly more accountable to the people they governed and came to be regarded as rightly accountable. More than ever before they had to promote solid material interests, and show themselves competent and in command of real power, if they were to survive.

For 1848 had inaugurated the age of the masses. Just as the revolutions originated in the towns, so their characteristic device was the barricades, the instinctive gesture of urban revolt. Radical agitators had prepared the revolutions, and nationalist leaders emerged once they had begun; but the initiative in making revolution came not from such leaders but from the masses themselves. The timing of them was decided by those conditions that affected the masses everywhere: the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1846, the bad harvests of 1846 and 1847, the declining standard of living in the towns. Governments in future had to accept the fact that the masses held the master key of politics, and to lead or mislead mass opinion made vocal by universal suffrage became the first necessity of politicians. Moreover, parliamentary assemblies had gained no credit from the events of 1848-50, whereas it was the armies that had won in the end. When gatherings of enthusiastic middle-class representatives had finished talking, it was the professional armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria under their professional generals which had settled the fate of Europe. Governments would in future rely more on organized military power to achieve their ends. Bismarck's age of "blood and iron" had begun. For all these reasons the sequel to the era of revolutions was an era of authority and realism, of diplomacy and war; and it was in these conditions that a united Italy and a united Germany were at last to appear.

PART *FOUR*

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POWERS *1851-71*

12. *The Balance of Power in Europe, 1850-70*
13. *The Reorientation of Western Europe*
14. *The Remaking of Central Europe*
15. *Emancipation in Eastern Europe*



THE OUTSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS of Europe during the two decades between 1851 and 1871 were the industrial and commercial supremacy of the United Kingdom in the world; the temporary resurgence of French power and influence under the rule of Napoleon III; the achievements of political unification in Italy under the leadership of Piedmont and in Germany under the leadership of Prussia; and the remarkable expansion of European power into other continents. For many purposes the period can usefully be divided into two halves, because the years 1861-62 brought a turning point in the internal development of several major countries. In March, 1861, the movement for Italian unification culminated in the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy by the first Italian parliament. Though the city of Rome remained outside the kingdom until 1870, Italy ranked as a major power in Europe after 1861. In November, 1860, Napoleon III began to relax his autocratic power and inaugurated the phase of so-called "Liberal Empire," which brought a revival of parliamentary and electoral activity in France. In February, 1861, the tsar emancipated the serfs, so beginning a new era in the economic evolution of Russia; and he granted concessions in Poland. In September, 1862, Bismarck became president of the Prussian ministry, and began his single-minded policy of unifying Germany under Prussian domination. After three major wars he succeeded triumphantly when, in January, 1871, the king of Prussia was crowned as German emperor. During the second decade of this period European affairs were dominated by the German problem, and they were to remain dominated by it until 1945.

But the two decades, taken together, have a coherence of their own. This coherence comes partly from the common characteristics of the men who now occupied the European diplomatic stage: Lord Palmerston, who was Britain's prime minister from 1855 until 1865, except for a brief interlude in 1858-59; Napoleon III, who ruled France throughout; Count Cavour, who led Piedmont from 1852 until 1861; Bismarck, who controlled Prussian policy from 1862 until

1890. All four men had dynamic personalities, pursued forceful policies, and engaged in militant diplomacy and war. Each expressed a vigorous spirit of self-assertive nationalism, and each helped to transform the European scene into an arena of more naked struggle for national prestige and power. For all four, liberalism took second place to nationalism, although Palmerston and Cavour contrived at least in some degree to reconcile the two.

The coherence of the period derives, too, from the prevalence of major wars. As previously suggested,¹ the age of revolutions was succeeded by an era of great wars between major powers, a natural consequence of the militant policies followed by the leading statesmen. Of the five major wars between 1854 and 1870, France, Prussia, and Austria were each engaged in three, Piedmont in two. But except for the first, the Crimean War, none lasted more than a few weeks or months. They were in general wars between regular and professional state armies, and except in Prussia national conscription did not yet make them wars between whole nations. They were wars that were truly "continuations of policy by other means." The period is distinct from the generation which preceded it, in that governments came to fear other governments more than they feared revolutionary uprisings from within their own countries, and armies fought other armies rather than revolutionaries at home. It is distinct from the generation which followed it, in that the French rather than the German empire was still regarded as the greatest threat to the balance of power in Europe, and relations among the powers were more fluid and governed less by treaty alliances than they were to be after 1871.

A third source of coherence is more concealed than these other two, but none the less real. It was a time of general internal political reorganization in Europe, the impetus for which had been given by the experience of nationalist and liberal revolutions in 1848-49 and by the revival of a more intelligent and subtle conservatism after 1850. These were decades of remarkable fertility and ingenuity in the devising of new kinds of public administration, new forms of federal structure, and new economic and political organizations. Many fac-

¹ See p. 91.

tors combined to cause this: the rapid growth of population and of large towns, the speed of economic development and of industrialization, the old fear of revolution and the new fear of imminent war, a new expectation of greater efficiency and honesty in public life. To regard the central theme of the period as merely a continued conflict between the forces of conservatism and continuity and the forces of change and revolution would be misleading and superficial; as would be a purely diplomatic picture of the conflicts between the western parliamentary states of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium on one side, and the central and eastern autocratic monarchies on the other. More important than either of these was the more silent and unobtrusive overhaul of the whole apparatus of public order, law, administration, and government which was taking place in nearly every country. France, Italy, and Germany were outstanding only in that the militant nationalism of these three great countries filled the headlines with dramatic events and mobilized in its cause the new masses of population, the new economic and military resources of society, and the harsh power of forceful and ruthless leadership. But it is the task of the historian to look behind the headlines, to the less conspicuous and less sensational changes that eventually helped to make modern Europe.

In the longest historical perspective, events of these years in eastern Europe might even be regarded as of more far-reaching significance than those in the west. The invention of the dual monarchy in Austria-Hungary, the emancipation of the Russian serfs, the crumbling of Ottoman Turkish power in Europe and north Africa, the consolidation of expansionist Balkan states in Greece, Serbia, and Rumania, were events no less pregnant with meaning for the future of the world than the attainment of commercial and industrial supremacy by Great Britain, the devising of new systems of government in France, or the making of new states in central Europe. The era of state-making was just beginning, and it was beginning in central and eastern Europe. While Abraham Lincoln was fighting to preserve the Union in America and Britain was devising a new and elastic federal constitution for Canada, while Cavour and Bismarck schemed to unite

Italy and Germany, and small Balkan nationalities struggled to attain separate statehood, comparable tendencies were beginning to develop in Russia and Turkey. Finnish and Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalisms were stimulated and strengthened; Bulgarian national aspirations were kindled and Slav peoples stirred under Turkish misrule. Nor were the reverberations of the great upheaval restricted to Europe. They were already felt throughout the vast Asiatic hinterland. The opening of Japan to western influences by Commodore Perry in 1854, the establishment of the treaty system in China between 1842 and 1858, and the ending of East India Company rule in India in 1859 laid foundations for continuing the process of westernization, and so of industrialization and eventual state-making, which was already so evident within eastern Europe. Viewed in this way, the century between 1850 and 1950 was one long story of the extension of western European ideas, influences, and modes of organization in politics, economics, and social life, to the other continents of the world and to the larger part of mankind.

CHAPTER 12

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE, 1850-70

The Great Powers and Their Relationship

AFTER the storm, a strange calm. The year 1851 was a year of peace in Europe, and its symbol was the Great Exhibition of the works of industry of all nations held in the Crystal Palace in London. But outside the United Kingdom itself the calm was due less to the prosperity of industrialism than to the temporary exhaustion of revolutionary impulses, to the retrieval of a balance of power in Europe, and to the resumption in modified form of the Holy Alliance against revolution. The main components of this balance were the same five great powers that had made the settlement of 1815: in the west, the United Kingdom and France; in central Europe, Prussia and Austria; in the east, Russia. Because of the economic transformations since 1815 and the events of 1848-50, the relative importance of these five powers had changed and was still changing.

In population France remained larger than any power except Russia, and because of her republican institutions and revolutionary traditions she was still thought of as the most likely threat to European order and peace. The United Kingdom was the only industrial and commercial power of great importance. She produced 57 million tons of coal when France produced only $4\frac{1}{2}$ million and the whole of the German *Bund* only 6 million; more than 2 million tons of pig iron when France, her only rival, produced less than half a million tons; and she commanded more than half the whole world's tonnage of ocean-going shipping. But in terms of immediately available military power she lagged behind other states, for the long period of peace and a policy of financial economy had allowed both her army and navy to fall into remarkable decline. For powers that still thought predominantly in terms of land warfare, armies mattered more than navies. The German fleet was even sold by auction in 1853. Russia, the only one of the powers which could claim to have

more than a million serving soldiers, was rated next to France as the most likely source of aggression.

The formal basis of Austro-Russian relations remained the agreements of Münchengrätz made by Metternich in 1833,¹ and these also involved Prussia. They bound all three powers to oppose the doctrine of nonintervention should any independent sovereign appeal for help against liberalism and revolution. They more specifically bound Austria and Russia to act together to preserve the *status quo* in Turkey and to provide mutual help in case of rebellion in Poland. The most sensitive point was then regarded as Poland, because of the recent Polish revolts of 1830; and thereafter garrisons were kept by Russia in Warsaw, by Austria in Cracow, and by Prussia in Posen. The next most sensitive point was Italy, and Austria kept the bulk of her forces in northern Italy. In the west, because of fears of France, Prussia kept most of her forces in the Rhineland fortresses, and British naval bases were all pointed against France.

Of the five powers in 1851, Prussia was the smallest in population and, since the "humiliation of Olmütz" in 1850, the weakest in prestige. Having then been forced to give up the Erfurt Union which, in March, 1850, she had formed with most of the smaller German states, Prussia was induced to enter the revived *Bund* under Austrian presidency in November, 1850. Within the *Bund* the old clericalist and conservative tendencies were renewed in all German states, and even Prussia, while keeping the constitution of 1850, fell into line. For a time, at least, her inferiority to the Austria of Schwarzenberg was accepted and her weight thrown into the same side of the European balance as Austria's. In May, 1851, the two countries signed an alliance, to last for three years, that was designed to prevent further revolution in Europe. If it was a revived Holy Alliance, it had the important difference that it excluded Russia, because Nicholas I refused to join, and it was more flimsy in that it involved one-sided advantages for Austria. While it involved Prussia in guaranteeing Austrian power in Italy, it left her with no corresponding guarantee for her own territories in the Rhineland. By keeping out of commitments, the tsar hoped to enjoy an automatically favorable balance of power. It seemed that by 1851 a nice system of checks and balances had been established. In Poland the enforced partition gave Russia security in Warsaw. Despite Austrian hegemony in Germany, the *Zollverein* remained and Prussia had succeeded in preventing the incorporation of the whole of Austria in the *Bund*. In Italy, Austria backed by Prussian guarantees remained strongly enough entrenched to check both revolution and French aggression. In western Europe, Prussian power in the Rhineland combined with British naval strength seemed capable of checking France. These subtle balances left Russia able to stand out of

¹ See p. 155.

entanglements while enjoying an automatic protection of her main interests. As a result, she fought the Crimean War without allies.

Points of Tension. It was on the periphery of the continent that new points of tension appeared; this signified the new problems created by the expansiveness of the powers and the growing importance of maritime strength. The two points of tension were the Baltic provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, under Danish control, and the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, controlling access to the Black Sea. These two strategically important areas were to be directly involved in the wars of this period.

International agreements about the Elbe duchies of Schleswig and Holstein dated from the eighteenth century. So long as Britain depended for much of her timber and ship stores on the Baltic, and Russian exports of timber found their outlet chiefly through the Baltic, it was of interest to both that the entrance to that sea should not be controlled by a rival power. In agreement with France they had contrived that the Elbe duchies should remain attached to the Danish crown. Now the situation was changed. Britain with the development of steam and of overseas connections, and Russia with the growth of her southern export trade in wheat, were less concerned with the Baltic. While Britain looked overseas, Russia looked south to the Ukraine and the Straits. The Baltic accordingly was open for expansionist German national claims, on the grounds that Schleswig, though predominantly Danish, had German minorities in its southern part, while the southern duchy of Holstein was entirely German and since 1815 had been included in the German *Bund*.

In March, 1848, the Estates of the two duchies broke from Denmark and sought support from the German *Bund*. By May, Prussian troops, acting nominally on behalf of the *Bund*, had expelled the Danes from the duchies; and when they entered Jutland, a part of the Kingdom of Denmark itself, Palmerston intervened and urged an armistice. In August, Prussia and Denmark signed the Armistice of Malmö, which caused both Danish and Prussian troops to be withdrawn from the duchies. They were to be temporarily administered by a joint Prussian-Danish commission—a solution that outraged nationalist feelings in both countries. Peace was concluded in 1850. In May, 1852, the Treaty of London, signed by all five great powers as well as by Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, settled the succession to the Danish crown on Christian, prince of Glücksburg, and included the two Elbe duchies among his dominions. It also gave assurances that the relation of Holstein to the *Bund* was not thereby altered. The aim was declared to be "the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the balance of power in Europe." The treaty was not accepted by the Diet of Frankfurt on behalf of the *Bund*, and was resented by Prussia as a frustration of German nationalism by the concert of powers.

Europe was to hear much more of the Elbe duchies as soon as Prussia was able to revive her claims, and it was by exploiting their complex position that the first steps toward German unification were to be taken.²

The question of the Straits was likewise formally regulated by previous international agreements. By the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829³ Turkey had agreed that there should be freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea, that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be open to all Russian merchant ships and to the merchant ships of all other powers with which Turkey was at peace. In 1833 Russia established herself for a time as the chief protector of Turkey, with paramount power in Constantinople, and induced the Turkish government to agree to close the Dardanelles to all foreign warships should Russia be engaged in war. This turned the Straits into a Russian outpost, for it left her fleet with free access to the Mediterranean while excluding her enemies from the Black Sea. But in 1840 Palmerston insisted that the affairs of Turkey were of general European concern, and the Straits Convention was made in July, 1841, by the five great powers and Turkey. It closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all foreign warships when Turkey was herself at peace.

Regulation of Russo-Turkish relations in these respects did little, however, to solve the basic issues of the Middle East. These sprang from the increasing weakness of Turkish rule in the Balkans and from Russian pressure southward, combined with attempts to make herself the protector and champion of Balkan Slav nationalities against the Turks. Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, though ended in 1851, left other powers suspicious.⁴ The Tsar was apt to speak of Turkey as "a very sick man" who might suddenly die on the hands of Europe, and to urge the prudence of preliminary agreements about disposal of his property. Britain resisted this view and followed her traditional policy of keeping Turkey whole as a buffer against Russian expansion. In the Holy Land the claims of Turkey, Russia, and France were in conflict over the special question of management of the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem. The Turks were formally in control; the French claimed a traditional right, dating sentimentally from the crusades and diplomatically from a treaty of 1740, to protect Christians against infidels in the east; and Russia now claimed special interests in the position of Orthodox Christians as against Roman Catholic Christians in the Holy Land. Since 1815 both France and Britain had established strong commercial interests in the Levant, and neither welcomed a prospect of further extensions of Russian influence into the Near East and the Mediterranean. Everything indicated the "Eastern Question" as a future cause of trouble.

² See p. 282.

³ See p. 119.

⁴ See p. 197.

By 1854 the peace of Europe depended upon whether the disruptive tendencies of these tangled and troublesome conflicts in the Baltic and the Black Seas could be removed or contained by the existing forces of European order. Although the "system" of Metternich had been destroyed in 1848, the desirability of preserving a general "balance of power" and the methods of preserving it by a "concert of Europe" were still accepted by the leading states. The revival of conservative forces after 1850 perpetuated many of the prerevolutionary habits and mechanisms for another decade. The emergence after 1848 of militant nationalism and liberalism was a standing challenge to the working of the old diplomatic system. The insistence that national independence and unity mattered more than stability or concert, that settlement of territorial frontiers by the joint decisions of autocratic governments was a violation of nationalist and liberal principles, that governments and peoples should work in closer mutual relationships, corroded the old system. But for a decade at least these forces were kept at bay.

Balance of Power. The concept of a "balance of power" kept a special meaning in the 1850's which it lost by 1914. It did not yet mean a balance between rival alliances of hostile states, but rather a balance of territorial possessions. It meant that no state should gain additions of territory in Europe without the agreement of the other states. In consequence, the "concert of Europe" meant the mechanism by which this agreement was reached and registered. The anxieties of foreign offices during the revolutionary turbulence of 1848 and 1849 had been that these upheavals might offer opportunities for unwarranted and unagreed transfer of territories. In 1849 Palmerston, sympathizing with Hungarian national aspirations yet fearful of Russian intervention, argued in the House of Commons that the survival of Austria was essential to the balance of power in Europe. "Austria," he said, "is a most important element in the balance of European power. Austria stands in the center of Europe, a barrier against encroachment on the one side, and against invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up, in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European Power. . . ."

Between 1815 and 1860 every important change in the territorial settlement reached at Vienna was ratified by the concert of major European powers: the independence of Greece in 1832 and of Belgium in 1839, the affairs of Turkey and the Straits in 1840-41, control over Schleswig and Holstein in 1852, and the disputes involved in the Crimean War in the Treaty of Paris in 1856. On the first of these five occasions, Great Britain, France, and Russia were concerned; on the other four occasions, all five great powers were involved. After the Congress of Verona in 1822 the concert of Europe worked not through regular congresses but through *ad hoc* international conferences. But it worked nevertheless,

and on very similar principles: the greatest of which might be described as "no annexation without ratification."

The most important implication of this principle was that a settlement should be reached not merely bilaterally, between belligerents which had just ended a war, but should include participation of other nonbelligerent powers recognized as being actively interested in the settlement. On these grounds the great powers had collectively recognized Belgian independence and joined in the Straits Convention; and a non-belligerent power like Prussia was invited (though grudgingly) to take part in the Congress of Paris in 1856. The assumption was preserved that the interests of great powers as such were likely to be concerned in any major changes of power relationships, and that they all had a claim to some voice in treaty settlements.

But the next four wars, which were to be fought between 1859 and 1871, were ended abruptly by the dictates of the victors, and the concert of Europe was sharply ignored. By being ignored for such major purposes as the achievement of Italian and German unification and after the defeat of major powers like Austria and France, it was in effect destroyed. The concept of a "balance of power" lost its old meaning of territorial balance, and began to assume its more modern meaning of a diplomatic balance, a seesaw between rival groups of powers united by treaty alliances. In 1918, when reaction set in against this new system, the notion of a general concert was revived in the greatly extended form of the League of Nations. The Crimean War is, therefore, an important landmark in the development of modern Europe. That a war involving three great powers occurred at all in 1854 was the first failure of the old system to keep the peace; that it ended in a general treaty settlement agreed upon by all five great powers was a twilight triumph for the fading conception of the concert of Europe.

The Crimean War, 1854-56

ALTHOUGH the dispute between France and Russia which precipitated the Crimean War was ostensibly about the Holy Places and the protection of Latin and Orthodox Christians in Turkey, it soon involved the whole tangled skein of the "Eastern Question." A test of prestige between France and Russia, it became also a conflict between Russian attempts to control the Turkish government and British fears of Russian expansion; and inevitably this aroused Franco-British anxieties to preserve the balance of power by upholding Turkish integrity. The original dispute was trivial, in itself no justification for breaking the forty years' peace and wrecking the concert of

Europe. The two years of protracted maneuvers which preceded hostilities suggest that the powers did not readily resort to war in 1854.

In February, 1852, after two years of French diplomatic pressure and threats of naval action, the Turkish government recognized the full claims of the Latin Christians in the Holy Land to share in administration of the disputed sanctuaries, while denying their claims to exclusive possession. By the end of 1852 Turkish officials were frankly allowing the Latins full control of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The Tsar decided to adopt open threats of force comparable with those by which France had successfully upheld Latin claims; and in January, 1853, he moved Russian troops toward the borders of the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which he had evacuated only two years before. Backed by this standing threat, in February he sent to Constantinople a special commission under Prince Menshikov, charged with the task of getting as clear a treaty right for Russia to protect the Greek Orthodox Church as France already enjoyed to protect the Roman Catholic Church in Ottoman territories. As reinsurance against the failure of Menshikov, he proposed to the British ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour, a plan to partition Turkish territories. Such an arrangement, he hoped, would preserve both the balance of power and the concert of Europe and would be generally accepted. The Tsar still, indeed, accepted the old principle of "no annexation without ratification."

The Tsar's hopes of securing Russian aims without general war were frustrated by the course of events, including not least the new factor of violent public outcry in Paris and London against Russian ambitions. When the sultan of Turkey, on advice from the British ambassador, made concessions about the Holy Places but firmly refused to recognize a general Russian protectorate over Christians in the Balkans, Menshikov left Constantinople and the Russian armies reoccupied Moldavia and Wallachia. Even now the powers headed by Austria tried to prevent war and summoned a conference at Vienna. Their efforts failed and in October, 1853, Turkey declared war on Russia. By the end of the month the French and British fleets passed through the Dardanelles as a gesture of deterrence. Near Sinope a Russian fleet attacked and destroyed a Turkish naval squadron. In Britain such behavior seemed intolerable both to Palmerston and to an excited public opinion susceptible to the popular press; and in France Napoleon III felt impelled to meet clericalist demands for action and to live up to the militarist traditions of his name. In March, Britain and France declared war on Russia. Before long Russia, under threat of Austrian attack so long as she kept troops on the Danube, withdrew from Moldavia and Wallachia. These provinces were at once garrisoned by Austria, which held them until they were returned to Turkey at the end of the war. With serious outbreaks of cholera in the

ill-prepared French and British forces, and with the immediate occasions of the war removed, peace might now have been reached. But both sides felt too heavily committed to withdraw so soon, national prestige was involved, and war continued with a joint attack of Turks, French, and British on the Russian naval base of Sebastopol on the southern tip of the Crimean peninsula.

The conduct of the siege of Sebastopol was remarkable for the inept way in which the allied command threw away their initial advantages. They landed to the north of Sebastopol and after hard fighting forced open the road to the city. Then, instead of driving straight for it, or even establishing a blockade on the north, they embarked on the long and difficult march round to the south of it. This delay enabled the Russians to prepare fortifications that held them at bay for a whole year, until September, 1855. The allied fleets, based on Balaclava, contrived to sink the Russian ships in the mouth of the harbor of Sebastopol and so prevented their own entry. Naval strength played a less decisive part in the war than had been planned. The besieging forces, harassed by the Russian winter and by cholera and typhus, as well as by Russian land forces, suffered great losses. The ineptitude of leadership and the sufferings of the men in frozen, disease-ridden camps were made known to shocked populations at home by the dispatches of war correspondents. It was the first general European war in which the telegraph and the popular press played any important role.

As the campaign dragged on, the diplomatic scene changed. In December, 1854, Austria joined in a defensive and offensive alliance with the western powers, but did not take part in hostilities. The next month Piedmont, under its astute leader Count Cavour, joined the allies. In February, 1855, Lord Palmerston succeeded Lord Aberdeen as British prime minister. In March the tsar Nicholas I died, and his successor Alexander II was more ready to consider peace. When Austria threatened to enter the war, he decided to give way, and because the strain of war was deeply affecting Russian government the Tsar signed preliminaries of peace in February, 1856. The terms of settlement were to be reached at Paris. Prussia, despite her continued neutrality, was invited to attend the Congress, though only after the peace terms had been negotiated, and then under Austrian patronage and against British resistance.

The Settlement of 1856. The settlement was concerned partly with the immediate issues that had led to war, partly with broader definition of rules governing relations between the powers. The independence of Turkey was affirmed, and it was laid down that no power had the right to interfere between the sultan and his Christian subjects. Turkey was admitted to the "Public Law and System (*Concert*) of Europe," which meant that for the first time she was brought within the ranks of the great powers and accepted as a component in the balance of power. As

encouragement for her government to implement its enlightened professions, the powers recognized "the high value" of the recent decree by which the Sultan recorded "his generous intentions toward the Christian population of his Empire." The Straits Convention of 1841 was "revised by common consent," so as to declare the Black Sea neutralized, its waters and ports thrown open to merchant ships of all nations, but the Straits closed to foreign warships in peacetime. Turkey and Russia made a separate convention governing the number of light vessels that each might keep in it "for the service of their coasts," and this convention was not to be annulled or modified without the assent of all the powers. In similar spirit, the free navigation of the Danube was ensured on the principles first laid down in 1815, and the powers declared that this arrangement "henceforth forms a part of the Public Law of Europe, and take it under their Guarantee."

The territorial settlement involved concessions from both Turkey and Russia. Russia gave up part of the province of Bessarabia, which was annexed to Moldavia. The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were to "continue to enjoy under the Suzerainty of the Porte, and under the guarantee of the Contracting Powers, the privileges and immunities of which they are in possession." The Sultan undertook to grant them (modern Rumania) a large measure of independence and self-government, under supervision of a special commission of the powers. Another Danubian principality, Serbia, was to enjoy similar rights under the collective guarantee of the powers. Serbia had gained some local privileges by revolts early in the century, and her rights had been secured by the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829. After 1856 she enjoyed considerable autonomy under her national prince, Milosh Obrenovitch, though Turkish garrisons remained in Belgrade until 1867. She did not become an independent kingdom until 1878. In these respects the settlement marked further steps toward the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which the victorious powers had ostensibly fought the war to prevent.

The signatories of the treaty at the same time signed a "Declaration respecting Maritime Law" which became a landmark in the regulation of naval warfare. Privateering was declared abolished; enemy goods were not to be seized in neutral vessels, or neutral goods in enemy vessels, unless they could be classed as "contraband of war"; and blockades, to be binding, were to be effective and not merely declarations on paper. These principles marked a concession on the part of the United Kingdom, for she had long resisted them and they would have made improper a general blockade of the kind which she had declared against Napoleon. In this respect, as in others, the Congress of Paris continued the elaboration of a system of international law and agreements on the pattern laid down in 1815. At least two thirds of the deaths in war had been due to disease—to pneumonia, typhus, cholera, and gangrene. The sufferings

endured by soldiers on both sides aroused widespread concern, and the improvement of nursing and medical services effected by the work of Florence Nightingale and others was one lasting benefit derived from the war. The same concern led to the International Red Cross, established by the Geneva Convention in 1864.

The chief significance of the settlement lay in its efforts to remove the sources of tension which had produced the first general war in forty years: the relations between the Turkish government and its subjects, and between Turkey and Russia; the question of the Straits and of the Danube; the breakdown in the concert of Europe. None of these ends was finally achieved. Turkish power went on declining and Turkish promises were seldom kept. Russian ambitions in the Balkans and the Black Sea were not destroyed. The concert of Europe had suffered a serious blow, and other wars were soon to come. The outcome of the Crimean War was as indecisive as its outset had been casual. But its consequences for the major participants were great. No belligerent had reason to be proud of its military organization and leadership, and it became clear that armies had to be modernized and overhauled. The charge of the Light Brigade, honored by Lord Tennyson, was heroic but it was not war. Both Britain and Russia proceeded with this task, and states became conscious of the need for more efficient preparations for war.

Napoleon gained in personal prestige, at home because he could boast of a victorious war, and internationally because the congress was held in Paris. Cavour gained the opportunity he had hoped for, of exalting his country's status by appearing at an international conference alongside the great powers; but his battle for Italian unification and recognition had still to be fought. Austria and Prussia gained as little from the settlement as they had contributed to the war, save that Russian influence in Vienna and Berlin was now greatly reduced. Russia, under her new tsar Alexander II, suffered the humiliation of defeat and loss of territory, and her administration and economy reeled under the strain of war. Her power in eastern Europe was broken and fear of it abated. Collectively, the belligerents lost about half a million men, which was a total larger than that incurred in any other European war between 1815 and 1914. Of these, the Russians lost over 300,000, the French nearly 100,000, the British 60,000. If small by twentieth-century standards of warfare, these losses were large by nineteenth-century standards. They denoted the new destructiveness of modern warfare.

In long-term perspective the Crimean War was a strange combination of recurrent and of unusual features in European history. Insofar as it was a war between Russia and Turkey, it was but one of the long sequence of Russo-Turkish wars, roughly one every generation, stretching from 1768-74, 1787-92, 1806-12, 1828-29 and going on to 1877-78. They were the result of the persistent pressure imposed upon Turkey

by Russian desire to extend influence into the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean. Insofar as it involved a western invasion of Russia, it was likewise one of a long historic sequence that included: the invasions of Napoleon in 1812, of the Germans in 1916-18, the western allies in 1919-20, and Hitler in 1941-44. On the other hand, it was the first war of recent times in which Britain and France fought on the same side; the first in which women, led by Florence Nightingale, took an important share; the first in which the telegraph and press exerted any influence on the course of events.

This mixture of familiar and novel features suggests its intermediate position in the history of modern Europe, just as the inconclusiveness of its achievements fixes its significance in diplomatic history. It was fought not so much for Turkey as against Russia. Europe, in the decade after 1848, stood at the parting of the ways. The old concert was dying, the balance of power was beginning to shift, the new era of realism was dawning. In a strange semi-twilight, contemporary Europe—the Europe of large, populous, industrial states, of restless dynamic forces of expansion and explosion, of war fears and acute insecurity—was rapidly coming into existence. Involving as it did the two great peripheral powers—only semi-European in interests and character—of Great Britain and Russia, the Crimean War was token of a profound change in the place of Europe in a wider world. It was a fumbling war, probably unnecessary, largely futile, certainly extravagant, yet rich in unintended consequences. It broke the spell of peace, and it removed the shadow of Russian power from central European affairs. It therefore cleared the way for the remodelling of Germany and Italy by means of war.

The Shifting Economic Balance, 1850-70

THESE two decades saw a continuation, but in some countries a slowing down, of that remarkable growth of European population which had characterized the first half of the nineteenth century.⁵ In 1850 there were roughly 66 million more inhabitants in Europe than there had been in 1815, and the United Kingdom and Russia had been growing faster than any other European countries. During the next two decades another 30 million were added, making by 1870 a total of about 295 million. This general rate of increase—roughly 11 per cent—was slower than in the preceding twenty years, and slower than in the subsequent twenty years. The fears of overpopulation which had haunted Britain and France earlier, when the ideas of the economist Thomas Malthus held the field, now disappeared in the surge of mid-Victorian optimism and Napoleonic self-confidence. France even began

⁵ See p. 92.

to fear relative underpopulation. Already in 1851 the French birth rate, like the Irish, was falling, while that of the Scandinavian countries was reaching its peak; and whereas the population of Germany by 1870 had been increasing at the rate of 8 per cent, that of France had increased by roughly 7.5 per cent. The transfer of Alsace and Lorraine with their one and a half million inhabitants from France to Germany in 1871 permanently destroyed the former predominance of France. After the transfer Germany had 41 million as against France's 36. This sudden change, more than the uneven distribution of population growth between different countries, affected the balance of power in Europe. There was, moreover, a flourishing cotton industry in Alsace and a rich field of iron ore in Lorraine.

The population of the United Kingdom also grew faster than the French by reason of natural increase, despite a more massive emigration and despite the decline in the Irish birth rate. The inhabitants of England and Wales increased by some five million between 1851 and 1871. This was due to all three causes that can increase population: a higher birth rate, a lower death rate, and immigration. In these twenty years the annual birth rate rose from 33.9 per 1,000 to 35.3 per 1,000; the death rate fell from 22.7 per 1,000 to 22.4 per 1,000. Immigrants came mostly from Ireland and Scotland. But, in all, the United Kingdom sent out some 3,700,000 emigrants, mostly to America. It was an age of large families and improving public health, of apparently boundless prospects of prosperity and expansion.

The incidence of urbanization varied even more sharply from one country to another; but nearly everywhere the migration from country to town was greater than the migration overseas. In 1851 half the population of Great Britain, excluding Ireland, was urban. In England from 1861 onward although the population was growing so fast, there was an absolute decline in the rural population; yet the number engaged in agriculture remained almost constant, and larger than the number employed in any other industry. In France the towns absorbed nearly the whole of the natural increase in population. In Germany the movement into towns came mainly after 1871, but then it came fast. Whereas only one Frenchman and one German in every three lived in towns in 1871, by 1914 two Germans in every three did so, but only one Frenchman in every two. In Russia, as in eastern Europe, the vast bulk of the population remained entirely rural, though urbanism was spreading. It has been estimated that out of every seven persons added to Europe's population between 1851 and 1871, one went abroad and four or five to the cities. In these ways the whole texture and fabric of social life was changing throughout most of western and central Europe, creating novel or more acute problems of urban housing, sanitation, public order, and organization.

Urbanization usually went hand in hand with industrialism, though the two changes are by no means identical. The growth of industrialism in these decades was even more revolutionary and startling than the growth and redistribution of population. World trade more than doubled in bulk, and Europe had more than its usual share of it. The years 1852-56 were in particular years of boom. The consolidation of conservative governments in Europe, the rapid expansion of railways, the official encouragement given to industry and commerce by, most notably, the governments of Britain, France, and Piedmont, all fostered a new spirit of confidence and enterprise. Fed by the fresh capital resources of gold from California and Australia, better facilities for credit and banking, and more progressive forms of business organization, western industry and trade expanded fast. Prices rose and wages tended to follow. The building of railways proceeded apace, textile industries expanded, engineering and heavy industries grew. The Belgian, French, and British railway systems were almost complete by 1870, and had undergone consolidation and modernization. The import and export trade of both France and Britain more than trebled, France's coal production trebled, her iron production more than doubled, as did her import of raw cotton. In Britain by 1871 more than three quarters of a million people were employed in metal, engineering, and ship-building trades, and another half million in mines and quarries. For the countries of western Europe, these decades were a time of very rapid industrial and commercial growth.⁶

Throughout central and eastern Europe, with the exception of a few small areas such as Piedmont, industrial and commercial growth was much less rapid. The rest of Europe was not yet ripe, socially or politically, for this spectacular advance. Industrialism was impeded by less positive government encouragement, by the sheer competition of British and French advance, by political disunity. The various administrative and political changes effected by 1871 were paving the way for a correspondingly rapid economic development in central and eastern Europe after that date. Meanwhile commercial and financial links were strong enough to make the operations of the trade cycle affect the life of these areas. The great financial crisis which broke in 1857, and which ended the boom of the five previous years, began in the United States, spread to Britain and thence to France, northern Germany, and eventually to Russia. It was a more spectacular repetition of the crisis of 1846-47.⁷ It shook the financial structure of central Europe and probably contributed to the renewal of agitation for political unity and consolidation. Political strength and stability seemed all the more desirable amid this new economic instability. There was another severe commercial crisis in 1866 to serve as a reminder of this growing interdependence of European countries in an

⁶ See p. 231.

⁷ See p. 163.

age of railways, new credit facilities, and international trade and finance.

Despite the new importance of world trade in the economic life of all countries, the changes of the years between 1850 and 1870 are best considered separately for the three broad geographical zones of western, central, and eastern Europe. This threefold division, which has already been described as resting on broad social and political differentiations, was of special relevance in these decades.⁸ The United Kingdom and France, with the initial advantages of political unity and rich natural resources, reoriented their internal economies and their commercial interests, and evolved new patterns of internal administration and of business enterprise. Their power was in the ascendant during these years. The lands of central Europe, in particular the states of Italy and Germany, were mainly preoccupied with the attainment of political unification, although in parts they also enjoyed considerable demographic and economic growth. The lands of eastern Europe, particularly of the Habsburg Empire and of Russia, were undergoing a more elementary agrarian transformation, with the ending of serfdom, the extension of railways, and improvements in administration. As yet they knew relatively little industrialization and had taken no clear shape of national separatism.

All three regions can now be seen to have been moving in an ultimately similar direction—toward greater industrial expansion and urbanization, toward national separatism and political reorganization. But in 1870 they were still in notably distinct stages of change. Their distinctive courses of growth as well as their mutual interactions must be more closely examined. The expulsion of Russian influence from central Europe by the Crimean War and the reorientation of western interests overseas made possible the remaking of Italy and Germany. That change in turn shifted the whole balance of power in Europe; but this shift had already been prepared by the economic development of western and of central Europe before 1870. Cavour and Bismarck achieved momentous results; but they were able to do so only because the tide of economic change was in their favor and because they knew how to ride its currents.

⁸ See p. 71.

CHAPTER 13

THE REORIENTATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

Economic and Colonial Expansion

DURING the years 1850-70 the proportion of western European trade which was purely internal decreased and the proportion which was external and international vastly increased. This change is commonly described, for the United Kingdom, as her becoming "the workshop of the world"—a change which was well on the way by the time of the Great Exhibition in 1851, but which was to become of supreme importance, both for Britain and for Europe, by 1871. What had been true for the cotton industry in the first half of the century became more and more true for the heavy industries and for the ship-building and engineering industries in the third quarter of the century. Their prosperity depended on imported raw materials or on exported manufactured goods or on both. In general Britain came to rely for essential foodstuffs—especially grain—upon imports. She paid for these imports by exporting industrial products, by shipping and insurance services, and by interest upon her capital investments abroad. Britain committed herself fully to being an industrial state. In consequence she became a crucial factor in the whole economy of the world.

Her chief competitor until 1871 was her traditional rival, France. The Paris Exposition of 1855 matched the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851, and showed that French enterprise was far from backward. But the spirit of co-operation which existed earlier between the Bank of England and the Bank of France in face of a common threat of financial crisis was not absent from other fields of economic life. The Cobden Treaty of 1860, negotiated by Michel Chevalier for France and Richard Cobden for Britain, marked the climax of recognition of common interests between the two major western powers. It involved a temporary reversal of the traditional French protectionist policy, which was no less significant than

Britain's adoption of free-trade principles in 1846. It reduced French duties on coal and on most manufactured goods to rates not exceeding 30 per cent. In return Britain lowered duties on French wines and brandy. Within the next decade the value of both British exports to France and French exports to England doubled. This began a movement toward creating a large free-trade area in western Europe. As a direct result of it similar treaties reducing tariffs were made by both countries with Belgium. By further treaties with the German *Zollverein*, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and even Austria, France of the 1860's became for a while the focus of a great European movement for the freeing of international trade.

This movement indicates the wider pattern that the economic life of Europe was assuming. It operated in two great zones. One, centering on the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium as the most highly industrialized countries, was now spreading out to comprise the whole of western Europe, including parts of Germany and northern Italy, and even the eastern states of the United States. The other zone comprised the large agricultural areas of southern and eastern Europe, the agrarian regions from which came raw materials and food; it extended eastward to Russia and westward to the western and southern United States and South America. It even stretched, through British imperial connections, to Australia and India.

British Enterprise. The chief initial impetus for this extension of economic life had come from Great Britain. In the 1850's many of the railways in western Europe were built by British contractors, partly with British and partly with local capital. In the following decade western European enterprise completed the railroad networks, expanded home industries, and mechanized manufacture. Meanwhile, after the financial crisis of 1857 and the Indian Mutiny of the same year, British interests moved on to the outer zone of raw-material supplies. The great age of British railway-building in India began, financed almost entirely by British capital; and in Argentina and Brazil the first railways were built in the 1850's. With the new links of railroads and, during the 1860's, of ships—which it had become a great new industry of Britain to build—the two zones became more and more closely interconnected. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was the symbol of the demand for quicker transit between the center and the periphery of this new economic complex. Though it was built with French capital and by French enterprise, more than half the shipping that passed through it was British. Sometimes British and French co-operation took more deliberate forms, as when these countries went to war against the Chinese Empire and in 1860 exacted from it not privileged concessions or separate spheres of influence, but the opening of new ports to world trade and the reduction of tariffs to 5 per cent. It seemed natural for the powers engaged in making

the Cobden Treaty to try to extend the principles of free trade from European to world trade.

Britain, because of her world-wide colonial connections, set the pace in forging new economic links between the inner and outer zones. After the middle of the century the colonies were turned from remote outposts and bases, difficult of access, into a more closely knit mesh of economic interests. Along with greater readiness to loosen the political controls and the commercial regulations that had previously been regarded as natural bonds of empire, came a closer actual integration of the economic development of the colonies with that of Great Britain. Their economic status continued much the same, even as their political status changed. They remained primarily sources of raw materials and markets for British manufactures; this division of labor was even extended as the influx of British capital investment joined the flow of British manufactured goods. This development, in turn, changed the whole focus of British capital investment and narrowed its geographical spread. In the first half of the century capital had flowed out to the whole world but little to the colonies; in the third quarter of the century it concentrated increasingly in the colonies. In 1850 about one third of England's foreign investment was in America, the rest mainly in Europe. In 1854 the total everywhere is estimated to have amounted to about £300 million; by 1860 it totaled £650 million. By 1868 more than £75 million had been sunk in Indian railways alone; and in 1870 well over a quarter of the total of over £750 million was invested in the loans of colonial governments.

At the same time the balance of British imperial interests in general had shifted since 1830. The old colonial empire had centered mainly on the North Atlantic—in Canada and the Caribbean, and in strong commercial and financial connections with the United States. With the growth and consolidation of British power in India, Ceylon, Burma, Australasia, and the South Pacific, such ports as those of West Africa, Cape Colony, and the chains of intermediate islands formed stepping stones on the route between the North Atlantic region and the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By then, too, the West African trading posts were growing into large colonial territories, the Cape was becoming the springboard for immense expansion northward, and on the western shores of the Indian Ocean lay a corresponding chain of British possessions. In the South Pacific what had been mere footholds in Southern Australia and Northern New Zealand were fast becoming a solid continent under British control.

The old commercial assessment of the value of colonial territories was itself undergoing change. They were valued less for their own commerce and more as guarantees of a world-wide trade, keeping open the supplies and markets of the world to British manufactures; as points of strategic advantage and strength; as offering opportunities for investors,

missionaries, and emigrants; as providing national prestige in an era of intensifying nationalist rivalries. Special local commercial advantages in the colonies themselves now seemed of much less importance, and so the old Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660, which had excluded foreign ships from the carrying trade between Britain and her colonies, were repealed in 1849. Greater freedom of trade and shipping was encouraged, and the establishment of responsible self-government on the lines that Lord Durham had adumbrated for Canada was encouraged elsewhere. The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 gave a general assurance of internal self-government to all the colonial legislatures; new constitutions for New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania were set up in 1855; and in 1867 the British North America Act opened the door for the federation of all the Canadian provinces except Newfoundland.

The growth of Europe's whole population, combined with the relatively slight improvements in agricultural production, meant that Europe as a whole, and particularly western Europe, was becoming dependent for its corn on sources extending beyond the granaries of eastern Europe. In normal years France could feed herself. The German states, in aggregate, had a surplus of corn for export, as had eastern Europe, including Russia. As of old the surpluses of the whole Vistula basin still went down-river to Danzig in the Baltic; from there much was imported to western Europe, particularly Holland, which had for long had to import grain. Some Russian wheat came from the Black Sea and found its way on to the European market. But after the middle of the century more and more corn came from the American continent and from Russia. Here were the boundless new supplies needed to feed Europe's enlarged population.

France and the Low Countries. France, like Britain, got most of her raw cotton from the United States, and cotton imports made the fortune of Le Havre as a port. During the Second Empire, France's exports tended to exceed her imports, and she was sending capital abroad heavily. But this was for the first time, and most of it went into railways, canals, mines, and government bonds. Internally, there was great concentration in the control of certain industries, most notably in iron. The famous Comité des Forges was founded in 1864, and its interests were extended into Belgium and Germany. Great families like the Péreires and the Foulds controlled large sectors of national industry and business. French colonial possessions were increasing too, though less spectacularly than Britain's. Algeria had been completely taken over by 1857. Though its products were too similar to France's own for it to serve the same purposes as were served by Britain's colonies, it became a good market for French cotton goods. Tahiti and the Ivory Coast had been added, even before 1850, and the Second Empire sent expeditions to Peking in 1859-60 and to Syria in 1861, explorers to West Africa, and new settlements to Dahomey and the Guinea coast. New Caledonia was oc-

cupied in 1853, and after the capture of Saigon in Indochina in 1859 three provinces in Cochin-China were annexed and a protectorate was established over Cambodia. In these ways France, like Britain, became indisputably a world colonial power, with national interests straddling both the inner and outer zones of the world economy. She differed from Britain in that her colonies were not used primarily for settlement, being mainly (apart from Algeria) tropical or semitropical in character; and her industrial development, no less than her geographical position, anchored her firmly in Europe.

Until the 1860's Belgium was the only European country to keep pace with Britain in industrial growth. In her resources of coal, iron, and zinc she was particularly fortunate, and she enjoyed, as did Britain, the advantage of the early establishment of iron and engineering industries. By 1870 she, too, had adopted a policy of free trade as regards the import of food and raw materials. By that date her own mineral resources of iron and zinc were becoming exhausted, but she remained a manufacturing and exporting country because she had the technicians and skilled workers, the industrial plant, enterprising management and business organization, and good communications. She exported heavy equipment such as machines, locomotives, and rails, as well as lighter goods such as glass and textiles. In the 1860's she was exporting capital for the construction of railways in Spain, Italy, the Balkans, and even South America. On balance she was, like Britain, a heavy importer of food, particularly wheat and cattle feed. After her separation from the Netherlands, Belgium lacked colonies until she acquired the rich territory of the Congo in the last quarter of the century.

The Netherlands, however, kept its profitable connections with the Dutch East Indies and ranked as one of the chief colonial powers. The Dutch spread their rule over the three thousand miles of the archipelago of the East Indies, and exploited it by a form of forced labor whereby farmers had to deliver fixed amounts of certain crops as a kind of tax. A freer system was introduced only after 1870, though no moves were made in the direction of greater colonial self-government. Although much less industrialized than Belgium, the Netherlands was strong in particular industries, including its traditional trade of ship-building. Commercially, it was an *entrepôt* for such colonial products as coffee, tea, sugar, and the traditional spices.

Despite important differences of emphasis between them, the western states of the United Kingdom, France, and the Low Countries were all sharing in a broadly similar process of economic change. Together they formed the most intensively industrialized core of the European economy. They were exerting a strong influence upon the growth of central and eastern Europe. But as the chief maritime powers they were looking increasingly outward to the oceans of the world across which

sailed their shipping and their emigrants, their raw materials and food-stuffs, their manufactured products and capital investments. They stood balanced between an economic and political pull inward to continental Europe, and a commercial and imperial pull outward to the other continents of the world. Their interests were being reoriented. Trade among the European states remained both large and important. Although French coal production trebled between 1850 and 1870, much of her coking coal for iron smelting came from Britain and from Westphalia in Germany. This was paid for by exporting French silks and wines to Britain and Belgium. For Britain the export of coal became important only after 1850. The 5 million tons she exported in 1855 were only 2½ per cent of her total exports, and went mostly to France, Germany, Russia, Denmark, and Italy. Of her very much larger exports of cotton goods at that time, one quarter went to Asia, mostly to India. Another very good customer was the United States, which supplied her with most of the raw cotton she needed. But by 1860 the destinations of British cotton goods had shifted. Asiatic and African customers were taking as much as one half of them, and they were to take still more in the course of time. For France and the Low Countries, too, overseas trade was becoming a more and more important sector of their commerce.

Iberia and Scandinavia. The southwestern states of Spain and Portugal, and the northwestern states of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, shared somewhat less directly and drastically in this burst of industrialization and overseas expansion. Whereas the Scandinavian states had no colonial connections but were expanding their industries, the Iberian states made little industrial progress but had colonies of some importance. Spain held the Canaries, and Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean. Portugal held the scattered Atlantic islands of the Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde; since 1848 she had occupied the area of Angola on the West African coast, and in 1857 she settled a European colony at Mozambique on the East African coast; in India she still held Goa. But both Spain and Portugal, despite the richness of their mineral deposits of iron, lead, copper, and other metals, developed these industries very slowly. They were handicapped by a shortage of good coal, scarcity of capital, and lack of technical skill and equipment. Both were predominantly agricultural and remained backward in techniques. There were large peasant risings in Castile, Aragon, and Andalusia in 1840, 1855, 1857, 1861, and 1865, caused by the breakup of common lands and extreme rural poverty. Sweden and Norway, in sharp contrast, underwent an industrial revolution between 1840 and 1860, under the benign rule of Oscar I, and foreign trade grew almost in proportion. A policy of free trade was adopted in 1857. Norway shared in this prosperity, and her trading interests were more widespread and even more important than those of Sweden. Denmark—the Denmark of Hans Christian

Andersen—stood economically as well as geographically midway between central Europe and northwestern Europe.

The homogeneity of western Europe as a whole derived not only from this common pattern of economic change and maritime expansion, but also, to an increasing extent, from a common direction of political tendencies. Liberal and democratic ideas were fermenting more vigorously because they were less impeded by irredentist nationalism than in central or eastern Europe. Save for Norwegian desire for independence from Sweden, which was blunted by the new prosperity, and the thorny issues of Schleswig and Holstein, which bedeviled Danish-German relations and impeded Danish economic development, western Europe already enjoyed political unification and national independence. On this basis there was growing up a new machinery of government, a closer interrelation between state and society established by new methods of administration and of social organization.

The New Machinery of Government

POETS make bad politicians. That seemed to be one of the general lessons of 1848. The spread of parliamentary institutions throughout most of western Europe brought into prominence the professional politician—the more prosaic but usually astute parliamentarian who mastered the arts of public persuasion, parliamentary debate, ministerial combination, and active opposition. Civilian rather than military, middle-class rather than aristocratic, gaining his ends more by manipulation and management than by force, and more by dint of personal talents than of high birth or great wealth, this relatively new type of political leader predominated in western countries during the second half of the century. In these new circumstances the men who came to power were men like Benjamin Disraeli and William Ewart Gladstone in Great Britain, Eugène Rouher and Émile Ollivier in France, Charles Rogier in Belgium and Johan Rudolf Thorbecke in the Netherlands, Baron Louis de Geer in Sweden. Financial acumen was becoming as important as political sense or parliamentary skill for governing the new industrial societies of western Europe. Between 1852 and 1868 Disraeli and Gladstone alternated as chancellor of the exchequer before they began to alternate as prime minister. A wealthy middle-class electorate interested in liberal, financial, and administrative reforms supported such men in power. It was under their guidance that the economic and colonial expansion already described took place.

Political Reforms. The economic and social changes, combined with the new personnel and the new spirit of politics, made for important developments in the machinery of government and administration.

There grew up an uneasy feeling that parliamentary institutions, as they had developed by 1850, were inadequate for the needs of the changing societies of western Europe. In Britain these were decades of widespread popular agitation for improvements in the parliamentary system, which the failure of Chartism had left unrealized. Men like John Bright campaigned for the secret ballot, liberal-minded Whigs like Lord John Russell introduced into parliament bills for further reform of the franchise and further redistribution of seats, and in 1859 the Conservative Disraeli proposed a complicated bill for parliamentary reform which crashed Lord Derby's government. But it was 1867 before a real reform of parliament and electorate was achieved by Disraeli.

His Representation of the People Act nearly doubled the electorate of England and Wales, mainly by giving the vote to all householders of one year's residence in boroughs and all farmers in the counties paying an annual rent for their farms of £12 or more. In effect it admitted to electoral power the whole of the lower middle class and the more well-to-do artisans of the towns. It also redistributed forty-five seats in the House of Commons, transferring them from the smaller boroughs to the counties and to the larger industrial towns. This adjusted the balance between small boroughs and counties, but even so the small boroughs were still overrepresented in the House of Commons. For the first time in English history the boroughs contained more voters than the counties: they had always had more representatives. This brought the electorate more into line with the consequences of social and economic change, and with the shifts of population described above.¹ In 1868 it was followed by comparable reforms in Scotland and Ireland.

Although this important measure of parliamentary reform was so long delayed—chiefly because Lord Palmerston, who died in 1865, had thrown all the weight of his authority and influence against it—the decades between 1848 and 1868 were years of incessant agitation for other reforms of all kinds. Reformers had learned well the lessons of Daniel O'Connell's Catholic Association and Richard Cobden's Anti-Corn Law League. Their instinctive and regular recourse was to form popular associations for propaganda, petition, and agitation. The Financial Reform Association of Liverpool kept alive the doctrines of Manchester liberalism by pressing for freer trade; the Administrative Reform Association and the more radical State Reform Association, both of 1855, demanded an overhaul of the civil service; the radical National Education League and the church National Education Union, divided on issues of secular education, pressed for the expansion and improvement of public education. Radicals had the satisfaction of seeing the methods of popular agitation and persuasion, which they had perfected, adopted by movements of all political shades which wanted some change in existing arrange-

¹ See p. 227.

ments. Every Englishman developed a conscience about something, no cause lacked its enthusiasts, and expectations of change by means of parliamentary enactment were boundless.

This striking development, a warning against hasty generalizations about the "complacency" of mid-Victorian England, produced a peculiar constitutional situation. The organization of political parties was still far from strong. The Reform Act of 1832 had encouraged more elaborate and systematic party organization both in the constituencies and at the center, but until after the Reform Act of 1867 really large-scale party organization was hardly needed. The old habits of corruption and influence continued little checked by the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854, and electorates remained small enough to be manageable by relatively simple and rudimentary machinery. There was growing up a whole galaxy of "pressure groups," in the form of popular movements demanding specific reforms, before the political parties were in a condition to transmit these demands into legislation or policy. The result was a growing sense of frustration which reached its climax in 1867, and which helped to make Disraeli's measure much more radical in character than he had intended or than his Conservative colleagues in power expected. Although enthusiastic movements in the country proved so little able to move governments to action before 1867, it was significant that they all focused upon parliament. Once again, as in 1829 and 1839 and 1848, the British constitution with all its defects proved flexible enough and stable enough to attract a general loyalty and to confine the forces of change to peaceful and constitutional procedures. Never was there a threat of revolution, never was the survival of the parliamentary regime itself challenged.

The monarchy, indeed, went through a period of considerable unpopularity in the 1860's, and shared in the general mood of discontent with the existing constitutional system. Queen Victoria's large family was becoming increasingly costly to maintain, and after the death of the Prince Consort in 1861 she withdrew into seclusion for so long that many began to ask whether a monarchy that offered so few colorful occasions in public life was worth so great a cost. A lively republican movement grew up, led by Sir Charles Dilke and Charles Bradlaugh, and much influenced by the course of events in France. But it was abruptly killed in 1871-72, by the astonishing wave of popular sympathy with the Queen when the Prince of Wales nearly died on the tenth anniversary of his father's death, and when an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate her. From these events dates the modern British monarchy, cultivating a dignified yet popular esteem by frequent contacts between the monarchy and the people.

New Organizations. The patience of reformers was rewarded as soon as the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1868 opened the door for more direct electoral pressure on political parties. With the electorate doubled, par-

ties had to organize much more thoroughly. In 1867 the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations was created, composed of two delegates from each local association. It was pre-eminently a machine for helping to win elections. Ten years later the Liberal party set up its counterpart, the National Federation of Liberal Associations, with Joseph Chamberlain of Birmingham as its president. The two great political parties, which were to alternate in power for the rest of the century, were fast becoming great election-fighting machines, outbidding one another in appealing for the support of the larger and more democratic electorate. The link that had hitherto been missing, between the pressures of public opinion and the systematic operation of these pressures within parliament on the government of the day, was now forged; and the British parliamentary system entered on its modern phase of development.

Meanwhile Gladstone's first administration of 1868-74 made itself a landmark in nineteenth-century English liberalism because it put into effect so many of the reforms which popular associations of the previous two decades had urged in vain. In 1872 it established secrecy of the ballot for all parliamentary and local elections; after 1870 it abolished patronage in the civil service and enforced recruitment by competitive examination; it carried out similar reforms in the army and greatly improved the conditions of military service; it reorganized the judicial system by the Judicature Act of 1873, remodeling both the legal system and the courts themselves. By these reforms it equipped the state to perform more efficiently the increasing burden of work which the needs and demands of a more democratic electorate would soon impose upon it. By the financial reforms in his budgets between 1853 and 1860 Gladstone had already completed the reorganization of the fiscal system begun by Peel. The auditing of public accounts was modernized by an act of 1866.

The forms and techniques of private business organization were likewise changing. The widespread use of the limited liability company, making possible larger concentrations of joint-stock capital for investment and changing the relations between ownership and management, became possible only after the company legislation of 1855 and 1862, matched in France by laws of 1863 and 1867, and in Germany by the commercial code of 1861. From the 1860's onward joint-stock companies became more and more the normal form of business organization in western Europe, and were regarded as "democratizing" capital just as a wider franchise was democratizing government. Accountancy became a profession, with the incorporation of societies of accountants and the elaboration of more ingenious and scientific methods of financial accounting.

Labor organization kept in step with the growth of larger units in

industry and business. In 1871 British trade unions were given legal protection for their funds and for their methods of collective bargaining, and were protected against the charge of being conspiracies at common law. The first meeting, in Manchester in 1868, of a limited Trades Union Congress, representing some 118,000 trade unionists, marked a new stage in the national organization of British labor. By 1871 it may be said that by diverse forms of new organization, whether of political parties, of the financial, administrative, and judicial machinery of the state, or of capital and labor, Britain had equipped herself for grappling more efficiently with the problems of a modern industrial and democratic state.

Napoleon III. France offers certain striking parallels in these years, despite the superficially very different course of her political development. When Louis Napoleon, in December, 1852, made himself emperor of France by a *coup d'état*, he reverted to a system of government closely modeled on that of his famous uncle. His rule was a usurpation of power, for a year earlier he had violently overthrown the republican parliamentary regime which, as its elected president, he had sworn to preserve. He tried to mask and to legitimize this usurpation by three devices: by preserving the shadow of parliamentary government in the form of packed assemblies based on managed elections; by popular plebiscites; and by giving France, in his policy, what he thought would be most popular and most beneficial to the nation. His rule became a strange mixture of authoritarian government with increasing concession to parliamentary power and popular demands. Yet the final result was a development of France's parliamentary institutions which made the Third Republic of 1875 possible. This paradox of French politics in these decades springs initially from the enigmatic character of Napoleon III himself.

This strange man, to whom in 1848 five and a half million Frenchmen had been persuaded to entrust the presidency of the democratic Second Republic,² had already had a colorful and varied career. Son of Napoleon's brother, Louis Bonaparte, king of Holland, he had assumed headship of the Bonapartist family and cause in 1832 when Napoleon's own son (called by courtesy Napoleon II) had died. In 1836 and again in 1840, with a handful of personal followers, he had tried to overthrow Louis Philippe by local risings that failed ridiculously. Imprisoned in 1840 he had escaped in 1846 by simply walking out of the fortress of Ham disguised as a stonemason. In the early months of 1848 the man, who in the 1830's had belonged to the *Carbonari* secret societies and who never lost his taste for cloak-and-dagger intrigues, could have been seen parading Piccadilly in the role of a special constable, defending the government of Queen Victoria against the dangers of Chartism. Always a dreamer and intriguer rather than a practical statesman, he combined a

² See p. 192.

nostalgic faith in the destinies of his family with a genuine concern for the welfare of the poor and of the French people as a whole. From the moment when he was elected president of the Second Republic of 1848 by so overwhelming a majority, it seems certain that he intended to revive the regime, and if possible the glories, of the empire of Napoleon I. Nor was he without considerable abilities and qualities worthy of admiration. He had quickness of mind and imagination, ready sympathies for all in distress, great moral and physical courage. But he lacked a grasp of realities, and his ambitions and sympathies clouded his judgment both of men and of events. He had not the infinity of energy and patience needed to master details and clarify his purposes. His poor physical health increasingly impaired his power of decision, and from middle age onward (he was already forty-four when he became emperor) he suffered from disease and bad health. He had undoubted talents, but he certainly lacked the genius of Napoleon I.

The new constitution which he inaugurated in 1852 rested on principles which, in a preamble, he carefully expounded to the country. He himself, as chief of state, assumed almost monarchical powers: the power to make war and treaties, to choose ministers and nominate to all important offices in the state, to initiate legislation, and to frame the regulations in which the laws were embodied. The Legislative Body, of not more than 260 members elected by universal male suffrage, sat for only three months a year and had little real power. A senate of life members, chosen ex officio or nominated by the chief of state, had the duty of examining legislation to make sure it did not conflict with the constitution. Ministers were responsible only to Napoleon, and there was no collective cabinet responsibility. In short, as he explained, "Since France has only maintained itself in the last fifty years by means of the administrative, military, judicial, religious, and financial organization provided by the Consulate and the Empire, why should we not adopt the political institutions of that period?" Accordingly, he revived the Council of State, the very core of Napoleonic autocracy, "an assembly of practical men working out projects of law in their special committees, discussing this legislation behind closed doors, without oratorical display." In such a system, it was clear from the first, parliamentary power was reduced to a minimum, and France was ruled by a centralized despotism tempered only by opportunism and necessity.

Yet within the next eighteen years, because universal suffrage and parliamentary institutions did survive if only in attenuated form, because the ideals and habits of democratic government had become so deeply rooted in France, and because Napoleon found that a series of reverses in foreign policy corroded his personal popularity and prestige and forced him to seek fresh support from parliament, France recovered bit by bit a more genuine system of parliamentary government. Universal

male suffrage, instituted in 1848, he never dared to infringe though he manipulated elections. In 1860 he had to make important concessions to parliament. The Legislative Body was allowed to debate its reply to the speech from the throne, which expounded government policy: a restoration of the right that had been used with great effect by the parliamentary opposition between 1815 and 1848. Ministers began to defend government measures before the Legislative Body and became more accountable to it. The press, despite continued control and censorship, was allowed to publish fuller reports of parliamentary debates. From 1866 until 1869 further concessions had to be made to the growing clamor of the republican opposition. Control of the press and of public meetings was relaxed. Ministers could be questioned more closely and opposed more openly in parliament. Despite the resources of electoral management in the hands of the prefects and the powers of police supervision at the disposal of the government, a vigorous and eventually successful republican opposition grew up, led by men of the caliber of Adolphe Thiers, Léon Gambetta, and Jules Ferry. The so-called "Liberal Empire" which came into existence after 1860 was at least as real a parliamentary regime as was the constitutional monarchy before 1848.

The decline of autocracy in France can be measured by election results. In the elections of 1857 only seven candidates hostile to the government of Napoleon were returned; in those of 1863 thirty-five were returned; and in those of 1869 ninety-three. The big cities of Paris and Marseilles, Lyons and Bordeaux, especially opposed the Empire. This impressive development was due above all to the growing strength and effectiveness of the republican press. Under stringent press controls set up in 1852, the political press had been almost stifled. But, as under Charles X, there was an immediate increase in the number and the circulation of literary, philosophical, and apparently innocuous publications in which critics could make their political arguments obliquely but, to the initiated, very effectively. The amnesty granted to political prisoners and exiles in 1859 brought a rebirth of republican activity, especially in journalism. The strongest surviving moderate republican paper, *Le Siècle*, by 1866 reached the large circulation of 44,000. In 1868, when press controls were relaxed, 140 new journals appeared in Paris within a year. *Le Rappel* contained the biting attacks of the literary giant Victor Hugo; and the mordant wit of the journalist Henri Rochefort won for *La Lanterne* a circulation of no less than 120,000. "The Empire," ran its famous opening sentence, "contains thirty-six million subjects, not counting the subjects of discontent."

The Empire, discredited by its succession of reverses abroad³ and in the failing grip of its sick emperor, could not have long survived such opposition even without the military defeat of 1870 to serve as its Water-

³ See p. 287.

loo. Ranged against it, too, were legitimist royalists like Antoine Berryer who wanted to go back behind 1830, moderate constitutional liberals like Thiers who wanted to go back behind 1848, the growing forces of socialism and of revolutionary communism represented by Blanqui and the supporters of the recently formed First International. But the toughest opposition came from two main groups, the liberals led by Thiers and the republicans led by Gambetta.

Before 1863 the parliamentary opposition was still no more than the five republican deputies for Paris and two others elected at Lyons and Bordeaux. But a liberal and republican opposition in the country was forming fast. It attracted brilliant lawyers like the "three Jules" (Jules Favre, Jules Simon, and Jules Ferry); and government prosecutions of journalists and agitators gave excellent opportunities for republican lawyers, as counsel for the defense, to expound republican principles within the immunity of courtrooms. The young Gambetta first revealed his formidable forensic and oratorical talents in helping to defend a group of republican journalists in a famous press trial of 1868. The opposition attracted eminent literary men like Victor Hugo, whose work *Punishment* (*Les Châtiments*), written in exile, constituted a devastating attack on the Second Empire. When, in the elections of 1863 the Liberal Union (Union libérale) won 2 million votes and 35 seats, half of the 35 were republican. In 1864 Adolphe Thiers made his famous demand for the "five fundamental freedoms," which he defined as "security of the citizen against personal violence and arbitrary power; liberty but not impunity of the press, that is to say liberty to exchange those ideas from which public opinion is born; freedom of elections; freedom of national representation; public opinion, stated by the majority, directing the conduct of government." This remained the essence of left-center liberal programs for many years to come.

By 1868-69 the activities of the opposition became more open and militant. In the Paris *salon* of Juliette Adam, the banker's wife, republican leaders could discuss politics freely over dinner parties, and Gambetta found a new milieu of influence. By 1869 when he stood for the working-class Paris district of Belleville, he was able to expound what came to be known as the "Belleville Manifesto," a program of radical republican reforms. It was the outcome of the years of courageous republican opposition, and its essentials had already in 1868 been set out in Jules Simon's *Politique radicale*. It went much further than Thiers's "five fundamental freedoms," and included universal male suffrage, for local as well as parliamentary elections; separation of church and state; free, compulsory, and secular primary education for all; the suppression of a standing army; and the election of all public functionaries. As yet this radicalism represented only the advanced ideas of the working classes and lower middle classes of the big towns, and Gambetta was triumphantly elected

not only in Belleville but also in Marseilles. It was well in advance of what even most republicans wanted. But it foreshadowed the program of basic democratic reforms on which the great Radical party of the Third Republic was to build. In the new republic soon to be created Gambetta became the key man in the Republican Union, prototype of more modern party organization in France. The paradoxical achievement of the Liberal Empire was to accustom France to the existence and the consequences of an energetic constitutional opposition party, and to nurture a new movement of secular radicalism.

Bonapartist Benefits. The Second Empire achieved much else, more deliberately, in the sphere of social and administrative reorganization. Its most impressive achievement in the eyes of foreign visitors was undoubtedly the transformation of Paris. By a decree of 1860 the area of Paris was extended to include all the outskirts and villages between the customs barriers and the fortifications; this increased its administrative area from twelve to twenty administrative units. Whereas in 1851 Paris had just over one million inhabitants, in 1870 it had more than 1,800,000. The rapid growth of industry combined with the replanning of the city by Baron Haussmann, under the strongest encouragement of Napoleon III himself, changed the whole character of the capital. It changed it socially, for the pulling down of houses in the old labyrinths of the center to make way for Haussmann's broad new boulevards, squares, and parks forced many workers to the outskirts, where new factories grew up to utilize their labor; omnibus and local railway services made a larger city possible. It changed Paris administratively, for a much more highly organized system of local government and police had to be devised to rule so large a city. The broad straight boulevards had political significance, for they made the raising of barricades in working-class districts less practicable, and the charges of cavalry, police, and troops more effective. It changed Paris architecturally, for the Emperor's program of spectacular public works included the building of the new Opera house and extensions to the Louvre, new squares and churches; the encouragement of big new stores like the Bon Marché, the Printemps, and the Samaritaine, and of joint-stock banks like the Société Générale and the Crédit Lyonnais.

With the new network of railways and steamship services Paris became more than ever the economic, social, and cultural center of France. Napoleon did all in his power to make it also the capital of Europe. Great exhibitions or world fairs were held in 1855 and 1867, and it was regarded as a diplomatic triumph to have the conference of powers which ended the Crimean War held in Paris. International showmanship, both commercial and political, was a constant feature of the Second Empire. It was an era of organization and depended on capital accumulation and investment, which Napoleon encouraged. Much of the real estate

development on the outskirts, which led to the present-day distinction between the central business and middle-class area and the outer "red belt" of working-class and industrial areas, was made possible by bankers like the Péreire brothers, Émile and Isaac, or the Paulin Talabot family. Inspired by the ideas of Saint-Simon, these new financial organizers hoped for a transformation of society through industrial progress and improved methods of social and economic organization. Down their bright new boulevards the inhabitants of the scientific, gas-lit Empire danced their way to the tinkling tunes of Offenbach—their way to the national disaster of Sedan and to the horrors of the Paris Commune of 1871.

It was a time when the more modern pattern of industrial society was taking shape. The year 1864, which saw the foundation of the industrial combine of the Comité des Forges, saw also the repeal of the clause in the French Penal Code which made concerted industrial action a crime. Trade unions, which since 1791 had labored under the stigma of illegality, were now tolerated, and prosecutions slackened. Just as industrial workers found their own separate dwelling places in the expanding outskirts of Paris, so they found their own separate economic and political organizations in the trade unions. In 1864, too, the First International was formed. Before this Napoleon III had permitted and even encouraged mutual insurance groups—had he not, in 1844, written a pamphlet on the conquest of poverty? In 1862 he sent a delegation of workers, at public expense, to see the British Exhibition. They returned impressed with the new opportunities of collective bargaining which the British trade unions were discovering. After the legalization of labor unions in 1864 two main types evolved: the local association or trades council (*chambre syndicale*) and the more militant unit for collective bargaining (*société de résistance*). Even so, labor organization did not become large in scale until near the end of the century, and it was 1884 before it won full legal rights. Meanwhile Napoleon, by a decree of 1853, implemented an idea which he had put forward in his pamphlet *The Ending of Poverty* (*L'extinction du paupérisme*). It revived and extended the Napoleonic idea of conciliation boards (*Conseils de prud'hommes*), composed half of representatives of employers, half of representatives of workers, with their chairmen, vice-chairmen, and secretaries nominated by the government. Designed to settle labor disputes and so prevent strikes, they were intended by Napoleon as an agency of public order and discipline. They were often means of improving working conditions and wages, and could sometimes become a focus for labor organization and agitation.

In general, the French people gained from having a paternalist government during these years of rapid industrial growth. They escaped something of the hardships caused in Britain by a more rapid industrial

growth in a period when doctrines of minimum state interference held the field. Napoleon himself has been called "Saint-Simon on horseback," and there is no reason to doubt either the sincerity of his desire to improve material conditions or the reality of the benefits his rule conferred. Politically, his policy vacillated as he sought to appease now the Catholics, now the liberals, now the socialists, and always the demands of the populace as a whole. "To-day," he had written before coming to power, "the rule of classes is over, and you can govern only with the masses." His efforts to govern with the masses led to a series of disasters in foreign policy, for he believed (not entirely without justification) that the masses wanted glory and were intensely nationalistic. But these failures should not obscure the more positive material gains that France derived from his rule. "Half-pint Napoleon" (*Napoléon le petit*) Victor Hugo had scornfully dubbed him. The Second Empire, judged in terms of military glory or original achievement, was indeed only a pale shadow of the First. But it has considerable importance for the material development of France and for the shaping of modern Europe.⁴

Belgian Liberalism. Throughout most of these years Belgium was governed by the liberal party of Charles Rogier and H. J. W. Frère-Orban, with the Catholic party in opposition. After a three-year Catholic government between 1854 and 1857, Rogier assumed power and kept it until 1870. It was 1879 before the Socialist party was formed. As in other countries the Liberals tended to fall into two wings: the more doctrinaire liberals demanding constitutional freedoms and believing in an economic policy of *laissez faire*, and the more radical liberals concerned with extension of the franchise and improvement of social conditions. As in France, this division became especially important from 1863 onward; and, as in France, trade-union organization was prohibited under the penal code. Only in 1867 did it become legal to organize workers, though labor organizations remained severely hampered in all their activities except as friendly societies and mutual-aid associations. Belgian workers were, in effect, kept disarmed and disorganized before increasingly powerful employers' organizations until 1921. Only then were labor unions granted full legal protection and rights.

Belgian politics of these years were dominated by two other major issues: the struggles between clericals and anticlericals, especially for control over the developing system of national education; and the growth of the strongly nationalistic Flemish movement, hostile to the domination of French institutions and culture. The problem of relations between church and state was the chief bone of contention between the Liberal and Catholic parties, and Rogier's ministry of 1857 had as its central aim "the protection of liberty against the attacks of the Church." By a series of laws it diminished the power of the clergy in primary and

⁴ See p. 274.

secondary schools, while tolerating the existence of church schools and seminaries. The Flemish movement, which began under Dutch rule before 1830 but became particularly vigorous after 1850, demanded the use of the Flemish language in the schools and colleges of Flanders and in the university of Ghent, in the courts whenever a Flemish defendant requested it, and in separate Flemish-speaking regiments of the army. The movement, though cultural and linguistic in origins, seemed to the Liberals to threaten the territorial unity and cohesion of the state as much as the power of the Roman Catholic Church. Its claims were therefore resisted until after 1870.

The Parliamentary Pattern. In the development of parliamentary government in Britain, France, and Belgium between 1850 and 1870 a certain common pattern can be discerned, underlying the more obvious differences. In all three the institutions of parliamentary government were undoubtedly more deeply rooted, more resilient, and more fully developed by 1870 than they had been in 1850, or than they were elsewhere in 1870. Elected assemblies asserted their power to control ministers responsible for executive government and administration; political parties evolved more efficient and thorough organizations both in the constituencies and within the parliamentary assemblies; the proper functioning of parliamentary oppositions was better understood; the conducting of elections was freer from abuses of corruption, influence, and intimidation. The rights of public association, public meeting, freedom of the press and of speech, were asserted and given stronger protection. Economic expansion was producing not only new types of industrial and commercial organization, but also new forms of labor organization, which claimed and won legal recognition by the state. Powerful groups other than the state—whether churches, capitalist corporations, trade unions, or cultural movements—were claiming rights even against the state, and certainly through legal recognition by the state.

But in all three countries national cohesion and unity remained strong, looking to a strong central political power for improvements in social life and for protection or support against foreign interference. Nothing cemented Belgian national unity more firmly, and nothing caused more acute friction between the three countries in these years, than the recurrent fear that Napoleon III nursed designs against Belgian independence. In 1852 he exerted pressure on the Belgian government to restrain the virulent press campaign of the French refugees who had fled to Belgium after the *coup d'état* of 1851. His proposals for a customs union were resisted as a device for subordinating Belgian economy to French. His schemes for gaining "compensation" for Prussian gains at the expense of Belgium and Luxembourg were a direct threat to her territorial and political independence. On each occasion British support for Belgium was decisive in restraining Napoleon's ambitions.

In 1870 Britain obtained the signatures of both France and Prussia, then engaged in the Franco-Prussian War, to a treaty that renewed their engagements of 1839 guaranteeing Belgian neutrality and independence.⁵

The northern European states shared, to a large extent, in this common pattern of evolving parliamentary constitutional government. The Netherlands adhered to a parliamentary system after 1849. Its strong Liberal party, led and largely created by Thorbecke, alternated in office throughout these years with the rival Conservative party. Thorbecke's reforms characteristically included an overhaul of the electoral laws and the administration, a simplification of the fiscal and commercial regulations, and the conversion of Haarlem lake into good pasture land. Beset by quarrels between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the governments of the time also had to grapple with problems of ecclesiastical control over education and of religious instruction in schools. In 1866 Sweden instituted a bicameral parliamentary system. Universal suffrage without property restrictions did not come, however, for another fifty years, as a result of reforms between 1906 and 1920. In southwestern Europe less solidly based constitutional systems fared less well, and these were years of acute instability. In part the alternations of reaction and revolution in Spain and Portugal were due to the instability of the monarchies themselves. Queen Isabella of Spain was eventually deposed in 1868, after successive experiences of her wayward and irresponsible character; and in Portugal a series of royal deaths involved short reigns. But instability came mainly from the backward social development of these countries, which meant that no strong Liberal parties could take shape. They lacked not only traditions of constitutional government and the habits engendered by them, but also the economic and social foundations on which the parliamentary parties of other western countries were developing. The Iberian peninsula proved unripe for the consolidation of a form of government which was, for the most part, a foreign importation with only shallow roots.

The inferences suggested by the changes in political and social organization in western Europe during these decades are that liberal constitutionalism and parliamentary institutions matched closely the needs of an expanding industrial, urban, commercial society. The countries most advanced in industrialization and urbanization—Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands—provided the most suitable soil for the flourishing of parliamentary government. Constitutional government in all its diverse forms calls for certain minimum conditions if it is to survive and thrive: a certain abatement of violence, a willingness to tolerate disagreement even about profoundly important matters, a readiness to come to working terms with rivals and opponents. These qualities of mind and outlook are fostered by a commercial society, and are inherent in the

⁵ See p. 149.

habits of business men and manufacturers. Where they had not been widely accepted as desirable qualities and were not commonly found, as in Spain or Portugal of these years, the indispensable conditions for parliamentary government did not exist. These qualities were encouraged in western Europe not only by industrialism and trade, but also by the ever-growing respect won for science and technology. The "scientific spirit" had traditionally fought against bigotry and fanaticism, intolerance and repression. A society coming to be more and more dedicated to a belief in scientific truth was also a society anxious to end religious strife and political instability by devising a more peaceful, efficient, and non-violent machinery of government. The subsequent history of Europe owes much to the triumphs of science, both as a system of knowledge, a way of thought, and a source of applied technology; and these were years of such triumphs.

The Growth of Science and Technology

BY 1850 the explorations of scientists had reached a point where truths discovered in different fields of research began to fit together. Knowledge that had so far appeared fragmentary and disjointed began to reveal interconnections and so to assume a quite new significance. The most momentous "discoveries" of pure science have, indeed, been a sudden revelation of hitherto unappreciated relationships: a perception of coherence and a glimpse of new synthesis. Newton related movement to mass and discerned, behind the complex working of the universe, general principles governing the motion of all material bodies; Lavoisier detected an elemental chemical pattern within the structure of nature; Lamarck used the vast accumulation of botanical and zoological information to support the hypothesis that throughout a very long period of time a slow process of evolution had changed one form of creature into another in an ascending series, so that all living organisms have some evolutionary interconnection. These discoveries of general "laws" hidden behind a hitherto puzzling diversity of observed facts, even though these laws may later be considerably modified and revised, are what constitute the great landmarks in the history of science. The momentous insight may be prepared by the labors of countless others, often obscure; and without the compilation of data which is reliable because it is experimentally verifiable, such insights would be unlikely to occur. But the insight itself, once propounded and found acceptable to a consensus of expert opinion, assumes an importance that stretches far beyond the confines of the particular field of study in which it originated. It begins to influence all thought, to challenge religious belief,

and pose fresh philosophical problems. It constitutes a "revolution" in thought because it affects the whole of human life.

The century between 1750 and 1850 had been one of intensive researches into every field of scientific exploration: mathematical, chemical, physical, biological, and technological. France had taken a pre-eminent place in this work. Her great mathematicians, physicists, chemists, and biologists had contributed more than those of any other country to extending the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Their characteristic faith was expressed by the great chemist Antoine Lavoisier in 1793, when he submitted a memorandum on national education to the Convention. All branches of science and technology, he argued, are linked together, all scientists serve a common cause and have a common interest. They are an army that must advance on an even front and move in co-ordinated fashion. All forms of knowledge are threads on one great tapestry, and we are assured of one ultimate pattern and design because there is a unity behind all knowledge.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the tapestry seemed to be nearing completion, although now, a century later, we know that its completion is still very far off. By 1850 the rapid progress of knowledge fostered a mood of boundless optimism, an ebullient hope, which may have closer connections with the roots of the romantic movement of these years than historians have yet discovered. Stimulated by this optimistic mood, scientists became bolder—even rasher—in venturing upon generalizations and in suggesting relationships between hitherto isolated facts. The Newtonian theory of motion and weight in physics and Lavoisier's theory of elements in chemistry were brought together by the study of atomic weights, thermodynamics, and the kinetic theory of gases. An international convention of chemists at Karlsruhe in 1860 standardized the system of atomic weights which, by 1871, became systematized into the periodic table by Dimitri Mendeléyev. This whole development made possible a clearer understanding of molecular structure and changed the whole concept of matter. At the same time, with the work in Britain of Michael Faraday and James Clerk-Maxwell in the fields of electromagnetism and thermodynamics, the concept of energy was being similarly transformed. The basic concept of energy, which could take various forms of heat, light, sound, or motive power and which could be interchangeably chemical power or electrical power, brought the sciences together into a quite new synthesis. It served as a common denominator for the study of physics, mechanics, and chemistry. The law of the conservation of energy—the notion of a natural store of force which merely takes a diversity of forms but itself remains constant—was a concept particularly susceptible of popularization, and one from which the most far-reaching philosophical inferences could be

drawn. By 1870, too, the kinetic theory of gases evolved by Stanislaw Cannizzaro, Clerk-Maxwell, and Marcelin Berthelot was linking up the theories of thermodynamics with those of molecular structure and atomic weights. The measurements of heat transformations in chemical reactions suggested affinities between energy and matter. Everything was falling into place so fast that the secrets of nature appeared infinitely discoverable (*see* Diagram 1).

Philosophical Synthesis. The urge to relate different fields of knowledge was no doubt strengthened by the metaphysical philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, which at this time was gaining impressive ascendancy in Germany. When Hegel died in 1831, his disciples had seriously doubted whether there was anything left to be said—he had so systematically and exhaustively encompassed the whole of thought. The element in his philosophy which was most easily transferable to other studies was the notion that all change and all progress come about by a process of “dialectic,” akin to intellectual conversation. An idea is stated (a “thesis”). It is then attacked or denied (the “antithesis”). Then a more complete and rounded truth emerges from the conflict between the two (the “synthesis”). This result includes something from both its predecessors, and it could not have come into being without them. It marks an advance toward a more perfect understanding and a more complete knowledge of reality. And it, in turn, being a positive “thesis,” then becomes the first stage in a new dialectical argument, to be carried forward by a further negation and synthesis into a still more complete truth; and so on, *ad infinitum*. Thus history, in Hegel’s view, was the progressive realization of a great ultimate truth or idea, and every aspect of human activity had its place in this all-comprehensive system. Hegelianism was a dynamic, evolutionary philosophy of life, in tune with the more dynamic, evolutionary qualities of scientific thought and of life itself in nineteenth-century Europe. It was from him that Karl Marx took the idea of a dialectical process underlying history, though Marx insisted that this process occurred at the level of economic and social conditions, and not, as Hegel taught, at the level of metaphysical Ideas. Similarly, the great authority of this new metaphysical philosophy lent support to all who wanted to bring together the scattered truths of different branches of scientific knowledge and discovery, and synthesize them into provocative new generalizations.

The New Biology. Darwinism had great effects on nineteenth-century thought because it was yet another wonderful new synthesis. It was connected, by dimly perceived links, with the other revelations of physical nature. Organic chemistry, and even more bacteriology, were already forging some links between the mathematical and physical sciences and the biological sciences. It was suggested that life is a process of chemical change. Louis Pasteur and Joseph Lister, from 1854 onward,



studied micro-organisms and devised the modern germ theory. Charles Darwin brought together these and other ideas to propound a new theory of life itself. Darwinism was the supreme achievement of contemporary trends towards synthesis, and the publication of *The Origin of Species* made the year 1859 a turning point in modern science and philosophy.

It was characteristically rooted in the material and technological progress of the time. The geological knowledge from which Darwin began had been greatly enhanced by the collection of fossils which came from excavations in building canals, railroads, and ports; the knowledge of selective breeding of plants and animals came from practical agriculture as much as from the experimental laboratory. The component ideas were familiar but so far disjointed. Conceptions of evolution, and even of the role of evolution in differentiating species, had been much discussed during the previous half century as a result of the work of Lamarck. The idea of the unity of life—of a fundamental relationship between all living things—had been defended as the basis of biology by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire in France. The idea of environment as a totality of surrounding conditions determining life and human society was familiar to historians such as Hippolyte Taine and H. T. Buckle even before Darwin wrote. The notion of competition as a principle of social life and economic activity, of progress coming through a struggle for survival, underlay the economic theories of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and all the laissez-faire arguments of the early nineteenth century. When Darwin brought together all these scattered ideas and integrated them into his daring thesis—that it is by constant adaptation to environment through a process of natural selection and struggle for survival that all species of living things have become differentiated—it was as if the whole Ark-load of animals had suddenly landed in the Garden of Eden, converting it into a jungle “red in tooth and claw.”


Darwinism apparently denied the act of Divine creation, and with it the whole familiar concept of great catastrophic occasions—the Fall, the Flood, Divine revelation. It replaced them by a notion of gradual secular transformation and adaptation throughout millions of years. Darwin was regarded as a blasphemer attacking the very foundations of Christianity. In the hectic debates that ensued, a British prime minister, Disraeli, could solemnly announce that if it were a choice between apes and angels, he was on the side of the angels. The whole development of science was brought to a focal point, at which it challenged all existing creeds and philosophies, all accepted notions of the origin, nature, and destiny of mankind.

The challenge of science to philosophy had been there for some time. Until 1848 general theories and philosophical doctrines—of the natural goodness of man, of natural rights and duties, of the universality


DIAGRAM 1. THE CULT OF SYNTHESIS, 1800-1870



III. WAGNERIAN SYNTHESIS OF THE ARTS



IV. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: RIVAL SYNTHESSES



of reason, of utopian socialism, of Hegelianism and Kantianism—were regarded as of the utmost general importance. Battles about general theories had marked the age of revolutions, of romanticism, even of reaction. But part of the consequence of disillusionment in 1848 was the discrediting of all abstract theories, and a new disbelief in their importance for human life or their efficacy as roads to social change.

This decline in esteem for philosophy left a vacuum that was now filled to overflowing by belief in science. Scientific experiment, method, and theory won credit partly by the striking new syntheses of science which produced general concepts more comprehensible to the ordinary man, more obviously of great human significance, and undeniably of momentous importance for all branches of learning and culture. It was an age of efficient popularization, by lecture, pamphlet, journal, and book, with a large and eager public in most European countries. The impact of scientific ideas was therefore quick and widespread. Because they were mostly products of real interchange and co-operation between the eminent scientists of all countries, scientific knowledge and thought could properly be regarded as an emanation of the whole of European culture. All races, nations, and states had contributed something of value to the general advance, and France lost something of the primacy and leadership which she had maintained during the first half of the century. Data collected in one country or in one branch of study had been taken up by scientists of other countries and other fields, added to and modified, and eventually brought together into a generally acceptable hypothesis; this, in turn, illuminated other sectors of human knowledge. It was all one vast process of integration and vitalization, exciting and wonderful. Tennyson, as usual, expressed perfectly the mood of 1850 when he wrote, in *In Memoriam*,

*Of those that, eye to eye, shall look
On knowledge; under whose command
Is Earth and Earth's, and in their hand
Is Nature like an open book.*

The mood of boundless confidence and optimism did not long outlive the phase of scientific progress which had generated it. By 1870 doubts, questions, unanswerable difficulties, were already being raised.⁶ Scientific study began to move again along more specialized and separate channels, knowledge became again fragmentary and unco-ordinated, and the mood of supreme confidence has never since been regained. The reception of Darwinism in itself marked the beginning of this new phase. Darwin had first formulated his theory as early as 1842, but delayed publishing it for seventeen years. It was not fully expounded until *The Descent of Man* appeared in 1871. But the first popularizers of it, notably

⁶ See p. 403.

T. H. Huxley, met an immediate gust of religious hostility and moral objection. The theory, indeed, seemed to minimize the importance of individual behavior and moral values. It depicted human progress as the result of an impersonal process, the blind product of the struggle of species for survival by very long-term adaptations to environment. It was intellectual dynamite because it contained in explosive compound several ingredients, each of which could be interpreted differently. If material environment were the determining factor, then it was a materialist philosophy, challenging spiritual qualities and degrading men to the level of mere pawns in a blind and age-long process. If adaptation to environment were the important factor, then the possibility of deliberate adaptations effected by human effort and intelligence restored scope for free will and voluntary progress. If the struggle for survival were the main cause of successful adaptation, then again the emphasis lay on selfishness, greed, violence, competition, conflict; but if the struggle were between species rather than between individuals, then it could become an argument for closer human co-operation, better social organization, even for socialism.

Although the first reactions to Darwinism were mostly hostile and bigoted, the long-range reactions were very diverse and eclectic. Many different schools of thought could find in it fresh support for their old beliefs. Nationalists and believers in *Realpolitik* could find justification, or at least explanation, for rivalries between nations and conflicts between states in the suggestion that warlike qualities decide which is "fittest to survive." Racialists and imperialists found fresh evidence for regarding one race or one power as inherently superior to another, judged simply in terms of worldly success. Freethinkers of all kinds hailed Darwinism as an ally against clericalism and religious dogma. The economic champions of free enterprise and cut-throat competition could with justice reflect that they had urged the benefits of a "struggle for survival" and "natural selection" long before the biologists had used the idea. It was, indeed, Thomas Malthus's doctrine of the relation between population and food supplies which Darwin had extended to the whole world of plants and animals. Each could find in Darwinism what he wanted. So much had flowed into the Darwinist synthesis that as much again could be squeezed out of it.

In political thinking it was perhaps socialist thought that was most profoundly and permanently affected by the impact of Darwinism. In its emphasis on the importance of material conditions socialists of all kinds could find scientific endorsement of their long-cherished belief, dating at least from Rousseau, that because environment is so important social progress must come from a more rational organization of social and economic activity. But the inferences they then drew could be either revolutionary or evolutionary. The Fabian Society in England argued from

it in favor of "the inevitability of gradualness" and against violent or revolutionary measures. On the other hand, Marxism, too, thrived in the new climate of opinion created by the "intellectual revolution" brought about by Darwinism. The theories of Marx and Engels claimed to be based on economic data patiently observed, collected, and verified; the hypotheses they used to explain these data—the theory that changes in social and political life are explicable only by underlying changes in the means of production and that the clue to all history is the struggle between economic classes—claimed to have the same validity as scientific hypotheses. As Benthamism in its day purported to be doing for social science what Newtonism had done for physical science;⁷ so now Marxism claimed to be doing for the social sciences of economics, politics, history, and sociology, what Darwinism had done for biology.

Marx was purporting to replace the older romantic or "utopian" socialism of Robert Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier with a new "scientific" theory of socialism, claiming validity and credence by reason of its strictly scientific foundations. Like Darwinism, it dealt not with matters of human motive or intention, but with the inevitable long-term trend of human life; it also placed emphasis on the importance of material environment as a conditioning or even determining factor; it also spoke in terms of struggle and conflict. Marx was so conscious of the affinities of his own theories with Darwinism that he wanted to dedicate to Darwin his greatest work, *Das Kapital*, of which the first volume appeared in 1867, but Darwin cautiously declined the honor. When Engels made a funeral oration over Marx's grave in 1883, he claimed that "Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history."

If the comparison was by no means as simple as that, there is still a sense in which Marxism and even Benthamism belong to the same world of thought and the same mode of belief as mid-nineteenth century thermodynamics and Darwinism. A science of society resting on a dynamics of competition and conflict, whether between individuals or classes, has affinities with a science of nature resting on a dynamics of energy and a struggle for survival. Social and natural sciences alike were marked by an amalgam of abstractions and materialist bias—the abstractions of "economic man" in the classical economists such as Adam Smith, Malthus, and Mill; of "economic class" in Marx; of "solid atoms" measurable by weight in the physicists; of "species" and "environment" in Darwin. And the basic notion in all was that of a self-regulating mechanism working according to "inevitable" laws, whether of supply and demand, of the iron law of wages and the inevitable impoverishment of the wage-earning proletariat, of the "conservation of energy," or the "survival of the fittest." The thought of the whole period has about it a cer-

⁷ See p. 165.

tain homogeneity that made it easy to believe all these things at once. We act in tune with the mood of these decades between 1850 and 1870. If we discover such an ultimate synthesis of all the most revolutionary and far-reaching ideas to which they gave birth.

The Arts. The quest for a synthesis, which is so apparent in scientific thought, can also be found in the artistic developments of these decades. The most striking example of this is the work of the German musician, Richard Wagner. Wagner contended that all the arts of music, drama, poetry, painting, and architecture should be made to fertilize one another by being brought into a single synthesis, a totality of all artistic endeavor (*Gesamtkunstwerk*). He saw in grand opera the best medium for attaining this result, because it combined the three chief forms of artistic expression—gesture, poetry, and sound. His great project of *The Ring*, a whole quartet of operas based on the Nordic myths of the Nibelungen Saga and planned to occupy four whole evenings in its performance, was completed between 1850 and 1870. After 1861 he enjoyed the support and patronage of King Ludwig II of Bavaria, and in 1872 the great theater at Bayreuth was begun, though it was not completed until four years later. It was designed to fulfill Wagner's theories. The vision of the whole audience was left unobstructed, the orchestra was sunk from sight between stage and auditorium, and the stage was planned to accommodate elaborate scenery, lighting, and machinery.

In spirit and choice of subject his work had a powerful appeal to surging German nationalism. The works of his great contemporary, Giuseppe Verdi, likewise reflected the spirit of Italian nationalism. His later operas such as *Otello* and *Falstaff* won popularity quicker in Germany than in Italy itself, partly because he was there hailed as a successor to Wagner. In France his near-contemporary, Hector Berlioz, demonstrated the new artistic opportunities of massive orchestration. When the king of Prussia asked him if it were true that he wrote for five hundred musicians, Berlioz replied, "Your Majesty has been misinformed: I sometimes write for four hundred and fifty." In the most influential musical developments of these years there was a characteristic grandiosity—a bias to bigness, power, and comprehensiveness—that matched the trends of the time in economics, politics, and science. Verdi and Wagner became national artists expressing the sentiments of whole peoples, and this is often regarded as the most significant social feature of their work. But of even deeper significance was their passion for synthesis and integration. Orchestration and opera were the artistic parallels to scientific synthesis and political unification.

The intellectual mood and the aesthetic tastes encouraged by science and *Realpolitik* produced an equally characteristic literature and art. From the middle of the century onward "realism" in the novel and in painting expressed a new reverence for facts observed and for feelings

experienced, and an urge comparable to that of the scientist to make man's physical environment more intelligible. Before 1850 Charles Dickens in Britain, Honoré de Balzac in France, had pointed the way by depicting in vivid detail the social life and problems of their times and countries. With Gustave Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* in 1856, Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace* in 1866, and in the theater Alexander Dumas's *La Dame aux Camélias* in 1852, the new approach was consolidated. In painting the work of the Frenchmen Gustave Courbet, Edouard Manet, and Claude Monet challenged the established romantic tastes of the Paris Salon and founded a new school of naturalism and realism. To see and depict life as it was—even the life of the ordinary people—and to find beauty and meaning in man's immediate surroundings and thereby make them more meaningful and comprehensible: that was their avowed purpose and, to a large extent, their achievement.

Even the specialized art of studying and writing history was powerfully influenced by the same tendencies. The massive collections and publications of historical sources and documents available by 1850 made possible, and indeed essential, a development of research techniques. More rigorous tests of evidence, verification of facts, criticism of accepted generalizations, became the tools of the professional historian. The techniques of the research monograph, with its elaborate apparatus of references and sources, became standardized. In Germany, Leopold von Ranke; in France, Fustel de Coulanges; in Britain, William Stubbs, laid foundations for a more "scientific" writing of history. If, as in realism in literature and painting, this often resulted in dullness or downright ugliness, it was nevertheless a valuable reaction against romantic history and the uncritical acceptance of age-old superstitions. The basic task of the historian is after all, like that of the scientist, to verify facts, sift evidence, test hypotheses, and find a synthesis that comprises and illuminates all the available knowledge within his province.

In countless ways the arts were affected by social changes and even by political movements. The use of large orchestras became both physically and financially possible because music became more of a democratic enjoyment, involving public performances in large halls. What made the realistic novel popular and effective was the growth of a large reading public; and this depended upon the growth of public education as well as the growth of population, on the reading habits encouraged by a popular press made cheap by the rotary press and commercial advertising. The national spirit, evident in men as widely different as Henrik Ibsen the Norwegian dramatist; Anton Dvořák the Slav musician; Nicholas Rimsky-Korsakov the Russian composer, reflected the political currents of these years. Art of all forms struck deep social roots in this age of all-pervading synthesis.

The unity of European culture was never shown more clearly than when its universal tendency was toward national differentiation. Even

when literature, art, and music were finding their most creative impulses in the separatist forces of nationalism, the peoples of Europe shared sufficiently in one heritage to find common enjoyment in their cultural diversities. The interchange of culture was even facilitated and protected in these years by such arrangements as a series of copyright laws and treaties, beginning with the Anglo-French copyright convention of 1851 and ending with the new German copyright law of 1871. The most eminent men in art and literature, like the most eminent scientists, were of international repute. Wagner and Berlioz, Turgenev and Tolstoy, roamed the continent and found themselves, whether in London, Paris, Vienna, or St. Petersburg, members of a European *intelligentsia* that included public men of all countries. The internationalism of the sciences was matched by the Europeanism of the arts.

Technology. While the world of thought and art was being transformed by new scientific ideas and methods, the material civilization of the western world was being no less strikingly changed by the practical effects of applied science and technology. The steam engine owed little in its origins to the pure scientists; it was a product of the artisan and the mechanic, the practical inventor and adapter. Much of the technical progress of the time likewise had little connection with the new science. But the railway age, which had come to Europe by 1850, involved a host of technical advances which had great repercussions in other fields: in the perfection of iron smelting and the refinement and applications of steel, in tunneling and bridge-building, in signaling, in organization both financial and administrative. The Bessemer process of making steel was developed in the 1850's and introduced into the United States after 1867. Only thereafter did use of the microscope, which had contributed so much to the advances of microbiology, begin to reveal the structure of iron and steel, and open a new age of alloys in metallurgy. The invention of the electric telegraph belonged to the first half of the century, but in the second it led to a European network of speedy communications and in 1866 to the successful laying of a trans-Atlantic cable. The use of the dynamo to generate electricity sprang from the researches of the physicists into the connections between magnetism and electricity. It began to come into industrial use by 1870, though its greatest utilization still lay further ahead. For building, although the traditional materials of stone, brick, and wood remained most common, increasing use was made of iron and steel and concrete.

The rapid advance of the biological sciences had speedy medical results: in improving sanitation, preventing disease, in aseptic and antiseptic surgery, and in anaesthesia. Food supplies were increased by the growth of more scientific agriculture. In Britain the Royal Agricultural Society had existed since 1838; the Rothamsted Experimental Station for agricultural research was set up in 1842. Bold investment, by both landlord and tenant, in drainage and deep plowing and in new

machinery, introduced the period of "high farming" which followed the free entry of foreign corn to the home market after 1846. Chemical science produced artificial fertilizers and oil cake for feeding. Steam-driven agricultural machinery was widely used in the 1860's. These improvements were characteristic of western European agriculture in general, and resulted in a much higher output of food.

Confidence that the advances of science would, through technical application, be perpetually and indefinitely useful to man, seemed amply borne out by the progress made during these two decades. Never before had so much knowledge, ingenuity, and skill been used so extensively and so profitably to promote the health, wealth, and welfare of mankind. Even many of the humbler amenities of life now taken for granted date from these years; for example, phosphorus matches and cheap soap, sewing machines and more comfortable furniture.

Yet technological knowledge is ultimately, in human affairs, neutral and equally capable of serving good or evil. Metallurgical skill that produces locomotives and dynamos can also make guns and shells: plowshares can be beaten into swords. The dramatic triumphs of the new Prussian war machine in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria-Hungary, and in 1870 against France, brought home to the whole of Europe how much the very nature of warfare, too, was being transformed by science. Not only did railways make the transport of troops and munitions faster and easier, but long-range field artillery capable of greater range, accuracy, and rate of fire was one of the decisive factors in Prussian victories. The French command in 1870 was defeated largely because it completely miscalculated how long a small body of men, armed with the breech-loading rifle, could hold out against superior numbers, while the telegraph could summon reinforcements brought speedily to the scene by train. The Franco-Prussian War was symbolic of the ambiguous outcome of scientific discovery: a Frankenstein monster, perpetually liable to astonish its creator by its unexpected behavior and liable always to get out of human control.

Allied with the vastly greater economic and financial resources of western Europe and with new forms of political and social organization, scientific and technical skills constituted a source of power at man's disposal which he has yet to learn to use exclusively for good, under the penalty of being himself destroyed by irresponsible use of it for evil. Insofar as the intellectual climate induced by science favored materialism and realism, it also favored Marxism and *Realpolitik*. Karl Marx and Otto von Bismarck are the most characteristic products of the new age in Europe, which came into being by 1871. The resources of power made available by technology were put at the disposal of men and societies which infatuation with science had helped to make realistic and materialistic in outlook. It was a fateful conjunction.

CHAPTER 14

THE REMAKING OF CENTRAL EUROPE

Economic Growth and Territorial Integration

BY 1850 economic changes had already had great effects throughout the lands of Italy and Germany. As already shown¹ the railway age made it possible for the first time to travel quickly from any part of Europe to almost any other. This opened the way for a rapid expansion of the economy of any state which was ready to take advantages of the new opportunities. Of all the central European states, two were most advantageously placed to do this. One was the constitutional monarchy of Piedmont and Savoy, with its favorable strategic position in northern Italy, its enlightened government anxious to "westernize" the country, and its prestige as a proven leader of Italian hopes for eventual liberation and unification. The other was the kingdom of Prussia, already in many ways precocious in internal administrative and military organization. With widespread German territories and interests, it was a natural focus for all hopes of German unification without Austria. How did these two countries develop economically between 1850 and 1870, and how did this development affect the destinies of Italy and Germany as a whole?

Cavour. Until his death in 1861 the most important man in Italian politics was Count Camillo di Cavour. Like his contemporary parliamentary leaders in western Europe, he was a convinced liberal both in devotion to constitutional liberties and procedures, and in his desire to develop along more modern lines the agriculture, industry, and finances of his country. He had himself made a fortune out of applying modern scientific methods and mechanization to the farming of his family estates before 1850. As a young man he had traveled widely in England, France, and Switzerland; he was a keen student of advanced western methods in agriculture, industry, and parliamentary government. All the new forms of organization described above² fascinated him; and it became the mission of his life to "westernize" Piedmont and

¹ See p. 159.

² See pp. 237-50.

eventually the whole of Italy. He knew that railways, mills, factories, banks, business enterprise, as he had seen them working in Britain and France, were the only road to economic prosperity in Italy. In October, 1850, he accepted ministerial office in Piedmont as minister of agriculture, commerce, and marine. He made a series of commercial treaties with Belgium, France, and England which linked Piedmont to the growing free-trade area of western Europe. As minister of finance, which he also became, he raised capital by an internal loan for immediate needs and an external loan from England. With part of it he built more railroads. In November, 1852, he formed his own ministry. Its first task was to improve Piedmont's roads, railroads, docks, and ports; expand her commerce; and strengthen her finances. As a young engineer in the army he had imbibed the outlook and aptitudes of the technician, approaching problems of politics with a systematic, well-informed, logical mind, prepared to analyze them patiently and carefully in search of a solution. By 1854, when the outbreak of the Crimean War forced him to turn his attention mainly to foreign relations, he had gone far toward running Piedmont on sounder businesslike lines and assimilating her economic life to that of the west. He passed legislation, on the British and French model, modernizing the structure of business corporations, banks and credit institutions, co-operative societies, the civil administration, and the army. But the rest of Italy, under Austrian or Papal or Bourbon rule, still offered striking contrasts of economic backwardness.

After the end of the Crimean War in 1856 Cavour resumed, for another three years, an even more intensive program of economic development. Now that war between the great powers had come to Europe after nearly forty years of peace, he had to accumulate military as well as economic strength. The railways of greatest strategic importance were extended. The Mont Cenis tunnel was planned to pierce the Alps and link up Piedmontese territory with French. Genoa was changed from a naval base into a great commercial port with new docks and loading facilities. By rail and steamship Piedmont came to be linked more closely to the west. By the time Cavour died in 1861 he had created, by a series of diplomatic alliances and wars, which shall be described below,³ a kingdom of Italy with Piedmont as its core but still excluding Venetia and Rome. This political and diplomatic achievement is his most memorable. But it took place against a background of economic development which had an essential place in the whole scheme, and which in itself would have earned for him a high position in the story of Italy. Unlike the constitutional and liberal experiments in Spain or Portugal, that of Piedmont could henceforth rest on the firm and indispensable basis of economic and social modernization.

United Italy. But even after the Kingdom of Italy was created

³ See pp. 274-80.

in 1861, Piedmont remained very different from the rest of the country. In material wealth and development it forged far ahead of Lombardy, Tuscany, the Papal States, or Naples. Whereas Piedmont had some 850 kilometers of railroads connecting the main towns of Genoa, Turin, and Alessandria, and Milan, Lombardy had only 200, Tuscany 300, and Naples hardly any. Standards of living and literacy varied greatly. Traditions of separatism and local peculiarities, even of language, remained very strong. The contrast between north and south, accentuated in the 1860's by the exclusion of Rome from the kingdom and for many decades to come by the mere geographical shape of the peninsula, was a contrast between two vastly different ways of life. By 1870, when geographical assimilation was completed by the inclusion of Rome, the short-term effects of political integration had been to cause dislocation and confusion in economic and social life.

The necessary solvents of separatism—a common legal code, a new administrative and educational system, greater economic development—were all long-term remedies. Italy needed two or three generations in which to grow together, before political unification could be reinforced by a more substantial assimilation of economic life and social habits. Meanwhile a disruptive mood of disillusionment set in. Unity had been expected to lighten the burdens of taxation, but in fact it increased them. Political unification was itself expensive because it involved wars. Schemes for administrative and educational reform and capital development made slow progress because the kingdom was chronically short of money. The country had not yet developed the industries needed to sustain the costly equipment of a “great power” in military and naval establishments. Because Italy was poor in natural supplies of coal and iron, her industrial growth was slow. It was fatally easy for her to overstrain her resources.

These economic difficulties had important effects on the working of the new constitution. The Piedmontese parliamentary constitution, which was adapted to the needs of the new kingdom after 1861, was modeled partly on the French Constitution of 1830 and partly on the English constitution as it existed after 1832. The electorate, determined by property qualifications, was only some 150,000 out of a population of more than 20 million. Widespread illiteracy, strong local patriotism and factions, a weak party system, all threw grit into the works of parliamentary government. Parliamentary groups took shape on a local rather than an ideological basis, and many of them were jealously anti-Piedmontese in sentiment. Governments were unstable and weak. Politics were too often corrupt.

In the 1860's war had to be waged in the south, between the national forces (mostly Piedmontese) and so-called “brigands,” encouraged by the former king of Naples, Francis II, from his exile in the Papal

States. It was a civil war, fought with savagery on both sides and devastating in its effects. For some fifty years to come the south was reduced to a sullen acquiescence in unification. It was inspired with little positive enthusiasm for partnership in the new kingdom. Turin, too far north to be thought of as a real national capital, served only to isolate parliament from the rest of the country, to the great disadvantage of both. The double move of the capital, from Turin to Florence in 1865 and to Rome in 1871, dislocated the administrative system. For all these reasons the new Italy took a very long time to settle down.

If the effects of a decade of strain could have been mainly confined to the years 1861-71, all might have been well. Venetia was added to the kingdom in 1866, Rome in 1870. This piecemeal accretion of territories might even have had some advantage in easing their gradual assimilation had it been achieved peacefully. But since each acquisition involved war, and Italy had to be perpetually on the alert and in a state of preparation for war, they were won at excessive cost. Lavish expenditure on a large conscript army, a new navy of ironclads, great arsenals and naval bases, in strenuous efforts to live up to her new status as a "great power," had to take place before the country was able to afford such extravagances. Heavy taxation and lavish loans mounted up into a ruinous national debt that carried forward great financial difficulties into the years after 1871. Immense annual budget deficits became a habit. In 1866 more than 2,300 monasteries and convents were suppressed and their property confiscated, but like all such historical "windfalls" this did little to restore national solvency. That even geographical and political unification took a whole decade, and involved the country in four wars and in recurrent civil war, meant that the cost of formal unity was itself almost ruinous.

The diplomatic and international aspirations of Italy went on overreaching her material resources, putting severe strains upon both her economy and her parliamentary system. The prolonged period of uncertainty and excitement made virtually impossible the growth of settled parliamentary government. Despite the welcome given to the new Italy by liberal opinion throughout Europe, the methods by which it came into being left fresh sources of bitterness, grievance, and disturbance in central Europe. When the *Risorgimento* reached its culmination in November, 1871, with the opening of the new Italian parliament in Rome it was a full half century old. It had attracted heroic self-sacrifice and boundless enthusiasm. It had triumphed partly because of amazing pertinacity and dauntless courage. But it had also triumphed because of war and deceit, by a policy modeled on Machiavelli's combination of force and fraud. Its triumph was bitter-sweet, and its nemesis fifty years later was to be the inflated bombast of fascism.

Unification in Germany. The process of German unification was equally protracted, equally identified with Machiavellian diplomacy and

war, equally centered on the leadership of one state, Prussia. But there was one highly significant difference—the economic resources, industrial development, and financial strength of Prussia and of other German territories were much more adequate to sustain the equipment of a great European power. Germany could underpin political unification with a solid foundation of economic expansion. In 1850, whereas Italy had only 400 kilometers of railroad open to traffic, Germany as a whole had 6,000—a length that Italy attained only by 1870; and Prussian territories already had about the same length as in France. This enabled Germany, even by 1860, to exploit her great mineral resources of coal and lignite to a point where her annual output exceeded that of France or Belgium; and between 1860 and 1870 her output of iron increased even more rapidly. The development of both the railroads and the heavy industries was carried out mainly by private capital in Prussia, mainly by state help in other German states. But the Prussian government fully appreciated their military uses. It encouraged the building of strategic railroads by guarantees of interest and similar methods. Military strategy, guided by Moltke, was devised to take full advantage of the new speed with which troops and supplies could be moved. The manufacture of heavy artillery, which this industrial revolution was making possible, transformed field warfare. The needs of the army were never neglected in the policy of the Prussian state.

Prussia was not, like Piedmont, handicapped by shortage of capital; nor was Germany during her years of semi-unification between 1866 and 1871. The Prussian Bank, a joint stock organization with privately held capital but under state control and direction, had existed since 1847. After the unification of Germany it was to become the Imperial Bank of Germany. Meanwhile other large joint-stock banks, with power to issue notes, had been set up in Cologne, Magdeburg, Danzig, Königsberg, and Posen in Prussian territories; and most other German states developed banks with the authority not only to issue notes but also to promote companies and business enterprises. By 1871 there were thirty-three German banks with the right to issue notes; twenty-five had come into existence after 1850. This rapid and lively growth of a banking system, loosely jointed though it was, played a vital part in mobilizing capital for investment in business and industry; and after 1871 the domination of the *Reichsbank* welded German banks into a formidable financial power. The growth of population, its drift into the towns, and the decline of rural industries, all provided the mobile sources of labor needed for industrial expansion. The whole fabric of German economic life was better suited than the Italian to absorbing without dislocation the shocks and jars of an industrial revolution and the changes made necessary by political unification.

Even so, there remained considerable disparity between the pace of

economic development in Prussia and that in other parts of Germany, though it was less sharp and coincided less with geographical divisions than was the contrast between northern and southern Italy. German states varied considerably in the speed with which, after 1850, they revised the old relationships between peasant and landlord. By 1870 Prussia had largely completed the process of freeing peasants from legal obligations to the landlord in return for their tenure of land, although the manor remained as an administrative unit until near the end of the century. Bavarian peasants were not fully emancipated until a generation later. But though moving at different paces it was broadly true that all were moving in the same direction.

The *Zollverein* had knitted German trade more closely together. During the 1860's various all-German associations were formed to push this trend of economic unification still further. After 1858 a congress of German economists agitated for free trade, a unified system of coinage, co-operative organizations. In 1861 this body organized a national chamber of commerce (*Deutscher Handelstag*). Jurists followed suit, working for a unified legal system for all German states. At a political level, the *Deutscher Nationalverein* of 1859 sought to unite liberals and democrats of all states into a national movement behind Prussian leadership. It was supported, like the older liberal-democratic movement of 1848, by middle class and professional men, government officials and intellectuals. But it was also supported by the important financiers and industrialists—men like Werner Siemens, who since 1847 had been busy constructing telegraph systems and in 1866 invented the electric dynamo; men like Heinrich Hermann Meier, who in 1857 had founded the North German Lloyd shipping company of Bremen. The growing class of entrepreneurs gave to this new drive for national unification a social backing that previous movements had lacked.

Without the rapid economic development of these decades German nationalism would have been a much weaker force. It would, no doubt, have triumphed in any case, since political unification was the work of King William and his great minister Bismarck, and the result of a series of diplomatic and military victories won by the genius of Bismarck and the might of the Prussian army. But as a movement it would have drawn less support, in a critical period, from the most progressive sections of public opinion throughout Germany.

Like Italian unification, German unity was brought about by a sequence of diplomatic maneuvers and wars: by a skillful exploitation of the disposition of forces in Europe which enabled the Prussian army to fight three successive wars against isolated enemies—Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, France in 1870. Each victory was speedy and decisive; each was accompanied by a further step toward geographical unity and the political ascendancy of Prussia. Just as King Victor Emmanuel II of

Piedmont became king of Italy in 1861, King William I of Prussia was declared German emperor in 1871. The political reshaping of central Europe was pre-eminently the work of two states, Piedmont and Prussia, and of two men, Cavour and Bismarck. But the historical significance of these achievements is distorted if they are considered only as political, diplomatic, and military events—the successful results of deliberate man-made policies implemented by two statesmen of undoubted political genius. They were also a consequence of the changing structure of economic and social life in central Europe. They drew strength from the natural desires of the growing class of liberal-minded entrepreneurs which, like its counterparts in Britain, France, and Belgium in earlier decades, wanted to throw off the legal and administrative arrangements of an old-fashioned order, open up new supplies of free labor and larger free-trade markets, and claim political power through more liberal and democratic parliamentary institutions.

Cavour and Bismarck were above all exponents of *Realpolitik*—the view that government and state policy are matters divorced from moral considerations, to be dictated only by the necessities of power and judged only by success. “Reasons of state” in their eyes justified any means, provided only that these means yielded the results intended. In later years European and British liberals were to oppose this conception of politics and, like Gladstone, condemn the calculated use of violence to achieve national ends. But the special characteristic of the years between 1850 and 1870 was a close alliance between liberalism and militarism. In 1848 liberalism was already in close alliance with nationalism.⁴ The failures of that alliance in 1848–49 bred disillusionment and brought to most of Europe a period of conservatism. At the same time the development of science and technology fostered a mood of realism and even materialism.

Liberal movements in Europe changed in tune with these shifts of mood. Benefits both economic and constitutional which, in 1848, liberals had looked for only from more democratic republics and representative parliamentary systems, they were now more willing to receive from the hands of kings and their ministers, from diplomatic *coups* and victorious generals. Armies were no longer regarded as the enemy of liberals and nationalists, used chiefly to crush revolutions, but as the agencies of national unification at the expense of foreign powers. Until 1871 support for Prussian leadership in Germany and for Bismarck’s policy of “blood and iron” came from liberals and progressives, from people who favored parliamentary government, constitutional liberties, freedom of conscience and thought, broader educational opportunities, and scientific and industrial progress.

This new alignment was of far-reaching importance. The chief opposition to the national unification of Germany, as of Italy, came from

⁴ See p. 208.

people who favored more authoritarian or absolutist government, conservatism, clericalism, traditionalism, and aristocracy. The southern German states held out longest against absorption into a Prussian-dominated *Reich* partly because of their particularist and conservative traditions, partly because of their Catholicism. What changed European liberalism from the romantic, idealistic, democratic movement of 1848 into the realistic, unscrupulous, opportunist movement of these two decades was more than simple disillusionment after the revolutionary failures of 1848-49. It was the growth, in central Europe, of enterprising business men; it was the demonstration given to these men, in the financial crises of 1857 and 1866, that industrialism brought economic loss and insecurity of a kind which only bigger, stronger states could help to overcome;⁶ it was the living example of the rapid material progress made by Britain and France and Belgium, countries that enjoyed a degree of political unity hitherto unknown in central Europe. The renewed desire of liberals for substantial national solidarity was not unconnected with the anxiety of bankers and businessmen to enjoy the same political advantages and rights as their rivals in western Europe.

If cautious constitutionalists like Cavour and authoritarian conservatives like Bismarck welcomed this alliance of liberal movements, it was likewise because, in the preceding age of revolutions, liberals had shown themselves resolute opponents of radical revolts and popular risings; because they needed the active support of the new business classes in order to overcome the forces of reactionary separatism; because eventual domination of the new kingdoms by states such as Piedmont and Prussia would be sufficient guarantee against any revolutionary excesses. They had learned from Napoleon III the lesson of how readily republican and democratic enthusiasm could be diverted into support for an authoritarian and militaristic regime by skillful timing of demagogic gestures and popular plebiscites; and until 1870 there was no comparable evidence of how disastrously, in later nineteenth-century conditions, such adventures could end.

Between 1850 and 1870 a statecraft of cunning realism was the fashion, and it apparently brought very rich rewards. Nothing is more characteristic of Italian unification than the series of plebiscites by which successive territories were transferred after diplomatic agreement or conquest: Savoy and Nice to France in 1860; Tuscany, the Marches and Umbria, Naples and Sicily, to Italy in 1860; Rome to Italy in 1870. Bismarck, equally characteristically, dispensed with the formalities of plebiscites but utilized the device of the North German Confederation of 1867 to consolidate Prussian hegemony in the north, after he had expelled Austria by his victory of 1866. Federalism, like plebiscites, could become a device of autocrats for preserving their power. What neither

⁶ See p. 229.

Italy nor Germany could acquire was a satisfactory parliamentary system within which parties co-operated effectively to produce stable government. Government had to be conducted in spite of, and not through, parliamentary institutions and procedures. In the end, national unity was won at the expense of liberalism.

Dualism in Austria-Hungary. The place of economic changes in the reshaping of central Europe can be further defined by asking: Why was there no comparable movement for national unification in Austria-Hungary? Where is the missing "third man," to place alongside Cavour and Bismarck? By 1852 the Austrian Empire, guided by Schwarzenberg, had apparently gained strong ascendancy over Prussia as a power in Germany.⁶ In the same month as Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* in France (December, 1851) the emperor Francis Joseph had declared the liberal constitution of 1849 null and void, and replaced it with a series of regulations. These preserved the centralized authority and completed the destruction of local and provincial privileges, but they excluded provision for representative parliamentary institutions to control the central power. Henceforth the Habsburg government had an administrative machine as highly centralized as the French and a central government as autocratic as the Prussian. This remarkable organization, working through a host of local officials, administered the diverse lands of the Habsburgs, which comprised so many different races, nationalities, and languages. It sought to create a sense of common citizenship, akin to that of the United States, but without permitting any important local self-government or any regional and provincial loyalties. By 1859 this system had indeed produced some unity of sentiment throughout southeastern Europe but it was a sentiment of common resistance to the central bureaucracy. The result was that in 1860, when the Council of State (*Reichsrat*) was enlarged to become more representative (though still not elected), two parties came into existence within it.

One, representing the Hungarian, Bohemian, and southern Slav interests, stood for a federalist program that would restore greater freedom to these lands and by decentralization give to the landowning aristocracy its old role as intermediary between locality and center. The other, representing Germanic interests, wanted to preserve a strong bureaucratic authority though it was willing to decentralize some power to new organs of local government. Neither party favored liberalism or representative government; one thought in historic terms of "estates of the realm" and the other in terms of autocracy. As a result of financial difficulties—the traditional dilemma of all autocracies since 1789—the government drifted into a semi-parliamentary system without real social bases. In October, 1860, the emperor Francis Joseph agreed to exercise his power of legislation only with the "co-operation" of lawfully assembled diets in the

⁶ See p. 218.

Crown lands and of the central *Reichsrat*, which would consist of delegates from these diets. The new *Reichsrat* would control most matters of economic policy—coinage, credit, trade, communications, taxation, and the budget. The local diets would control all other matters. The arrangement satisfied neither party and still less the Hungarian gentry, the liberal middle classes of Vienna, or the Slav nationalists. It was especially strongly resisted by the Hungarian nationalists and liberals, led by Ferencz Deák. They constituted the only element in Austrian development at all comparable with the contemporary nationalist movements in the rest of central Europe; but they spoke for the gentry or squirearchy of the Hungarian countryside rather than for any truly industrial or commercial middle class. In 1850 the whole Habsburg territory had only half the mileage of railways that France had; and although the great Viennese development company, the *Kreditanstalt*, was founded in 1856, the country knew only localized industrial development in this period.

Under the pressure of separate nationalist demands from all the diverse component parts of the empire, both the *Reichsrat* and the Hungarian diet moved part way toward federal solutions of their political difficulties. Anton von Schmerling, the Viennese liberal who became Habsburg minister in 1860, induced the Transylvanians to send delegations to the *Reichsrat*. He persuaded neither the Hungarian diet as a whole nor the Croatian diet to follow suit. The Hungarian diet, pursuing a similarly divisive policy, won over the Croats but neither the Serbs nor the Slovaks. The weakness of Hungarian nationalism was, throughout, that the Magyars were little more than a third of the population of Hungary; and that they were not prepared to concede to the other minorities of Serbs, Slovaks, and Rumanians within their own territories the nationalist claims that they themselves made against the Germans of Austria. This had bedeviled the Hungarian nationalist movement in the time of Kossuth.⁷ It haunted it still. In 1867 the conflict between Magyar and German claims was conciliated by the institution of the Dual Monarchy. A complex bargain was struck, by which the emperor Francis Joseph became simultaneously emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. His territories were divided by the river Leitha, a minor tributary of the Danube, and there was legally complete equality between both sections. One, dominated by Germans, was ruled from Vienna; the other, dominated by Magyars, was ruled from Pesth. The two governments and systems of administration were separate and distinct as regards all domestic affairs. The Common Monarchy, acting for both the others as regards foreign policy, war, defense, and common finance, was in effect a third government. Within each kingdom the nationalist aspirations aroused among Czechs, Poles, and Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, and Rumanians,

⁷ See p. 200.

were sacrificed to the interest of preserving German and Magyar domination. Deák agreed to the bargain, and in 1868 the Hungarian diet passed a law designed to make nationality a purely individual and personal right, respected by the state in all matters that did not endanger state unity, but not a communal political right involving territorial independence. In the Austrian kingdom liberals hoped that the new parliamentary constitution, with guarantees of civil liberties, would similarly reconcile subject peoples to German domination.

This elaborate compromise clearly rested on an ingenious effort to evade the principles of national unification and independence which were coming to prevail in Italy and Germany. It was a synthetic substitute for nationalism, not an implementation of it. It consecrated political division and national disunity. From an imperial Habsburg point of view it was a masterpiece of conciliatory statecraft, devised to perpetuate the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a power unit in European politics, to postpone indefinitely the separatist hopes of subject peoples for independence, and to consolidate the joint predominance of Germans and Magyars over the dual kingdom. It represented the principle not of unification but of partition: partition of territory between German and Magyar, of political functions between the three governments, of nationality between its personal and its political aspects. It accepted and reaffirmed the view that the Austrian Empire was incapable of national unification in the sense that Italy and Germany were being unified. It may be condemned as leaving to the twentieth century a tangle of unresolved problems, as merely papering over the cracks. Yet it lasted for half a century—a long spell on the time scale of modern historical change—and it gave Austria-Hungary a period of relative stability at a time when the rest of central and eastern Europe seethed with unrest. It was, moreover, realistic in that it accepted the undeniable fact that the economic and social development of this area could not yet support a homogeneous nation state. Ferencz Deák and Count Beust, who made the agreement on behalf of the Emperor establishing the Dual Monarchy, showed a spirit of realism worthy of Cavour or Bismarck. But their services were rendered to an ancient dynastic state and not to the cause of integral nationalism. The most highly developed, intransigent, and indigestible nationalist movement, the Magyar, was taken into partnership; and together Germans and Magyars co-operated to hold in check for another generation the eruption of other nationalisms.

Unlike Austria-Hungary, the states of Italy and Germany could be built on homogeneity of language, on strong nationalistic cultural movements dating from the years of French revolutionary enthusiasm and Napoleonic government, and on the substantial beginnings of a real industrial and commercial revolution. These are perhaps the main foundations for the success of their movements toward national unification.

But their political integration had to be engineered, with subtlety and skill, by purposeful men who were prepared to use every lever of diplomatic intrigue and every instrument of force needed to attain their goals. It was an age of mechanized manufacture, and the nation-state, too, had to be manufactured in Italy and Germany. That process took over a decade, and inflicted upon Europe a series of major wars. It would be as misleading to regard the triumphs of nationalism in central Europe as the inevitable consequences of trends of European history, as it would be to see in them the isolated and individual achievements of two men of dominating genius. What mattered was the interplay of trends and policies, of inherent developments and deliberate design. States are the creation not of nature but of men; and Cavour and Bismarck created not nations but states. It was these states which then, in turn, created the modern nations of Italy and Germany. They did so because they were designed to do so. The state constructed by Beust and Deák was designed to do the opposite. It also succeeded.

Political Unification in Italy and Germany

BECAUSE the movements to create a united Italian kingdom and a united German empire occurred simultaneously, and made progress by manipulating the diplomatic situation in Europe between 1850 and 1870, their histories touch and overlap at many points. They sometimes wittingly, sometimes unintentionally, helped one another. Their leaders had to deal with a common enemy, Austria-Hungary; a common factor of power, France under the Second Empire of Napoleon III; a single religious force, the Roman Catholic Church. For these reasons their progress becomes intelligible only if the two stories are told interwoven and not separately. Together they form one great event, the total upheaval and political reshaping of central Europe north and south of the Alps. With their joint success in 1871 and its repercussions in France and Austria, the whole balance of power in Europe was fundamentally altered. A gulf was fixed between the continent of the previous eighty years and contemporary Europe of the subsequent eighty years.

Pact of Plombières, 1858. The first chapter of the story centers on the year 1858. In July of that year Napoleon III held an interview with Cavour at Plombières-les-Bains, and they sealed a bargain that came to be known as the Pact of Plombières. It involved three undertakings. First, the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel of Piedmont, the fifteen-year-old Princess Clotilde, would marry Jérôme, cousin of Napoleon III, in order to link together the two states by the old-fashioned dynastic bonds of marriage. Second, France and Piedmont would go to war against Austria. Third, in the settlement that would follow, Piedmont

would gain Lombardy and Venetia, to be taken from Austria, and would form a new kingdom of Upper Italy linked with the duchies of Parma and Modena and the Papal Legations. In return, Piedmont would cede Nice and Savoy to France. It was one of the more cynical bargains of nineteenth-century history, and it took some time for the plotters to discover a suitable excuse for declaring war against Austria.

What prompted Cavour and Napoleon to make this remarkable agreement? Cavour had become convinced that the old slogan "Italy will go it alone" (*Italia farà da sè*) was wrong. The immediate obstacle to northern Italian unity was Austria, which held the vital territories of Lombardy and Venetia. Austria had repeatedly made it clear—especially at the Congress of Paris in 1856—that she could be made to give up these territories only by force. Piedmont alone could never hope to defeat Austria—Custoza and Novara had demonstrated that. So she needed an ally. Italian unification could make progress only with foreign help. There is little doubt that Cavour would have preferred British help; for Britain was, in general, sympathetic to the cause of liberal nationalism in Italy, and had no immediate demands to make of Italy in return. But British governments had repeatedly made it clear, too, that they would not help by military support. It was an axiom of Palmerston's foreign policy that the survival of the Austrian Empire was necessary for the maintenance, as between France and Russia, of the balance of power in Europe.⁸ When in 1857 the archduke Maximilian became viceroy of Lombardy, his policy of leniency and conciliation was warmly approved by British diplomats at Vienna and Turin. Clearly, the most that Cavour could expect from Britain would be benevolent neutrality and an anxiety to avoid involvement in general war. He had engaged in the Crimean War as an ally of Britain and France, and had thereby won a place for his government at the council tables of Paris when the treaty was signed in 1856. His most likely ally was Napoleon III, who made much of his sympathies for the cause of Italian unification and showed a restless readiness to embark on foreign adventures in order to gain fresh prestige for his regime. Cavour, then, nursed hopes of help from France.

That it was forthcoming in 1858 was due to the internal politics of the Second Empire. In the Crimean War, Napoleon had tasted the fruits of popularity and prestige which could be derived from successful war. His natural liking for intrigue, and possibly a genuine ex-*Carbonaro* sympathy with Italian nationalist aspirations, turned his attentions toward Piedmont. A north Italian kingdom owing its very existence to French help would be a welcome and useful element on the diplomatic chess-board of Europe. To gain for France the territories of Nice and Savoy would awaken pleasing echoes of Napoleonic gains and reverse an unpopular provision of the Vienna settlement of 1815. Napoleon I had, even

⁸ See p. 221.

if unwittingly, done service to the cause of Italian unity;⁹ it would fit well into the pattern of Bonapartist traditions, as evolved in the legends of St. Helena and the earlier writings of Louis Napoleon himself, that the Second Empire should complete the work begun by the First. When the elections of 1857 in France returned only a weak opposition, Napoleon's confidence at home was renewed. He felt free to embark on fresh adventures abroad.

Early in 1858 French-Piedmontese relations suddenly deteriorated when Italian conspirators, led by Orsini, threw bombs at Napoleon and the Empress on their way to the opera. They were unhurt but many others were killed or wounded. The plotters had been supporters of Mazzini, though no support for the plot could be traced to Mazzini himself. Orsini, from prison, wrote to Napoleon urging France to free Italy. The government at Turin took immediate repressive action against the Mazzinians and passed a more severe press law. Victor Emmanuel sent General Della Rocca to congratulate Napoleon on his escape, but the French minister's protests were so hostile that they evoked spirited replies from both Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. These replies, most unexpectedly, aroused the admiration of Napoleon and appear to have confirmed him in his resolve to encourage Italian unity. "Now that is what I call courage," he exclaimed, and he proceeded to publish Orsini's last letter appealing to him to support Italian freedom. Henceforth the scheme matured in negotiations between Napoleon and Cavour, conducted in the deepest secrecy and mystery, yet inevitably leading to rumor and shrewd guesswork in the chancelleries of Europe.

The first step in fulfilling the Pact of Plombières was the simplest to achieve; and in mid-September, 1858, little Clotilde agreed to meet Jérôme and promised "if he is not actually repulsive to me I have decided to marry him." He was not, and she did. The marriage advertised how close was to be the alliance between Piedmont and France. In January, 1859, the Pact, hitherto only verbal, was embodied in a formal treaty between the two governments. Two months later Russia was won over by a treaty whereby Napoleon agreed to support revision of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 in return for Russian approval of changes in the settlement of 1815 insofar as it affected Italy. This cleared the field, and insured against Russian intervention. British intervention was taken to be unlikely because, although British distrust of Napoleon was becoming acute, popular sympathies lay with Italy. Prussia was expected to follow Britain in seeking mediation but to be not averse to seeing Austria humiliated; and events fully bore out this expectation.


Piedmont and Austria began to mobilize as the international tension of a war scare intensified. Cavour's diplomacy was geared to the simple aim of forcing Austria to issue an ultimatum at the right moment, so put-

⁹ See pp. 101 and 112.

ting herself in the wrong with the other European powers. Mobilization in Piedmont, where it involved the calling up of reserves, created severe dislocation of civil life and inflated the diplomatic crisis. It was more than a precautionary measure, and by committing the government to a policy from which it could not retreat, came near to being a declaration of war. Napoleon, under severe political and diplomatic pressure, showed signs of backing down. By April 18 it even seemed that the concert of Europe was reviving enough to prevent an outbreak of war; and it might well have done so, for the next day Cavour agreed to demobilize. But the emperor Francis Joseph at that very moment sent the long-awaited ultimatum and refused to demobilize. Cavour's policy of "defensive provocation" unexpectedly triumphed, and war began with Austria as the technical aggressor. The treaty with France therefore held good.

Villafranca, 1859. After six weeks of fighting the Piedmontese and French forces won two pitched battles, at Magenta and Solferino, and drove the Austrians out of Lombardy. These were decisive victories and betokened the eventual defeat of Austria—unless other powers came to her aid. At this point the enigmatic Napoleon effected one of those incalculable about-turns of policy which were to end in his downfall. Prussia had begun to mobilize; and although Austria had no assurance that Prussia would help her against Piedmont, Napoleon became anxious. Both the French and Austrian governments, therefore, were inclined to make a quick peace. On July 11 Francis Joseph and Napoleon met and agreed to make peace on condition that only Lombardy be given up and that an Italian Confederation be formed under the presidency of the Pope. The rulers of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, recently expelled by their subjects, would be reinstated. This treaty of Villafranca of 1859 came as a bolt out of the blue to Cavour, who regarded as total defeat any such arrangement that left Austria (as the government of Venetia) a member of an Italian confederation. He promptly resigned. Throughout France, Italy, and many other parts of Europe, Napoleon's betrayal of the nationalist cause in Italy stirred liberal sentiment as nothing else could have done. He had made a mistake that was inexcusable in a former *Carbonaro*: he underrated the passions of liberal nationalism.

In the Italy of 1859 it was impossible to play with the forces of nationalism, inflame them to a fever pitch of expectations, and then dash all hopes by so tortuous a policy. During the fighting the many nationalist groups of central Italy had sprung into action, expelling petty rulers and preparing for liberation. They could not now afford to stop, to allow 1859 to become a mere repetition of 1849; Villafranca made them desperate. In August constituent assemblies met in Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, and formed a military alliance with a common army. They wanted Victor Emmanuel as their king. By December the tergiversations of Napoleon led him to go back even on the terms



MAP 5. UNIFICATION OF ITALY, 1859-70

The core of Italian unification was the Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia. It gained Lombardy from the Austrian Empire at the Treaty of Villafranca in 1859. The following year Parma, Modena, and Tuscany were joined to it; Garibaldi conquered Sicily and Naples; and Cavour annexed to Piedmont all the remaining central states except Rome. When the first Italian parliament met at Turin in 1861, only Venetia and the Papal city of Rome remained unincorporated. These were added in 1866 and 1870, as a result of Bismarck's defeats of Austria and France. By 1871 Italy's political unification was complete.

of Villafranca, and he again began to support the Italian liberal nationalists. In January, 1860, Cavour resumed office in Turin, bent upon utilizing this new turn of events to annex central Italy. The following month Napoleon agreed to new terms of the old bargain. Piedmont could have Parma and Modena, as well as Lombardy; but if it took Tuscany then France must get Nice and Savoy. Cavour agreed, regarding Tuscany as essential to the shaping of a solid north Italian kingdom. In March the central Italian states voted almost unanimously, by plebiscite, for union with Piedmont. Europe was presented with the accomplished fact of a new Italian kingdom which included all Italy except Venetia in the north, the Marches and Umbria and the Papal States in the center, and the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily in the south. These exceptions were large and important; but by the end of 1860 the Marches and Umbria were added to it by conquest and plebiscite, and so were Naples and Sicily. (See Map 5.)

Garibaldi. These further acquisitions between March and November, 1860, were due mainly to the efforts of the veteran Garibaldi. He started in the south and worked northward—concentrating first on Sicily, where his natural advantages were greatest. In May he landed at Marsala with his band of a thousand red-shirts and proclaimed himself dictator of the island. The Sicilian people who rallied to him were more intent on getting rid of their local grievances and on shaking off the rule of Naples than on any notion of unification with northern Italy. But as a popular hero of the most romantic and glamorous kind, he was able with their help to defeat the large Bourbon army of Francis II of Naples, heir to a system of government sapped by decades of brutality. In August, Garibaldi led his forces across the straits of Messina to attack Naples, and he took it early in September. The Bourbon army collapsed before him, Francis fled, and Garibaldi's progress became a triumphal procession. It was his intention to march on to Rome and turn over the whole of southern Italy to King Victor Emmanuel.

But these dramatic victories of Garibaldi did not at all suit Cavour's plans. To attack Rome would mean trouble with France and with the whole of Catholic Europe; to force the pace of events too hard might also call down a further onslaught from Austria; and since the republican supporters of Mazzini were now gaining great strength among Garibaldi's followers, there was every danger that the nationalist movement might abandon Piedmontese leadership and turn republican. He must therefore somehow check Garibaldi's plans. He turned again to his old ally Napoleon, who for different reasons shared Cavour's fears. By agreement with France, Cavour sent the Piedmontese army to invade the Marches, which had been prepared by the work of his agents to receive it; the army then destroyed the papal forces led by General Lamoricière, a French Catholic royalist whose anti-Bonapartist sentiments made his defeat welcome

to Napoleon; and it marched on to Naples, forestalling and checking the movement of Garibaldi. A plebiscite was held in Umbria and the Marches in October, and they were duly annexed to the Piedmontese monarchy in November. In the same month Victor Emmanuel and Cavour rode into Naples, similarly annexed after a popular plebiscite. Meanwhile Garibaldi, refusing all rewards, set sail humbly for his island home on Caprera. His intervention had been decisive, though it had served Cavour's cause more than his own. In January, 1861, the first all-Italian parliament met in Turin, with only Venetia and the city of Rome itself still unconquered for Italian unification. On June 6 Cavour died, dying (like Abraham Lincoln four years later) at the very moment when his survival seemed essential if his work were to be completed and true national unity preserved.

Prussia versus Austria. Meanwhile, north of the Alps, comparable movements for unification were gathering strength in Germany. In the month when the Italian parliament met and accepted Victor Emmanuel as king of all Italy, a new king, William I, came to the throne of Prussia. Since Frederick William became incapable of ruling in 1857, his brother William had acted as regent. Though deeply conservative and regarding kingship as a pious divine duty, he also believed in the national mission of Prussia to unify Germany. Nationalists and even liberals welcomed his accession. The situation that confronted him in Prussia and in the German *Bund* had been greatly transformed by the activities of Napoleon and Cavour, and especially by their war of 1859 against Austria and their erection of a new Italian kingdom. The significant decision in Prussian policy had been her refusal to come to Austria's aid in the war of 1859, despite their mutual obligations as members of the German *Bund*. Her motives had been to assert Prussia's role as an independent great power, to play a diplomatic hand as free as Britain's or Russia's, to stay in reserve as a possible mediator of the dispute.

With this aim in mind she resisted, within the Diet of the *Bund* at Frankfurt (*Bundestag*), the scheme sponsored by Bavaria and Austria to appoint a confederate commander in chief to hold office for five years, and alternating between Prussia and Austria. Prussia proposed, instead, a dual system in time of peace, which would place two northern confederate army corps under Prussian control and two southern army corps under Austrian control. In this way the Prussian government backed not the unification but the partition of Germany, for its scheme would have left southern Germany under Austrian political influence as well as under her military supervision. It was, indeed, a scheme for northern German unification parallel with Cavour's initial plans for a kingdom of Northern Italy headed by Piedmont. Both movements began with schemes for partial, not total, unification.

This conflict of view about the organization of the German army

was of little importance for its military consequences (the military strength of the smaller states was slender anyhow compared with that of either Prussia or Austria); but it was of great significance for its political implications. It raised the whole issue of Prussia's place in Germany. The defeats of the Austrian troops at Magenta and Solferino in 1859 brought Prussia a relative gain in prestige. Her own decision to mobilize during the war had, moreover, proved a powerful factor in Napoleon's calculations when he made the peace of Villafranca; though otherwise Prussia had no say in the creation of the new Italy of 1861. In July, 1861, Otto von Bismarck prepared his famous Baden memorandum on the defense and organization of Germany. He argued that because stability in central and eastern Europe had been destroyed by the breakdown of the Holy Alliance, Prussia now had special responsibilities for the defense of Germany as a whole. These could be exercised only through a body representative of all Germany, in which Prussia would have hegemony. Austria must be excluded, and Germany divided at the river Inn. When the dispute about army reform reached a deadlock soon after William came to the throne in 1861, it was to Bismarck that he turned. The elections of 1862 gave the Liberal opposition a large majority in the lower house of the Prussian parliament. In order to press their opposite view of army reform, they refused to pass the budget. In September, William called in Bismarck as chief minister and foreign minister; with the special task of defying the Liberals and the lower house. At his first meeting with the budget committee Bismarck issued his most famous warning: "the great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and the resolutions of majorities—that was the blunder of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron." He had ample opportunity to make this prophecy come true, for he was to control Prussian policy without interruption for the next twenty-seven years.

Bismarck. This man, who ranks among the greatest heroes of German history and among the most important statesmen of the modern world, assumed power at the age of forty-seven with slender experience of political affairs, but a decade's experience of German and European diplomacy. He had been born in the fateful year 1815, in the Protestant *Junker* estate of Schönhausen in Brandenburg, just east of the Elbe. A massive man of stiff military bearing, he had a quick, sensitive mind, great personal charm, acute intelligence, and indomitable will power. He was by nature passionate and volcanic, a man of action. Though born into a family of landowning gentry and apt to make the most of his *Junker* affinities, Bismarck was in fact brought up in Berlin in contact with the Hohenzollern court. He had a short career in the civil service, then eight years of work as a somewhat unsuccessful rural landowner, and at the age of thirty seemed to be a failure. He was saved from frustration only by happy marriage and family life; and in 1847 he became a member of


the Prussian Diet in Berlin. There he opposed every liberal proposal and made a name for himself as a determined reactionary. Inevitably he deplored the events of 1848, welcomed the end of the Frankfurt Assembly, the defeat of the Erfurt Union of 1850, and the restoration of the old *Bund*. His concern, first and foremost, was with the national interests of the Prussian state. As Prussian representative to the German *Bundestag* at Frankfurt he learned the arts of diplomacy which he was later to use with such devastating effect. By the time he took over the government of Prussia in 1862 he was convinced that Prussian foreign policy must have two guiding principles: alliance with France and Russia, and a decisive showdown with Austria. These ideas governed his initial policy.

His first duty was to defeat the Liberal majority in the Prussian parliament. This involved him in a four-year battle that revealed his qualities of ruthless persistence and strength of purpose. When parliament refused to vote the proposed taxes, the government collected them anyhow. The struggle showed how shallow were the roots of constitutionalism in Prussia, for a docile population paid taxes to the officials of the state bureaucracy despite their illegal basis. Lack of parliamentary consent meant nothing against royal authority. The taxes were used to enlarge, re-equip, and reorganize the army. There was a case for a larger military establishment, if Prussia was to live up to her status as a "great power" and to live down the diplomatic humiliations of recent years—the same case as there was for the new kingdom of Italy to spend lavishly on armaments. Since 1815 the population of Prussia had grown from eleven million to eighteen, but the army had not been correspondingly enlarged. It was ominous, for the future of parliamentary liberalism in Prussia, that this was now done only by violating the constitution. Bismarck had no hesitation in violating it, for he despised liberalism and parliamentary assemblies, and believed in order, service, and duty. He was satisfied that by 1866 Prussia would be strong enough to challenge Austria. Meanwhile he set the diplomatic stage for that challenge, as well as trying out his new army, by his skillful manipulation of the dispute between Germany and Denmark about the old question of control over the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.

The issue had arisen in 1848 and been settled for the time being by the Treaty of London in 1852. The two duchies had then been included among the dominions of the Danish king, though Holstein was left as a member of the German *Bund*.¹⁰ (See Map 6.) What revived the dispute in 1863 was a disputed succession to the Danish throne and the desire of the Danes to incorporate Schleswig, which had a large Danish population. The old king died in November, 1863, and in accordance with the agreement of 1852 he was succeeded by Prince Christian of Glücksburg. The new king, following the policy of his predecessor, tried to

¹⁰ See p. 219.

THE GERMAN QUESTION, 1815-1871



MAP 6. THE GERMAN QUESTION, 1815-71

The Confederation (Bund) of 1815 set up only a loose framework within which Austria predominated. But the enhancement of the power of Prussia marked her out as Austria's chief rival. Attempts at unification in 1848-49 came to nothing (see Chapter 11), and until 1866 Germany was divided into thirty-eight states of which only the largest are shown. In 1866 Bismarck began three stages of unification. First, he conquered for Prussia the areas of Schleswig, Holstein, and Hanover, and in 1867 took Mecklenberg, Saxony, Darmstadt, etc., into the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation. Secondly, in 1870-71 he absorbed Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and other southern states, and seized Alsace and Lorraine from France. Finally, in 1871 he excluded Austria from the German Reich and established the German frontiers as they were to remain until 1918.

change the administration of the duchies and virtually to annex Schleswig. This immediately met with a nationalistic outcry from the *Bundestag* of Frankfurt on behalf of Germany. Why, they asked, should the German minority in southern Schleswig be annexed to a foreign power, and permanently lost to the German fatherland? A rival to the Danish throne, Frederick of Augustenburg, who like the *Bundestag* had never accepted the Treaty of London, lent himself to German intervention. The *Bundestag* decided to back him and go to war.

Bismarck wanted such a war, but he wanted it to be waged by Prussia and Austria in alliance, not by the whole German *Bund*. He saw that for Prussia to make a successful war against Denmark in 1864 would serve some of the same purposes as Cavour's timely entry into the Crimean War: it would indicate future leadership, and would raise Prussia's prestige. To act jointly with Austria was both inevitable and desirable; inevitable, because Austria would never agree to let Prussia act alone, and he was not yet ready to defy her; desirable, because any Prussian-Austrian settlement of so thorny a problem would leave ample room for picking a quarrel with Austria later whenever he chose. Bismarck hastily made an alliance with Austria in February, 1864, sent a joint Prussian-Austrian army against Denmark, and claimed that it was acting as the agent of the *Bund*. Denmark was quickly defeated, and in October, 1864, the three powers signed the Treaty of Vienna. The Danish king "renounced all his rights over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in favor of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria." The claims both of the *Bund* and of Frederick were completely ignored. Henceforth Prussia, unlike Piedmont, could "go it alone."

What were the attitudes of the other three great powers to this open defiance of the principles of a balance of power and the "concert of Europe" which had, as recently as 1856, been at least partially reasserted? ¹¹ They were directly concerned, because the Treaty of London in 1852 had been signed by all the five great powers, as well as by Denmark and Sweden; and they were materially affected because Prussian and Austrian action had forced a small state to surrender territories that were generally regarded as a likely source of international dispute. But each of the three, for different reasons, was inhibited from taking any action. In Britain, Lord Palmerston blustered, but found Queen Victoria, a majority of his cabinet, and the opposition, all against any specific action. Napoleon III had himself, only five years before, connived at a similar defiance of the concert of Europe when he joined with Piedmont to attack Austria; he was by 1864 on bad terms with Britain and faced with growing opposition at home; and since 1861 he had become more and more deeply embroiled in the difficult entanglement of the Mexican expedition, which committed French troops to trying to keep Maxi-

¹¹ See p. 222.

milian, brother of the Austrian emperor Francis Joseph, on the throne of Mexico. He was at that moment in neither the mood nor the position to exert pressure on Austria and Prussia. Russia exercised no restraining influence because Bismarck had taken the precaution of ensuring her friendly neutrality. Only the year before he had assured Alexander II of support against the Polish insurrection, which had threatened to attract British and French sympathies against Russia. Alexander, grateful for Bismarck's backing against the Poles, was now willing enough to reciprocate as regards the Danes. The new kingdom of Italy, though ranking as a "great power," had neither the prestige nor the inclination to engage herself against Prussia and Austria together. Bismarck had timed his actions with great insight and skill.

The two duchies were jointly occupied by Prussia and Austria. By the Convention of Gastein in August, 1865, Prussia took Schleswig to administer, Austria took Holstein to administer, but the future fate of the duchies remained a joint responsibility. This degree of partition left the partnership most uneasy, and Bismarck knew that his only problem was to time and stage the next war, the German civil war against Austria, as well as he had staged his first. He made overtures of friendship to both Italy and France. In return for Italian promises of help against Austria he promised that Prussia would not make peace until Italy had secured Venetia. In October, 1865, he visited Napoleon at Biarritz and contrived to charm him into friendship. British inertia and Russian friendship would, Bismarck assumed, keep them out of action again, as in 1864. Difficulties at home, from an increasingly active liberal opposition, he removed for the time being by proroguing and dismissing parliament. There is no doubt that Bismarck, backed by Moltke and Roon in charge of the Prussian army, wanted and planned for war against Austria as the next step in Prussian domination of Germany. Bismarck might have preferred to gain his ends without war, but he came to regard war as indispensable. Despite the complexities of the Schleswig-Holstein question, it was only a pretext for the war; despite the strenuous diplomatic maneuvers throughout Europe in 1865 and 1866, and the series of proposals to preserve peace, neither had any chance of preventing Prussia from attacking Austria whenever she chose. In June, 1866, Napoleon agreed with Austria that he would keep France neutral and if possible Italy too; and in return Austria promised to hand Venetia over to Italy after the war, whatever its outcome. Napoleon hoped, in his cloudy way, that the two belligerents might be so equally matched that the struggle would be long and France might step in as the decisive force, exacting whatever gains she could from both. But just as he had underrated the passions of Italian nationalism at Villafranca, so he now underrated the power of Prussian militarism.

In June, 1866, Prussia forced the issue by proposing that the *Bundes-*

tag at Frankfurt should be dissolved and the German *Bund* abolished; she proposed the election of a special German assembly to draft a new constitution excluding Austria and all Austrian lands. Austria retaliated by accusing Prussia of breaking both the Treaty of Vienna and the Convention of Gastein, and demanding mobilization of the federal German forces against her. Austria was supported by nine out of the fifteen states, including Hanover, Saxony, Baden, and Bavaria. Prussia was therefore faced with scattered west German armies, which she could prevent from combining, and with the main Austrian army in Bohemia. War began on June 14. After only three weeks it resulted in the defeat of Austria and her German allies. On July 3 the decisive battle was fought at Sadowa (or Königgrätz), where the main Austrian army was beaten. In Lombardy strong Austrian forces, pinned south of the Alps by the alliance of Italy with Prussia, defeated the Italians on the old battlefield of Custozza. The Italian fleet was also defeated at the battle of Lissa. These reverses of his Italian allies were especially embarrassing to Bismarck. As in 1864 his greatest anxiety, as soon as he had attained his aims, was to bring the war to a speedy end. He had to prevent it from spreading, and forestall any danger that a concert of powers might intervene to demand a share in the settlement. Even generous terms for Austria were preferable to that.

In August, Bismarck forced the Prussian king to conclude the Treaty of Prague with Austria. He had all he wanted: the power to expel Austria from German affairs. The treaty arranged for a new federal constitution to be set up for Germany north of the Main, alongside an association of southern German states "with an independent international existence." Prussia got Schleswig and Holstein, subject to northern Schleswig's being returned to Denmark if so decided by plebiscite. Bismarck saw to it that this proviso never applied because no plebiscite was held, and Prussia kept the territories until 1919. Austria undertook to claim no further share in the organization of Germany. She was obliged to hand Venetia over to Napoleon, as she had previously promised France; and Napoleon, preening himself on at least this opportunity to appear as a mediator, duly handed it on to Italy. He won no gratitude from Italy, only indignation. At least Italy had done some fighting for it—if not very successfully—and it was Prussia which had promised it to her.

The war had achieved no less and—equally important for Bismarck—no more than he had intended. The excellent organization of the Prussian army, the new needle gun with which it was equipped, the clockwork precision of the campaign, had combined to serve perfectly his diplomatic and political aims. The Austro-Prussian War was a landmark in the history of several states. It was a sharp blow to French power and

to Napoleon's prestige, and brought nearer the fall of the Second Empire. It completed the north Italian kingdom and brought Italian unification one step closer. It helped to bring about the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867. None of these consequences embarrassed Bismarck. The pieces on the European chessboard remained as he wanted them.

Franco-Prussian War, 1870. Meanwhile Bismarck had been busy, even before the Treaty of Prague was signed, staging the next series of diplomatic maneuvers which would complete the political unification of Germany under Prussia. He signed treaties with Bavaria and other southern states that opened them to Prussian influence. Napoleon III, searching as ever for the basis of a bargain which would bring him prestige, proposed that he might accept Prussian gains if in return he could advance French territories to the Rhine in the direction of Mainz. Bismarck did not at once reject these proposals. He induced the French ambassador, Benedetti, to state the proposals formally, got the Prussian king to reject them in righteous horror, and then published them to the world. Napoleon pursued similar suggestions for the French annexation of Belgium with Prussian connivance. Bismarck made certain that these, too, were put into writing and then kept them by him until 1870, publishing them at a moment when they served to scare Britain and Belgium into anti-French policies.

These unscrupulous tactics succeeded because French opinion regarded Sadowa as a French defeat, and because Napoleon was seeking feverishly for some form of "compensation" for the great gains made by Prussia, and for the final collapse of his ill-fated expedition to Mexico. In the older conceptions of a balance of power such compensation was reasonable and conventional. In the new world of *Realpolitik* there were no grounds for expecting compensation except at the point of the bayonet. Napoleon, now an ill and failing man, was already old-fashioned and out-of-date in his grasp of the European scene. Bismarck was effecting a revolution in the whole balance of power—that Napoleon understood. But in thinking that the balance could be redressed by diplomatic bargaining instead of by superior force, he was profoundly mistaken.

Bismarck had no such delusions, and proceeded to digest his latest territorial gains in preparation for defiance of France and the final incorporation of the southern German states. By July, 1867, the projected North German Confederation was equipped with its constitution. Hanover, Nassau, Frankfurt, and the Electorate of Hesse, having been defeated in battle, were annexed to Prussia. The other north German states—Brunswick, Anhalt, Oldenburg, and the rest—were included in a federal structure that was designed to make the subsequent inclusion of the southern states easy, yet to ensure the actual domination of Prussia

throughout the whole of Germany. The result was a curious hybrid constitution, of importance because it was later adapted to the needs of the German Empire in 1871.

The hereditary head of the new Confederation was the king of Prussia. His chief minister was the chancellor, through whom he appointed and controlled all other ministers and officials. The chancellor was appointed by the king, but all other ministers were subordinate to the chancellor. The federal council representing the different states (*Bundesrat*) represented not their peoples but their governments; and representation was weighted according to a schedule laid down in the constitution. Whereas no other state had more than four votes, Prussia had seventeen. This gave her automatic predominance in the *Bundesrat*. As might be expected, the *Bundesrat* was accorded more decisive powers than was the other federal assembly, the Diet of the Confederation (*Reichstag*), which was "elected by universal and direct election with secret voting," as in 1849. As chancellor of the Confederation, Bismarck now virtually governed the whole of Germany north of the river Main. He exercised very direct influence over the affairs of most of the southern states as well. He was in an immensely stronger position to grapple with the obstacle that he regarded as still his most formidable—France. Inside Prussia new elections brought large conservative gains and liberal losses. Bismarck was emerging as the national hero of Germany—the invincible champion whom it was more than ever unpopular to oppose even within Prussia. Nationalism gained, but the cause of liberalism and of parliamentary institutions had suffered loss.

From 1866 onward relations between France and Germany remained tense. Napoleon, and behind him an aggrieved national opinion, nursed bitter jealousies of Prussia's gains, mingled with fears of further upheavals in the European balance of power. The "concert of Europe" had become so threadbare and discredited a conception that no pacification or settlement seemed possible. There existed no international organization for promoting a peaceful settlement of disputes and, as always in such conditions, there began feverish competition in preparedness for war. Across the Rhine, German opinion, too, alerted by Bismarck's clever use of Napoleon's indiscretions, was coming to look upon France as a sworn enemy and an obstacle to further national unification. For a time in 1870 things seemed to have quieted down. The international situation had remained long enough unchanged, after the torrent of changes between 1859 and 1866, for it to seem almost stabilized. The violent dispute between France and Germany about the succession to the Spanish throne, which suddenly blew up in July, 1870, came all the more as a rude shock to the chancelleries of Europe—always except to that of Prussia, which was quick to take full advantage of it. It seems certain,

indeed, that Bismarck engineered the dispute by supporting the Hohenzollern candidate for the Spanish crown.

Again, the technical details of the dispute mattered little, because it became hardly more than a pretext for war. As already shown,¹² the instability of Spanish politics was closely connected with the character of the Spanish queen, Isabella. She fled into exile in September, 1869, and by the summer of 1870 the question of her successor was still unsettled. Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was among those considered. He was related to the king of Prussia, who was head of the Hohenzollern family. Because it was expected that Leopold's accession in Spain would bring still further gains both in prestige and in material benefit to Prussia, it was welcomed in Prussia and equally warmly opposed in France. France feared encirclement, should Hohenzollerns rule on both the Rhine and the Pyrenees.

On July 6 the French foreign minister announced that unless the Hohenzollern candidate were withdrawn, France would treat the matter as a cause for war. On July 9 Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, had four interviews about it with the King. On July 12 Prince Leopold, under diplomatic pressure and not reluctant to back down from so insecure a career as that of a Spanish monarch, withdrew his candidature. In France this was greeted with exultation, as a great diplomatic victory over Prussia and as "revenge for Sadowa." The French government decided immediately to press their advantage and to demand from Prussia guarantees that the candidature would not be renewed. Benedetti was instructed to seek such assurances personally from the king of Prussia. He again sought out William at Ems on July 13 and presented this demand. The King received him courteously but firmly refused to give any such guarantee. Later in the day, after receiving official news of Leopold's withdrawal, William sent one of his aides to Benedetti to say that he now regarded the affair as closed and that he could not see him again about it. He had a telegram sent to Bismarck in Berlin, telling him what had taken place. There seemed no occasion here for war; and but for Bismarck it would not have led to war.

Bismarck wanted war. He believed that the time was ripe. As before, he wanted the enemy to appear to be the aggressor. He bitterly deplored the King's mild behavior and on July 13 he was about to resign. He regarded the events of July 12 and 13 as the French did—as a humiliating surrender before French demands. He was at dinner with Moltke and Roon on July 13 when the telegram arrived from the King at Ems, informing him of the events. He had permission to inform the press and the Prussian embassies abroad if he wished. He saw that if he only slightly edited the telegram he could present the news to the world in a totally

¹² See p. 249.

different light. He drew up a condensed version which made it appear that the King's refusal to see Benedetti again was due not to his having meanwhile heard news of Leopold's withdrawal, but to the very nature of Benedetti's original demands. It thus appeared that the King had been far from amenable and had curtly rebuffed, from the start, these formal demands of the French government. Both German and French public opinion were so sensitive and so excitable that when this news came out in the press of both countries it caused hysterical reactions. Never before had the power of the press played so dramatic a part in international diplomacy. France felt insulted and clamored for war to avenge her honor; German opinion rejoiced at the King's sturdy defiance of unwarranted claims. On July 19 France declared war on Prussia. Once again Bismarck got what he wanted when he wanted it. He put the match to the powder barrel. That the powder barrel existed was as much the responsibility of France as of Prussia. Neither was anxious to keep the peace. But as soon as war became probable, Bismarck claimed it as his own and used it for his own ends.

The war followed the now familiar pattern. The German army, commanded as one unit by Moltke, organized with scientific precision, and equipped with superior artillery and supplies, at once moved smoothly into action. The cumbersome French war machine, lacking clear leadership and surprisingly ill-equipped for action, creaked and split before the concentrated power of the German attack. Marshal Macmahon commanded in Alsace, Marshal Bazaine in Lorraine, with no considered strategy to co-ordinate their actions. Napoleon III, courageously fighting his own physical weakness, was in no condition to unify the command. On August 6 Macmahon was beaten and withdrew his forces, and Bazaine's army of some 200,000 was encircled at Metz. Macmahon, who should have been falling back to defend Paris, was sent to relieve Bazaine. He got as far as Sedan on August 30. On September 2 his whole army and Napoleon III himself were forced to surrender. In Paris a republic was proclaimed and a provisional government took over power, calling itself the Government of National Defense.¹³ Paris went into a state of siege, and the German army settled down to blockade it. The siege lasted until the end of January, 1871, but meanwhile, at the end of October, Bazaine with his army of 173,000 also capitulated.

The war proved longer and tougher than Bismarck had bargained for. Gambetta, escaping from Paris in a balloon, organized provincial resistance from Tours with the object of relieving Paris. He and his colleagues performed prodigies of improvisation, but they had little chance of success. On January 28 an armistice was signed with Bismarck. The war had been kept as a duel, and involved no third power. It was the nemesis of Napoleon's restless policy that France found herself friend-

¹³ See p. 294.

less in Europe; it was the triumph of Bismarck's policy that by judicious timing he contrived to isolate the conflict and prevent its becoming a wider European war.

Bismarck refused to make peace until elections had been held for a new national assembly in France. The Assembly which met at Bordeaux in February, 1871, accepted with heavy heart the severe terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt. France lost Alsace and Lorraine, which Germany annexed. She undertook to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs (200 million pounds sterling) and German troops remained in occupation of the northern provinces until it was paid. The peace treaty was signed on May 10, 1871. But meanwhile Bismarck used the defeat of France to complete the unification of Germany. The southern states of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg were induced by the surge of nationalist enthusiasm to join the German Confederation. Germany remained partitioned at the Inn—for Austrian territories were excluded—but no longer at the Main. On January 18, in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles, the king of Prussia was proclaimed German emperor.

German Unification. There has been considerable disagreement among historians about whether the long sequence of events which culminated in the new German *Reich* of 1871 can be regarded as one coherent plan, conceived in the mastermind of Bismarck when he came to power in 1862 and then carried out, with uncanny insight and dominating will power, according to a precise timetable. Both the enthusiastic hero worshipers of Bismarck and his liberal critics have tended to argue that this was so. There is one remarkable piece of evidence which supports this view. According to Disraeli, who met Bismarck at a dinner in London in 1862, shortly before he came to power, Bismarck told him about his whole scheme in the course of half an hour's conversation. Later in the evening Disraeli remarked to Saburov of the Russian embassy in London, "What an extraordinary man Bismarck is! He meets me for the first time and he tells me all he is going to do. He will attack Denmark in order to get possession of Schleswig-Holstein; he will put Austria out of the German Confederation; and then he will attack France—an extraordinary man!" If this tale is true, and both Saburov and the official biographers of Disraeli vouched for it, there would seem to be no doubt that at least the broad design was in Bismarck's mind when he took office.

But it is so rare in history for even the greatest of statesmen to plan successfully ten years ahead and then to impose their plans on the world, that Bismarck's more recent biographers have cast doubts on whether he can be credited with so much uncanny and prophetic insight. Bismarck, it is argued, was not like Metternich or Alexander I, a system maker. He was a brilliant opportunist, whose course of action always remained undecided and flexible until the last moment and whose policy looks more

clear-cut and coherent in retrospect than it was at the time. He was first and always a Prussian nationalist who believed that Prussian interests demanded that she should dominate the whole of northern Germany and exclude Austria from German affairs. His policy toward Denmark, Austria, and even France was guided therefore only by the one ultimate test of the interests of the Prussian state. All else was a matter of detail and method, determined by the circumstances of the moment as he, with his profoundly realistic insight into the nature of European politics, understood them. The unification of Germany was incidental, a by-product of his never-ending pursuit of Prussian interests.

His original plan for unification had reached only to the Main; it was extended to the Inn, and so brought in the southern German states, chiefly as a necessity of the war against France. "Far from using the war to promote unification," writes A. J. P. Taylor, "he sought unification in order to continue the war." He distrusted Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg as Catholic states, liable to weaken rather than strengthen the predominance of Protestant Prussia in Germany. But he brought them in when it became a military and diplomatic necessity to shorten the war against France and preclude intervention by other powers. The southern states could make a separate peace so long as they remained independent states; once included in the empire they would have to stay in the war. Likewise he at first had no desire to annex Alsace and Lorraine, because the provinces included so many Frenchmen who he foresaw would be an embarrassing national minority in the new *Reich*. He agreed to annexation only under pressure from the generals who demanded the territories on strategic grounds. This deviation from his original policy was to prove fatal. It made France the irreconcilable enemy of the German empire, plotting revenge and eventually defeating Bismarck's aim of keeping France friendless and isolated in Europe.

In the same way the achievements of Cavour in Italy have been subject to reinterpretation by later historians. He too, they claim, was the brilliant and ingenious opportunist rather than the framer of long-term plans for a speculative future. Neither he nor Bismarck, it is argued, dealt in futures; both were always engrossed with the present. They were supreme practitioners of *Realpolitik*, and their eventual successes are to be explained more by this profound and imaginative grasp of the immediate realities of international politics than by any alleged control over the long-term course of events. They were masterly statesmen, not masterful supermen.

Although these two views of Cavour and Bismarck as opportunists and as planners seem to be so diametrically opposed, they are not entirely irreconcilable. Both men, it can be agreed, cherished certain aims, and both had minimum programs, which they devoted all their energies to completing. A united kingdom of northern Italy, a Prussian-controlled

north German federation, seemed practicable programs of policy in the 1850's. Both were within the grasp of practical politics if only Austria could be forced back behind the Alps and the Main, and if other great powers—particularly Russia, France, and Britain—could be kept from intervening on Austria's side. Once the sequence of diplomatic movements and military events necessary to achieve these ends had been started, events themselves began to take control. The statesmen of Italy and Germany adjusted their policies to take account of each new situation that arose, and to exploit for their own ends each new set of circumstances as it was revealed. Because the old machinery of a concert of Europe had been demolished, and because the western powers of Britain and France, for different reasons, took no decisive steps to restore it, central Europe was reshaped by the interplay of ruthless and well-devised policy with the course of events. It is the way history often works.

The Settlement of 1871

THE YEAR of explosion, of extreme violence, loosened several other pieces in the kaleidoscope of European affairs and allowed them to drop into a new pattern. First, the government of Italy took the opportunity of the withdrawal of French troops from Rome in August, 1870, to seize the city a month later. The government first circularized the European powers, describing how it proposed to ensure the freedom and spiritual independence of the Papacy when its temporal power would pass to the Italian state. Austria and Germany, even France and Spain, now accepted the incorporation of Rome as unavoidable. But the Pope himself still rejected the whole idea. He compelled Italy to use force to seize Rome. He then capitulated, and a plebiscite held in the papal state went overwhelmingly in favor of union with Italy. So Italian unification, too, was accomplished in 1870 without foreign intervention.

Secondly, Alexander of Russia took the opportunity to announce in October, 1870, that he would no longer feel bound by the naval clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 1856.¹⁴ He claimed the right, denied by that treaty, to build military or naval establishments on the shores of the Black Sea. France was powerless to protest. Gladstone's government in Britain, in concert with Prussia, summoned a conference in London to denounce this unilateral change in a multilateral agreement. But nothing was done to make Russia retract her repudiation of the treaty. Again the "concert of Europe" suffered a severe rebuff, and a fresh cause of future Anglo-Russian distrust was created.

¹⁴ See p. 225.

Thirdly, in France the republican opposition to the Second Empire seized its chance, and on September 4, 1870, a republic was proclaimed in Paris. Although the newly elected National Assembly of 1871 included a majority of monarchists, opinion in the country soon swung round to republican sympathies. By 1875 the parliamentary Third Republic received formal definition in new constitutional laws; but not before there had occurred the violent outburst of the Paris Commune. This insurrection of the capital lasted from mid-March until the end of May, 1871, and was accompanied by more short-lived risings in other big cities—Lyons, Marseilles, Saint-Etienne, Toulouse, Narbonne, and Limoges. The Commune was many things: a protest of civic pride against the humiliation of defeat; an extreme republican protest against the predominantly monarchist assembly; a social rising prompted by the sufferings of siege and hunger; a socialistic revolt of the urban workers.¹⁵ But in the circumstances of 1871 it was, above all, a demand for drastic decentralization of government—an attempt to displace the centralized nation-state by a federal conglomeration of small self-governing local units, groups, and associations. By crushing this movement so decisively in 1871 Adolphe Thiers, head of the executive power in France, assumed a place in history alongside Cavour, Bismarck, and Abraham Lincoln as one of the great champions of national unity and the nation-state. He ensured that France of the Third Republic would be a middle-class parliamentary state capable of pursuing a unified national policy in world affairs.

Whatever may have been the personal responsibilities of the Piedmontese and Prussian leaders for the events of the period 1850–70, the undoubted effect of their behavior was that war between states had been used as a deliberate method of political reconstruction. To a degree unknown since 1815, politics were now the politics of intimidation and organized violence. The governments of great powers were dedicated to war as an effective instrument of national policy; and to diplomacy as a means not of keeping the peace and maintaining the public law of Europe, but of preparing and timing hostilities so as to yield the maximum advantages. Two great powers only—Britain and Russia—had held aloof from these wars, and had enjoyed years of peace while central Europe rocked with the roll of gunfire. Even the United States, in the same decade, had been torn by war between the northern and southern states. Nor were the defeated powers of Europe left any less bellicose in spirit. The republicans who came to power in France were for long committed to ideas of a war of revenge; the Danes never accepted as permanent the loss of Schleswig to Germany; the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary soon replaced ideas of revenge against Prussia by a tightening alliance with the new German *Reich*, dictated by fear of

¹⁵ See p. 364.

Russia and hope of gains at the expense of Turkey. The legacy of the great wars of the 1860's was recurrent international tensions and new systems of alliances in the 1870's and after.

The New Balance. With uneasy relations prevailing between the six great powers of Europe, the whole nature of the balance of power underwent a transformation. It became a fluid conception, a system of diplomacy conceived as a self-adjusting mechanism whereby an equilibrium was constantly re-established by fresh governmental maneuvers and agreements, some secret, some public. A generation of armed watchfulness and anxious rearmament was the sequel of 1871. The ethical standards of the behavior of states toward one another—never high in modern history—had sharply deteriorated as a result of the cynical diplomacy of Cavour and Bismarck and Napoleon III. The notion of a public law of Europe, which it was in the common interest of all states to preserve, seemed to have been abandoned along with the idea of a general “concert of Europe.” The delirium of nationalistic fever which accompanied the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 betokened a new era of popular hysteria in international relations.¹⁶


Despite these facts, the events that culminated in 1871 can properly be regarded as one of those great periodic settlements of Europe which habitually follow great wars. The map of the continent between 1871 and 1918 was simpler than it had been before or has been since (see Map 7). The total number of states in Europe was greatly reduced. Like the settlement of 1815, that of 1871 inaugurated a period of 43 years during which there was no war between the major powers. In some respects the new map of Europe and the new pattern of international relations were more radical transformations than those that occurred in 1815. The settlement of 1871 resembled those of 1815 and of 1919 in that it represented a consolidation of the outcome of great wars between major powers. It differed from them, and more closely resembled the European settlement of _____ in that it was framed not by general agreement of

MAP 7. EUROPE, 1871. See following pages.

After the unification of Italy and Germany (see Maps 5 and 6) the political map of Europe was simpler than at any previous time in history. Six big states, more evenly matched in power, now dominated the scene. Outside the eastern marchlands and the Balkans, frontiers were less in dispute than at any time since 1815; but the Ottoman Empire remained “the sick man of Europe.” Relations between the other powers were increasingly complicated by this “Eastern Question,” and the settlement of it attempted in 1878 (see inset) proved undurable. Because of these issues, and of colonial and other rivalries, the powers formed into two rival alliances which in 1914 were pulled into the First World War (see Part VI and Map 8).

¹⁶ See p. 343.

EUROPE 1871





the victorious powers registered in a large international conference, but rather by a sequence of separate victories and *coups*. It received no more than the tacit and often reluctant acquiescence of the great powers which were not directly involved. Because it was not shaped or supported by an organized concert of the powers, it left behind it no concept or institution of a "concert of Europe."

The settlement of 1871 was, in origin and nature, a new arrangement of European frontiers and relationships dictated by events and imposed by German military power. It had happened—it had fallen into shape undesignedly but with dramatic rapidity. It therefore took some time for the governments of Europe to appreciate its essential features and its diplomatic consequences. That two large national states now existed in central Europe instead of the previous multitude of small non-national states was quickly understood and accepted. Their creation was accepted as irreversible, their survival as inevitable. But the precise position of their frontiers was not regarded as fixed. Just as there were Danish and French minorities within the frontiers of the German *Reich*, so there remained German and Italian minorities outside the borders of the new states. To this extent, at least, the settlement lacked completeness and finality.

The territorial and political settlement rested, no less clearly than that of 1919, on certain underlying principles. Though not deliberately contrived in all its details, it had certain inevitable modes of operation. It rested, primarily, on the principle of nationality: on the belief—which had conquered Europe since 1848—that people who felt drawn together by bonds of a common national sentiment should proceed to set up a common state and assert their collective independence of other states. The incorporation of nearly all Italian-speaking people within the new united Italian kingdom, and of areas such as Schleswig and Holstein, Alsace and Lorraine, into the new German *Reich*, were violent assertions of this principle. But these very assertions denied comparable rights to the French inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine and to the Danish inhabitants of Schleswig. It followed that rights of national self-determination belonged only to those nations powerful enough to assert them: they were implicitly denied to all who lacked superior power. The tendency to make Europe a continent of nation-states instead of a mixture of large and small non-national states involved from the outset this inner contradiction. The settlement of 1871 violated the principles on which it rested.

The paradox was vividly seen in the settlement of Austria-Hungary under the Dual Monarchy. Independence for Germans and Magyars was attained only by the subjection of Czechs and Slovaks, Croats and Poles. If states were no longer to be frameworks of authority and power within which peoples of different language, race, religion, and nationality could find a common citizenship, but the political forms of exclusive nationality,

then the Austro-Hungarian Empire was doomed to eventual disruption in favor of a multitude of small Balkan states. Others would follow the example of Serbia, and a cluster of mainly Slav states would take the place of Habsburg power. A similar fate might be expected to befall Ottoman Turkey and Romanov Russia. The settlement, so far as eastern Europe was concerned, could be at best only an interim arrangement. And with continuing jealousy and tension between the great powers of the continent, Habsburg or Turkish disintegration would almost certainly bring further major wars. That is the long-term explanation of why the assassination of an Austrian archduke in the little Bosnian town of Sarajevo could, in 1914, precipitate a world war that embroiled all the great powers of Europe.

The ingenious arrangement of the Dual Monarchy proved able, though with increasing difficulty and strain, to postpone disintegration for over forty years to come. The crumbling of Turkish power was to cause most of the great disputes until 1914. Meanwhile the crucial fact in Europe was the supremacy of the German *Reich*. By reason of its great and growing economic resources, its military might, its large population, its considerable strategic advantages in the new Europe of railways and heavy industries, Germany was the new colossus in Europe. Stretching in a continuous mass from the Vosges to the Vistula, and from the Baltic to the Danube, it pressed upon all its neighbors with relentless economic and political force. It included 41 million people when France included only 36, Austria-Hungary 36, the United Kingdom 31½, and Italy 27 million. The disparity increased during the next generation. Of the great powers of Europe only Russia, with some 87 million, had a larger population than the new German empire of 1871. For military purposes these great manpower resources were fully tapped by the new *Reich*. The Prussian army laws were extended to the whole country, and the military forces were unified under the immediate control of Prussia. Only Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg kept independent military contingents, but the king of Prussia, as emperor of Germany, was in complete control of the whole army; just as his chancellor had complete authority in matters of foreign policy.

Bismarck remained chancellor for the next twenty years, and applied his genius to keeping the diplomatic scene favorable to the security and hegemony of Germany in Europe. He preserved and manipulated the settlement of 1871 in German interests, just as Metternich had used the settlement of 1815 in Austrian interests. German economic life made rapid progress under the stimulus of political unification, the indemnity received from France, the absorption of the developed industrial areas of Alsace and Lorraine, and the acceleration of industrial progress already begun before 1870. The western powers of Britain and France and the Low Countries, despite their leadership in industry, trade, and finance,

found the *Reich* a formidable competitor in world markets. The eastern powers of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey, because of their relative economic backwardness, offered rich openings for economic penetration by the fast-growing German commercial and financial enterprises. A great new dynamic generator of wealth and power had been built into the heartland of Europe; it soon made its impact felt throughout the whole continent.

The Roman Church. The settlement of 1870-71 brought with it an important change in the position of the Roman Catholic Church. In relation to the new nation-states of Italy and Germany the Vatican naturally found itself hostile and on the defensive. The destruction of the temporal power of the Papacy and the loss of the papal territories to Italy remained an inconsolable grievance, and it was not until the Lateran Treaty of 1929 that the Papacy finally recognized the Italian state. Until then each pope regarded himself as a prisoner in the grounds of the Vatican. The domination of the Protestant power of Prussia over the southern, Catholic states of Germany was equally resented, and Bismarckian treatment of Roman Catholics led to a struggle between state and church in Germany throughout the 1870's. In France the simultaneous triumphs of the anticlerical republican parties led to similar difficulties there. Everywhere the spread of a secular spirit, of science and materialism, of state power and capitalist organization, of anticlerical radicalism and of irreligious revolutionary communism, challenged the dogmas, influence, and claims of the Roman Church.

It so happened that in 1870, when the European crisis was at its height, a Vatican council including representatives from the whole of Christendom had been summoned in order to proclaim the dogma of papal infallibility. This was the climax of a series of papal measures intended to counteract the irreligious tendencies of the times. In 1854 the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary had been announced as dogmatic truth, to doubt which was heresy. In 1864 Pope Pius IX, cured of any earlier proclivities toward liberalism by his experiences of 1848 and 1849, issued a *Syllabus of Errors*. It denounced as errors most of the widely current ideas of these decades—liberalism, rationalism, science, progress, and so-called "modern civilization." The ecumenical council of 1870, in accepting and proclaiming the dogma of papal infallibility, completed the triumphs of ultramontanistism over Gallican and other national tendencies within the Church itself. It laid down that when speaking *ex cathedra* on matters of faith and morals, the pope speaks with final and supernatural authority. To question or reject such decisions is heresy. The Roman Church thus emerged from the events of these two decades intransigently opposed to their secular trends and achievements: hostile to science and the nation-state, to the devotion of human energies to material progress and social reform. Yet, by reason

of its new freedom from local, temporal interests in Rome and its own re-equipment of dogma, it was better fitted to appeal to the spiritual loyalty of its adherents in all nations. To the new tensions and fears between large nation-states were added more frequent conflicts between church and state, as well as between the teaching of religion and the trends of science.

In important respects, the settlement of 1871 was a fulfillment of the aims of 1848 by means quite different from the methods of 1848. The liberal and democratic nationalists of 1848 had wanted to make Italy and Germany unified and independent. They believed that true national unity could come only by popular mass action and through parliamentary or republican institutions. Unity had come to Italy and Germany not by revolution but by war, not through surging republican enthusiasm but through monarchical diplomacy and from above. The new kingdoms were parliamentary in form more than in spirit. Nationalism had triumphed at the expense of liberalism; and when, in the generation after 1871, nationalism was wedded to democracy, it never recaptured fully the liberal idealism of 1848. Many liberals in both countries accepted and even welcomed the gifts of national independence from the hands of kings. Some of them were later to join more intransigent liberals and radicals in opposition to the authoritarian tendencies of nationalistic governments. But, at profound variance with the forces of Roman Catholicism, and with proletarian movements now infused with Marxism, liberalism in central Europe suffered lasting loss from the events of 1871. The defeat of its methods in 1871 was to prove as serious as the defeat of its aims in 1848. The political climate in central Europe remained as different from that of western Europe after 1871 as it had been before.

CHAPTER 15

EMANCIPATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

THE DECADES between 1850 and 1870 were formative years in the two largest dynastic empires of eastern Europe, Russia and the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Neither yet felt the full throb of the industrial revolution, though to both the railways had come, and more trade with western countries did something to stimulate new social and political forces. Neither, in these years, lost much of its former territory or gained any new lands; for a time after the Crimean War, neither played a prominent part in general European affairs. But there took place profound internal changes in their social life, combined with surprisingly little corresponding change in their political or administrative systems. They differed from the western nations in that the greatest social changes were effected not by economic processes but by legislative action; and from the central European nations in that no overhaul of their governmental systems accompanied such changes. Politics were, in consequence, harshly out of tune with social life. This created, as always, a revolutionary situation.

The End of Serfdom in Russia

FOUR years before slavery was abolished in the United States, serfdom was abolished in Russia. It was ended, characteristically, by a decree of the tsar Alexander II in 1861. This momentous event was a landmark in the modern history of Russia, not so much because it betokened the acceptance of western ideals of individual freedom and rights, but rather because it inaugurated a social and economic revolution, and opened the door to a more massive material westernization of Russian life. Many different circumstances contributed to the abolition. The defeat of Russia by Britain and France in the Crimean War served as a warning that some change was needed. Operating from a great distance and using only part of their resources, these advanced western powers had mounted a highly localized offensive which the

Russian Empire had failed to repel, despite its vast size and its obvious strategic advantages.

Alexander II. Alexander II had become tsar during the war, in 1855, and he decided to enlist as far as possible the help of the liberal intelligentsia of Russia in reorganizing his regime. This class, composed partly of university students and graduates and literary men, found itself sharply cut off both from the majority of the ruling bureaucracy of tsarist absolutism and from the mass of ordinary people who remained sunk in poverty and ignorance. Their spiritual home was western Europe; their closest affinities lay with the most extreme and perfectionist ideas evolving from the cultural development of western and central Europe. They were strange candidates for a political alliance with the tsardom. But Alexander had no other class to turn to—the landowning aristocracy and gentry were mostly indifferent to reforms, the Orthodox Church was too conservative a body to promote drastic change, the official classes were satisfied with their power, and the mass of peasants were too apathetic and depressed to afford any leverage of self-help. So there had to be a sudden, doctrinaire enactment from above.

Alexander wooed the intellectuals by permitting them to travel more freely abroad, by easing the control of universities and of the press. His father, Nicholas I, had already done something to alleviate the burden of serfdom. Greater freedom of discussion now generated a flow of public opinion which was entirely in favor of emancipating the serfs. The problem was how to do it without ruining the gentry and dislocating the whole economy of the country. As a system of labor relations serfdom was generally recognized, even by the more conservative elements, to be unprofitable and bad. The big landowners of the south, engaged partly in export trade, were finding wage labor more efficient. Serfdom robbed workers of self-respect, initiative, and incentive. It embittered all social life. Local peasant revolts, already endemic, were becoming more frequent. Nor was it only a matter of agricultural labor, though agriculture was by far the largest occupation of the Russian people. Serfs could be used by their owners to work in mines or factories or mills, they could be hired out for that purpose, and they could even be mortgaged as security for debts or loans. Some two thirds of the serfs not owned by the tsar or the state were, indeed, so mortgaged by 1855. They could be bought and sold, and instead of being bound to the soil as previously in central Europe, they were virtually in bondage to their owners. Humane and paternalist treatment, sometimes to be found, in no way offset the obvious social and moral evils of a system which kept more than 40 million people in bondage to landowners or state.

The imperial decree of emancipation gave the Russian peasants legal freedom without economic freedom. They became subjects of the government, and were no longer under compulsion to pay dues to their

former owners either in forced labor or in money. But they had to pay redemption money for such services and dues, and for the land which they now received. In all, about half the cultivated land of Russia was henceforth held by the peasants in their own right, though conditions naturally varied greatly from one area to another. They held it, however, not as private property as did the French peasants, but as shares in the collective property of the village or *mir*. The control and restrictiveness of the *mir* largely replaced the old authority of the gentry. It was the *mir* which paid the redemption money collectively—as it already paid taxes—collected it under sanction of forced labor and other exactions, and as before supervised the allocation and cultivation of the land by the members of the village community. Emancipation meant the abolition of personal servitude but the affirmation of communal responsibilities. The committees of nobles or gentry which were set up everywhere to carry out the reform were above all anxious to avoid the evil of the landless laborer which, in the west, had produced the new urban proletariats. The peasant was to be given a stake in the soil, and, unlike the Prussian peasant after emancipation, he was not left free to take up trade or migrate into the towns. To do so he needed permission from his *mir*. Permission was even more reluctantly given now that it meant unloading on the rest of the village the responsibility for paying the redemption. Only when the *mir* ceased to be collectively responsible for village dues and taxes did freedom of movement become greater; and that was not until after 1905.

If emancipation was a mixed blessing for the peasants, it was usually a welcome arrangement for the landowners. The Russian nobility secured nearly half the arable land, were quit of responsibilities for the serfs, and received the redemption money in place of the human property which they had anyhow largely mortgaged. The aristocracy were strengthened, not weakened, by the change. Opposition to the further liberalizing moves of Alexander came not from aristocracy and gentry, but from the intellectuals whom he had hoped to win over. Since the lords now had no jurisdiction over their serfs, new courts replaced the old. By edicts of 1864 the Tsar overhauled the whole judicial system, with the aim of establishing the "rule of law" on the English model. Trials were now held in public, a jury system was introduced, litigants could choose their own lawyers to represent them in court, and judges were given a better professional training and fixed stipends. At the same time local elected councils (*Zemstvos*) were instituted for districts and provinces, to attend to public health and welfare, road maintenance and education. But no provision was made for a nationally representative body or parliament. The central authority remained detached, autocratic, irresponsible.

Economic Conditions. Nor did emancipation lead to any marked

improvement in the methods or output of Russian agriculture. The government excluded priests and former landowners from the *mir*, and this left the supervising authority exceptionally ignorant and unenterprising. For the next forty years the land was still mostly cultivated in strips, and the time-honored methods were used to grow the traditional crops. No fresh wind of scientific agriculture or progressive methods blew through the farmlands of Russia. Each male child had a right to land, and the land of the *mir* had to be divided periodically to provide for the new generation. A growing population meant, for the most part, a decline in the size or number of strips which each peasant held. As a man's holding shrank, he had no incentive to improve land that he might lose at the next redistribution. He ceased to be able to live on his holding, unless he could get more land from some other source. Some bought land from the nobles. A few moved on to the eastern frontier, much as the American frontiersman moved west. Because productivity did not keep pace with population, famines and periods of great distress became more and more frequent. Personal and family misfortunes ruined some peasants and offered a chance of gain to others. Great inequalities arose in a closed community which presupposed a broad equality. Redemption had the effect of much heavier taxation, for 80 per cent of the money was advanced by the state and repaid by the peasant to the state in installments over many years. These repayments were collected along with the regular state taxes. This additional burden proved unbearable, and by 1905 outstanding arrears had to be canceled in an effort to stave off revolution.

In all these ways the liberal and far-reaching measure of emancipation did little to improve either the economic lot of the mass of the peasants or the economic prosperity of the country as a whole. Nor did it make for a more stable and acceptable political system. The yearning to get distress and grievances remedied was only whetted, not satisfied, by emancipation. Discontent remained sufficiently intense and widespread to make reformist opinion (which was mostly that of the intellectuals) more than ever responsive to the extreme Marxist and anarchist opinions that were infiltrating from the west.¹ The Tsar won neither gratitude nor strength from his reforms. He was nearly assassinated in 1866, in 1873, and again in 1880, before he was finally killed by a bomb in 1881.

The forces of change fermenting in Russian life by 1871 were the consequence of these reforms rather than a result of any marked industrial development. The Crimean War led to a rapid growth of railroads. A special body called the General Company of Russian Railways promoted them, and by 1870 there were more than 10,600 kilometers of track. Combined with the emancipation of the serfs, even this moderate amount of railroad construction was enough to carry Russia forward, for

¹ See p. 372.

the first time, into a money economy. Until the middle of the century most of the country had been economically self-sufficing, and the basis of nearly all transactions was services or payments in kind. Barter in purely local markets was the basis of most internal trade. The growth of a foreign trade in wheat, now increased by the new railroads, the demand for money to hire laborers or to pay redemption payments and taxes, the influx of foreign capital from the west, all conspired to develop a money economy. As had happened centuries before in western Europe, social relations that had rested on status and custom were replaced by relations based on contract and law. But this deep transformation could come about only very slowly and with difficulty. Money remained in short supply for a long time, and the protectionist commercial policy of the tsars was directed, for the rest of the century, to importing bullion and keeping it in the country. Labor only slowly became mobile because of the restrictiveness of the *mir*. Industry remained subservient to the land, and factory workers often went back to agricultural labor in the summer.

By western or German standards industrial progress was slow, industrial organization primitive, until at least the end of the century. In mining, transport, and the building industries a favorite method of organization was the *artel*, or co-operative labor group. Each member performed his agreed share of the work in return for an agreed share of the earnings, and a leader conducted the bargaining for the whole group. Traveling *artels* of carpenters or masons, numbering anything from 20 to 200, moved from their villages to the towns each year, completing the work contracted for and then returning to the villages for the winter. Spinning and weaving, metalwork and woodwork, were often organized along similar lines in the villages themselves, the peasants working either in their own homes or in co-operative workshops. These peculiarly Russian modes of production had many admirable features. They served to strengthen the bargaining power of the otherwise helpless workers, ensured a good level of craftsmanship and industriousness, and prevented widespread unemployment. But they linked industry very closely to an agriculture that was primitive and to a domestic system that resisted mechanization. The general retarding of the economic development of Russia in these years was to have far-reaching consequences in the twentieth century.

Only in the twentieth century, too, did the greatest safety valve for a growing population begin to operate—emigration. The periodic redistribution of lands in the *mir* favored large families. For that and other reasons the peasant population was growing rapidly. To the east—in Siberia and Transcaucasia—Russia had vast underpopulated territories. Yet government policy until after 1865 did not encourage migration, which it regarded as depleting the supply of labor nearer home and as

undermining the bargaining position of the landowners and contractors in their agreements about wages. Nor did the *mir* itself relish any diminution of the number among which the collective tax burden could be divided. The same considerations that restricted the mobility of labor even more strongly resisted permanent migration. As a result movement to the frontiers was small in scale during these years. Undeveloped areas remained undeveloped for lack of labor. In the decade after emancipation less than a thousand a year went as free emigrants into Siberia, most of them illegally. The colonization of Transcaucasia was strictly regulated after 1866 by a homestead policy—the government offering for rent homesteads of 135 acres. The railroads did not cross Siberia until 1905, and the marvelous expansion into Russia's Asian hinterland was reserved for the years after that. Most of the colonization was punitive. Between 1853 and 1874 nearly a quarter of a million people were deported to Siberia.

Nationalist and Revolutionary Movements

THE WELL-MEANT reforms accomplished by Alexander II had little connection with any sentiment or movement of nationalism. They were autocratic reforms carried out by authoritarian methods. The real nationalist movement of Russia was a revolutionary movement, rooted not in the people as a whole but in the intelligentsia and in that great cultural movement of mid-nineteenth-century Russia which found inspiration in the west and had its roots as much in exiles as inside Russia itself. The so-called intelligentsia included some of the nobles themselves, parts of the urban population engaged in trade and the professions, and the majority of university students and graduates, as well as the literary men. It overlapped the bureaucracy, the traders and business men, and the landed nobility; yet it was distinct from them, a thin crust of educated people with a European outlook, intensely self-conscious and profoundly uneasy about the desperate condition of their country in the modern world. The trend toward replacing the old classical education by a more scientific and technical education only made the younger generation more impatient with the political regime and the economic backwardness of their country. This important class of intellectuals was partly the cause and partly the outcome of the remarkable cultural efflorescence of nineteenth-century Russia.

In music and literature Russia quite suddenly enriched the whole culture of Europe. The symphonies of Borodin and Tchaikovsky, the suites and program music of Rimsky-Korsakov, the songs of Musorgski, belong to these years; and all leaned heavily upon legends and folk tales of Russia for their themes. The great novelists Turgenev, Dostoevski,

and Tolstoi were all concerned with social evils particularly endemic in Russian life; conditions of the poor, the psychological dilemmas arising in conditions of deep distress and violence, the reform of government, were themes especially fascinating to them. Though dealing, like all great art, with eternal human emotions and problems, the works of the Russian composers and novelists of the time expressed a stirring of national conscience, a profound concern for the welfare of the people. They were eagerly received by the whole intelligentsia and helped to give it unity and self-consciousness. They were not repudiated even by officialdom. Conservatoires of music were founded in the 1860's in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Tchaikovsky traveled widely throughout Europe, Britain, and America, and his own fame attracted world interest in Russian culture.

The spiritual stirring of Russia was displayed before the world which, if it found Russian novels and music hauntingly pathetic and exotic, or often gloomy to the point of morbidity, could still recognize them as a great new offshoot of European culture, linked to the west by a thousand subtle ties of form and taste. It differed from more militant nationalistic culture, such as the German, in that these great sons and lovers of Russia yearned not for national unity and independence (which they already had), but for greater human happiness and peace of mind, and a less oppressive social order. Nationalism in Russia was revolutionary because it was in rebellion against fate and the elements, against history and the harshness of life itself. Patriotic memories of triumph against invasion in 1812 were awakened by Tolstoi's *War and Peace* as much as by Tchaikovsky's famous overture, but that was not a theme that was predominant. Rather is it a culture of struggles of the human heart and problems of the soul, tortured and profoundly moving, echoing the cry of a whole people in distress: a culture of revolt even more than of nationality.

Nearly all these great composers and writers came from the classes of nobility and officials. They spoke for the people rather than from them. During the 1860's there grew up a more specifically radical revolutionary movement, expressing itself less in literature than in journalism, and voicing more crudely, fanatically, and savagely the discontent of the masses of peasants. The socialist journalist N. G. Chernyshevski and the romantic revolutionary Aleksandr Herzen were concerned less with liberal and constitutional reforms, and more with drastic economic change. Both welcomed the emancipation of the serfs in 1861; both were bitterly disillusioned by its results. In periodicals and often illegal pamphlets such writers directly attacked the policies of the Tsar and stirred desperate men to revolution. In a mass of minor literature, revolutionary radicalism was propagated by men who perforce spent much of their lives in prison, in Siberia, or in exile. It was at this level that Marxism and anarchism

soaked into the Russian revolutionary movement, producing frequent acts of terrorism and equally frequent reprisals and repressions.

Separatist Nationalities. Russian nationalism was of less immediate concern to the Tsar and his officials than was separatist nationalism in the western fringe of his possessions, especially in Poland. The Poles, as already seen,² were perennially the most troublesome nationalist minority of European Russia. Their cause aroused the sympathies of the western world almost as sensitively as did that of the Greeks. The ruler who was prepared to emancipate more than forty million serfs might be expected to have some sympathy for the aspirations of his Polish subjects. Within a week of his decree which emancipated the serfs, Alexander was presented through his viceroy in Poland with a request from the Agricultural Society of Poland to redress grievances. This society, which had existed since the time of the Crimean War ostensibly to promote more scientific farming, had come to be a political organ of the old nobility of Poland, wedded to national independence and to recovery of such former Polish territories as Lithuania. Alexander responded by setting up special bodies to deal with Polish problems and grievances, and entrusting powers of local self-government to provincial councils. It was a timely and well-received gesture.

But the liberal nobles of the Agricultural Society were only one of three nationalistic and revolutionary elements in Poland. There was the Roman Catholic Church, which had retained much of its influence and was permanently opposed to the domination of Russia. There was also the party of impoverished country gentry and the professional classes, closely resembling the supporters of Kossuth in Hungary; it was equally anti-Russian, and had formed a secret committee to run radical propaganda and plan resistance. The Agricultural Society spoke for neither of these powerful movements. The country seethed with revolutionary discontent and when, in January, 1863, an attempt was made to draft the young patriotic revolutionaries of the towns into the army, open revolt broke out. The tactics of the Russian government were those of Austria-Hungary in the comparable Polish revolt of 1846: to appeal for support of the peasants by backing their claims against the Polish nobles. The peasants were much more interested in getting land than in winning national independence. They had gained proportionately much less land than was granted to the Russian peasants after 1861. The liberal administrative and educational reforms so far carried out had done little or nothing to improve their condition. They were ready enough to fix responsibility and blame on their own landlords. Accordingly, the nationalist revolt organized by the secret revolutionary committee, which spread throughout the country and lasted for most of the year 1863, received

² See pp. 101 and 136.

only lukewarm support from the peasants in most parts of Poland. By autumn the revolt was almost crushed. The neighboring Ukrainians gave it little support; the Lithuanians did support it and were brutally suppressed.

The chief embarrassment which the revolt brought to the Tsar was the interest which it inevitably aroused in Europe. On the grounds that Polish autonomy had been granted in 1814 and 1815 by treaties of which they were also signatories, the French and British governments, with half-hearted Austrian support, made representations to the Tsar. Napoleon III asked him to restore Polish self-government, but was rebuffed. Britain asked him to restore the situation of 1815 and grant an amnesty; she received only partial reassurances. Further notes by all three powers proved equally ineffective, because none was prepared to go to war and only force could have deterred the Russian government from suppressing the revolt. The Russian policy had formal Prussian backing, for in February, 1863, Bismarck signed a convention with the Russian government providing for similar repression in the Polish provinces of Prussia should the revolt spread to them. Prussia, with a clear common interest with Russia in crushing any moves for Polish independence and reunification, gave the Tsar all the support he needed in order to defy the western powers. His victory was thus not only a military victory against the Poles, but also a diplomatic victory against the western powers. This helped to restore Russian prestige, which had been internationally weakened by the Crimean War. Austria and Russia were now more deeply alienated. Prussia and Russia had moved toward that mutual arrangement and friendship which was to be so useful to Prussia in 1866 and 1870, and which Bismarck was to cultivate further after 1871.³

The Polish peasants gained substantially from the revolt, which they had done so little to support. The Tsar rewarded them by a more liberal interpretation of the emancipation decrees. They got more land and paid lower redemption payments than the peasants in Russia. A reform of local government also gave greater powers to the rural communes. But national independence was postponed still further. Even the name of the territory was changed from "Kingdom of Poland" to "Vistula provinces." Educational policy was designed to root out the Polish religion and language. In 1869 the university of Warsaw was suppressed and a purely Russian university put in its place. Catholic Church schools and private Polish schools were obstructed or forbidden, and for most official purposes the Russian language was used instead of Polish. An important result was that Polish nationalism lost much of its old romantic flavor and turned to a more realistic policy, designed to make the best of a bad situation. In the 1870's a modern Polish industry grew up, taking advantage of the large domestic market of Russia. Textile industries de-

³ See pp. 285 and 426.

veloped along more modern western lines, and technical education began to produce a new generation of intelligent Polish engineers and managers. In the southwest, coal and iron industries developed. Economic westernization happened sooner and faster in Poland than in the rest of Russia—a strange result of the pitiful failure of the revolt.

The Russian Empire was fringed in the west by other active nationalist movements, especially the Finnish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian. In 1861 the Tsar experimented with greater autonomy for Finland as well as for Poland. Finland had been annexed by Alexander I in 1809, and kept in 1815 as an autonomous grand duchy. Officially, it was united with Russia only in the person of the monarch. Less prone to violent rebellion and always more realistic in their nationalism, the Finns could continue to be treated as a separate but relatively loyal part of the empire. Lithuanians, as already shown, supported the Polish revolt of 1863 and were in consequence crushed. Having formed part of Poland for four centuries, they were mostly Roman Catholics and had close affinities with Polish nationalist aspirations. A real cultural and nationalist movement, distinctively Lithuanian, came only in the 1880's.

The Ukraine covered the important southern area of Russia stretching from the Austrian and Rumanian frontiers to the Don and the Kuban steppe in the east. Its inhabitants were regarded as "Little Russians," speaking a language closely akin to Russian, and in religion mostly Orthodox, though the Uniate Church was strong in the western Ukraine and came to serve as a focus of Ukrainian nationalist feeling. Ukrainian peoples straddled the Russian frontiers, for they were to be found in eastern Galicia and Bukovina in Austria, and in the northeastern corner of Hungary known as Carpathian Ruthenia. They had become more nationally conscious by 1850 because of a strong literary movement during the first half of the century. By 1847 it assumed political form with the foundation of the secret society of Saints Cyril and Methodius, led by poets and historians, on the pattern of contemporary romantic nationalism.⁴ Although this society was suppressed, the period 1850-70 brought greater official tolerance of nationalist activities, and the heroic land of the Cossacks remained a distinctive though not actively separatist part of the tsar's dominions.

Finnish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian separatism was to have importance later in the century.⁵ But by 1870 these provinces, like the Polish provinces, seemed for a time reconciled to continued Russian rule. By 1871 the nationalist movements of the eastern marchlands were left unsatisfied but temporarily quiescent. The Russian Empire was to survive intact for another generation. Only in Poland had economic progress begun to lay fresh foundations for a stronger movement of nationalism;

⁴ See p. 124.

⁵ See p. 444.

and Polish nationalism, like Ukrainian, encountered the resistance not of Russia alone, but of Austria and even Prussia as well. It could bring about no effective change until such time as the whole of eastern Europe might be thrown into the melting pot, and the grip of the three great powers simultaneously weakened. That unlikely event did happen in 1918, with drastic results.

The Failure of Reform in Turkey

IN 1815 the Ottoman Empire had extended across the whole northern coast of Africa as far as Morocco, and into the Balkans as far as the rivers Danube and Pruth. It straddled the mouths and the lower reaches of the Danube, and ended only at the southern ranges of the Carpathians. Even so, it had been progressively pushed back since its maximum extent at the end of the seventeenth century (*see* Map 8). During the eighteenth century, Austria, Hungary, and Russia had taken the lead in recovering large areas of Hungary and the northern shores of the Black Sea (including the Crimea). The empire survived the Napoleonic wars only because of deadlock in the balance of power in eastern Europe between Russians, British, and French. In 1830 the process of dissolution began again with the French conquest of Algeria and the independence of Greece. At the same time the whole structure of Ottoman rule was shaken and loosened by the recognition of Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia as autonomous principalities within the empire, and by the emergence of Egypt under Mehemet Ali as another autonomous region. In the Crimean War, Russia pressed still harder upon its northern frontiers, and only the aid of the western powers kept Russia at bay. It was symptomatic of the new era of "realism" in international affairs that Catholic and Protestant Christians then allied with Moslem Turks against Greek Orthodox Christians—evidence enough that Turkey had become a focus for policies guided in no way by religious considerations but only by anxieties about the balance of power in the Near East. Even so, an empire that still had a firm base in Asiatic Turkey and whose territories still extended from the Persian Gulf to Tripoli would be an unconscionable time in dying.

The Ottoman Turkish Empire between 1850 and 1870 resembled Russia in four respects. It was impelled to attempt reform and renovation as a result of the Crimean War. It was confronted with a series of disruptive nationalist movements in its western territories. Its difficulties attracted considerable interest on the part of the other great powers of Europe. And like Russia it was not so much a European state as that characteristically Asian phenomenon—a vast sprawling dynastic empire comprising a great mixture of races, languages, and religions held to-

gether only by subservience to an arbitrary and harsh central authority. But it differed from Russia in the important fact that the ruling class was Turkish and therefore Moslem, whereas many of the subject peoples were either Jews or Christians. Religious and racial divisions did not coincide: some Slavs had adopted Islam; some Arabs, Christianity. But to western European eyes the general picture was one of an infidel race misruling, and from time to time massacring, Christian peoples; and though this picture was not quite accurate, it was at least true enough at certain periods.

What was abundantly clear was that Turkish power, which had been disintegrating for 150 years past, was likely soon to crumble further before the renewed pressure of Russia and Austria; and when it did, the whole balance of power in the Near and Middle East would be drastically changed. The western powers of France and Great Britain hesitated between an impulse to buttress Turkish power as a barrier against Russian and Austrian expansion, and exasperation with the corrupt and brutal methods by which the Turks misgoverned their Christian subjects. This ambivalent attitude to what was generally known as the "Eastern Question" became of great international importance in the decade after 1870.

During the third quarter of the nineteenth century, however, the "Eastern Question" remained a cloud gathering for the future, rather than a storm immediately about to break. The great powers were preoccupied with the dramatic changes in central Europe, and Russia was undergoing the social upheaval of abolishing serfdom. From 1856 onward it seemed that even the Turkish government was bringing itself more up to date and was accepting reforms. In that year the Ottoman government issued a reform edict known as the Hatt-i Humayun. The religious groups under separate religious leaders—patriarchs, rabbis, bishops, and the rest—had been the units of government and administration, each separately responsible to the sultan. Now a universal Turkish national citizenship was created for all persons within the sultan's territories. The civil authority of the religious leaders, which had been very great, was abolished. Equality before the law and equal eligibility for public office were guaranteed. Christians and Moslems alike could join the army, hitherto restricted to Moslems. The system of taxation was reformed, and, as in Russia, judicial reforms were undertaken abolishing the use of torture and improving conditions in prisons. The universal corruption and extortions of public officials were to stop. For the next twenty years some effort was made to implement these far-reaching reforms—but with increasing failure and disappointment. The degeneration of the Ottoman administration had gone too far, its corruption was too deep-seated, to permit of easy renovation. The powerful class of legal-religious rulers resented and resisted the changes. The official reli-

gion of Islam inhibited equal treatment for non-Moslem citizens. In the provinces the beys and pashas ignored the reforms, and the power of the sultan in Constantinople was neither resolute enough nor efficient enough to enforce his will.

In 1861 the sultan Abdul Mejid drank himself to death and was succeeded by Abdul Aziz, who reigned until 1876. He tried to implement the reforms and to open Turkey to western influences. He allowed freer newspapers and some propagation of western ideas. The first sultan to visit Europe, he traveled to Vienna, London, and Paris. With the help of foreign loans, railroads were built to join the Danube and the Black Sea. A literary nationalist revival began. The admission of Turkey to a status in the public law of Europe in 1856 began to mean something.⁶ One part of the empire in particular, Egypt, made solid material advance in westernization. Railroads were built, mainly with French and British capital and technicians. While the War between the States in America prevented the southern states from exporting as much raw cotton as usual, between 1861 and 1865, Egypt's annual exports of cotton multiplied fourfold. The khedives modernized their legal and administrative systems and encouraged the building of the Suez Canal. The completion of the Canal in 1869 made the Middle East once again a focal point of world trade and of European rivalries.

In these ways, despite the effeteness of the sultan's power and the internal resistance to all reforms, fresh forces were at work within the empire. By 1870 it was an open question how far they could transform the Turkish lands, and what results such transformation might bring. But one result most unlikely to be achieved was a thoroughly renovated and consolidated Ottoman Empire. No European government wanted such a result. Russia still dreamed of a warm-water port and worried about her security in the Straits; Austria cast covetous eyes on Salonica and the Aegean; Prussia cared little about the fate of Turkey; France was anxious to retain her position in Syria and Palestine; Britain and other western powers sympathized with the aspiration of Greeks and Serbs for national freedom. The Balkan peoples themselves instinctively resisted any improvement of the Turkish system which might prolong their servitude. Nobody had an interest in the sick man of Europe becoming any healthier or stronger.

Balkan Nationalism. As in Austria-Hungary and Russia, much the most disturbing element in the whole situation was the separatist aspirations of the smaller states and nationalities. Although Turkey was almost untouched by the wave of revolutions in 1848, its territories had been falling away on the western edges wherever nationalism was strongest. In the 1820's it had been the Greeks who had successfully asserted

⁶ See p. 224.

independence.⁷ In the 1830's Serbia followed suit, and so had the Rumanians of Moldavia and Wallachia.⁸ These three Christian peoples, Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians, won further gains during the troubled years between 1850 and 1870; and these gains all undermined Ottoman power in the Balkans. Each developed aims of national unification, miniature versions of the contemporary movements in Italy and Germany. Substantial minorities of each were still under direct Turkish rule in 1870, and the centripetal attraction of neighboring states or provinces with some degree of self-government and independence continued to be a violently centrifugal force within Ottoman territories.⁹

The Greek kingdom which in 1830 was guaranteed by the powers included only about half the Greek-speaking peoples. It was confined within narrow boundaries chiefly because the western powers had not wanted to weaken Turkey too much. Its economic resources were too meager, its system of law and order too fragile, to ensure prosperity and security. King Otto, established in 1833, was in 1843 forced by popular uprising to grant a constitution. In 1862 he had to abdicate, and the following year a son of the king of Denmark was installed as George I. At the same time Britain gave to Greece the Ionian Islands, off its western coasts, whose "protection" the British had found costly and troublesome. But this only whetted the ardent Greek desire to gain, at Turkey's expense, the Aegean Islands off the east coast and the northern half of the peninsula including Macedonia. Although philhellenic enthusiasm in Europe had waned considerably with further experience of the misery, disorder, and aggressive fanaticism of independent Greece, it remained strong enough to enlist western sympathies in the cause of further Greek gains. Torn by political factions and obsessed with hatred against the Turks, the Greeks by 1871 were clearly one of the most likely sources of war in the Balkans.

In 1829 Serbia had also become a semi-independent principality after a generation of struggles for freedom, and by mid-century she was raising the issue of southern Slav unification. Her rights were reaffirmed by the powers in 1856. To her southwest lay the tough mountain people of Montenegro, relentless fighters against the Turks; to the west the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were inhabited by Slavs under Turkish rule; on the north were Slavs under Austrian and Hungarian rule; on the east and south lived Slav minorities in territories held by Turkey. The internal politics of Serbia, as of Greece, were an explosive mixture of ferocious domestic feuds and excitable nationalist claims. Prince Alexander of the "Black George" dynasty ruled from 1842 until 1858,

⁷ See p. 119.

⁸ See p. 196.

⁹ See p. 428.

when he was deposed by popular uprising. He was replaced by Milosh, of the rival Obrenovich dynasty, who had ruled from 1817-39. He reigned only until 1860, when his son Michael succeeded to his turbulent inheritance. With the aid of the western powers he contrived, in 1867, to have the last of the Turkish garrisons withdrawn from Serbia. He was assassinated the following year. Michael was succeeded by his cousin, Milan I, who proclaimed a new constitution but kept wide powers for the monarchy. Lacking any seaport, Serbia was primitive in her economy. It depended upon the Danube, which formed her northern frontier, and so she was virtually dependent upon Austria. This did not prevent—it even reinforced—Serbian resolve to fight for western territories that would give her an outlet to the Adriatic.

North of the Danube was appearing a third distinct Balkan state in the form of Rumania. After 1815 Turkish suzerainty over the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had become little more than nominal, though rival Austrian and Russian intentions made eventual independence for these provinces problematical. As already seen, they were temporarily occupied by Russia in 1829, reoccupied in 1848, evacuated in 1851, reoccupied in 1853, and evacuated again, under Austrian pressure, in 1854.¹⁰ As a result of the Crimean War they were augmented by the addition of part of Bessarabia surrendered by Russia, and were guaranteed in their rights by the powers, though remaining under Turkish suzerainty. In 1859 they were united under a single government, and until 1866 the consolidated kingdom was ruled by Prince Alexander Cuza, one of the abler Rumanian nobles. He carried out the reforms characteristic of these years, abolishing serfdom, dissolving monasteries, and promoting education. But the Rumanians deposed him in 1866, and offered the crown to Prince Carol, who was connected by birth with the Hohenzollerns of Prussia and even with the family of Napoleon. His accession was opposed by Austria and Russia but supported by Bismarck, and in the European situation of 1866 Bismarck got his way. Unlike her Balkan neighbors, Rumania was a rich agricultural country and had the capacity to develop more quickly. In 1870 she still suffered from the prevalent deficiencies of Balkan kingdoms. She had no railways, few good roads, an oppressed and poverty-stricken peasantry, and chaotic finances. But with less strident nationalist grievances and claims, and with an able administrator at her head, Rumania was well equipped to consolidate her independence in the near future.

The two great decades of "state-making" between 1850 and 1870 therefore saw the creation or consolidation of three new Balkan states, destined to remain continuously thereafter on the map of Europe and to extend their frontiers, as well as accomplishing more complete independence, by the end of the century. There remained within Turkish terri-

¹⁰ See p. 220.

tories two other peoples still in a more primitive phase of struggling to attain statehood. On the mountainous eastern coast of the Adriatic was the province of Albania, home of the ancient Illyrians. Its inhabitants were still in a semi-tribal stage of development, in religion partly Moslem and partly Christian, but in civilization the most backward people of Europe. Turkish rule was weak in Albania, less because of nationalist resistance than because of the sheer impossibility of imposing any rule whatever on the tough and barbaric mountain tribes. To collect taxes was to cause ferocious rebellion, and wise Turkish administrators were usually content to leave the province alone. In the eastern Balkans, bordering the western shores of the Black Sea, lived a half-forgotten people, the Bulgars, speaking a Slav tongue but of Finnish-Tartar stock. During the first half of the nineteenth century Bulgar nationalism had revived, and it was now encouraged by Russia as a weapon against Turkey. There began a demand for Bulgar education and use of the native language in churches. In 1860 the Bulgarian Christians declared that they would no longer acknowledge the ecclesiastical authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. In 1870 the sultan of Turkey, under Russian pressure, set up an exarch in Bulgaria as head of the Bulgar church. This recognition of Bulgarians as a separate religious nation was their first step toward national independence. Although in 1870 they were still completely under Turkish rule, this strange people was soon to make a dramatic re-entry on the stage of European history and become a focus of great-power diplomacy.¹¹

A shrewd observer in 1871 might well have perceived that the whole Eastern Question was ready to burst into flames. The failure of reforms in Turkey, the fraying of Turkish rule throughout the Balkan peninsula, the emergence of three restless new states and of other nationalist movements, the stirring of new economic and political forces in a region of Europe still little affected by the mighty transformations of the nineteenth century, all betokened a fast-approaching upheaval. But events in western and central Europe served to distract the attention of the great powers from such impending changes in the east. Austria and Russia continued to offset one another in expansionist plans. France and Italy were preoccupied with their own reconstruction and the consolidation of new regimes. Britain, still obsessed with fears of Russia, cherished the hope that the integrity of Turkey might somehow be preserved. And Bismarck, the most perceptive statesman of Europe, was so engaged in completing the work of unifying the new German *Reich* that he was prepared to discount the Eastern Question as of negligible importance. The Balkans he declared to be "not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier," and he affected "never to trouble to open the mailbag from Constantinople." Yet from this time onward the Eastern

¹¹ See p. 433.

Question was to demand more and more attention from the statesmen of Europe. It resulted in frequent crises, wars, and revolutions during the remainder of the nineteenth century. It contributed to the causing of two world wars in the twentieth century, one precipitated by events in Serbia and the other by events in Czechoslovakia and Poland. By the 1950's the partition, tension, and balance between the worlds to the west and to the east of Berlin seemed to impose a new pattern upon European and world relationships. The origins of this situation could be traced back to that shift in the orbits of power which had taken place by 1870.

PART *FPVE*

DEMOCRACY
AND
SOCIALISM
1871–1914

16. *The Pattern of Parliamentary Democracy*
17. *Socialism Versus Nationalism*
18. *The Texture of European Culture*



IN THEIR TWO most significant features the forty years after the settlement of 1871 resemble the generation after 1815. They are a period of internal tensions between forces seeking to consolidate and perpetuate the political and social order that had been established by 1871, and rival forces seeking to transform society by new forms of organization and reform. They are also years of peace following an era of great wars, though years marked by frequent tensions and minor conflicts between the great European powers. Since history never repeats itself, the actual forces and the nature of the issues about which they were in conflict were different from those that shaped Europe after 1815. But in a broad and general way the nations of Europe passed through another phase of postwar settlement and reconstruction, both internal and international; and the phase ended, as the first phase between 1815 and 1854 had ended, in ordeal by battle in 1914.

Whereas the forces of continuity and establishment after 1815 had been mostly conservative institutions, classes, and creeds, their counterparts after 1871 were mostly liberal-conservative institutions, classes, and creeds, attempting to find stability through wider electorates, parliamentary representative institutions, and strong central authority.¹ Whereas the forces of change and revolution after 1815 had been mostly liberal and socialist movements demanding constitutional rights and social reforms, their counterparts after 1871 were socialist, anarchist, and communist movements demanding more complete democracy and economic reorganization. In the earlier generation the forces of change had combined with insurgent nationalism in central and eastern Europe; in the later, they combined with insurgent nationalism in eastern Europe and in Asia.

Whereas international order after 1815 had rested formally on the "concert of Europe" and more basically upon the continental hegemony of Austria maintained through the "system" of Metternich,²

¹ See pp. 79-91.

² See pp. 110-20.

it rested after 1871 ostensibly upon a "balance of power" between the major European states and more basically upon the continental hegemony of Germany. The system of alliances which Bismarck constructed after 1871 to provide security for Germany provoked a counter-system of alliances hinging upon France; and so long as balance between them prevailed and they served to restrain wanton aggression by either side, they underpinned the settlement of 1871. When, after 1890, they bred mutual fear of aggression and a competition in armaments, they resulted in a series of acute international crises which culminated in war. These crises were closely connected on one hand with the tensions of the Eastern Question, and on the other with the hectic rivalry of the maritime powers for overseas colonies. While dynastic imperialisms of the old kind crumbled in eastern Europe, colonial imperialisms of the new kind clashed in Asia and Africa.

This whole conjunction of conflicts governed the course of European history between 1871 and 1914; their total outcome gave shape and pattern to European affairs in the twentieth century. Part V is devoted to examining the internal developments of European states before 1914, Part VI to the international developments of the same years. What matters most throughout is the interplay between the two, and the intricate reshaping of international relations by domestic changes, of domestic affairs by international relations. This interplay is indicated throughout both parts, and is summarized as "the system of alliances."³

³ See p. 488.

CHAPTER 16

THE PATTERN OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

The New Electorates

IN ALMOST the whole of western and central Europe, parliamentary institutions developed between 1871 and 1914. They varied widely in form and in effectiveness, in their electoral basis and in the extent of their control over governments. Because most states were still kingdoms (Switzerland, France, and after 1910 Portugal, being the only republics in Europe) these parliamentary institutions were usually, as in the United Kingdom, the bridge between a strong centralized governmental authority and the demands of peoples for more direct representation and more general participation in the shaping of national policies. They were at least a provisional solution to the old problem, which had agitated European civilization since 1815, of how to establish a closer mutual relationship between state and society, between government and governed.¹

Wider Franchise. France was ahead of all other countries in having effective universal male suffrage from 1871 onward. The electoral laws of 1848, which were revived in 1871 and again in 1875, gave the vote to some ten million Frenchmen. The electorate of the United Kingdom after the reform acts of 1867-68 numbered only between two and a half and three million. But in 1884 Gladstone passed a further act which extended the electorate to about five million, or roughly one sixth of the population. This made the rural electorate as democratic as the urban, and was the first clear recognition of the radical principle that the individual, regardless of property qualification, was entitled to a vote. It applied to Ireland as well as to England and Wales. It was followed by a redistribution of seats which established single-member constituencies for all save the universities and the largest towns—with more than 50,000 inhabitants. In 1883 a Corrupt Practices Act effectively attacked the rowdiness

¹ See pp. 103 and 209.

and abuses that had prevailed during elections. Together with the secret ballot, which had been instituted in 1872, these reforms launched Britain on the broad road toward political democracy. In neither Britain nor France were women given the parliamentary vote before 1914, and in Britain nearly a quarter of even the adult male population remained voteless until 1918. But because the general principles of universal personal suffrage had now won the day, it was to be only a matter of time before they permeated the electoral systems of both countries.

Other western states, having instituted parliamentary systems in the years before 1870, developed along comparable lines.² Switzerland had universal male suffrage after 1874. In Belgium until 1893 property qualifications restricted the electorate to less than 5 per cent of the population, but a reform of that year established universal male suffrage with the addition of plural voting for men with special property or educational qualifications. In the Netherlands, reforms of 1887 and 1896 extended the electorate from 2 per cent to 14 per cent of the population but universal suffrage came only in 1917. Spain introduced universal male suffrage in 1890, Norway in 1898. Finland and Norway pioneered female suffrage in 1907. But in Portugal and Sweden the electorates remained comparatively restricted until after 1900. The two great new states of Germany and Italy differed widely in these respects. Bismarck had permitted the *Reichstag* to be elected by universal male suffrage, but the decisive power wielded by the upper house (*Bundesrat*), and still more by the emperor and his chancellor, ensured that government could be conducted without undue dependence on a democratically elected assembly. Of the German states, Baden adopted universal male suffrage in 1904, Bavaria and Württemberg two years later. In Italy, on the other hand, the constitutional monarchy retained its mid-nineteenth-century restrictiveness, and even the electoral reform of 1882 widened the electorate to only about two million, or 7 per cent of the population. Most Italian men gained the vote, at last, in 1912. Whereas the age for voting rights was 21 in the United Kingdom and France, in most other countries it was more. In the German *Reich* it was as high as 25; and in Italy, even in 1914, it was 30.

In the states of eastern Europe the same tendencies were at work, though often more weakly and slowly, as befitted the stage of social development in those lands. Austria adopted universal manhood suffrage in 1907, after adding in 1896 a fifth class representing the mass of the population to her former four-class system based on property. Hungary preserved until 1918 a complex system of franchise restrictions resting on qualifications of age, taxation, property, official status, and national privileges, which admitted only 5 per cent of her population to the electorate. Rumanian politics were very narrowly restricted. In the Ottoman

² See p. 237.

and Russian Empires there was no suffrage at all, until after the revolutions of 1908 in Turkey, of 1905 in Russia.

Behind the whole checkered story, in spite of all the many divergences and restrictions, there can be discerned a great tide of movement. Democracy was advancing everywhere in Europe, and by 1914 it was lapping the frontiers of Asia. The symbol was the right of the individual citizen to vote—a right increasingly buttressed from the 1880's onward by secrecy of the ballot. The vote was often endowed, by enthusiastic radicals and frightened conservatives alike, with a magic power. Too many radicals expected universal suffrage to bring the millennium—to sweep away before it the last relics of feudalism, of aristocratic and plutocratic privilege, of popular squalor and ignorance. Too many conservatives and moderate liberals took the radicals at their word, and feared that democracy would demolish monarchy, church, religion, public order, and all that they cherished. Therefore the struggles for extensions of the franchise and secrecy of the ballot were often long and bitter, raising exaggerated hopes on one side, excessive fears on the other.

It was seldom that mere extensions of the vote produced any results as dramatic as this. Constitutional liberals knew many ways, effective enough, to check the operations of full democracy: devices such as separate estates, second chambers, plural voting, party agreements. Elected representatives were usually moderate men, for the most part lawyers and technicians, businessmen and bankers, and a whole class of professional politicians whose skill lay in finding modes of compromise and the practical devices of parliamentary moderation. Napoleon III, Disraeli, and Bismarck had been shrewder than many of their contemporaries or successors in sensing that the vote of the masses was as likely to favor strong government and nationalist policies as it was to support revolutionary or destructive forces. In France, Gambetta converted the peasants to republicanism, but it was to a moderate and somewhat conservative republicanism, respectful of private property and intolerant of the revolutionary excesses of the big towns. The crushing of the Paris Commune in 1871, by the forces of the moderate constitutional government and of the French provinces, was symbolic of the new order in Europe. So was Bismarck's successful manipulation of the popularly elected German *Reichstag* after 1871, and Crispi's domination of the unruly and weak Italian parliaments.

Growth of Population. The new electorates of Europe were large, not only because of extensions of the franchise, but also because of the growth of populations. The immense increase of population in earlier decades³ was now producing the most momentous of all modern European phenomena—"the age of the masses." This, even more than the spread of democratic ideas, compelled every state to overhaul its ma-

³ See p. 227.

chinery of government and administration. The accumulated consequences of this fact were to make the twentieth century unique in its problems and its opportunities. Between 1870 and 1914 Europe as a whole maintained the dizzy speed of its growth, and grew at an average rate of more than 1 per cent each year. The 293 million in 1870 became 490 million by 1914. The last three decades of the nineteenth century, which saw the increase of Europe's inhabitants by nearly one third, saw also the emigration of 25 million more to North America, South America, and Australasia. The earlier rate of increase tended to slow down in the western nations but to accelerate in the central and eastern nations. Between 1871 and 1914 the population of the United Kingdom increased by nearly half, that of Germany by more than half, that of Russia by nearly three quarters. Italy grew more slowly than Germany, from 27 to 35 million; but France grew more slowly still, from 37 to only 40 million. Many Italians emigrated, whereas in France immigration constantly exceeded emigration. The significance of these differences for the balance of power between the largest states of Europe will more appropriately be considered later.⁴ Its significance for internal politics was that every European government now had to administer and serve the interests of larger and denser agglomerations of people than ever before in the history of mankind. When the First World War began, the United Kingdom was still, as she had been since 1815, the most highly urbanized country in Europe, whereas France clung stubbornly to her rural character. But after her political unification Germany swung over sharply from a population almost as rural as the French to a position in which three out of every five Germans lived in towns. This "flight to the towns" had begun before 1871,⁵ but it now took place in Germany at a speed unrivaled by any other nation.

These changes in greater or lesser degree affected all European countries. In terms of politics and administration they meant that all governments were confronted with problems that British governments had been obliged to tackle earlier in the century. These were problems of how to govern densely populated industrial towns; how to ensure adequate provision for public health and sanitation, public order, and police; how to protect industrial workers against bad conditions of working and living. Perplexing social problems were forced upon every government by the course of events; and the parallel growth of democratic ideas and of wider electorates ensured for these problems a high priority of attention.

The decrease in death rates, which so largely accounted for the general growth of population in these years, was still further promoted by these improved provisions for public health and sanitation which the

⁴ See p. 496.

⁵ See p. 228.

growth of large cities made necessary. The researches of Louis Pasteur into the role of microbes in causing disease and of Joseph Lister into chemical methods of destroying these microbes resulted in better hospitalization and better public sanitation. The German physician and scientist, Rudolf Virchow, pioneered the new sanitation in Berlin; while the Benthamite radical Edwin Chadwick, the Tory radical Benjamin Disraeli, and their like in other countries persuaded governments and local authorities that pure water supply, the scientific disposal of sewage, the regular collection of refuse, were essential services in modern towns. Meanwhile a host of research institutes concerned with the study of bacteriology evolved the wonderful science of preventive medicine. The determination of which germs caused the most frequent epidemic diseases and the discovery of how to guard against them by inoculation, quarantine, and appropriate medical care and treatment combined to revolutionize modern medicine.

By 1914 European civilization had discovered how to protect itself against such venerable scourges as cholera, bubonic plague, typhoid, malaria, smallpox, and most of the more deadly destroyers of mankind. As a result, the expectation of life of babies born in England and Wales was over ten years more in 1914 than it had been in 1871. The elaborate organization, and frequently the powers of legal compulsion, which such preventive techniques required could come only from national governments. Nearly every state in Europe, by 1914, had a code of legislation governing the building of houses and the making of streets; ensuring minimum standards of sanitation, safety, and conditions of labor in factories, mines, and mills; regulating the entry of ships into ports; and enforcing standards of purity and cleanliness in food and drink. In Britain the first landmarks were Disraeli's Public Health Act of 1875 and a series of housing acts from 1875 onward. With the rapid growth of large towns and of mechanized industry, a larger proportion of every electorate was an industrial, wage-earning class dwelling in or near large towns and making its living in conditions that demanded greater social discipline, a higher degree of organization, and more sustained administrative activity on the part of governments. Every state, in this minimum sense, was becoming a welfare state even before 1914.

Social Reforms. Accordingly, the politics and policies of all European states came, in these years, to be greatly concerned with social problems. This pressure of demand for a more active state came into conflict, especially in western countries, with the recently dominant tendencies toward free trade, *laissez faire*, and a divorce of politics from economic and social affairs. The more doctrinaire liberals, wedded to notions of free trade and free enterprise, found themselves being pushed from the left—partly by more radical-minded liberals and partly by the growing parliamentary socialist movements and labor organizations. In the

novel circumstances of large popular electorates for whose votes rival political parties had to compete, there was a strong temptation for politicians to outbid one another. For this reason many of the social welfare measures passed in these years were the work of conservative parties, or of liberal parties obliged to yield to the pressure of their more radical supporters. Larger towns and larger electorates conspired to change the whole purport of state activity, as well as to make it more democratic.

A host of important consequences followed. Parliaments became busier passing legislation that imposed upon governments new kinds of work and organization; local authorities and officials blossomed into fresh life; and new sources of taxation had to be tapped to finance such activities. By illustrating each of these three tendencies, it is possible to assess the new significance of parliamentary democracy in Europe.

First, legislation extended the activities of governments into new fields. Britain, by 1871, already had extensive regulations governing the conditions and hours of work in factories, mines, and mills. Conservative governments passed laws in 1878, 1891, and 1901, which consolidated previous controls. But it was the Liberal governments after 1905, led by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and H. H. Asquith, and under pressure from organized labor, which undertook more general legislation about social problems. In 1909 a Trade Boards Act attacked "sweating" in certain trades. It was effective enough to be soon extended to others. Conditions of shop assistants were improved by a Shops Act of 1911, which introduced the principle of a legal weekly half holiday, and a Coal Mines Act consolidated the laws applicable to work in mines. In the same year the National Insurance Act introduced a vast contributory scheme insuring the whole working population against sickness, providing for free medical attention, and insuring some categories of workers against unemployment. Modeled on the German laws of 1883-89, with which Bismarck had contrived to steal the thunder of the socialists by paternalist action on behalf of the workers, it anglicized the scheme to the extent of bringing in friendly societies and trade unions as "approved societies" to help administer the money benefits for their members. As in education and poor relief, such co-operation between the state and voluntary bodies was characteristic of the British approach to these new social problems. Two years before, a start had been made in providing non-contributory old age pensions, on a very limited basis and as an addition to the many private schemes for superannuation.

Many of the other social welfare schemes introduced into Great Britain in these years were imitated from European examples. The Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909 was in part also prompted by German example, though it proved more of an obstruction than a help to effective town planning. In the 1890's Infants' Welfare Centers began, with schemes for supplying clean milk free to poor mothers (an idea

that had originated in France) and "schools for mothers" (imitated from Ghent). The successive moves to build up a national system of primary and secondary education, culminating in the Education Act of 1902, were largely an effort to catch up on the more advanced educational systems established earlier in France and Germany. The adherence of English liberalism to doctrines of free trade and *laissez faire* was not unconnected with its relative slowness in meeting the pressing social problems of the last years of the century.

In France the traditions of paternalist legislation declined with the fall of the Second Empire, and the prolonged struggle of the republican parties to secure the Republic against its monarchist and Bonapartist threats delayed any serious tackling of social problems. Nor, with her slow industrialization and urbanization, and the prevalence of small towns and villages, small firms and farms, was France faced with social problems of the same scale or urgency as those in Britain and Germany. Characteristically, the most effective French labor regulations derived not from politics at all but from the activities of the bureaucracy, where the traditions of Bonapartist paternalism remained strongest. In the 1890's it set up workers' delegations for the mines, and got laws passed regulating hygiene, limiting women's work to ten hours a day, and providing in part for pensions and accident insurance. In 1900 the maximum working day was limited to ten hours, and in 1906 a six-day week was enforced. When Georges Clemenceau formed his ministry of 1906, with a seventeen-point program which included various proposals for workers' welfare, it came to practically nothing. But labor legislation was codified between 1910 and 1912, old age pensions were instituted, and enough had been done by 1914 to give French industrial workers as a class some protection and relief from a state which in so many other respects remained more responsive to the interests of small capitalists and landed proprietors.

By 1914 every European country outside Russia and the Balkans had relatively well-developed codes of factory and labor legislation, comparable with the British and French. Austria set up a system of national factory inspection in 1883, and in 1907 issued an elaborate industrial code consolidating regulations that prohibited employment of children under twelve, prescribed an eleven-hour day in industry, and provided for good sanitation and protection against injury. Separate Swiss cantons, led by Zürich, followed the same course, and by 1877 a comprehensive federal statute was passed, applying to all cantons. In the same decade the Netherlands and Belgium introduced comparable laws. Italy and Spain lagged far behind other countries, but between 1886 and 1904 they too made some progress in labor legislation, the Italian being closely modeled on the German.

Just as Germany provided the most spectacular example, in these

years, of massive and speedy industrial expansion, so she also set the pace in systematic social legislation. The emphasis in the German system lay neither on factory legislation, which Bismarck distrusted as external interference in employers' affairs, nor on unemployment insurance, which he treated as of minor importance. It aimed at a comprehensive national provision for security against the three commonest vicissitudes of urban life—sickness, accident, and incapacity in old age. Acts tackling successively these three problems were passed in 1883, 1884, and 1889. In 1911 the whole law of social insurance was codified and extended to various classes of nonindustrial workers, such as agricultural laborers and domestic servants. Before these laws were passed, a multitude of local provisions had been made voluntarily by benefit societies, guilds, burial clubs, and parishes. The *Reich* system utilized these older forms but gradually absorbed and replaced them by new local and factory associations which administered the insurance schemes. By 1913 some 14½ million persons were insured in this way. To the sickness and pension funds, both workers and employers contributed and both were represented on their management. In the course of time such benefits as free medical attendance and hospital care were extended, and by 1914 codes of factory legislation and of child labor were at last added. Although the prewar *Reich* did not set up unemployment insurance, it set up labor exchanges, and some municipalities had local schemes of insurance and relief for unemployed workers. Germans were pioneers in the thoroughness and extent of their welfare system. When war began, German workers were better protected against the hazards of an industrial society than those of any other country. This was a not unimportant element in her national solidarity and strength.

Germany's neighbors, impressed by these further developments, were quick to imitate them in whole or in part. Belgium and Denmark, as well as the United Kingdom, imitated all three forms of insurance. Austria adopted accident and sickness insurance in 1887–88, Italy and Switzerland in the 1890's. In these same years Britain, France, Norway, Spain, and the Netherlands introduced legislation that obliged employers to compensate their workers for accidents that occurred during work. Everywhere the state shouldered new kinds of responsibility for the safety and well-being of its citizens, and the principle of contributory insurance helped to reconcile laissez-faire individualism with this spectacular growth of state activity.

Local Government and Taxation. Secondly, this expansion of social security systems, combined with the urbanization of much of European society, called for a general overhaul of local government and administration. In the United Kingdom a whole new phase in the history of her local government began in the 1870's, led by the big northern industrial towns such as Birmingham and Liverpool. The radical Joseph Chamber-

lain was mayor of Birmingham between 1873 and 1875. He ran the gas and water supplies as municipal undertakings. He initiated the first successful local program of slum clearance, public parks, and recreation grounds. In 1880 Liverpool succeeded in its appeal for a loan from private investors for municipal enterprise, instead of borrowing from the central government, and it followed Birmingham's example of slum clearance. A Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 swept away the last legal restrictions on services that municipal corporations could provide. During the next decade municipal enterprise, or "gas and water socialism," became the most impressive feature of local government. Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894 democratized all local authorities by creating county councils elected as were the borough councils. To them were transferred nearly all the administrative duties hitherto carried out by un-elected justices of the peace, and by a host of sanitary and educational boards which had been set up piecemeal during the previous half century, often with overlapping and confused areas and duties. To meet the objections of the large towns to having any of their services run by county councils, a special new category of county boroughs was created, having all the powers of county councils and so being immune from county interference. Some sixty big towns gained this status. Outside them, the county system was subdivided into urban and rural districts, whose councils were also elected but whose duties were more limited. London, always a special problem because of its vast size, was entrusted to a special London County Council. There the recently formed Fabian Society, led by Sidney Webb, found a rich field for practicing its socialist principles. By the end of the century nearly every large town took pride in its municipally owned parks, water supply, gas works, streetcar lines, schools, hospitals, museums, art galleries, public baths, and similar amenities of all kinds. In this work individualistic radicals with no enthusiasm for socialism could join with democratic socialists in caring for the welfare of all citizens.

By 1914 most large cities on the continent trod the same path, endowing Europe with a great new equipment of municipal public utility services, markets, laundries, slaughterhouses, hospitals, and labor exchanges. Several countries found it equally necessary to endow local authorities with wider powers in order to enable them to carry out these labors. In 1884 the powers of French municipal councils and mayors were redefined, and the communes were given general authority to provide for all matters "of communal interest." Under energetic mayors this led them into wide fields of activity. A few years later Italian provincial and communal administrations were given greater regional freedom from central interference in matters of local government, and municipal services flourished. In lands such as Belgium or Sweden, where provincial and communal independence had preceded the national

state itself, local government was inevitably strong and active, and Swedish municipal authorities were democratized in 1909. Germany surpassed most other countries in the massiveness of its municipal activities; and in Vienna the energetic Christian Socialist mayor, Karl Lueger, municipalized most civic utilities and strove to persuade a reluctant city council to tackle the formidable housing problem. All over Europe, while cabinets and chancelleries talked increasingly of guns and warships, local councils and mayors were busy planning schools and hospitals. Without this basic reorganization of civic life which took place everywhere in the generation before 1914, it is unlikely that the structure of civilized life in Europe would have withstood so well the strains and burdens of four years of war.

Thirdly, all this increased activity of central and local governments cost money, and rulers everywhere were driven to find new ways of assessing, collecting, and allocating national revenue. Until after 1871 direct income tax had been an institution virtually peculiar to Great Britain. In the climate of opinion favorable to freer trade (and in the eyes of electorates of consumers) indirect taxes became unpopular. Progressive direct taxation, scientifically assessed and collected in proportion to wealth, came increasingly into favor. Even so, it roused fears of excessive official inquisition into private finances and of unrestrainable public expenditure, and was everywhere greeted with great suspicion. Economic expansion was greatly increasing the national income of every country; but governments had to discover acceptable and preferably painless ways in which to divert a large enough proportion of this wealth into national treasuries.

In Britain the greatest constitutional crisis of the period, involving a long conflict between the House of Commons and the House of Lords, arose over this very issue. In his budget of 1909 the Liberal chancellor of the exchequer, David Lloyd George, included the whole gamut of new fiscal devices which had been evolving for some years: heavy duties on tobacco and liquor; heavier death duties on personal estates, which had first been introduced by Sir William Harcourt in 1894; graded and heavier income tax; an additional "supertax" on incomes above a fairly high level; a duty of 20 per cent on the unearned increment of land values, to be paid whenever land changed hands; and a charge on the capital value of undeveloped land and minerals. The Conservative majority in the House of Lords broke convention by rejecting this budget until it could be referred to the electorate for approval, and so initiated a two-year battle, which was ended only by the surrender of the Lords and the passing of the Parliament Act of 1911. This important Act permanently removed the Lords' control over money bills and reduced their power over other bills to a mere capacity to delay them for two years. The merit of death duties, income tax,

and supertax in the eyes of radicals and socialists—and their infamy in the eyes of conservatives and more moderate liberals—was that once accepted in principle they were capable of yielding an ever greater return by a simple tightening of the screw. The screw was, in fact, repeatedly tightened throughout the following half century.

During the 1890's, *pari passu* with the growth of governmental expenditures on social services and on armaments, Germany and her component states, as well as Italy, Austria, Norway, and Spain, all introduced or steepened systems of income tax. France repeatedly shied away from it, though in 1901 she resorted to progressive death duties; it was 1917 before she at last introduced a not very satisfactory system of income tax. With the drift back to protectionism in commercial policy in the last quarter of the century, indirect taxes generally yielded a higher share of revenue than before. Every state had clung to considerable sources of indirect taxation, and as late as 1900 the bulk of the revenue of most governments came from these sources. Progressive taxation, weighing heavier on the more wealthy, was accepted by liberals as in accord with the principle of equality of sacrifice. To radicals and socialists it was welcome as in itself an instrument for achieving greater equality by systematically redistributing wealth. The modern state was to assume more and more the role of Robin Hood, robbing the rich to feed the poor.

Russia and Turkey. The most striking feature of all these great changes in the size and extent of electorates, in the character and scope of central and local government activity, and in the structure of state finance, was their virtual universality in Europe. Even the two eastern empires of Russia and Ottoman Turkey, though the forces operating in them were in many ways so different from those in western and central Europe, were not unaffected by these tendencies. District and provincial assemblies (*zemstvo* institutions) had been introduced in Russia from 1865 onward. Though the noble, landowning, and official classes tended to dominate them, they did considerable work in improving public health, famine relief, road building, and even education. Municipal councils had also been set up in 1870, and in the revolutionary crisis of 1905 these were strong and independent enough to join with the *zemstvo* representatives in demanding full civil liberties and a legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage.⁶ In spite of many changes in the fiscal system, the bulk of the Russian government's revenue before 1914 was drawn from the peasants and the town workers. The land tax bore twice as heavily on peasant-owned land as on estates of the nobles. A light inheritance tax was instituted in 1882 but reduced in 1895. Indirect taxation remained extremely heavy. Important duties such as that on sugar worked in the opposite direction to income tax—

⁶ See p. 374.

the tax on sugar was collected mainly from the poor consumers and handed on as subsidies to the exporting sugar producers of the south-west provinces. As in prerevolutionary France, a complex, unjust, and unscientific fiscal system was important in creating the revolutionary situation of 1917 in Russia. The tsardom financed its colossal war expenditure in 1914 partly from its large gold reserves and partly from extensive foreign loans. It was bankrupt before 1917.

Turkey, after the abortive attempts at constitutionalism and reform between 1861 and 1876,⁷ fell for a whole generation under the oriental despotism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, known as "Abdul the Damned." Though a man of considerable ability and shrewdness, he had a deep antipathy to everything Christian, western, and European, especially after his reverses in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and the further losses exacted from him by the western powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.⁸ He therefore devoted his talents to ensuring his own undisputed rule and to excluding, as far as he could, disturbing western influences from his dominions. He lived on a huge national debt, but saw to it that the interest on it due to European investors was promptly paid, even when his own administrators went unpaid. As in Russia, a generation of misrule culminated in revolution. In 1908 the "Young Turks," westernized Ottoman patriots, brought about a revolution demanding the revival of the abortive constitution of 1876 which, having bestowed upon Turkey a complete parliamentary system by a stroke of the sultan's pen, had been by the same means entirely overthrown. Abdul blandly granted it—and again tried to abolish it the following year. But this time the Young Turks counterattacked and deposed Abdul in favor of his more amiable younger brother, Mohammed V. Members of the new Turkish government, though almost as brutally intolerant as their predecessors, unable to carry out much of their program, and beset by revolts and wars that disrupted the already fragile empire, did something to modernize the state and open it to western influences.⁹

The revolutionary situations that built up in Russia by 1905 and in Turkey by 1908 were in part due to failures in war; to Turkish losses in 1877–78 and to Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. But these wars only brought to a head inherent tensions which had been apparent in each country during the previous generation. And these tensions were closely related to the absence of that close interplay between state and society which other European states had ensured through widened electorates, parliamentary representative institutions, and all the developments of beneficial governmental activities already

⁷ See p. 313.

⁸ See p. 430.

⁹ See p. 437.

described. That the lack of such developments in the two great eastern empires culminated in revolutions is some indication of why revolutionary movements made so little real headway in western and central Europe during these years. It was not for lack of such movements. They existed in abundance and are described below.¹⁰ But it took the prolonged upheaval of the First World War to give them their opportunity; and while the twentieth century was to perpetuate that close relationship between war and revolution which had existed in Europe since 1815,¹¹ the generation between 1871 and 1900 was for most of the continent a period of internal consolidation and reorganization rather than revolutionary upheaval. From 1900 onward the air became charged with more menacing revolutionary currents. Wherever parliamentary institutions, however imperfect, and wider electorates, however defective, were firmly established, they had a moderating and civilizing effect, taming revolutionary fervor as much as they tempered arbitrary government, and promoting works of human welfare which made the life of men richer and happier. It became apparent that the age of the urban masses was susceptible, also, to more irrational, sinister, and violently destructive forces. These forces were to have an important future, of which there were a few portents in the decade before 1914.¹²

Public Opinion and Politics

EVERY European government after 1871 regarded it as one of its first duties to provide, or to see that others provided, a system of public education which had two main purposes. It would destroy mass illiteracy by compulsory primary education; and it would produce by higher education an adequate number of more specially educated citizens to meet growing national needs for engineers and doctors, technicians, and administrators. Even before 1871 several states—most notably France and Prussia—had gone far toward creating a complete national system, comprising within one structure all stages of education from the primary schools to the secondary and technical high schools and the universities. By 1914 every western state had some such system in fairly full operation. It was an objective upon which different parties could agree, however violently they might differ about how it should be attained or about how far the state should permit the church to have any hand in the work. The attack on illiteracy was implied in the widening of the electorate. "We must educate our mas-

¹⁰ See p. 372.

¹¹ See p. 91.

¹² See pp. 343 and 492.

ters" was an idea in the minds of even very conservative statesmen; and in turn the demand for more equal educational opportunities derived fresh impetus from the existence of wider electorates.

Thus in Britain each extension of the franchise was accompanied by a new educational advance which opened fresh doors of opportunity to children of ability regardless of their parents' wealth. Three years after the Reform Act of 1867 Gladstone passed the Education Act of 1870, which for the first time ordained that a primary school should be within the reach of every English child; and in 1880 attendance became compulsory. In 1871 religious tests that had made Oxford and Cambridge an Anglican monopoly were abolished. In 1902 secondary education was greatly extended and better financed, and so became available to many more pupils. But it was not until 1918, when the electorate was more drastically widened, that Britain instituted a coherent and comprehensive national system of free and compulsory public education.

In general the 1870's were a decade of expanding public education throughout Europe; the 1880's saw such expansion consolidated, as public education was made more universally free and compulsory. Prussia nationalized her existing system in 1872 and made education free in 1888. Switzerland made attendance compulsory in her new constitution of 1874; Italy, in 1877; the Netherlands, in 1878; Belgium, in 1879. In most countries, however, until the twentieth century, compulsion applied only to children below nine or ten years old. Shortage of buildings and of teachers made the advance of education everywhere a slow and gradual process. Governments were reluctant to spend the necessarily very large sums of money required for so vast an undertaking. But, considering the novelty, scale, and cost of the whole development, the chief cause for comment is not the slowness and the mistakes that were undeniable, but the persistence and universality of the great adventure. The Prussian government was spending in 1901 more than thirty times as much on primary education as it had spent thirty years before. In 1914 education authorities in England and Wales were spending nearly twice as much on elementary education as they had spent in 1900, although this was also a period of extremely heavy expenditure on armaments; and there were more than six million children attending grant-aided elementary schools, staffed by 120,000 teachers.

In France the greatest changes came in the 1880's, with the controversial educational laws passed by the anticlerical republican Jules Ferry. Since Napoleon I, France had conceived of a single integrated system ranging from the village school to the *lycée* and the universities, all ultimately controlled by the Ministry of Public Instruction. But each regime had hitherto neglected the primary base of the pyramid, and each had become embroiled in bitter wrangles with the Roman Catholic Church about the relationships that should exist between religious and

secular education. The outcome of Ferry's tenures of the Ministry of Public Instruction between 1879 and 1885 was a real network of free, compulsory, primary, secular schools. Many "free schools" run by the churches survived, though under state inspection and limited supervision, and the number of children attending them was steadily declining by 1914.

Church and State. Prolonged and bitter controversy between church and state about education was a feature of nearly every European country in these years. Even in the United Kingdom, where traditions of religious toleration were strong and anticlericalism was weak, religious controversies greatly impeded the growth of an educational system. In France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, this issue dominated the whole story. It resulted everywhere in the eventual toleration of church schools under varying degrees of restraint, but also in the establishment of a strong anticlericalist and even antireligious bias in the education provided in state schools, as well as in the training of teachers to be employed in them.

In France the feud between church and republic, which raged especially around the issue of education, led eventually to the separation of church and state in 1905 and to a deep rift in French national opinion. In Germany the conflict with the Roman Catholic Church was accentuated by unification itself. The North German Federation had been predominantly Protestant. The addition of the south German states in 1871 made the Roman Catholics a very formidable minority in the new *Reich*. Their political power was concentrated in the Center Party in the *Reichstag*. Bismarck's famous struggle with the Roman Church and the Center Party, known somewhat grandiloquently as the *Kulturkampf*, lasted until 1878. He passed the "May Laws" of 1873-75, which required state approval for the training and even the licensing of priests; suspended and imprisoned priests and bishops; and stiffened secular control over the system of public education. But the conflict in Germany was less sharp than elsewhere. In Belgium, as in France, it provoked a long struggle between clericals and anticlericals, begun during the liberal government of Frère-Orban in 1878 and known as the "war of the schools." In Italy between 1887 and 1896 the ministries of the liberal anticlericalist, Francesco Crispi, had many reasons for their turbulence; but one at least was his policy of making religious teaching optional instead of compulsory in the primary schools and of attacking the role of religious orders in education. In Austria-Hungary battles between liberals and clericalists for control of education became inevitably tangled up with rivalries between the various nationalities, each anxious to secure its own schools or to make special provision for the teaching of its own language and culture. In Spain, though most schools belonged to the civil authorities, most schoolmasters were devout Ro-

man Catholics, and since the Concordat of 1851 it was compulsory for them to teach the Catholic religion and catechism. Even so, the Church tried to force the state schools to close down for lack of funds, and preached a ferocious antiliberalism. In Scandinavia, where Lutheranism prevailed, there was little friction between church and state.

All Europe, during this period, was going to school. From the age of five or six the rising generation was increasingly compelled to attend classes regularly, to become at least literate, to learn what governments considered it desirable that every citizen should know. Schoolteachers became a more numerous and more influential element in the life of the community. Usually given a special form of training by the state, and often obliged to teach from a syllabus laid down by a department of the central government, the schoolteachers (many of whom were women) tended to become apostles of the doctrines of secularism or nationalism, the advance guard of anticlericalism. Typical of the outlook and doctrines which state-trained teachers were required to impart to their pupils were those prescribed by Jules Ferry, in a circular letter to primary teachers in which he explained the purport of the law of 1882. Emphasizing the role of the teacher as "a natural aid to moral and social progress," he urged them "to prepare a generation of good citizens for our country." Octave Gréard, his right-hand man, whom he described as "the first schoolmaster of France," told them that "in history we must emphasize only the essential features of the development of French nationality, seeking this less in a succession of deeds in war than in the methodical development of institutions and in the progress of social ideas." The civic virtues of loyalty, discipline, devotion to duty, patriotism, were usually taught in a manner which exalted nationalism and undermined religious faith. Only too often the missionary zeal of the teachers brought internal strife to the villages and small towns of Europe, and their lot became unenviable. By 1894 Georges Clemenceau passed this judgment on the excessive narrowness and the unimaginative outlook which infused French primary education:

In futile efforts the pitiful ambassador of the Republic to the inhabitants of the rural districts consumes his time and his strength. The parents are inaccessible to him; the country squires are his enemies. With the priest there is latent hostility; with the Catholic schools there is open war. . . . They steal his pupils. They crush him in a hundred ways, sometimes with the connivance of the mayor, usually with the co-operation of the big influences in the commune.

Because this remarkable expansion of popular education took place at a time when the new doctrines of science, realism, positivism, secularism, nationalism, were at flood tide, it caused violent controversy.

Its collision with the established creeds and institutions of Christian churches, hitherto the chief sources of education, left deep scars on the body of European opinion. The rising generation was divided into those whose education had been provided by the church in militant mood, and those whose education had been strongly anticlericalist and militantly nationalist. To either side indoctrination seemed more important than the spirit of free inquiry and reflective thought. By the twentieth century some of this acerbity had gone; the Roman Catholic Church under Pope Leo XIII, from 1878 onward, gradually came to terms with the new states of Europe and the feud between clericals and anticlericals partly burned itself out. But outside the United Kingdom and Scandinavia it was always liable to revive whenever questions of subsidies to church schools or official inspection of all schools raised their heads. To a degree quite unknown in the United Kingdom or the United States of America, European education has been haunted by schism.

The social effects of the great attack on illiteracy were immense. One of the less frequently noticed is the incidental training in social discipline. The bringing together of large numbers of children of the same age into a common classroom under the charge of a trained teacher did much more than destroy illiteracy. For the first time it accustomed the urban masses to a highly integrated community life and a standardized form of group discipline. When the children left the discipline of the classroom, at some age between ten and fourteen, an increasing proportion of them passed on to the no less standardized discipline of the workshop and the factory, the business office and the shop. The foreman, manager, or employer took the place of the schoolteacher. It was often a harsher and less benevolent discipline; but how much did it owe its effectiveness to the preliminary training and conditioning achieved in the classroom? When, as in many European countries after 1871, these strong conditioning circumstances were also reinforced by the equally inescapable and still more rigorous disciplines of military training and national service, the molding forces of the new generation are seen to be quite revolutionary in their effects.

The unit of the family or the village or the church ceased to be supreme among the communities that normally shaped the early life and experience of children. Living in larger, more impersonal, and more highly organized communities was an art that had to be learned. Without it an ordered and civilized life in the big modern communities of cities and nations would have been impossible. Yet the learning of it imposed great burdens of adaptation and conformity, and often brought new senses of frustration, psychological disturbances and distortions, which might find alternative outlets either in antisocial urges or in a too easy surrender to the instincts of the herd. The millions who in youth and adolescence had known schoolroom, barracks, and factory

were bound to be different in outlook and behavior from their predecessors who had known none of these things. The younger people who grew up, worked, and voted in the generation before 1914 were the first generation that had so universally known these experiences. They marked a turning point in the social history of modern Europe.

By 1914 popular education, both in its intended and in its unintended effects, was no doubt the greatest single force molding and conditioning public opinion in general. From the classroom came many of those basic assumptions and implicit forms of behavior which unconsciously determined much of what people thought and did. But other great new engines for shaping opinion were coming into operation. One was popular associations of all kinds, and not least political parties; another was the popular press, enjoying a mass circulation and influence. These two media, more than any other, formed the link between public opinion and politics in the age of wider electorates and parliamentary governments.

Popular Associations and the Press. The rights of free association and public meeting had traditionally been regarded as inherent rights of democracy. They were, for example, stipulated in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. Yet it was only in some European states, and there belatedly, that full freedom for citizens to associate and meet together for private or public purposes was granted before 1914. By 1871 the United Kingdom had come to accept freedom of association, meeting, and speech as normal. The mid-nineteenth century was a golden age of large popular associations for promoting every sort of cause.¹³ But it was only by 1876 that trade unions won full legal recognition and protection, and their rights were not fully determined until the Trades Disputes Acts of 1906 and 1913. In France the famous *Le Chapelier* Law of 1791 and the Napoleonic Penal Code forbade all forms of economic association of workers, but this had been partially relaxed in 1864, and in 1884 freedom of association was finally granted. In general, freedom of association was securely recognized and practiced in all the Scandinavian and western states before the end of the century; but in central Europe—especially in Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary—it was subject to severe curtailment in certain circumstances, despite formal recognition of civil liberties in laws and constitutions.

In all three countries trade unions grew and flourished in spite of periodic setbacks. Other forms of association were less secure. In 1878 when Bismarck, as German chancellor, was engaged in battle with the socialist parties, he passed a law that gave him power to suppress all independent labor organizations, all socialist political and economic associations, and all their publications. They were forbidden to hold meetings. The law was renewed until 1890, and in the intervening years

¹³ See p. 171.

over 150 periodicals were suppressed by the police, and over 1,500 persons arrested. In 1894 the Italian premier, Crispi, launched a similar attack against the socialists, dissolving their associations, suppressing their newspapers, and arresting many people. He met with somewhat less success than Bismarck for whereas the German socialists lost nearly a third of their former votes in the elections of 1881, the Italian socialists gained considerably in the elections of 1895. In both countries the repressive measures ultimately failed to achieve their ends, and socialist movements gained in strength.¹⁴ In Austria the constitutional laws of 1867 had authorized the emperor to issue "emergency regulations" in case of need. From 1900 until 1907 Austrian politics fell into such a deadlock that the prime ministers virtually ruled by emergency powers, and constitutional government became a farce. In Russia freedom of association and speech were as short-lived as the brief constitutional interlude of 1905-06; in Turkey they never really existed. Clearly, as one moved further east in Europe, constitutional government and its attendant rights and civil liberties had struck shallower roots. They were still liable to wither and die, unless revolution should plant new seeds.

Freedom of speech and of the press, closely linked in purport with freedom of association and public meeting, was an equally vital element in the forming of public opinion in politics. Again these rights, so widely canvassed before 1848, had often been embodied in the new written constitutions of Europe: in the Belgian of 1831, the Dutch of 1848, the Austrian of 1867, the Swiss of 1874, the Spanish of 1876. In Britain the last tax on newspapers, condemned as a "tax on knowledge," was removed in 1861; and the last restriction, in 1869. Germany in 1874, France in 1881, enacted special laws guaranteeing the press against governmental interference. Although the political press was still, in central and eastern Europe, liable to suffer occasional oppression in special circumstances, as under Bismarck's antisocialist law of 1878, there was in general enough freedom of expression for the press to develop in vigor, scale, circulation, and influence. With the more modern techniques for collecting news, printing papers, and speedily distributing them, new opportunities for popular journalism appeared; and the growth of a much larger literate public, more directly interested in politics, ensured that these opportunities would be seized, whether for profit making and advertising, or for purposes of political propaganda and persuasion. It has been estimated that the number of newspapers published in Europe doubled during the last two decades of the century; and this increase was mainly due to the growth of a new kind of press. It was less literary and less sophisticated than the old, but more popular in its mass appeal, more sensational and irresponsible, cheaper

¹⁴ See p. 366.

and more dependent for its finances upon commercial advertising than upon the subscriptions of its readers.

During the 1870's and 1880's there existed a good, vigorous middle-class press, represented by the British *Daily Telegraph* and *Daily News* (dating from 1846), the French *Le Matin*, the German *Neueste Nachrichten*, and the Italian *Messaggero*. It was quickly followed in the 1890's and after by a still more popular and proletarian press, often modeled on the spectacularly successful Hearst press in the United States, and inaugurated by such journals as Lord Northcliffe's *Daily Mail*, the Parisian *Petit Journal*, and the Berlin *Lokal-Anzeiger*. By 1900 each major country had some such papers, exceeding the million mark in daily circulation and fostering a new type of bright popular journalism. They were skillfully calculated to attract the maximum number of readers and therefore the largest advertisement revenue. Highly competitive and commercial in character, they appealed directly to the new literate and semiliterate public. Lord Salisbury might jibe at Northcliffe's *Daily Mail* of 1896 as "written by office-boys for office-boys"; but this pioneer of the modern press magnates in Britain had gauged nicely the mentality and prejudices of the public which now mattered most in Britain. He gave it what it wanted—bright accounts of world news, blended with occasional campaigns against some abuse or some alarming foreign government, now arousing hate and then a scare, but always exploiting the excitement of the moment. It paid very handsomely, and others soon imitated it.

Inevitably, political parties and movements came to rely on the press to keep in contact with their adherents and to rally fresh support to their cause. Every country acquired a political press as well as a commercial press, and sometimes the two could be combined in one organ. In Germany the Conservatives had their *Kreuzzeitung*, the Catholic Center Party its *Germania* (established in 1871), the National Liberals their *National Liberale Korrespondenz*, the Social Democrats their *Vorwärts* and *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, and each party acquired other local or provincial organs. The German political press remained basically serious and "educational" in character, putting heavy emphasis on political issues, editorial opinion, and literary or philosophical articles. It did much to nationalize opinion by focusing it upon issues of importance to the whole *Reich*, rather than upon those peculiar to the component states. France, too, had strong traditions of political journalism. Of the forty-six general newspapers that appeared in Paris daily in 1914, all save a small handful could be classed as markedly political in bias; but the exceptions were mainly those with the largest circulations which, to maintain sales, carefully avoided alienating any specific category of readers. The demands of party polemics and of mass circulations frequently conflicted in this way, and it is seldom that

large circulations have been built on a mainly political appeal. Crime and sport, sex and sensationalism, were the more favorite themes of the largest dailies, before 1914 as since. Nonetheless, party organs were valued and valuable aids in the building of new political and social movements, most obviously the new socialist parties that appeared in most countries by the end of the century. In France *L'Humanité* edited by the socialist leader Jean Jaurès, in Germany the Social Democrats' *Vorwärts*, in Britain the *Daily Herald* of George Lansbury, in Italy *Avanti!*, have a central importance in the history of European socialism.¹⁵

Public Excitement. Even by 1900 all these tendencies—popular education, and literacy, popular associations of publicity and propaganda, and a popular press—had gone far enough to produce dramatic and often incalculable results in politics, both national and international. As early as 1870 Bismarck's publishing of the Ems telegram, which the following morning set on fire extreme nationalist opinion in both Paris and Berlin and helped to precipitate the Franco-Prussian War, was token enough of the new inflammability and violence of public opinion.¹⁶ The years between 1871 and 1914 were to yield a large number of further examples of the impact of public opinion on politics, of which three may be taken as representative.

One is the prevalence of sensational scandals and affairs in France under the Third Republic. It is improbable that as much corruption, gerrymandering, and political blackmail existed under the parliamentary republic as had existed under its predecessors, the notoriously corrupt monarchy of Louis Philippe before 1848 or the resolutely unjust regime of Napoleon III. The difference after 1875 was partly that the enemies of the republic delighted in uncovering every disreputable fact about it, and partly that social consciences were now more tender and alert. It was easier to excite indignation when so many had cherished high hopes of a democratic and republican regime. In 1887 Daniel Wilson, the son-in-law of the venerable republican leader, Jules Grévy, who had been president of the Republic since 1879, was discovered to have carried on a prosperous traffic in honors and decorations from the very precincts of the president's palace. There ensued a long political crisis, which involved the resignation of both the ministry and the president. In another example the monarchists and Bonapartists hostile to the Republic sponsored the cause of General Boulanger, who had already been active as a popular champion of the demand for "revenge" against Germany. In 1889 he attempted a *coup d'état*, and the Republic was saved chiefly because his nerve failed him at the last moment. The government took swift action against the chauvinistic League of Pa-

¹⁵ See p. 367.

¹⁶ See p. 290.

triot and other violent movements that had backed him. Popular excitement, which he had been exploiting, was given timely diversion by national celebrations of the centenary of 1789. Only three years later an even wider scandal concerning the finances of the Panama Canal again rocked the government and the Republic, and led to the trial of six ministers, only one of whom was convicted.

In 1896 came the greatest of the affairs, which split French opinion and had far-reaching effects on the Republic. It was alleged that the chief document on the evidence of which Captain Dreyfus, a Jewish army officer, had been convicted and punished by a military tribunal, had in fact been forged; and that its forger had been protected by the reactionary military authorities, who had seized upon the excuse to expel Jews and Protestants from the armed forces. The great novelist, Émile Zola, published an article "I Accuse" ("*J'accuse*") in which he deliberately invited legal penalties in order to set out the charges against the army. A whole succession of charges and countercharges meanwhile aroused public excitement to fever pitch, and Zola's trial, in which he was defended by Clemenceau, became a heated political debate. The personal issue of the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus was lost sight of, and the issue became one of general principle. It was a clear issue between the military claim, that the honor and prestige of the army mattered more than injustice to any individual, and the Republican civilian claim, that individual justice must triumph over all else. Both sides exaggerated and inflated the issue until no settlement seemed possible. The Church became implicated on the side of the army, partly because of the unwise behavior of some of its members and partly because the Republicans were ready to see the hand of clericalism in everything. The affair ended with somewhat half-hearted attempts at a *coup d'état* by extremists of the right, and eventual pardon and reinstatement of Dreyfus. But the depths of bitterness engendered by it, and the violence with which each side fought it for several years, made it seem natural even in 1940 for the overthrow of the Third Republic by Marshal Pétain to be described by Frenchmen as "the revenge of the anti-Dreyfusards."

A second example of the impact of public opinion on politics can be drawn from the United Kingdom, where at least parliamentary institutions and traditions of political compromise were by now firmly established. Gladstone touched the chords of the new mass opinion when, in the winter of 1879, at the age of seventy, he stumped the country denouncing Disraeli's policy of imperialism. This Midlothian campaign scandalized Queen Victoria. It had not hitherto been etiquette for a leading statesman to behave in this way. Just before the elections of 1880 he launched a second Midlothian campaign, which his biographer John Morley described as an "oratorical crusade," but which Disraeli

(who did not imitate him) called "a pilgrimage of passion." In any case the Liberals won a majority of 137 seats in the elections, so these methods clearly paid. However much the Queen might frown, there was irresistible logic about Gladstone's decision. Now that the franchise had been widened (and Disraeli had widened it), national leaders must expect to have to make some such direct contact with the electorate. Lloyd George was to perpetuate this new kind of electioneering. But the frenzy to which opinion in the whole country could be raised did not become evident until, at the end of the century, Britain became involved in the Boer War against the small Dutch farmers' republics of South Africa. Coming as the climax of a period of colonial expansion, and amid darkening clouds of international tension, it was the first important war in which Britain had engaged since the Crimean War nearly half a century before. The irresponsible swagger with which it was undertaken, and the unexpected reverses that the British forces met with, induced remarkable outbursts of popular anger and rejoicing. Already the crisis of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878 had given the English political vocabulary one word that was to survive because it so aptly fitted the mood. The old conjuror's gibberish word *Jingo* had become incongruously popular through the music-hall song:

We don't want to fight, but, by jingo, if we do

We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.

Now the Boer War contributed another, "mafficking." It originated in the scenes of popular hysteria with which Londoners, in 1900, greeted the news that the long siege of Mafeking by the Boers had been at last relieved. Jingoism and mafficking were symptomatic of the irrational forces at work in the new age, stirred by the crudest forces of sensationalism and mob emotion. The Boer War, for a time, split the British nation almost as deeply as the Dreyfus Case was, at the same moment, splitting the French; and both coincided with the Spanish-American War, which revealed not dissimilar impulses across the Atlantic.

A third example can best be drawn from the field of international relations. In 1890 the emperor William II, who two years before had come to the throne of the *Reich*, dismissed the veteran Bismarck and opened a new era in German policy. Instead of being guided by the shrewd calculations of the realistic Bismarck, Germany was now governed by the theatrical gestures and utterances of her neurotic emperor and the emotionally unstable ministers whom he chose to advise him. His nervous and inept way of handling German foreign relations made him, even among his own advisers, a byword for clumsiness. The long series of international incidents and crises in which the Kaiser played a central role will be described later.¹⁷ There is little evidence that his

¹⁷ See p. 497.

behavior made him at all unpopular at home, and it seems probable that it was accepted as an instinctive reflection of the uncertainties of German national sentiment and the surges of her expansionist aspirations. He was among the first of the great national leaders to exploit the new relationship that was growing up between diplomacy as it had long been conducted by the ruling *élites* of Europe—the frock-coated, top-hatted circles of “influential people” (*massgebende Kreise*)—and the new disturbing force, which these men could no longer ignore, of the prejudices, passions, and attitudes of the mass electorate.

Hitherto, although domestic affairs had been directly subject to electoral pressures, diplomatic and military affairs had remained the almost unchallenged province of the *élites* of birth and skill. The Kaiser, by his very vulgarity and emotional instability, was especially sensitive to these pressures. The link between the two was not so much “public opinion,” which suggests something more coherent, rational, and articulated than what actually existed; it was rather “publicity,” the day-by-day reporting of news and views to a gigantic public that was inevitably largely ignorant of the complexities of international relations. This process, which was coming about through the interaction of mass literacy, universal suffrage, and the popular cheap daily press, was revolutionizing the old diplomacy. The financial burdens of taxation and the personal burdens of military service compelled governments constantly to rally general public support behind their policies, abroad as well as at home. There was an irresistible temptation to short-circuit the process of rational persuasion by appealing to the strongest, because the crudest, of the mass emotions: hatred, anger, and fear. The intensifying competition in armaments which dominated the decade before 1914 was based on this, and so was much of the Kaiser’s diplomacy. Long before President Woodrow Wilson demanded “open covenants openly arrived at,” the traditions of secret diplomacy were already giving way to the newer practices of diplomacy by publicity and demagoguery. Even before the Kaiser began rattling his saber, relations among European states were subject to the violent vibrations of national passion and the incantations of imperialism. The murders at Sarajevo, which touched off the great war in 1914, occurred appropriately enough on the day whose patron saint was St. Vitus.

CHAPTER 17

SOCIALISM VERSUS NATIONALISM

Economic and Social Organizations

JUST as the growth of Europe's populations and towns brought about a revolution in the electoral basis, structure, and functions of central and local governments, so economic expansion brought about a revolution in the nature and structure of economic organizations. Tendencies that had been apparent before 1871 in Great Britain, Belgium, and France, now became even more dramatically apparent in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. The whole of Europe was being pulled irresistibly into the pattern of economic development which western nations had been the first to evolve.¹

German Expansion. Germany outpaced all other nations in the production of wealth, and it was not that western nations stood still. If the output of France's blast furnaces increased sixfold between 1870 and 1904, that of Germany's grew tenfold. By exploiting the rich mineral resources of the Ruhr, the Saar, and Alsace-Lorraine, as well as the newly unified labor power of the *Reich*, Germany by 1914 had become the greatest industrial nation in Europe. The ratio of industrial potential between Germany and her two western neighbors at that date has been estimated as Germany 3: Britain 2: France 1. This rapid ascendancy of Germany in the economic life of Europe was the most significant feature of the prewar generation. Moreover, whereas France manufactured for home rather than world markets, and her industrial structure of small firms slowed down standardization and total output, Germany manufactured increasingly for export. This made her the chief European rival to Great Britain as the "workshop of the world," as well as in banking, insurance, and shipping. This rivalry added greatly to the international fears and tensions that sprang from other considerations of national security, naval power, and colonial possessions. The rule of the Iron Chancellor inaugurated an age of iron

¹ See p. 156.


and steel—commodities which the *Reich* as he forged it was especially well equipped to produce.

Like Britain half a century earlier, Germany became a food-importing country, despite more scientific and more mechanized agriculture which greatly increased the productivity of her farms. By 1914 about a fifth of her food was being imported, mainly from the Netherlands, Denmark, and the Danube valley. Already in 1879 Bismarck changed German commercial policy to one of protection, and imposed tariffs in response to pressure from agricultural and industrial interests alike. France, traditionally protectionist, imposed new tariffs throughout the 1880's. During the same decade even the United Kingdom abandoned her free-trade policy. These departures from free-trade policies by the leading industrial nations started a general European movement toward protection. Within the territories of the *Reich* a rapid extension of all means of transport and communication—of roads, railroads, waterways, mail, and telegraph service—welded the country into one great economic unit. The 11,000 kilometers of railways in 1860 became 19,500 by 1870, 43,000 by 1890, and 61,000 by 1910 (*see* Diagram 2). Between 1879 and 1884 most of Prussia's roads were brought under state control. Germany's coal output multiplied nearly sevenfold between 1871 and 1913, and her output of lignite, tenfold. The marriage of coal and iron gave her the greatest iron and steel industry in Europe. The firms of Krupp, Thyssen, Stumm-Halberg, and Donnersmark developed huge steel empires. British coal production kept ahead of German, but in the output of pig iron, which is a convenient index of the growth of the iron and steel industries, Germany overtook the United Kingdom before 1900. (*See* Diagrams 3 and 4.) After 1878 English discovery of the Thomas-Gilchrist process for smelting ore made the phosphoric iron ores of Lorraine available for German steel manufacturing, and was partly responsible for its rapid expansion. The heavy industries of the Ruhr, the Saar, Lorraine, and Silesia became the very foundation of German prosperity and power in Europe.

German electrical and chemical industries expanded no less impressively. Werner von Siemens, who invented the electric dynamo, built up the firm of Siemens and Halske, which specialized in heavy current and in 1903 merged into the Siemens-Schuckert Werke combine. Emil Rathenau created the German Edison Company of 1883, which later became the famous AEG (*Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft*). Between them these two gigantic concerns literally electrified Germany, and by 1906 this new industry was employing more than 100,000 people. In 1913 electrical equipment and electrical goods of all kinds were among Germany's most valuable exports. Her chemical industries prospered partly because her excellent scientific education could be married to rich mineral resources. With the production of a

DIAGRAM 2. BUILDING RAILROADS, 1870-1910

approximately in thousands of kilometers



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
NOTE:

(1) The three columns for each country measure the length of railroad in use in that country at twenty-year intervals between 1870 and 1910. The differences between them indicate the activity in railway construction during these years. Thus the "heroic age" of railway building in the United Kingdom came before 1870, in Russia after 1890; and France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland more than doubled their mileages between 1870 and 1890.

(2) The Diagram does not measure the density of railroads within each country. A small country like Belgium was always better served by a closer network than was Spain.

DIAGRAM 3. OUTPUT OF COAL AND LIGNITE, 1871-1913


In millions of metric tons



wide variety of industrial and agricultural chemicals, ranging from sulphuric acid and ammonia to pyrites and potassium salts, there grew up important national industries in dyes and fertilizers as well as in explosives and armaments. The number of people employed in the chemical industries nearly quadrupled between 1885 and 1913, the years of most rapid expansion. The combination of these two especially modern electrical and chemical industries modernized Germany's whole industrial equipment, and gave her immense advantages over other nations.

It was inevitable in these circumstances that German trade should expand, and should come to rival that of the United Kingdom in European markets. The completion of the railway network in Europe brought Germany immense advantages. It even converted her geographical position, previously a handicap, into a positive asset. It no longer mattered


DIAGRAM 4. OUTPUT OF PIG IRON, 1871-1910
in millions of metric tons



that several of her rivers ran northward into the Baltic, nor that her seacoast was short, nor that mountains hemmed her in on the south. As the great central land power in Europe she became the focus of the whole European network of railroads, with access by rail to Russia and Turkey, by tunnel to Italy, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean ports, by steamship to the Atlantic and Pacific. From 1880 onward the *Reich* also promoted the reconstruction of its already good internal canal system, and widened and extended waterways to take steamer traffic. The Kiel Canal was built more for strategic than for economic reasons. From 1886 onward the great *Hamburg-Amerika* line was expanded by Albert Ballin, until its 22 ocean steamers with a gross tonnage of little more than 60,500 tons had by 1913 become the HAPAG fleet of 172 steamers, with a gross tonnage of over a million tons.

DIAGRAM 5. TOTAL VALUES OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1875-1913

In millions of pounds sterling



Ballin expanded the lines to the United States, Latin America, and the Far East. He became a close personal adviser of William II. In 1888 its chief rival, the North German Lloyd company (*Nord-Deutscher Lloyd*) of Bremen, began regular sailings to Australia. The ports and harbors of Hamburg and Bremen had to be repeatedly extended, and even between 1900 and 1914 their tonnage of shipping was doubled. When war began, the German merchant fleet was the second largest in the world, exceeded only by Great Britain's. Its steam fleet had come to exceed that of France during the 1880's, and by 1910 was three times as great; and the total tonnage of the German merchant marine in 1913 was nearly 490 times greater than its tonnage in 1870.

In 1913 the value of German exports to all foreign and colonial countries was a little less than 2½ billion dollars; that of British ex-

ports was a little more than this figure. French foreign trade was in value little more than half the British; Russian, only half the French and even less than that of Belgium (*see* Diagram 5). But the most important overriding fact in the fifteen years before 1914 was that world trade as a whole was rapidly expanding and a very high proportion of it was European trade. It was Germany's share of this European and world phenomenon, her place in a rapidly expanding global economy, that gave her an irrefutable claim to be a world power.

Throughout Europe less spectacular but still very important economic expansion was taking place. By 1890 France, Italy, and Switzerland, as well as Germany, had rather more than doubled their mileage of railroads as compared with 1870, while Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain had nearly doubled theirs. All countries continued building track, though at a slower rate, during the following twenty years. (*See* Diagram 2.) Between 1891 and 1905 Russia completed the great Siberian railway, as a state undertaking. It ran over some 3,800 miles and opened up vast new Asiatic regions to trade and settlement. Russian railroad mileage nearly doubled between 1889 and 1902. Other railways penetrated right through Asia, and Eurasia became in a quite new sense one continent.

Behind this economic expansion, and the growth of industries, shipping, and trade, lay a complex financial system, linked with new and more gigantic forms of economic organization. In banking and finance Berlin was coming to rival London, Paris, and Amsterdam. The rapid expansion of German economy would have been impossible without the activities of the banks which were so much concerned with "production credit," that is, with the organization of capital and credit for purposes of business enterprise and expansion. Most of these banks had been formed before 1871,² but they were reorganized and expanded after unification. They helped to provide capital and credit, not only for the development of domestic industries and trade, but also for financing scores of enterprises abroad: in Austria and Russia, Africa and the Near East, even in the United States and Latin America. The *Deutsche Bank*, founded in 1870 and developed by Georg von Siemens, cousin of Werner, was especially active in these foreign enterprises. It took part in the construction of the famous Berlin-Baghdad Railroad, which caused such far-reaching international repercussions in the decade before 1914.³

Combines and Trusts. In every advanced industrial country there took place a variety of changes which tended in one direction—toward ever larger units of production, distribution, and financial organization. It might be what is known as "concentration of industry," the growth

² See p. 267.

³ See p. 482.

of larger units of production, bigger factories each producing more than any had produced before. This might be accompanied by the elimination or amalgamation of a previously larger number of small factories. Or it might be the vertical combination of firms at different stages of an industry, as became common in the metal trades—large steel businesses managed the whole making of steel from the mining of the iron ore to the manufacture of rails and steamships. Or it might be horizontal combinations, known as cartels, designed to restrict competition by association among rival producers in order to control output and prices; and the associated firms did not necessarily belong to the same country. European countries before 1914 offered examples of all these types of concentration, combination, and cartel, and of various shades of association which included more than one such type. The Dynamite Trust formed in 1886 by the Swedish inventor of dynamite, Alfred Nobel, having collected a large fortune from international trade in explosives, devoted much of it to the causes of philanthropy and peace. The United States produced its Carnegies and Rockefellers and Fords in these years; Europe had its counterparts.

The new industries, such as the iron and steel, electrical, and chemical industries of the *Reich*, showed these elephantine tendencies to a marked degree. In Europe, Germany was the extreme example of high-powered integration and concentration into leviathan firms and cartels. But similar things happened in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and even France, despite the French affection for small units of production. French sugar factories, numbering 483, produced an average of 840 tons each in 1883–84. By 1900, there were 334 factories producing an average of 3,000 tons each. By 1912, there were 213 factories averaging more than 4,000 tons each. Even so, as late as 1896 the average number of employees in each industrial unit of France was 5.5. The workshop, not the factory, was still the typical unit of French industry. In Britain the most conspicuous example of concentration in industry before 1914 was the powerful combination of J. and P. Coats which made sewing thread. By 1890 it controlled a third of the thread trade in the United Kingdom; it was then reorganized as a limited liability company and acquired almost a monopoly. Britain's largest combinations, Unilever and Imperial Chemical Industries, developed after 1914, and her banking business became concentrated in the "Big Five."⁴

In western Europe it was, naturally enough, the heavy industries that set the pace in amalgamation and unification. The French metal industries had their great trust, the *Comité des Forges*. It dated from 1864, and by 1914 it had come to include nearly every iron and steel firm in the country. Its controlling power was virtually in the hands of half-a-dozen large firms, especially Schneiders of Le Creusot and Wendel

⁴ See p. 540.

of Lorraine. Germany evolved, among others, her two greatest cartels, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate and the Steelworks Union. The former was set up in 1893 and dominated the Ruhr coal area; the latter in 1904, and included all German steelworks except those engaged in making the very finest products. Similar syndicates grew up in Russia after 1900, especially in the heavy industries. Thus Prodamet, formed in 1902, came to include 80 per cent of the entire production of Russian metallurgical works.

The appearance of these vast new economic organizations inevitably had repercussions on politics, and in this way too the inter-connections between politics and economics were reinforced between 1871 and 1914. Concentration of industry meant new concentrations of power. No government, least of all a government concerned directly and increasingly with conditions of labor, social security, and national strength, could ignore combinations as powerful as these. Nor were such enterprises, often engaged in far-ranging international transactions, inhibited from seeking to influence governmental policies. The sinister influence of armaments manufacturers in promoting international rivalries in order to bring them richer profits may often have been exaggerated; but at least the great coal and steel and chemical magnates formed or backed all kinds of associations which urged courses of action considered desirable in the interests of their business. The Union of Economic Interests (founded in France in 1911) was a powerful association of businessmen within which the *Comité des Forges* had great influence. It exerted a steady pressure in postwar France against governmental controls, state monopolies, and graduated taxation. The creation of the German Navy League in 1898 was prompted by a combination of conservative nationalists, Rhenish steel interests, and northern shipping interests. It has been described as marking "the entrance of the heavy industries, the mercantile interests, and the financiers into the ranks of the naval enthusiasts." With the help of newspapers owned by the same steel and shipping interests, it ran a tremendous campaign in favor of naval armaments in rivalry to Great Britain. It was an unexpected consequence of democratic principles, of freedom of association and speech, that such powerful economic groups could most readily avail themselves of the instruments of modern publicity and propaganda; there is little cause for surprise and no reason to doubt that they used these instruments to advance their special interests.

Just as the private consumer was at the mercy of cartels and price-fixing agreements of big business, so the ordinary citizen was subjected to high-pressure propaganda emanating from big business. Growing evidence of this stimulated, by reaction, a host of different social and economic organizations. Two of the most important were co-operative movements and trade unions.

Co-operative Movements and Trade Unions. Co-operative associations, both of producers and of consumers, arose in many countries. France, the home of producers' co-operatives since the 1830's, saw a fresh flowering of the movement in the 1880's. Between 1880 and 1914 the number of such associations rose from 100 to 450. After 1894 their activities were co-ordinated by a "consultative chamber." Britain, on the other hand, was the traditional home of consumers' co-operatives, and the movement that had begun at Rochdale in 1844 likewise bore rich fruit toward the end of the century. The English Co-operative Wholesale Society was formed in 1863; the Scottish, five years later. Both were federations of consumers' societies, designed to cut out the middleman. In the 1870's they extended their activities into production, and even into landowning, insurance, and banking. Strong co-operative movements developed in Germany only at the end of the century—with the formation in 1899 of the Hamburg Society *Produktion* (which propounded an ambitious and aggressive program of social reconstruction), with the new Wholesale Society of 1893, and with an expansion of mutual credit associations among the agricultural population. In all three countries schemes of profit sharing and copartnership, designed to give workers a direct interest in the business, were introduced by certain firms; most notably in some banks and insurance companies in France, several gas companies in Great Britain, and in a few farming estates in Germany. But this movement, advancing in the 1890's, was sharply declining by 1914.

Other nations adopted co-operative organizations in fields especially appropriate to their economies. In Denmark, Italy, the Low Countries, Finland, and Ireland, they spread most quickly to agriculture and dairies. Danish developments were the most far-reaching, with 1,000 co-operative dairies by 1892; and the bulk of Danish eggs, fruit, and bacon, as well as milk and butter, were produced and marketed by co-operative methods. Italy had more than 400 co-operative dairies by 1900, and masons and less skilled laborers formed a great national association on co-operative lines. In Ghent in 1873 workmen combined to lower the price of bread by setting up a co-operative bakery. By 1880 this example led to the formation of *Vooruit*, which eventually gave rise in every large Belgian town to a great co-operative organization running shops, cafés, libraries, and sometimes a bakery and brewery. The *Maison du Peuple*, which began in Brussels in 1881, followed similar lines, and came to serve as the headquarters of the Second International.⁵ In Sweden the movement was small and localized until 1899, when the Wholesale Society (*Kooperativa Forbundet*) was formed; it then sailed on to broader waters, but moved slowly until after 1914. The place of

⁵ See p. 387.

co-operative *artels* in Russian industries has already been mentioned.⁶

Besides specifically economic organizations, a host of social and cultural associations grew up in these years. Here and there, as in Belgium and Germany, these became linked closely with political parties, but their greatest functions were not political. These years saw a rich proliferation of voluntary associations of all kinds, ranging from the Workers' Educational Association formed in Britain in 1903 to a host of women's leagues and youth clubs, from the restless German youth movement (*Wandervogel*) to the French Catholic "Popular Institutes" of around 1900, from chambers of commerce to trades councils. From all these the more literate populations gained experience in organization and management. They were the products of a new sense of community, a new urge to find intellectual and material improvement through self-help and greater security through national solidarity—an urge born of urbanism, education, nationalism, democracy.

Most important of all, the same reaction against the pressures of big business brought a general renaissance of trade unionism. Labor organization already had long traditions and a rich history in western Europe by 1871.⁷ Economic expansion after 1871 brought it fresh opportunities and incentives, and its rapid growth before 1914 forms a pattern common to all areas of Europe which had become industrialized. Combination of workers into larger units became easier with the rise of larger factories and firms. It became more desirable if workers were to hope for any success in bargaining collectively with the powerful new captains of industry. Democratic ideas favored legislation granting freedom of association and legal protection for union funds, officials, and bargaining activities. Accordingly, these years mark a whole new phase in trade-union history. Trade unions were given legal recognition in Britain by 1871, in France by 1884, in Austria by 1870, in Germany after the lapse of Bismarck's antisocialist laws in 1890, in Spain in 1881.

Until the 1880's labor unions included mainly the more skilled workmen in particular trades, such as building, engineering, mining, textiles, and printing, all of which were expanding. They were predominantly craft unions, constantly preoccupied with mutual insurance and self-help against the hazards of accident, sickness, and death, and only sporadically engaged in strikes to reinforce their demands for better working conditions, shorter hours, and higher pay. They tended to ally with the more radical liberal movements, with John Bright in Britain, the radical republican journalist Barberet in France, the progressive liberals Hirsch and Duncker in Germany. When the first French

⁶ See p. 306.

⁷ See p. 132.

Labor Congress met in Paris in 1876, it was attended by 255 delegates from Paris and 105 from the provincial towns, representing the trade unions, co-operative societies, and mutual aid societies; when the third Congress met in Marseilles three years later, it fell more under the influence of Jules Guesde who preached a Marxist program. The mildly reformist Hirsch-Duncker unions in Germany were strongest among the skilled workers in engineering and in the metal industries, but they declined during the 1890's. In the United Kingdom their counterparts were the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, dating from 1850, and its imitators in other skilled trades. The British unions grew bigger sooner, and whereas by 1886 their membership totaled 1¼ million, that of German unions totaled only 300,000, and of French only 50,000. But in all western industrial countries, by that date, they had not only won legal status but had also become strong enough to exact greatly improved conditions of labor from employers and state alike.

The "new unionism" that came into existence with dramatic suddenness after 1886 coincided with a period of comparative economic prosperity which lasted until 1892, and which followed years of economic depression between 1882 and 1886. It was heralded by a series of long and bitter strikes, involving the less skilled workers—the strike of Belgian miners and glass workers in 1886, of the London match girls in 1888 and of the London dock workers in 1889, of the Ruhr coal workers in 1889, of the French forest woodmen in 1891 and 1892. These great strikes revealed the stirring of new levels of the working classes, hitherto unorganized or almost unorganized. The enlistment of masses of less skilled workers into the ranks of trade unionism transformed its whole character. Three main changes can be seen. First, there was a great multiplication of different types of labor organization, as unionism became fashionable; and as a result, it came to be more closely linked with political and social creeds, often competing with one another for union allegiance. Secondly, in each country there were movements for creating more national and unified labor organizations, on the self-evident principle that solidarity gives strength. Thirdly, efforts were made to link up labor organizations internationally. Unionism, like so many other things in these years, became a phenomenon of the masses and therefore different in structure and significance from all that had gone before.

The proliferation of several different kinds of labor organization in some ways enriched social life; but in other ways it weakened, because it divided, trade unionism as a movement. In France from 1887 onward there grew up locally *bourses du travail*—a peculiarly French institution that was a mixture of labor exchange, trades council, and workers' club. These groups catered for a wide variety of local needs. In 1892 Fernand Pelloutier formed them into a national federation, which

ten years later combined for many purposes with the new federation of trade unions. In France and Germany, as in other countries, the Roman Catholic Church, encouraged by the encyclicals of Leo XIII, formed separate labor unions of Catholic workers, designed to give them the advantages of trade unionism free from association with anticlerical socialists, syndicalists, and communists. In most countries, too, the closer relations between labor organization and political movements resulted in distinct socialist and communist trade unions, often quarreling with each other as well as with the older liberal and the newer Catholic unions.⁸ This diversification of types brought wider ambits of workers into unionism and catered more specifically for their needs and sentiments; but it also splintered labor organization as a whole and made desirable—though also more difficult—the second development of the period, national federation.

Movements for unification and federation came to a head at the end of the century. The French unions in 1895 formed a national federation, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (C.G.T.), the name it kept when seven years later it combined with the federation of *bourses*. It was from the start wedded to a policy of industrial action through collective bargaining backed by strikes. The first article of its constitution was that "elements constituting the C.G.T. will remain independent of all political schools." It deliberately divorced itself from politics and parliamentary activities. The British Trades Union Congress, formed originally in 1868, had proved able to hold together the old and the new types of union, and by 1900 represented some half a million members. In that year it joined with the socialist societies to set up a Labour Representation Committee to return workers' representatives to parliament. It put up fifteen in the general election held within a few months of its formation. Only two were successful, but one of them was the Scottish miner, Keir Hardie. British unionism thus followed a course of action quite opposite to the French, and by 1906 gave birth to the modern Labour party. Italian socialist unions formed, in 1906, a General Italian Federation of Labor, but Catholic and syndicalist unions remained distinct. In Germany, as in France and Italy, trade unionism was sharply divided into distinct segments. There were three main kinds: the original liberal Hirsch-Duncker unions; the so-called "free" trade unions, which were socialist in inspiration; and the Christian unions of the religious groups. By 1913 the socialist unions had by far the largest membership (more than 2½ million, as compared with 107,000 in the Hirsch-Duncker unions and some 343,000 in the Christian unions). In contrast to both the French and the British, German unionism was highly concentrated. The 4 million British trade unionists of 1913 were enrolled in over 1,000 unions; the 3 million German

⁸ See p. 375.

in only 400 unions. The high degree of concentration in German industry was matched by the same phenomenon in labor organization. The small scale and relative weakness of trade unions in France likewise reflected the highly diversified and unconcentrated character of the French economy. The one million French trade unionists of 1913 were enrolled in more than 5,000 local unions.

Finally, trade unionism evolved international affiliations. In this it shared in a broader trend. All such working-class movements tended to project themselves across state frontiers. In 1895 the co-operative movement formed the International Co-operative Alliance, but this organization came to represent the outlook and interests much more of the consumers' co-operatives than of the producers'. From 1889 onward individual trades established international links; such as the leather workers' international federation of 1889, and its counterparts for the miners, metal, textile, and transport workers. In 1901, after a few abortive attempts, the national federations of Britain, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries set on foot concerted efforts that led by 1913 to the International Federation of Trade-Unions (IFTU). It represented the bulk of organized labor in nearly every European country, though by no means all labor was yet organized.

The history of labor organization in other countries is but a repetition, with variations, of one or other of the patterns of development noted in Britain, France, and Germany. Belgian unions, like so many other Belgian institutions, broadly followed the French pattern; in Austria, Italy, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries, Marxist disciples tended to get control over important sections of the unions; Catholic unionist movements were launched in Belgium, Austria, and Italy. In Russia every attempt by workers to form associations of their own was looked upon by the government with the liveliest distrust, and before 1905 was punished as a crime. In 1906, in response to the revolutionary events of 1905, both workers and employers were given the legal right to form unions, confined to economic purposes. But the legal right to strike was not granted, and the revival of repressive policies after 1906 forced labor unions to perpetuate their old secret and conspiratorial habits. Strikes did occur frequently. In 1913 there were more than 2,400 strikes, mostly very short in duration but mainly in the textile and metal-working industries of the St. Petersburg district.

Capital versus Labor. There was, in all these ways, a clearly defined pattern of European economic growth between 1871 and 1914. It varied in intensity and time from country to country, and in its details it was infinitely diversified. But everywhere the overriding fact was the emergence of ever larger and more powerful units, chief of which were the big combines of capitalist production and finance on one hand, the massive organizations of labor on the other. In the decade before

1914 these two groups were increasingly coming into conflict about conditions of labor, and engaging in the open warfare of giant or epidemic strikes.⁹ The background to this intensifying industrial unrest was the alternation of periods of depression with periods of prosperity. There were spells of general depression and slump between 1873 and 1879, 1882 and 1886, 1892 and 1896, 1900 and 1901, 1907 and 1908, 1912 and 1913. These were separated by spells of economic revival and relative prosperity.

The cyclical business recessions, which seemed now to be a regular characteristic of the European economy and beyond the control of governments, aggravated the conflicts between employers and workers, and help to explain the social tensions of these years. It was significant that the countries that most completely coincided in their susceptibility to business recessions were those predominantly industrial and predominantly engaged in world trade; that is, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The international solidarity that trusts and trade unions were seeking to achieve by means of economic and political organization seemed to be there already and very effective at a deeper level of their economic activity. The business of one country was peculiarly sensitive to changes in another. European nations were sharing as partners in a single vast economic expansion that was masked, impeded, and at times disrupted by their behavior at a diplomatic and political level. World trade, world markets, world investment, had raised European society to a new plane of development.

The central problem in understanding the history of European peoples before 1914 is to penetrate behind all these new types of organization of the state, of capital, and of labor, to the transformation that they were effecting in the daily lives and habits of thought of men and women and children. There was a rising social pressure on each individual and on every national state. Any change so far reaching as changes in where most people lived, how they were brought up and made a living, what social and group loyalties they avowed, was bound to revolutionize human behavior and outlook. The greatest of all reorganizations in these decades was the unplanned, uncomfortable, yet quite relentless transformation of the very texture of social life itself. The new medicine and sanitation, the new education and press, the new towns and factories, the new subjection to the capricious forces of cyclical boom and slump, the more frenzied rivalries of nation-states, were elements in this over-all transformation. The twentieth century would have been a turbulent, dynamic, violent era even if there had been no world wars to intensify these qualities. That was apparent enough in the ferment of socialist, syndicalist, and even anarchist ideas and movements which occurred among all classes of European workers

⁹ See p. 378.

before the century began. By examining these movements more closely, it is possible to get deeper insight into how the fabric of European life was being transformed; for work is not merely a factor in production—it is one of the main sources of individual experience and it shapes the quality of life of every human being.

Organized Labor and Social Democracy

TRADE UNIONS in many countries (most notably France) strove to keep free from political affiliations and to confine their energies to improving the material lot of their members by direct industrial action. But only occasionally did they succeed in staying neutral. In Belgium, where after 1898 the law required incorporated unions to be nonpolitical, they were not. The rise of unions coincided, throughout Europe, with the rise of socialist, communist, syndicalist, and even anarchist political movements; and inevitably the leaders of such movements took an active interest in labor organizations that might bring support and power to their political activities. Socialism, and even more communism, had been virtually submerged as operative forces in European politics during most of the twenty years of state-making prior to 1871. Because socialists were more violently opposed to dynasticism and clericalism than to nationalism and liberalism, they had in general welcomed the creation of a unified Italy and a unified Germany; though individuals such as August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht in Germany had opposed the wars of 1866 and 1870. Socialism had been born in the heyday of romantic liberalism, and shared its enthusiasm for national liberation and self-determination. It likewise perpetuated the internationalist and humanitarian traditions of the democratic and radical movements. It was, accordingly, natural enough for socialist organizations in several western countries to lend support to the First International of Working Men's Associations, which Karl Marx helped to set up in 1866. But within six years this organization was torn apart by dissensions between Marxists and anarchists, and it was disbanded in 1876 without having achieved anything of importance.

The Socialist Dilemma. The choice before trade unionists, of remaining purely economic in activity or of becoming political, was paralleled by the equally vital choice which confronted socialists. It was the avowed purpose of all socialist movements to use the state to overhaul and reconstruct the social order so as to further working-class interests. (In this they all differed from the anarchists, whose purpose was to abolish the state.) The choice before them was then one of basic strategy and method. Should they try to get political power by working

within the framework of parliamentary democracy and the new electorates, exerting pressure on liberal and conservative governments to get concessions in the form of social welfare legislation and state regulation of working conditions? Or should they stand apart from the inevitable compromises and half measures of parliamentary politics, preserving intact their revolutionary impulse and striving to hasten (if need be by violence) the day when the parliamentary state of capitalism would break down and open the door to a socialist revolution? It was on this issue that socialists usually parted company from communists, and chose the reformist rather than the revolutionary path.

In every important European country this issue split socialist parties; and it was indeed a crucial question. To accept the road of parliamentary action involved accepting the democratic processes of discussion and majority decision, and it meant treating the existing state as potentially a source of good. It meant accepting, from the hands of opportunist or of well-intentioned conservative and liberal governments, concessions which the extremists called sops, and which by reconciling workers to existing conditions perpetually weakened the urge of electorates for more drastic measures. The moment of final decision came when there arose an opportunity for socialist leaders to accept a share in government alongside the capitalist parties. Was this merely offering leaders as hostages to the maneuvers of their political opponents and implicating socialists in repressive policies? The charge of betrayal was regularly hurled against any socialist leader, such as Alexandre Millerand or Aristide Briand in France, who accepted membership in a coalition government. Yet the original decision to work within the existing political and social order in the hope of reforming it from inside could scarcely lead, logically, to refusing all share in power and responsibility when it was offered. If the chief aim was to exact concessions from employers and the state by political action, might not larger concessions be got from inside a government than from mere opposition?

It might be expected that parliamentary socialists would find organized labor a more ready ally than would revolutionary Marxist parties; for both socialists and trade unionists had elected to bargain with capitalists rather than to try to abolish them, and therefore both had a natural interest in keeping employers prosperous in order to produce a better bargain. Periods of prosperity and economic expansion, such as the 1850's and the interludes of the later 1880's and 1890's, favored unionism. Employers needed workers most when business was brisk, and they could more comfortably make concessions when their own profits were high. These were also periods, as already noted, when socialist parties prospered most. On the other hand revolutionary Marxists gained ground in the intervals of economic recession and slump, when unemployment increased and employers hardened in their ability to bargain; and the

Marxist analysis of the class war carried more conviction in times of greater tension between capital and labor. For this reason unionism as a whole tended to waver and split between support for the moderate socialists and seduction away to the more violent revolutionary Marxists and anarchists, according to the fluctuation of the business cycle. So long as real wages rose, moderation prevailed. But when real wages rose less quickly—as in Great Britain, France, and Germany between 1880 and 1900, when they rose only some 20 or 25 per cent—workers demanded a larger share of the wealth which the new machines could produce.

Moreover socialist thinkers of all kinds, whether backing parliamentary programs or revolutionary action, had something in common. They were all less interested than was the ordinary worker and trade unionist in short-term gains such as immediate increases in pay or shortening of hours. They thought more in terms of society as a whole; they dreamed of long-term reconstruction of the whole social and economic system. They were intellectuals, attracted to general programs and projects rather than to detailed benefits for particular trades. They liked to think and speak of the working class or of society as a whole rather than to serve the immediate needs of separate groups of workers. The socialist parties were seldom the work of the masses in the sense that trade unionism or the co-operative movement was born of working-class initiative and needs. They were rather the work of intellectuals, political agitators, and a few enterprising individual workers. Such men valued, more highly than did the ordinary worker, the niceties of doctrine and the subtleties of political strategy. It was partly in revulsion against the perpetual ideological debates and the incorrigible quarrelsomeness of socialist parties that the solid ranks of trade unionism and co-operatives tried to hold aloof from politics. Yet the countless small groups of intellectuals, journalists, and propagandists concerned with socialist parties contributed a lot to the political reshaping of Europe before 1914.

The Paris Commune, 1871. In western Europe of the 1870's socialist movements struggled against a heavy tide of resistance and resentment. The dominating fact in men's minds, breeding on the one hand violent fear and on the other hopelessness and apathy, was that strange paroxysm of violence—the insurrection of the Paris Commune in 1871. This event played so important a part, both in the actual history and in the mythology of socialism, that the facts of the matter are of great importance. On March 18, 1871, after the national humiliation at Sedan, after Paris had endured a four months' siege by the armies of Bismarck, after Gambetta's republican Government of National Defense had failed, heroically but decisively, to keep France at war, and after German troops had marched in triumph down the Champs-Élysées in Paris, the

city broke into revolt. Its purpose was to defy the efforts of the newly elected National Assembly, and of its provisional government headed by Adolphe Thiers, to make peace with the Germans and build a conservative regime in place of the defunct Second Empire of Napoleon III.¹⁰ It recalled, in its fury, the "June Days" of 1848, which had left among the workers of Paris a deep class hatred of the *bourgeoisie* and a distrust of all politicians. Power quickly fell into the hands of the medley of extremists which traditionally congregated in Paris, the international home of full-time professional revolutionaries. One reason was that, after the long siege, the population of Paris no longer included many of its more wealthy citizens, but did include some forty thousand evacuees and refugees from the German-occupied industrial provinces of the north. Another was that the population as a whole was outraged, in its patriotic and civic pride, by the humiliation of defeat and irritated by the decision of the new assembly to meet at Versailles rather than in Paris.

The lead in the revolt, with its echoes of 1793 and 1848, was taken by the few thousand followers of the veteran revolutionary, Auguste Blanqui, idol of the Paris underworld of conspirators. Allied with them were the doctrinaire Jacobins, led by Charles Delescluze and Félix Pyat, experienced in clandestine resistance during the Second Empire and resolved to restore the revolutionary tradition of France to its original purity and idealism. They were also joined by various socialist groups, disciples of Saint-Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, and above all Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, whose anarchistic theory of society gave prominence to the role of the small, autonomous unit, the commune. The slogan of "the Commune" meant something different to each group, but it served well enough as an omnibus rallying cry. The revolutionary government which appeared was a hasty compromise between these main groups, and included also one or two Marxists, notably Édouard Vaillant, who became minister of the interior in the Commune, and Leo Franckel, who kept in touch with Marx himself. But it was neither a mainly communist and Marxist movement, nor even closely connected with the recently formed First International. It was a peculiarly French and Parisian revolt, the apotheosis of the long French revolutionary tradition and an outburst of local pride and distress, fiercely patriotic and anti-German. After two months the national forces of Thiers overthrew it and restored Paris to France. The fighting in Paris was conducted on both sides with an atrocious ferocity unwonted even in that city of immemorial barricades. The men of the Commune burned some of the finest public buildings, shot the Archbishop of Paris and many other hostages, and ruled by methods of terror. The national troops took savage reprisals, shooting prisoners mercilessly and eventually deporting

¹⁰ See p. 290.

some seven thousand five hundred. Paris relapsed into sullen acquiescence in the new Third Republic which the conservative assembly proceeded to construct.

These startling events, which brought an oriental barbarism into the most civilized and cosmopolitan capital of Europe, had decisive consequences for nascent socialism. Marx wrote his pamphlet on *The Civil War in France*, which hailed the Commune as the dawn of a new era of direct proletarian revolutionary action and a triumph for his own followers and for the International. Frightened property-owning classes everywhere in Europe took him at his word, and saw in the Commune the beginning of a fresh revolutionary menace. Even a confusion of words contributed to this widespread misinterpretation of the Commune. *Communards* (supporters of the Commune) were assumed to be *communists*. *Capitulards* (as the rebels called Thiers and his ministers who "capitulated" and made peace with Germany) were confused with *capitalists*. The Marxist analysis of the event as a landmark in the class war was made to fit only by a distortion of both facts and words. It can be regarded more accurately as the last dying flicker of an old tradition, the tradition of the barricades of 1789 and 1848, rather than as the beginning of a new. Never again was Paris to impose her will upon the rest of France, as she had done before 1871. The aftermath of the Commune and of its repression was the exile or imprisonment of all the more revolutionary elements in France; and the new parliamentary republic was erected during their elimination from the scene. It was only after 1879, when the republican parties gained full control of the Republic, that amnesties were granted and more active socialist movements could again operate freely in France.

Social Democracy. This temporary expulsion of socialist and communist movements from France enriched her neighbors with socialist agitators and contributed to the growth of socialism elsewhere. The failure of the Paris Commune launched Marxism upon a new phase: the development first in Germany, and soon in nearly every other country, of "social democratic" parties. The establishment of the German Empire, with its *Reichstag* elected on wide popular franchise, transformed the conditions of political action in Germany. It made the division of German socialism into rival parties an obvious barrier to electoral success. The party which Ferdinand Lassalle had formed in northern Germany in 1863 (the General German Workingmen's Association) rested on Lassalle's un-Marxist doctrine that universal suffrage and proletarian interests were not incompatible. It was designed from the first to be a political and electoral movement aimed at gaining parliamentary power. The party which Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel formed in southern Germany adopted, as early as 1869, its Eisenach program, which was distinctively Marxist.

In 1875 these two parties combined to form the German Social Democratic party based on a new program. This so-called Gotha Program accepted Marx's doctrines of the class struggle and his materialist interpretation of history, but it abandoned his view of the state in favor of Lassalle's, and regarded revolutionary Marxism as rendered out of date by the existence of universal suffrage. The new party set out to capture the state by parliamentary methods, not to overthrow it in favor of a proletarian state. It was attacked by Marx (in his *Critique of the Gotha Program*), but his attack was not published until many years later. The issue was anyhow smothered until 1890 by Bismarck's antisocialist laws, which closed the socialist ranks and forced them back into underground activities; but meanwhile social democratic movements on the Gotha model grew up in other countries, and after 1890 the German Social Democratic party resumed its original aims more explicitly. It soon became the largest of all the parliamentary socialist parties in Europe.

"Social democracy" became the general pattern of the new socialism in Europe during the 1880's. It was everywhere characterized by that tension between orthodox Marxists and more moderate political socialists which had appeared in Germany. In Great Britain, where Marx and Engels spent most of their time, no specifically Marxist party existed until that wealthy and eccentric old Etonian, Henry Hyndman, set up his Democratic Federation in 1881. In 1883 the poet, William Morris, combined with him to remodel it into the Social Democratic Federation. In France the first Marxist party was formed in 1880 by Jules Guesde. In both countries the existence of a wide franchise encouraged the simultaneous growth of less doctrinaire socialism—with the result that Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation was soon superseded as a political movement by Keir Hardie's Independent Labor Party of 1893, and rivaled by the Fabian Society of 1884; and in France, Guesde's party had several rivals in the Blanquists, Proudhonists, and others.

But wherever extension of the franchise came late, as in Italy or the Low Countries, Marxist parties enjoyed a more undisputed leadership of socialist movements. A narrow franchise, such as existed in Italy until 1913 and in the Low Countries until 1918, discouraged and impeded socialism from building mainly electoral parties committed to programs of immediate social reform. Its leaders could talk the language of Marxism more plausibly and with less inconsistency than could socialist leaders in Britain, Germany, or France. Thus the Italian socialist party founded by Turati in 1892 was equipped with a Marxist ideology, by the young Roman professor, Antonio Labriola. But the economic backwardness of Italy kept it relatively unimportant. The Belgium social democratic party (the *Parti Ouvrier Belge*) dated from 1885, the Austrian and the Swiss from 1888. Belgian socialism was moderated, despite the narrow franchise, by the growth of other large working-

class organizations such as the co-operative groups; it became in spirit realistic and opportunistic. Even a Czech social democratic party was formed in 1887.

In every country the first problem facing political socialism was its own unification, for whether the aim was electoral gains or revolutionary action, unity was important. By the beginning of the twentieth century unity was substantially achieved in Britain and France. In 1900 the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian Society, and the Independent Labor party combined with the swelling trade-union movement to found the future Labor party. In this new amalgam the Marxist ingredients were swamped. The Social Democratic Federation, never large, was much weakened by the secession in 1884 of its most influential member William Morris. Both the Fabians and the Independent Labor party took from Marxism only those notions that attracted them, irreverently discarding all those that did not. On this basis a broad, solid, socialist movement was built, little divided by doctrinal feuds and backed by massive trade-union funds and support.

In France, partly because trade unionism abstained from politics during the formative years, socialist parties remained chronically weak and splintered until 1905. From the followers of Guesde split the followers of Paul Brousse, known as "possibilists" because they rejected the all-or-nothing absolutist doctrines of Marx. Alongside these movements grew up an influential group of middle-class intellectuals and individual parliamentarians, calling themselves Independents. They included many who were to become the most eminent leaders of parliamentary socialism—Jean Jaurès, Alexandre Millerand, René Viviani. Such semidetached socialists of bourgeois origins were liable to be distrusted by the workers. Under the pressures of the Dreyfus Affair the socialists combined in 1905 into a unified parliamentary party headed by Jaurès; but the main trade-union body, the C.G.T., still held aloof, and after the untimely assassination of Jaurès in 1914 the party's short-lived unity broke up. Yet by 1914 there were as many as 76 socialist deputies in the Chamber.

The corresponding architect of social democratic unity in Germany was August Bebel. On the basis of the Gotha Program he led the Social Democrats to a succession of electoral gains until, in the *Reichstag* of 1912, they were the largest single party with 110 representatives. By 1914 its membership in the country was over one million, and it had 110 daily newspapers with a total circulation of nearly one and a half million copies. Bebel, who ruled it with an iron hand and imposed on it its characteristic discipline, led it for close on fifty years—until his death in 1913—and made it the most impressive of all continental socialist parties. He combined in his personality and career all the qualities most desirable for a socialist leader. Having been trained as a carpenter and worked

with his hands, he had an instinctive sympathy for ordinary workers and their families. Having been imprisoned on charges of treason, he had a certain halo of martyrdom. As a resourceful organizer he was able to build up the party systematically, and as a persuasive orator he was well qualified to lead it in the *Reichstag*. He had the power of intellect to cross swords with Bismarck in Germany and with Jaurès in the congresses of the Second International. More than any other socialist leader outside Great Britain, he contrived to base his party on the broad mass of the industrial workers. Its roots were deepest in the big industrial centers—the Rhineland, Berlin, Hamburg, Saxony, and Silesia. Yet even this unusually monolithic party suffered the same kind of schism that developed elsewhere in Europe.

Its doctrinal unity was achieved only by preaching a much more orthodox Marxism than was matched by its parliamentary behavior; and inevitably there developed within it in the 1890's a more moderate or so-called "revisionist" wing, led by Eduard Bernstein. Bernstein argued, with considerable truth and effect, that the trend of events was not bearing out the Marxist analysis and predictions. The number of people who owned property was not decreasing as Marx had predicted, it was increasing. The workers were not getting remorselessly poorer and more repressed, they were coming to be better off and freer. There was no sign that the capitalist system would soon reach a point of collapse: in Germany, more conspicuously than anywhere else, it was getting ever stronger and more successful. Socialism should therefore, he argued, regard itself as a movement toward a co-operative system of production, a gradualist and reformist movement transforming society through the achievements of democracy and the constant improvement of working-class life. It must give up talk or hope of cataclysm, and, like the Fabians in England, observe "the inevitability of gradualness." He wanted to end the internal contradictions of Gotha and make the "revision" of Marxism explicit.

Here, in short, was a socialist program and theory that fitted closely the inherent aims and methods of organized labor, as well as the established procedures of parliamentary democracy. It compelled the party to modify its ideas. Bernstein was supported in his revisionism by a large number of able young writers who ran their own press and journals. They drew attention to the usual Marxist neglect of the peasants, and put forward programs of agrarian reform. They pointed to recent achievements of parliamentary and democratic social legislation in the United Kingdom and the United States, which contrasted with the negative legislative achievements of the German Social Democrats, for all their strength. They even attacked the doctrinal antinationalism and anti-imperialism of the Social Democrats. In the great storm that blew up in the *Reichstag* in 1907 over their opposition to military expenditure, the

revisionist Gustav Noske declared that "the Prussian Minister of War should know that we have always demanded an armed nation." Here was foreshadowed the final issue which was to dominate the fate of socialist parties everywhere. Should they support their nation and nation-state in war? Or should they adhere to the strict Marxist teaching that modern wars are imperialistic, destined to injure the interests of the workers who know no country and who in revolution have nothing to lose but their chains?

Within the German Social Democratic party this fundamental issue was smothered until 1914 by the ritual of proclaiming on all official occasions a resolutely revolutionary purpose, while following in normal practice an equally determined reformist and revisionist policy. This meant preserving the formal unity of the party at the expense of alienating all liberal and many middle-class elements in Germany, and of perpetuating an unresolved internal contradiction between principle and practice. These remained two of the greatest weaknesses of German socialism until 1914. They condemned it to the same fate as German liberalism in 1848: ¹¹ an ineffective combination of absolutist and challenging pronouncements with feeble action. The party reflected, also, the most striking characteristics of German nationalism: subordination of spontaneity and freedom to discipline and corporate efficiency. Its representatives in the *Reichstag* showed immense loyalty and devotion, and normally voted as one solid block in opposition. Yet the great measures of social insurance were passed by Bismarck, while his antisocialist laws made co-operation of the party impossible; the *Reichstag's* lack of control over the government made the party's strength largely illusory in politics; and by 1914 it had a remarkably barren record of legislative achievement. If within the party the legacy of Lassalle triumphed over that of Marx, in Germany it was rather Bismarck who triumphed over Lassalle. In 1881, when he promoted his social insurance schemes, Bismarck said, "Whoever has a pension for his old age is far more content and far easier to handle than one who has no such prospect." He was proved right.

The whole complex of political issues which divided Broussists from Guesdists in France and followers of Bernstein from followers of Bebel in Germany beset the socialist movements of nearly every other country. The pattern prevailed in Italy and Austria-Hungary, in Scandinavia and in the Low Countries, though with local variations. Nowhere else did socialist parties attain the size and discipline of the German. The main Italian socialist party, dating from 1892, was returning 32 deputies by 1900. Even more than the French it was haunted by internal dissensions, both over reformism and nationalism, and over syndicalist and anarchist

¹¹ See p. 187.

splits of its own. During the war with Turkey in 1911-12, in which Italy claimed colonial territories in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the reformist socialist leaders Bonomi and Bissolati supported the war on nationalist grounds and were duly excommunicated from the party.

The Austrian Social Democratic party owed its existence chiefly to Dr. Victor Adler, the son of a well-to-do businessman whose ideas were much influenced by Lassalle. By 1888 he succeeded in unifying and consolidating the party to an extent that brought it success in its first task of agitating for wider suffrage. That the vote was in 1907 extended to all men over twenty-four years old in the Austrian half of the empire was in part due to socialist agitation. But the consequent addition of social issues to the multitude of nationalist issues which already divided the Austrian parliament merely made it easier for the ruling bureaucracy to dispatch current business without much deference to parliament. Austria was not made much more democratic. (The introduction of universal male suffrage in Italy six years later likewise did little to change the power of officialdom in that country.) The Austrian Social Democratic party was itself haunted by the bugbear of all Austrian politics, nationalist divisions. By 1911 it had split into three groups, German, Polish, Czech. Despite their common recognition of Adler as leader, and their collectively large membership of 82 in the Austrian parliament, these divisions hamstrung the party as a political power. As Adler remarked in 1900, "We in Austria have a little International of our own."

The socialist parties of Scandinavia and the Low Countries broadly followed the British pattern, both in their affection for moderate parliamentary reformist programs and in the closeness of their relations with trade unions. The Danish Social Democratic party, founded in 1878, was from the first closely associated with the trade unions. It grew steadily in strength by adapting its program to the needs of agricultural co-operatives and by shunning Marxist doctrines. By 1913 it mustered 107,000 votes and sent 32 representatives to the Danish lower house (*Folketing*). This victory led to the formation of a joint government of Radicals and Social Democrats. Sweden's Social Democratic party of 1889 was likewise backed by the trade unions. They co-operated, as in Britain, in getting legislation passed to provide for old-age pensions and sickness insurance. Norway's socialist movement dated from 1887, but made little headway until after the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905. By 1912 it won nearly 125,000 votes and 23 seats in the *Storting*. The Low Countries developed somewhat more along the German and French pattern than the British or Scandinavian. The main Belgian socialist party led by Émile Vandervelde originated in 1885, the Dutch in 1894. Although the Dutch was more stricken by the familiar feud between reformists and revolutionary Marxists, a special feature of

the progress of both was their development of a vast national co-operative organization.¹²

The Birth of Bolshevism. The socialist party of most momentous importance for the future, though few would have predicted that at the time, was the Russian. The rapid industrialization of western Russia in the twenty years before 1914 opened the door to a more western type of socialist movement, distinct from the former anarchist and terrorist organizations to which tsarist repression had given birth. George Plekhanov—in exile in Switzerland—founded the first Russian Marxist party in 1883. It had little influence until, in 1898, attempts were made to found a Marxist Social Democratic Labor party inside Russia. In 1902 was founded a rival Socialist Revolutionary party which appealed more directly to the peasants than to the industrial workers. The absence of constitutional liberties compelled both to work either through secret organizations inside Russia or in exile. Both were simply more up-to-date offshoots of the whole violent tide of Russian revolutionary movements which had come into being during the generation since the emancipation of the serfs.¹³ Their common basis was a frenzied hatred of the tsar and his government, and of the whole social system which they represented. In this broad tide of discontent the intelligentsia took a leading part, many of them belonging to the aristocratic and official class, since these alone were well educated. "A father," it has been said, "would sit in his office as Chief of Police or Governor while his daughter stood at a street corner throwing bombs." Young students of noble birth set out to destroy all that their parents respected. This revolutionary movement, though professing the French revolutionary ideals and preaching constitutionalism and democracy as an ideal, was compelled by circumstance to adopt every device of conspiracy and terrorism. There could be no question of working through trade unions, for these were not permitted to exist; nor of choosing between reformist and revolutionary strategies, for there was no nationally representative body. So violence, secret plotting, and bomb-throwing it had to be.

The Russian Social Democratic Labor party of 1898 was in one sense a break with this peculiarly Russian tradition. It was the Socialist Revolutionary party of 1902 which perpetuated the old tradition, and concentrated on propaganda among the peasants. It was the Social Democratic party, modeled at first upon the Social Democrats of Germany, which introduced the more systematic doctrines of Marxism and propagated them among the industrial workers. But at an early stage it was confronted, in especially crucial form, with the choice that lay before all such European parties. Could it, like the German Social Democrats, concentrate upon the special class interests of the workers, their wages,

¹² See p. 356.

¹³ See p. 302.

housing, and conditions of work, and so seek to win a place for itself within the existing political system as the articulate voice of the working classes? Or should it concentrate upon the overthrow of the political system and the capture of the state? If it chose the latter course, it was faced in Russia with a life and death struggle, for in the absence of political democracy there was no prospect of changing the regime save by violent revolutionary activity. If it chose the former course, it might even win for itself some kind of semilegal existence under the tsardom, but only at the expense of losing its revolutionary impulse and of granting to the rank and file of the workers a controlling voice in the conduct of the party. Until its congress held in 1903 the trend of the party was in this last direction, following in the footsteps of the German Social Democrats. But in 1903 its course was abruptly altered mainly by the actions of one man: Vladimir Ulyanov, known in history as Lenin.

Lenin was then 33, son of a minor official of the regime—a district inspector of schools in the district around Moscow. His elder brother had in 1887 been hanged for his share in a plot to assassinate the tsar Alexander III. Since then, steeping himself in Marxist and other revolutionary literature, and excluded from posts to which his intellectual brilliance entitled him but from which his revolutionary ideas and activities barred him, he had been imprisoned and exiled to Siberia. Returning from Siberia in 1900, he went into exile and threw himself into work for the recently formed Russian Social Democratic party. He edited *Iskra*, the party paper, which was smuggled into Russia from Germany and Switzerland. He was convinced that the old terrorist tradition, in the cause of which his brother had died, was spent: that the future lay only with a highly organized movement and a disciplined revolutionary party.

The party was led and dominated by George Plekhanov, who applied Marxist theories to the new Russian phenomenon of a large industrial proletariat, gathered together in the western towns, factories, and mines. Lenin worked in collaboration with him. The parting of the ways came in 1903, when the party held its second congress to decide its formal constitution and structure. It began, as one writer put it, "in Brussels in a rat-infested flour mill surrounded by Russian and Belgian detectives; and continued, after two of the delegates had been arrested, in the August heat of the Tottenham Court Road in London." Lenin and Plekhanov wanted membership in the party restricted to those who "personally participate in one of the organizations of the party." A rival group, led by Martov and supported by Leon Trotsky, wanted membership to include all those who "work under the control and guidance of one of the party organizations." The first definition would restrict the making of crucial decisions to the narrow circle of militant members and active organizers; the second would produce an open party, guided by the collective voting power of all its enrolled supporters and

sympathizers. The first would, Lenin believed, keep intact the party's revolutionary impetus, which was especially necessary for reasons of security and of drive. The second would yield a party comparable to the German Social Democrats, a mass organization broadly based on the Russian working classes. But how could any such party function in tsarist Russia? In the end Lenin's group won by a majority of two votes, and so came to be known as the "majority-men," or *Bolsheviki*. Martov's group were dubbed the "minority-men" (*Mensheviki*). Paradoxically, the Leninist "majority-men" were thus those who stood for controlling the party by means of a small minority of the *élite*, the fanatical and hard-bitten experts who would be ruthless in their revolutionary policy and unswayed by any consideration of the wishes or immediate interests of the majority of members. So was born modern Bolshevism, and the nucleus of the modern totalitarian single-party states of which Russia after 1917 was the model. The whole aim of this party was to capture complete political power for itself by the total overthrow of the existing regime. No compromise or half measures would now be possible: it was war to the death against tsardom. The two groups continued to work together until 1912, when they eventually split. The differences between them had a more desperate significance in the Russian environment than anywhere else in Europe.

Meanwhile the eruption of discontent which Lenin could detect in 1903 was boiling up in Russia. Leon Trotsky had brought further news of it in October, 1902, when he had arrived at Lenin's lodgings in London. Even while the congress met, a gigantic general strike had been taking place in southern Russia. The underground revolutionaries in villages and factories were bringing things to a head faster than the exiled leaders of the party could catch up on them. The crisis was precipitated by the strain of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, and by the brutal massacre of January, 1905. This occurred when a crowd of people, led by an Orthodox priest Father Gapon, came to petition the Tsar to call a constituent assembly based on universal suffrage, transfer the land to the people, and decree an eight-hour day. They were shot down on the Tsar's orders. This atrocity provoked the most widespread and comprehensive industrial strikes that Europe had ever known. Lenin, Trotsky, and most of the Bolshevik leaders were caught unawares, and few of them reached Russia in time to take control of the revolution.

By June, 1905, there was a mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin*, a general strike in the Black Sea port of Odessa, and committees (*soviets*) of workers were set up in St. Petersburg factories. By October, when further waves of strikes began, Trotsky and the local Mensheviks organized in the capital a Soviet of Workers' Delegates, in which both wings of the Social Democratic party took part alongside the Socialist Revolutionaries. Lenin did not arrive until late in November, and the Bolsheviks

took no decisive action until he came. It was too late. The Soviet had lasted only 50 days when its members were arrested. It was crushed by the savage reprisals of the government, as were the peasants who had risen against their landlords, the sailors and soldiers who had mutinied, and the workers who had held out behind barricades. It was the bloodiest civil war since the Paris Commune. By the time the Tsar was compelled to summon the first national assembly (*Duma*) in April, 1906, it is estimated that his government had killed some fifteen thousand people and arrested seventy thousand. The Bolshevik leaders escaped mostly to Finland and thence into exile, to debate tirelessly the lessons of 1905 and to plan for the next magic moment. Nicholas II dissolved the Duma after it had sat for only two months. Although three more Dumas were elected before 1914, they wielded little power. Russian government relapsed to its familiar routine of despotism, backed by a loan of 2¼ billion francs from French bankers, which the Russian prime minister proudly and accurately described as "the largest loan yet made in the history of mankind."

Minimum and Maximum Socialism. This panorama of the proliferation of socialist parties before 1914 suggests two general conclusions that have great importance for the later history of Europe. One is that within socialism there was a recurrent and inescapable cleavage: between those parties which, from an early stage in their growth, came to terms with the institutions of parliamentary democracy, with trade unionism and the co-operative movements; and those which held to more absolutist revolutionary doctrines, whether of Marxism or anarchism, and so dedicated themselves to the task of fighting and overthrowing all other political parties and institutions. The best examples of the former are the British and Scandinavian Labor parties and the parliamentary socialist groups of France and Italy; of the latter, the supreme example is the Russian Social Democratic party after 1903. It had not yet become customary to distinguish between them by labeling the former Socialists, the latter Communists. That convention arose only after 1918. But here was the origin of the mid-twentieth-century cleavage between western parliamentary socialism and eastern revolutionary communism. All the essentials of that conflict were already present in 1914, save that neither socialism nor communism had by then won power in any country.

The second conclusion is that parliamentary socialism, like other working-class movements and organizations, grew and flourished most where the traditions and institutions of liberal democracy had already become most fully established. It was in the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, and France that reformist socialism took shape most quickly and won its earliest triumphs. Wherever universal suffrage remained for a long time impeded, as in Italy and Austria-Hungary, or wherever its operation was severely limited by strong central authority, as in Ger-

many, socialists went on using the language and preaching the ideas of revolutionary doctrinaire Marxism even when their practice and their achievements were more moderate. Where parliamentary institutions and universal suffrage were unknown, as in Russia, reformist socialism could strike no roots and was replaced by extreme revolutionary communism. The pattern of socialism is, so to speak, a pattern superimposed on the territorial distribution of liberalism and democracy, and matches the extent of the new electorates.

These conclusions are clinched by a comparison of the minimum and maximum programs of policy which the different parties drew up and endorsed at various times. In western countries the parliamentary socialist parties, committed to seeking votes in order to gain political representation, normally drew up minimum programs of those reforms best calculated to win broad electoral support. Inevitably these were mostly concerned with widening of the franchise, social welfare legislation, an eight-hour day, and improvement of conditions of work. Such was the minimum program which the Italian Socialist party drew up in 1895. Their more abstract ideological aims were relegated to ultimate or maximum programs, which appealed more to the intellectuals and preserved something of the party's doctrinal character. Thus when the main French socialist groups combined in 1905, they drew up a common program which included a statement of ultimate collectivism, of the group's resolve to socialize the means of production and of exchange, and a protestation that it was "not a party of reform but a party of class struggle and revolution": but it also included an assurance that "in parliament, the socialist group must dedicate itself to the defense and extension of political liberties and the rights of workers, to the promotion and realization of reforms which will ameliorate the conditions of life and of the class struggle of the working classes." The difference of emphasis between French and German socialism emerges if this statement is compared with the German Social Democrats' Erfurt Program, which they adopted in 1891. It was a more thoroughgoing Marxist statement than its predecessor, the Gotha Program of 1875. It propounded orthodox Marxist philosophy as its very foundation, and gave this theoretical basis more prominence. But it added, as its immediate and practical aims, demands closely similar to those of Gotha, or of the Italian and French minimum programs: including universal direct suffrage for men and women over twenty, freedom of expression and meeting, secular education, an eight-hour day, social welfare legislation, and progressive income tax.

The more fundamental difference between all western socialism and Russian communism becomes clear if these programs are compared with the Russian Social Democratic program adopted in 1903. It too, in accordance with precedent, was divided into maximum and minimum aims.

But it was not exposed to the Italian or French or German danger of exalting the minimum at the expense of the maximum, in order to gain electoral votes. In western countries since 1871 (and even since 1848) the whole notion of a minimum program depended on its being attainable within the existing framework of capitalist society without revolution; the whole point of the maximum program was to keep before men's eyes the doctrines and the ultimate ends of socialism, but to relegate them to a distinct category of aims unattainable without revolution. In Russia both minimum and maximum programs were of necessity revolutionary. The minimum political demands of 1903 began with the revolutionary overthrow of the tsarist regime and its replacement by a democratic republic. The minimum economic demands were those normally included in the minimum demands of western socialists: an eight-hour day and six-day week; effective factory inspection; state insurance against sickness and old age; the confiscation of church lands. But these too, in Russia before 1914, were revolutionary demands, and there was no essential difference between this minimum program and the maximum program of the proletarian socialist revolution. Indeed the most important decision taken in 1903, as already shown, was not about programs at all, but about the actual organization of the party as a militant force, tempered for the struggle against the whole existing order. The point was appreciated from the outset in the manifesto which the new-born Russian Social Democratic Workers' party issued in 1898: "The further to the east one goes in Europe, the weaker in politics, the more cowardly and the meaner becomes the bourgeoisie, the greater are the cultural and political tasks that fall to the lot of proletariat."

These differences of program and of organization involve a still wider contrast. It was not merely an issue of whether socialism should be economic or political in its scope, whether it should concentrate on capturing or on destroying existing states. To enter into competition with other parliamentary parties for winning votes, and to win from government concessions of value to the working classes, enmeshed every social democratic party, however vocal its protestations of ultimate proletarian purposes, in more nationalistic ways of thinking and behaving. In universal suffrage what counts is the vote of the individual elector, whatever his class; and in restricted electorates majorities lie with the nonproletarian electors. The leaders of a parliamentary socialist party instinctively think in terms not of classes but of individual voters and of majorities. They find themselves thinking in general, national terms, rather than in narrow terms of class war. Their working-class supporters, benefiting increasingly from legislation in their interests passed and enforced by the national state, likewise think more and more in national and nonrevolutionary terms, since they become aware that they have more to lose than their chains. The growth of social democracy and of

parliamentary labor parties brought about a nationalizing of socialism. This changing outlook was at variance with the older traditions of universal humanitarian socialism which were inherently internationalist in outlook, just as it was in conflict with the resolutely internationalist tenets of orthodox Marxism. This, above all, is the historical reason why it was Russia that was destined to make the first successful communist revolution. The conflicts between socialist movements that had been domesticated or "nationalized," and revolutionary movements that still thought exclusively in terms of class war and proletarian action, were fought out before 1914. They repeatedly arose in the many congresses of the First and Second Internationals, until in 1914 the supreme issue seemed to be socialism versus nationalism.

Loyalties in Conflict

BY THE 1890's industrialized Europe had in many respects become one unit, comprising the five major powers of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and most of Austria-Hungary, along with the smaller states of Switzerland, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia. Within this bloc the fabric of social and economic life was woven on a broadly common pattern: a pattern traced by railroad tracks and shipping lines, commercial connections and urban densities, industrial concentrations and labor unions; a pattern colored everywhere by the rich reds of violent conflict about religion, wealth, politics, and nationality. To the south and the east of this bloc stood areas still only partially affected by this pattern, still no integral part of this new economic fabric: such lands as Portugal and Spain, most of the Balkan peninsula, and all save the western fringe of Russia. The process of interweaving was by no means complete, and the peripheral countries already showed signs of being deeply affected. (See Diagram 6.)

Labor and the State. The great strikes that took place in Russia before 1905 were one such sign. They were part of a much more widespread feature of European life in these years. In Russia they were, it is true, exceptionally violent and persistent, and those of 1905 were closely related to the dislocating effects of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. But they were preceded and followed by a whole epidemic of European strikes of which they can properly be regarded as a part. In France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden, there took place a long sequence of general strikes, wider in purpose than the immediate improvement of local working conditions, and aimed against governments as much as against employers. In the United Kingdom and Germany these were also years of large and important strikes which, though more

limited in aim, caused alarm because of the contemporary fashion for general strikes elsewhere. As early as 1893 there had been a general strike in Belgium. Another occurred in 1902, accompanied by strikes in Sweden and Spain, and followed by general strikes in the Netherlands in 1903, Italy in 1904, France and Sweden again in 1909. A general strike of the metal workers of Barcelona in 1902 provoked widespread disturbances in Spain and in 1905 led to another in Cordova.

The first decade of the century was hag-ridden by such clashes between organized labor and the state. They were so relatively simultaneous in so many countries that it is tempting to look for a common cause; yet closer scrutiny shows that they differed widely in purposes, character, and success. They were rather multiple facets of a whole surge of industrial and social unrest which was increasingly guided into political channels, leading to the belief that the limits of social justice to be got within the existing framework of society had been reached. This general unrest was itself only part of a much wider crisis of human loyalties.

Both the Belgian strike of 1893 and the Swedish of 1902 were political in purpose, and were directed to forcing the governments to introduce universal suffrage. Each was partly successful. The Dutch general strike of 1903 was aimed against projected legislation that would have made strikes in the public services illegal; it failed completely. The Italian strikes of 1904, though widespread, were quite spontaneous protests against the killing of workers by government troops. They had no other clear objective, and their results were naturally negative. The Spanish strikes were protests against extremely low pay and harsh working conditions, and they failed—that in Andalusia in 1905 being ended by a terrible drought and famine. The Swedish general strike of 1909 was purely about wages, and was the trade unions' reprisal to a general lockout proclaimed by the employers in order to break the unions' resistance to wage reductions. It failed decisively. So did the French general strike of the same year.

In all countries particular strikes, usually about wage claims, were as liable to succeed and to cause severe dislocation as these so-called "general strikes." Thus the repeated strikes of miners in Britain, and of postal workers in France in 1908 or of railwaymen in 1910, produced more specific if meager results. The lead, moreover, was usually taken by socialist trade unions, rather than by the avowedly syndicalist or communist unions; though these were the years when syndicalism, as an economic and political theory, was being most systematically expounded by men like Georges Sorel in France and his friend Vilfredo Pareto in Italy. It was percolating into Spain where it blended with anarchist movements launched by the Russian aristocrat, Michael Bakunin. Syn-

dicalists, anarchists, and Marxists, were wont to take credit for the strikes which the frightened governments and ruling classes were ready enough to accord to them.

Both syndicalist and anarchist theories, as they were expounded in these years, had closer affinities with Marxism than the bitter quarrels between their advocates and the Marxists might lead one to suppose. All accepted the doctrines of class war and of the proletarian revolution; all believed that it was essential to overthrow existing society and the state. They differed mainly in emphasis and in priorities. Syndicalists argued that the chief weapon of the workers in the class war must be the general strike, and that the medium of proletarian action must be not political parties but the workers' own organizations, the labor unions. It was the task of union leaders to train their followers for the battles of the class war, and strikes were the best training ground. The state would be replaced, after revolution, by federal organizations of the workers, grouped in their functional unions.

Anarchism, as taught by Bakunin, was readier to resort to a wider repertoire of revolutionary deeds, and to seek salvation not in any interim "dictatorship of the proletariat" but in the total destruction of all state organizations and the breaking down of national communities into local groups, voluntary associations, and municipalities. (In this way his ideas linked up with those of Proudhon, which had played a leading part in the Paris Commune of 1871.) He differed from the syndicalists in refusing to accord labor unions the key position; from Marx, in refusing to think of "the masses" and of provisional dictatorships; from the social democrats, in his disbelief in the usefulness of parliamentary methods. He looked for salvation not to the industrial proletariat, but to the poor peasantry and town workers in such countries as Russia, Italy, and Spain. For this reason he is the creator of the peasant anarchism of southern and eastern Europe. In Spain and Italy anarchism and syndicalism could, for practical purposes, combine into a movement of anarcho-syndicalism, just as in the rest of Europe socialism and communism could combine into social democracy; but it was never a firm alliance, and beyond initial acts of violence or destruction it produced no concerted program of action.

It is not to such theories that the general wave of European unrest in the early twentieth century can mainly be traced. Although syndicalist ideas and labor unions calling themselves syndicalist grew up in all the Latin countries of Europe (wherever trade unionism and socialism had made slowest headway), these were too restricted in appeal to explain the wider movement. The syndicalist movement has been well described by W. Milne-Bailey as "merely that branch of a world-wide unrest that was equipped with a particular philosophy"; and outside the Latin countries and Russia it appealed not to workers so much as to isolated intel-

lectuals who had small influence as compared with social democratic leaders. The tide of industrial unrest, which extended to the United States and Australia as well as Russia, was really the climax of that whole era of expansion of population, towns, industries, nations, and social organizations of all kinds which has already been described. Everywhere men and women were now organized into larger and more powerful units: territorially, politically, socially, industrially. Giant trusts and corporations stood face to face with growing labor organizations inside more powerfully organized states. Friction between them all was more likely; and wherever it occurred it could be more disruptive. The state by its very existence (and its wider electoral basis) was committed to serve interests more general than those of any one type of organization within it. But governments found it more and more difficult to hold the ring, to pacify the contestants, and to reconcile rival claims for shares in the national income. The tendency, most marked in western Europe, for real wages to slacken still further in their increase after about 1909, may explain some of the unrest before 1914.¹⁴

But behind such specific reasons lay the larger issues of rival claims to popular allegiance. It is not surprising that so far-reaching a transformation of old ways of life should result in a host of new human predicaments, a great crisis of conscience which brought turmoil. A generation of collective bargaining between employers and workers, marred by occasional strikes and lockouts, and accompanied by a generation of Marxist or semi-Marxist argument which taught that class war was endemic in the new industrialism, contributed to popular awareness of rival claims on loyalty. A generation of bitter feuds between church and state, of feuds about control over primary schools which affected every village and every family, contributed also to the universal spirit of sectarianism. A mood of disappointment with universal suffrage, civic liberties, and parliamentary government added still further to the contemporary confusion. Even where these had been early and fully achieved, they had failed to fulfill many of the great expectations which enthusiastic radicals and liberals had cherished. A generation of intensifying nationalist rivalries throughout Europe, by this time involving extensive rearmament, anxious diplomatic alliances, and periodic international scares and crises fully reported by a popular press, served to exalt the claims of national allegiance above all others. The supreme question confronting most Europeans before 1914, though it was seldom appreciated in its full complexity, was nothing less than the basic question of human loyalties and allegiance. To what community did one most completely belong—to the old established communities of church and homeland, or to the newer organizations of nation-state and industrial unit? It was a dilemma constantly present and inescapable, because it in-

¹⁴ See p. 364.

volved such everyday intimate things as a man's wages and work, how his children should be educated and what they should be taught to believe, whether he should give military service to the state or militant service to movements that claimed to transcend frontiers and lead on to humanity. If old faiths had gone, what new faiths should replace them? Was patriotism enough?

It is a revealing comment on the so-called "century of nationalism" that not only did many millions of Europeans choose to leave their national homelands and seek their future overseas (*see* Map 10), but also so much migration took place between one European state and another during the last three decades of the century. Higher standards of living and richer opportunities in the modern industrialized states attracted immigration from the more economically backward countries. Never had the metropolis of each nation been so cosmopolitan. Into Britain flowed Irish, Jews, Poles, Germans, and Italians; into Germany came some 200,000 Poles; and into France poured many thousands of laborers from Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Among the wage-earning classes, at least, it seemed that the ties of national sentiment were weaker than the call of material prosperity. The nostalgic and sentimental patriotism that pervaded late nineteenth-century popular songs and legends, with their repeated protestations of devotion to the homeland and love of mother country, came mostly from individuals and families whose exile was voluntary and whose choice of habitation had been made for reasons of material advancement, despite the ties of nationality. Many such emigrants, indeed, eventually returned; those who did not kept a wistful affection for their own nationality and even contacts with their families and friends at home. But most did not return, and found little reason to regret their abandonment of the old world for the new, or of the less advanced for the more prosperous. The next generation was assimilated into the nationality of its adoption. Industrial unrest was but one manifestation of this wider conflict of allegiances. It is significant that syndicalism and anarchism, preaching allegiance to the smaller units of labor fraternity and locality, took root only in those parts of Europe least fully industrialized and urbanized, most consciously regional rather than national: they appealed slightly in France and Italy, more deeply in Spain, the Balkans, and Russia. For that reason they belonged to a dying social order, not, as they claimed, to a glowing future.

Anarchism and syndicalism were the most absolutist protests against the existing economic and political order in Europe. For this reason even movements of discontent which had no natural connection whatever with the aims of these movements tended to borrow their methods and ideas, and even to link up with them wherever possible. The most surprising examples of this occurred in the United Kingdom, where it might have been expected that parliamentary traditions were strong

enough to resist such reversions to force. There two special conflicts arose contemporaneously with the epidemic of strikes in Europe. One was the suffragette campaign, demanding votes for women as the next great step in feminine emancipation. The other was the perennial demand for Irish Home Rule, a more familiar cause of disruption in British political life. The Labor party lent support to their aims, if not to their methods. Although neither was in doctrine anarchist, each adopted methods of destruction and dislocation; although neither was syndicalist in character, each turned momentarily to seek alliance with organized labor. Like called unto like, and there is no more striking testimony to the new climate of the twentieth century than the hysteria and violence that these two political issues generated even around the Mother of Parliaments.

Women's Suffrage. The movement for women's suffrage took organized form in the fateful year 1903, and it began where so much that was revolutionary in Victorian England had begun, in Manchester. A little group of women, meeting in the house of Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst, widow of a socialist barrister, formed the Women's Social and Political Union. Until 1910 this little movement, along with other kindred groups, lobbied members of parliament, staged processions, and in general agitated as nineteenth-century radicals had always agitated when they demanded the extension of civic liberties and political rights. Gradually, meeting with ridicule or at best negative response, they became more militant. They found ingenious ways of heckling political meetings, disturbing debates in parliament, and of making cabinet ministers' lives more uncomfortable. Then, in November, 1910, when the Liberal government of Herbert Asquith was in the midst of its battle with the House of Lords,¹⁵ there occurred a scene that heralded the new phase of violence. The Women's Union staged an invasion of the Houses of Parliament, and found themselves blocked in Parliament Square by great numbers of police who had orders to keep them away. Pushing, jostling, and rough treatment went on for nearly six hours, intensifying in violence until the crowd dispersed. A few days later the women invaded Downing Street, where Asquith had to be rescued by the police when he attempted to leave his house. Thereafter relative quietness came, until November, 1912.

Then, convinced that Asquith was resorting to endless evasions, the women sprang into action again. They began a campaign of breaking windows, courting arrest and imprisonment, defying the law. They fell more completely under the guidance of Christabel Pankhurst, daughter of Emmeline and an altogether more ruthless and violent personality. For the next two years the "argument of the broken pane" was backed up by outbreaks of arson in churches and country houses. Paintings in

¹⁵ See p. 332.

picture galleries were slashed, telegraph wires cut, sports pavilions wrecked. Suffragettes sent to prison went on hunger strike, and the authorities resorted to the cruelty of forcible feeding. On Derby Day, June, 1913, Emily Davison threw herself in front of the King's race horse and was killed. The movement had its martyr, its human sacrifice. Hunger strikes might yield more. To forestall this danger, the government passed a law of very dubious constitutionality—the so-called “Cat-and-Mouse” bill, which provided that hunger strikers might be discharged when their health became affected but rearrested as soon as they were well again, so prolonging the term of their sentence indefinitely. Labor leaders such as Keir Hardie and George Lansbury took up the women's cause and opposed the bill, but in vain. The Liberal government seemed nearing the end of its resources, but would not accept Keir Hardie's simple proposal that the only answer was to give in. George Bernard Shaw, a leading Fabian, suggested that the home secretary, then busy suppressing suffragist papers, “apparently believes himself to be the Tsar of Russia, a very common form of delusion.” Down in London's dockland Mrs. Pankhurst's other daughter, Sylvia, was rousing working-class folk to the cause, and making links with trade unionism. It was all very frightening for the harassed Liberal ministers, betrayed into a most illiberal-looking policy. They were saved from their misfortune by the war in 1914. By then, indeed, the suffragette movement was showing signs of internal division, and public opinion was tiring of the endless violence of its methods. The cause for which the Edwardian women suffered so much was won in 1918, after the greater violence of war had given time for passions to cool. But it was a very revealing episode in prewar Britain.

Irish Home Rule. Nor were strikers and suffragettes the only thorns in the side of Asquith and his colleagues. There were also the Irish—the eternal Irish. In the days of Gladstone the Liberal party had been rent by his efforts to grant Irishmen home rule—the national independence and separation from England that the more ardent Irish patriots had demanded since the days of Daniel O'Connell.¹⁶ In 1870 Isaac Butt had founded an Irish party and coined the slogan of “Home Rule.” It was intended to be a more positive version of the old demand for “Repeal” of the Act of Union of 1800, which had made Ireland a part of the United Kingdom and given it representation in the parliament at Westminster. From 1874 onward, with nearly sixty Irish members in the House of Commons, Butt had repeatedly pleaded the cause of Irish independence but had equally repeatedly been ignored or rebuffed. In 1878 the conciliatory Butt was replaced by Charles Stewart Parnell, spokesman of those who preferred more drastic tactics. Parnell and his colleagues proved as ingenious in devising methods of obstructing busi-

¹⁶ See p. 132.

ness in the House of Commons as the Edwardian Women were later to prove in harassing the government of their day. By 1886 Gladstone was persuaded that Home Rule must be granted, but failed to carry the whole Liberal party with him. In 1890, when Home Rule seemed almost assured, Parnell was suddenly discredited by his role in a divorce case; and Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1892, though passing the Commons by a narrow majority, was rejected by the House of Lords.

In 1900 the "Irish Question" entered a new phase when the Irish party was reconstituted under John Redmond; and its fresh campaign coincided with the onslaught of the strikers and the suffragettes upon the parliamentary system in the new century. With a solid group of now eighty members, the Irish party could with luck control the balance between Liberals and Conservatives in parliament; so no government could afford to ignore it. But while the Liberals were still divided about the issue, the Conservatives were anxious to preserve the Protestant ascendancy in Ulster (the northern counties). They were strongly opposed to any home-rule measure that would subordinate Protestant Ulster to the Catholic south. It was a disruptive issue for both parties, and both maneuvered with care.

The passing of the Parliament Act in 1911 altered the whole situation. The Conservatives had hitherto been able to rely safely on their permanent majority in the House of Lords to block any attempt, as it had blocked Gladstone's in 1892, to grant home rule to Ireland. Now that the power of the Lords was reduced by the Act to a mere power of delay and not of veto, it seemed certain that the Liberals would pass Home Rule. Asquith had almost promised it when he bargained for Irish support in passing the Parliament Act. The Conservatives, led from 1911 onward by Andrew Bonar Law, a Scotch-Canadian Presbyterian, were bent on taking revenge for their loss of power in the Lords by mobilizing the resistance of Ulster to any conceivable scheme of Home Rule. The outcome was a sort of Conservative rebellion, a strike of the wealthy classes and the peers against the constitutional government of England. The intricacies of the story are of little importance. What mattered was the outcome, which was that Ulster found its fanatical and violent champion in Sir Edward Carson, a great advocate and a Protestant southern Irishman; that Bonar Law and Carson most recklessly incited Ulstermen to revolt should the Home Rule bill not provide independence for Ulster; and that for the next three years there seemed to be no limit to the excesses that responsible political leaders of either party were prepared to perpetrate. So frenzied was the party conflict that by 1914, on the eve of the outbreak of the world war, Conservatives were drilling and arming Ulster volunteers against the day when Ireland would get Home Rule, and were encouraging British army officers to mutiny and desert rather than coerce Ulster; while the Liberals were preparing to

coerce Ulster in the name of national freedom, and even to connive at the desertion of their own army officers rather than risk organized mutiny. It was a crisis not only of Irish history, but of English parliamentary government.

The Irish, moreover, like sections of the suffragettes, showed signs of linking up with syndicalists and so importing more violence into the matter. With Ireland heading for civil war—for the Nationalist Volunteers, like the Ulstermen, were drilling and arming—there grew up in Dublin a new syndicalist movement led by James Larkin and James Connolly. It preached the contemporary European creeds of riot, the general strike, guild socialism, syndicalist revolution. Larkin's Irish Transport Workers' Union fought a great transport strike in Dublin in 1913, and it led to a crop of sympathetic strikes and riots. Linked through Connolly with the Irish Volunteers, this desperate syndicalist movement of the workers seemed for a time yet another element in the forthcoming Irish civil war. The violent nationalist group of *Sinn Féin* was gaining in appeal. But here, as elsewhere in Europe, the bigger crisis of 1914 swamped all lesser quarrels. In the summer of 1914 it seemed certain that a general strike would soon occur in Britain. If it had, both Irish syndicalist revolt and Irish civil war would doubtless have merged into it. Sarajevo happened just in time to save the parliamentary system in Britain.

Terrorism. The back cloth of events in Europe, in these same years, was no less lurid. Besides the epidemics of great strikes and industrial unrest and the darkening clouds of war, there had been a remarkable list of assassinations. To be the head of a state or of a government had become a most perilous occupation. When the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand was murdered at Sarajevo in 1914, it was striking how many other leading personages had within living memory suffered the same fate. Three presidents of the United States, an emperor of Russia (Alexander II in 1881), a president of the French Republic (Sadi Carnot in 1894), an empress of Austria (Elizabeth in 1898), a king of Italy (Humbert in 1900), a king and queen of Serbia (Alexander and Draga in 1903), a king of Portugal (Carlos in 1908), quite a few Russian archdukes and several minor princes, had all been assassinated. It was not that assassinations were new, though there were many would-be assassins that did not succeed. Orsini had thrown his bomb at Napoleon III in 1858 and even in peaceful England an attempt had been made on the life of Queen Victoria in 1872. Bismarck's antisocialist laws of 1878 had been passed after two attempts to assassinate the German emperor. These were episodes in an already well-established nineteenth-century tradition which was born of the age of secret societies and the violent revolutionary tradition, and they had many earlier historical precedents. But the speed with which crowned heads fell in the generation before

1914 was such as to betoken a new era of violence. Men were not slow to trace the cause to the activities of anarchists, communists, and socialists in the Second International, which held frequent meetings from 1889 until 1914. This was to exaggerate the importance and the nature of this body, whose aims were organizational and not isolated acts of terrorism. But the story of the Internationals throws further light on the connections and conflicts between the different varieties of revolutionary and social democratic movements; and they provided the setting where, more clearly than anywhere else, the issues of socialism versus nationalism were debated to the full.

First and Second Internationals. The First International Association of Workingmen, which had originated in 1864 and to which Marx had given shape and doctrine by 1866, was throughout its existence rent between Marxism and anarchism. Rejecting the constitution first prepared for it by the veteran Mazzini, on the grounds that it was better suited to secret political conspiracy than to the more open encouragement of working-class strength and solidarity, it had accepted Marx's arguments that what was now needed was systematic co-operation internationally between all working-class societies in order to promote emancipation on a broad front. When the new constitution was adopted at its first full congress at Geneva in 1866, socialist doctrines were set out in very general terms. Its immediate concern was with the earliest possible reduction of the working day to eight hours, and better facilities for general and technical education. From this aim few labor organizations or socialist societies could dissent. The next year doctrine was formulated more precisely: means of transport and communication should be socialized. In 1868 came more precision: land, mines, and forests must also become the property of the state, and the principle of "to labor the full product of labor" must be established. By now the movement included representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. The International was gaining momentum, despite the wars of these years, and labor unions gave help to one another in times of struggle. It spread to Hungary and Poland. The police estimated its members and supporters at about five million. But in 1869 Bakunin and other anarchists joined it, and thenceforward it was beset with deep internal dissension. They were expelled in 1872 and it was finally disbanded in 1876. It corresponded, in the ambitiousness of its aims by comparison with the meagerness of its powers, with Robert Owen's Grand National Consolidated Trades Union of 1834 in Britain: each overreached what the stage of national industrial development made possible, and each failed because it was unrealistic.

The Second International thrived on the lessons that had been so bitterly learned. It came into being in 1889, in the large assembly of socialist societies which gathered in Paris to celebrate the centenary of

the French Revolution. It originated in a merger of two separate conferences, one of the Marxian revolutionary parties, the other of the reformist or "possibilist" parties and trade unionists. It was therefore a reflection of the very divisions which had already rent so many national socialist parties, and was at the same time an attempt to overcome that division. The anarchists it excluded from the first, remembering the fate of the First International—though its early sessions were made almost intolerable by the interruptions and heckling of anarchist groups protesting against their exclusion. The agile and ingenious Italian anarchist, Dr. Saverio Merlino, contrived to attend its first meetings and preach his own gospel.

The International held a long succession of congresses—at Brussels in 1891, Zürich in 1893, London in 1896, Paris in 1900, Amsterdam in 1904, Stuttgart in 1907, Copenhagen in 1910, and Basle in 1912; the congress that was to have met in Vienna in August, 1914, was abandoned because of the outbreak of war. From 1900 onward it had as a permanent office the International Socialist Bureau, housed in the Maison du Peuple in Brussels and run by Camille Huysmans. It grew considerably in comprehensiveness, and in 1910 the congress was attended by 896 delegates representing 23 nationalities. With the growth of socialist movements everywhere in these years, it also gained in solidity. At its best the Second International served to break down the isolation in which socialist leaders had lived and worked; it made working men in at least a score of countries more conscious of the political and social problems which confronted them all in common; and it achieved moments of important solidarity between people of different and often politically opposed nationalities. Much of what it attempted was haunted by frustration and failure. The nearest it ever came to embodying a real international working-class solidarity in face of oppression was the support it gave to the Russian revolutionaries in 1905; though even that proved ineffectual.

The two greatest controversies with which it had to deal, and which reveal most clearly the dilemmas before it, were about whether socialists should accept ministerial office along with members of nonsocialist parties, and about the correct action for socialists in time of war. These issues were the touchstones of choice between socialism and nationalism. The first arose at the congress of Amsterdam in 1904, occasioned by Alexandre Millerand's acceptance of office in the government of republican defense of 1899 in France toward the end of the Dreyfus Affair. French socialists were particularly shocked that his colleague as minister of war in the same government should be General Gallifet, a man particularly hated by the workers because he had so savagely suppressed the Commune of 1871. Internationally, this situation aroused especial fury among the German social democrats, who blamed the

disunity of French socialists for permitting this great betrayal. The issue divided both the French socialists and the International. Debates on the issue between Guesde and Jaurès became so frequent in the next few years that Briand remarked that the party now met in "annual scissions." At Amsterdam in 1904 Jaurès debated with Bebel, and the issue before the International became one between French and German conceptions of socialism.

Jaurès attacked the German social democrats for wanting to impose their doctrines and tactics on all other countries, and asserted that the great obstacle to progress was not the behavior of the French socialists but the "political powerlessness of German Social Democracy." This mighty disciplined party suffered, indeed, from the handicap that its strength in the *Reichstag* was of little consequence so long as the *Reichstag* itself had so little control over the German government. Jaurès touched a sore spot, too, when he pointed out that the party had "no revolutionary tradition but only one of receiving benefits—universal suffrage, for instance—from above." Jaurès was defeated on the motion condemning socialist participation in government, but the voting revealed a deep split in the congress. The men who supported Jaurès or who abstained were those from countries where liberal parliamentary institutions were most fully established—Britain, France, Belgium, Scandinavia, Switzerland. Those who supported Bebel, apart from the Italians, came from countries where they were anyhow unlikely ever to be offered a share in political power. They even included the lone delegate from Japan, Katayama. Nothing showed more clearly the diversity of circumstances with which social democrats had to deal in different countries, or the impossibility of their concerting any single agreed policy and tactic. An amendment moved by the Austrian Adler and the Belgian Vandervelde, allowing for such local variations, was rejected, though only by 21 votes to 19. On this matter international socialism appeared to be almost equally divided.

The second great controversy arose the following year. It was events in Russia that forced this issue upon the International. It was to dominate all subsequent congresses. What should be the action of socialists in the event of war? Bebel, Jaurès, and most other western social democrats believed that the workers' interest lay in ending the war as quickly as possible by opposing war credits, by a general strike, and by sabotage of the war effort. Lenin and the German Marxist Rosa Luxemburg argued that a European war would so weaken the machinery of the capitalist state that socialist revolution would become possible. Insurrection, they maintained, must aim not merely at ending a war but at the "overthrow of class rule" and the proletarian seizure of power. The Stuttgart congress of 1907 attempted to reconcile these contrary views by a famous resolution which, in the fashion of German

social democracy, contained something for everyone while committing nobody to anything. It included the now traditional condemnations of militarism and imperialism, and the call for a national militia in place of standing armies. It recited alleged instances of successful socialist action to prevent or end wars; and concluded with the omnibus statement of the role of socialists in wartime:

Should war break out in spite of all this, it is their duty to intercede for its speedy end, and to strive with all their power to make use of the violent economic and political crisis brought about by the war to rouse the people, and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.

The allegedly successful interventions for which the Stuttgart congress claimed credit amounted to very much less than they sounded. After Franco-British tension about Egypt and the Sudan in 1898, English and French trade unionists had indeed got together to reinforce Franco-British understanding—but only after the crisis of Fashoda had been overcome by diplomatic action. During the comparable Moroccan crisis between France and Germany in 1905, the parliamentary interventions of the French and German socialists did little to resolve the crisis.¹⁷ The socialist trade unions in Sweden had demonstrated against war on Norway, but they voiced only a part of a much wider desire to avoid war and it was a government-sponsored plebiscite which peacefully and constitutionally separated the two countries in 1905. Just as the German Social Democrats had little legislative achievement to show, so the Second International, constantly dominated by the Germans, had pitifully little positive achievement to show by 1914.

The arguments and resolution of Stuttgart did little to settle the overriding issue of socialism versus nationalism, or to frame any coherent principles upon which such diverse parties in so many different states could be relied upon to take action in an emergency. Perhaps in even trying to do this, it was at fault; for, as already seen, the spirit and character of socialism, as of labor organization in general, varied immensely according to the economic and political environment in which it grew up. The International of social democratic movements could be no more coherent in its principles and policies than the coherence of its component national parties permitted; and though they debated at home the issue of war and peace even more constantly than in the congresses of the International, they reached no greater clarity of program.

Militarism and Pacifism. The issue raised its head whenever national parliaments considered expenditure on naval and military establishments, and this happened very frequently in these years. In the same year as the congress of Stuttgart the question arose in the German *Reichstag*,

¹⁷ See p. 484.

and the "revisionists" gave full support for German military expenditure on the grounds that it was the duty of all citizens, socialists included, to see to it that "the German people is not pressed to the wall by any other nation." Both the Gotha Program of 1875 and the Erfurt Program of 1891 had specified among their aims "a people's army in place of standing armies," and "training in universal military duty." These were the most common socialist solutions to the problem of national armaments—a militia or "people's army" in the French traditions of 1793.

It was the solution which Jean Jaurès put forward in France in his study of *The New Army* (*L'armée nouvelle*) of 1910. His purpose was to refute the extreme antimilitarists and pacifists, like Gustave Hervé, who preached unilateral disarmament, and thereby to counteract the nationalists' charge that socialists lacked patriotism; but at the same time to reject the conservative preference for a standing professional army. The Caesarist traditions of Napoleon, recently strengthened by experience of that equally "good republican" General Boulanger and still more by the crisis of the Dreyfus case, made army reform a foremost issue for French socialism. The army seemed to be a "state within the state." How could the Republic be internationally secure without jeopardizing its own domestic survival? Jaurès argued for a citizen army, the "nation in arms" at the service of democracy and peace. He urged "a strong, democratic militia, reducing barracks to the functions of a training school," and the abolition of all the old invidious dispensations from service. He favored the Swiss principle of "the gun behind the kitchen door." What the republicans as a whole demanded was that length of service should be shortened but equalized; and after three successive overhauls of the system, in 1889, 1905, and 1913, this was accomplished. After 1889 no one was conscripted for more than three years, and after 1905 every young man, regardless of family origin or future career, served for the same period. The conditions of military life were made more democratic, and the army was treated more as a school of citizenship. Jaurès managed to unite socialists in this conception, save for the extreme pacifists and Marxists. But in 1910, the very year his famous book appeared, that former socialist Aristide Briand, who had once advocated the general strike, when in power broke a railway strike by means of the service laws. He called the strikers to the colors and then assigned them, as soldiers, to their former duties. Since mutiny, unlike striking, could be punished with death, it became clear enough that army laws could not so easily be reconciled with socialist activities.

The debate about military and naval establishments could be conducted at, so to speak, several different levels. At a constitutional and political level, most liberals and radicals were in agreement with the socialists that military power must be so controlled as to offer no threat

to civilian government. At a more technical level, it was a debate about the most efficient way to run an army—whether as a professional and highly trained fighting force, or as a peacetime framework for training the “people in arms,” whose patriotic spirit would in an emergency bring irresistible *élan* into a war of national defense. The main argument of the socialists was that since no war of conquest can be justified, it is essential to prepare only for a war of defense; to which the nationalists retorted that the lessons of Prussian victories in the 1860’s were that a professional army is superior to amateur militias, however enthusiastic. At an economic level, a recurrent difficulty was that military and naval expenditures competed for national resources with the social services and endangered existing standards of living. It was the characteristic twentieth-century dilemma of guns or butter.

Whereas the debate in France was conducted at the first and second of these levels, the debate in Germany was conducted mainly on the first, and mainly about naval rather than military expansion. The first bill expanding the navy was passed by the *Reichstag* in 1898. It was opposed by the Social Democrats, and many liberals feared that the fixing of the naval budget for seven years ahead would rob the *Reichstag* of control over expenditure. Anxieties accumulated with each successive approval of naval expansion—in 1899, 1906, 1907, 1908. But each law passed with large majorities, and socialists proved helpless against the tide of nationalist propaganda and sentiment.

In Britain, where compulsory national service did not exist, the debate took place mostly at the third level, that of finance and encroachment on national standards of living. Further naval expenditures in 1909 were resisted even within the Liberal government by Lloyd George and Churchill, who were anxious to develop social reforms—the joint burden led to the famous budget of that year which tapped new sources of taxation.¹⁸ Labor party speakers constantly took this view, and were especially opposed to British alliance with tsarist Russia. In January, 1912, the Labor party passed a resolution at its annual conference: “This conference, believing the anti-German policy pursued in the name of the British Government by Sir Edward Grey to be a cause of increasing armaments, international ill will, and the betrayal of oppressed nationalities, protests in the strongest terms against it.” But the party was still too small to matter. Such were the general sentiments of socialists almost everywhere in Europe: all deploring the race in armaments and the scramble for colonies, most seeking to arouse antiwar sentiments, the most extreme urging a general strike in the event of war. But differences of opinion fell along national as much as ideological lines of division.

It is easy and tempting, in retrospect, to laugh at the high-minded,

¹⁸ See p. 332.

loquacious, yet strangely ineffectual social democrats of the Second International, at their interminable and somewhat circular debates about how to prevent war, at their bitter sectarianism. Yet their purpose was worthy enough, their hopes noble and humane. They represented the basic pacifist sentiment of the European workers in an age of violence—the great majority of whom refused to differentiate, as Lenin wanted them to, between useful and harmful wars. They wanted no war at all, and their spokesmen at the congresses of the International reflected their desires when they rejected what Lenin or Rosa Luxemburg wanted, an international strategy of revolution devised to turn a “useful” war into a successful revolution. After 1890 Engels had argued that international socialism must pin its hopes on the continued growth of the German Social Democratic party. The Hohenzollern power in Germany would not survive a world war, and the Social Democrats would inevitably come into power. Since the Russian tsar was the chief enemy of workers everywhere, German workers would then wage a “useful” war of liberation against Russia, in the manner of France in 1793. What cut across his calculations was the alliance completed between France and Russia by 1894. To ask French workers to support imperial Germany against Russia was to ask them to accept the government of Wilhelm II as an ally, contrary to all their deep-rooted patriotic and anti-German sentiments. Here was the conflict of socialism versus nationalism in its most acute and concrete form, and the International evaded it simply by condemning all wars between capitalist governments.

It should not have come as a surprise in 1914 that socialist parties in every country voted almost unanimously for war credits and backed their national governments in war. The choice had already been made by their very refusal to concert a grand strategy of international revolution, by reference to which tactics appropriate for the socialists of each country could have been devised. At no time before 1914 was it possible to enlist support from the mass of French or British workers for the German imperial government in a war against Russia—however neatly that might have solved the dilemma of the German workers. In no country—not even in Germany—were social democrats anyhow numerous enough or in a position strong enough to determine the choice of peace or war.

The Socializing of Nationalism. The surge of social unrest and violence before 1914 was explicable in terms of the incompleteness of industrialization and of democracy. Wherever industrialization had slowed down, as in France or Spain, and wherever electorates were still restricted, as in Italy or Sweden, urban workers felt in some degree excluded from the national community. A sense of isolation and of underprivilege, of being treated as an internal alien group like a national minority, was perhaps as much a source of the workers' unrest as it was

of the unrest of the militant suffragettes. Millions of Europeans were moving toward a reorientation of community life. Just as Norwegians felt that they did not belong together with Sweden, or Irish home-rulers felt that they did not belong together with Great Britain whereas Ulstermen felt that they did, so the most class-conscious elements of the new proletarian masses no longer felt a community of interest or of aspiration with the property-owning classes of their states. The masses everywhere sought escape from anonymity—from the harsh impersonal rule of remote management in industry, from the gray uniformity of industrial life, from being, in short, inarticulate masses. The aim of the social revolutionaries, as of Norwegian and Irish patriots or militant suffragettes, was to intensify this decline in national loyalties and to make a counterappeal of sectional unity.

Wherever, as in the advanced industrial countries of Great Britain and Germany, this feeling was diminished and offset by a wide franchise, social legislation, and freedom of labor organization, the unrest was less explosive. There, strikes were concerned with remedying particular grievances, and agitation had definable and attainable goals. Industrialization was continuing everywhere, democracy and parliamentary institutions were spreading, labor organizations and socialist movements were growing, right up to the brink of war in 1914. Most workers could look forward with reasonable expectation to further alleviations before long, if only peace could be kept. Above all, the existing achievements of socialism and of social security were forging new links of solidarity and loyalty between workers and nation. Men become more conservative when they have something to conserve. The old attachments to locality and country, to national life and traditions, were being intensified by popular education and publicity. It was only where no such ameliorations existed, where the electoral basis of the state remained narrow and the provisions of social security practically nonexistent, as in Spain or Russia, that unrest was necessarily political and revolutionary.

Those nation-states of western and central Europe which had undertaken to serve the interests and welfare of all classes in society, and which had admitted organized labor to some share of responsibility and power, were rewarded by a socialism that was in spirit co-operative and unrevolutionary. Wherever the nation-state had been most completely socialized, there also was socialism most completely nationalized. The counterpart to the growth of wider electorates and of social-security provision was the growth of social democracy rather than revolutionary Marxism.

This important fact does much to explain the stability and resilience of the western states, even when subjected to the strain of war. In the whole industrialized area of western and central Europe, excluding the Iberian and Balkan peninsulas, the only states to suffer revolution as the immediate result of the First World War were the two defeated empires

of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Outside this area, in Poland, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, revolution was the rule rather than the exception. And even the two exceptions in central Europe deserve attention. The dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was disrupted not by Marxist revolution but by the old-fashioned nationalist insurgence of Balkan peoples. The revolution in Germany in 1918 proved to be a much more superficial change of political system than it at first appeared. If the German *Reich* had been more advanced in its provision of social security than republican France, it had also been a less genuine parliamentary democracy. The turning point had come as early as 1879, when the Third French Republic, designed to be conservative, fell completely into the hands of moderate republicans who controlled its presidency, ministry, and parliamentary majorities. At that same time the Bismarckian *Reich* broke with the National Liberals, who were inopportunately demanding freedom of speech, press, and trade, as well as the implementing of parliamentary control over government, and sought support from the conservative Prussian landowners and large industrialists. The French parliament remained, thereafter, a more effective organ of representative democratic government than the *Reichstag*. Germany lacked this source of moral strength which France, for all her other weaknesses, enjoyed.

Thus, as has been remarked, "from St. Petersburg to Paris the political spectrum of Europe shaded from autocracy to parliamentarianism, preserving the gradations that had distinguished it since the Congress of Vienna." The point had not gone unnoted by the precursors of the Bolsheviks.¹⁹ It may not be too fanciful to see in so persistent a pattern the basis of divisions in Europe after the Second World War. In eastern Europe the penalties of having repudiated liberal democracy in 1848, and social democracy before 1914, were belated experiments in fragile democratic systems after 1919 and the imposition of new-style "people's democracies" after 1945.²⁰ Deviant paths, once followed in history, seldom end at the same destination.

¹⁹ See pp. 95 and 377.

²⁰ See pp. 552-62, and 788-790.

CHAPTER 18

THE TEXTURE OF EUROPEAN CULTURE

Science and Material Progress

AFTER the First World War it became common to despise or to ridicule the boundless faith in progress which had prevailed during the nineteenth century. Before 1914, it was suggested, people had taken for granted that material betterment—the mere capacity to produce more and more wealth with less and less labor through the use of machines—was in itself progress. It had been forgotten that man cannot live by bread alone, that knowledge is not the same as wisdom, that the enhanced resources put at man's disposal by science, technology, and superior methods of organization might be used for destruction or tyranny instead of for creation and emancipation. It in no way followed that when a people became more healthy and wealthy, it also became more wise. Spiritually and morally, indeed, to devote so much energy and enterprise to material ends might be not progress but retrogression—the first step in a reversion from civilization to barbarism.

It was natural enough, after the collapse of prewar prosperity and optimism, after experience of the devastations of the first modern war, that there should be reaction, and even revulsion, against the whole trend of developments which had led to this catastrophe. But equally, it was neither foolish nor wicked of nineteenth-century men to believe that what had happened in that century had resulted in positive and creative progress. Many of the age-old miseries of mankind had been abolished or were in rapid retreat: slavery had been ended in all save the remotest and most primitive parts of the earth; famine, plague, and disease were being speedily diminished by greater abundance of food, better transport, wonderful drugs, and more skillful medical services; the agonies caused by childbirth and early death were being soothed away by science; decades had been added to the average length of human life; squalor and exploitation were receding before slum clearance and sanitation, factory regulation and social controls; ignorance and illiteracy

were in retreat before advancing armies of teachers. The numbers of mankind grew so fast, and within a single lifetime families became so clearly healthier and better fed, cleaner and better housed, more literate and better informed, more mobile and better governed, that none could doubt the truth of vast individual and social betterment.

This material progress was especially obvious in the industrialized western countries, where between 1870 and 1900 real wages—or what incomes would buy even allowing for losses due to periods of unemployment—rose by about half. It was not an absolute fall in the value of real wages after 1900 which provoked industrial unrest, but merely a slowing down of what had come to be regarded as their normal rate of increase—that, and the unevenness of wage levels, which prompted less skilled or less fortunate types of worker to press for a more equitable share in the profits of mechanization. The most liberal minded admitted that many evils remained still to be fought: including the newer evils of drab squalor in mining towns and industrial cities, the ravages of the countryside, the menace of unemployment, the terror of economic crisis, and above all the frightfulness of more scientific warfare. But few doubted that these, too, could safely be added to the list of remediable evils, that the ingenuity of men of good will could in due time overcome all these and other ills. The most observant noted that two new perils loomed ahead: the dangers of mass hysteria and sensationalism in the more gregarious and less religious communities of modern Europe, and the new fact that in a world deficient in international organization national prosperity depended on what happened everywhere else. But even these perils good sense and good will could reasonably be expected to remove, and a new age of prosperity, peace, and plenty seemed at last to be within reach of mankind. Such was the mood of nineteenth-century Europe, so abruptly dispelled in 1914.

“Miracles of Science.” If pride is ever justified, the men of nineteenth-century Europe were justified in taking pride in their achievements. If asked what had made so much progress possible, they would have answered, almost with one voice, that it was above all science. It was feats of mechanical engineering that attracted their highest admiration: the quadrupling of the world’s railway mileage between 1870 and 1900, involving such masterpieces as the Forth Bridge in Scotland and the Trans-Siberian and Canadian Pacific railways; the erection of the first skyscrapers in New York and Chicago, and of the Eiffel Tower in Paris; the digging of the Suez and Kiel and Panama canals; the great new oceanic liners and the exciting consequences of the invention of the internal combustion engine, which made possible both automobiles and airplanes. There were signs of the impending conquest of the air, as well as of land and sea, when in 1895 the Irish-Italian inventor, Guglielmo Marconi, first used radio waves to transmit messages by wireless

telegraphy, and when in 1909 the Frenchman Blériot successfully flew the English Channel in one of the new flying machines which Americans had invented. Next in esteem ranked exploration of the earth's surface, now made more possible by modern resources of transport and medicine. While some Europeans, like David Livingstone and Henry Stanley from Britain, Fernand Foureau and Savorgnan de Brazza from France, Gerhard Rohlfs and Hermann von Wissmann from Germany, the Hungarian Samuel Teleki, and the American Donaldson Smith, penetrated into the interior of the unknown African continent; others, like the Norwegians Fridtjof Nansen and Roald Amundsen, and the Englishmen Robert Scott and Ernest Shackleton, explored the poles of the earth. The exploits and courage of these men were material for a new saga of heroism, to be told to children as inspiring examples of what brave men might achieve. Even a new universe began to come within view when the German astronomer, Johann Gottfried Galle, discovered the new planet Neptune—a discovery that in the opinion of one historian of science, Sir William Dampier, probably “had a far greater effect in establishing the credibility of scientific method in the civilized world at large than the far more important co-ordination of observation and hypothesis in the preceding fifty years.”

Meanwhile the theoretical and experimental scientists were advancing new hypotheses that opened fresh vistas of progress in man's knowledge of his physical environment. That versatile Scot, James Clerk-Maxwell, who in 1871 became the first professor of experimental physics at the University of Cambridge, put forward an electromagnetic theory of light. Since the velocities of electromagnetic waves and of light waves were shown to be the same, he inferred that light waves were probably electromagnetic in character. He died in 1879, but his theories were further investigated by scientists in many countries, and by 1886 the German Heinrich Hertz measured the actual velocity of electromagnetic waves. This work linked up with a rapid development in the study of radioactivity, of which the enormous importance was fully realized only after 1914. In 1895 the German Wilhelm Konrad Röntgen discovered X rays; the next year the Frenchman Antoine Henri Becquerel showed that uranium gave off rays similar to those discovered by Röntgen; and two years later Pierre and Marie Curie (one French, the other Polish) isolated radium. These discoveries carried much further that inquiry into the secret relationships between energy and matter which had begun before 1870.¹ They brought closer together the physical and biological sciences; and led on the one hand to telecommunications and radio, on the other, to radiotherapy and new methods of attacking disease.

In the experiments of J. J. Thomson and Ernest Rutherford, each in

¹ See p. 252.

turn a successor to Clerk-Maxwell in his Cambridge professorship, these theories led to a completely new theory of atomic structure. By 1897 German physicists had discovered that when a high voltage of electricity was applied across two metal plates sealed within an evacuated tube, rays were given off from the negative plate, called the cathode. Thomson proved that these cathode rays consisted of very small particles (ions), traveling at very high speed and carrying a negative charge of electricity. He called them at first "corpuscles," but they are now known as electrons. The electron was held to be present in all matter, and the conductivity of gases was shown to be due to the splitting up of atoms by the removal of one or more electrons, leaving the atom positively charged. Electrons were found to be one of the simple fundamental units out of which all the different kinds of atoms are built; and though all carry the same electrical charge, they are not identical in mass. The American scientist, Robert Millikan, proved finally that electricity, too, is atomic in nature; and the connection of energy with matter was established. The chemical properties of matter depend entirely on how electrons are arranged within it. The flow of electricity through a wire means that there is a flow of electrons through the wire; the picture on a television screen is painted by an electron beam. The electron is everywhere, and it is the chief link between what is called matter and what is called energy.

By 1903 Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy evolved a theory to co-ordinate and explain all the phenomena of radioactivity which had been observed. They suggested that such activity was released by changes within single radioactive atoms as a result of their internal explosive disintegration. Rutherford's book on *Radioactivity* first appeared in 1904, and two years later in *Radioactive Transformations* he added his theory of the transmutation of elements. Though many chemists resisted the view that chemical atoms, hitherto thought immutable, were actually undergoing transmutation, Rutherford was proved to be right. He went on to suggest that the atom was itself like a miniature solar system, with a positively charged nucleus as the sun, surrounded by negatively charged electrons revolving about it like planets, and that even the nucleus might also have a complex structure. Thus apparently solid matter must be thought of as mainly empty space, and both energy and matter were reducible to common units. All this work was abruptly interrupted by war in 1914, when scientists were diverted to research of immediate military usefulness. But the basis had been firmly laid for revolutionary developments in physics in the interwar years, involving the discovery that the neutron, or uncharged particle, is part of the structure of the nucleus of the atom. With this discovery came man's ability to "split the atom" and so release at will energy hitherto securely locked up inside it.

The New Mathematics. The precision required of modern engineering, and still more the highly complex calculations required in atomic physics, were made possible only by great parallel developments in mathematics. The new mathematics challenged both Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics. In 1900 Max Planck produced the quantum theory. In 1905 an unknown clerk of twenty-six in the patent office of Bern, Switzerland, published an article that was to shake the world. Young Albert Einstein began to propound the theory that came to be known as relativity. In 1908 Minkowski depicted a four-dimensional world, with three co-ordinates for space and one for time. The effect of these advances in mathematics was to question the old distinctions between space and time, as well as between energy and matter, and to bring into a new relationship astronomy, nuclear physics, and philosophy. Since Einstein's genius, like Darwin's, was above all one of synthesis—the capacity to reveal underlying unities behind apparently disparate observations—he properly ranks as the supreme scientific genius of the early twentieth century. One great flaw in Newtonian mathematics was an unreconciled discrepancy between calculation and observation of the working of gravity in the case of the planet Mercury. Einstein claimed that his modification of Newton's theory would remove this discrepancy. It was found to do so. His other astronomical predictions, such as that light rays from distant stars are bent when passing the sun by double the amount Newton calculated, were tested and proved correct in 1919, when a total eclipse of the sun was visible both in West Africa and in Brazil. The discovery that matter is energy, energy matter, and that space and time are interdependent, constitutes a revolution in human thought closely parallel with Darwinism. Atomic physics and the mathematical theory of relativity destroyed some of the basic conceptions on which science had been built since Galileo and Newton. The idea of a substance as something extended in space and persistent in time becomes meaningless if neither space nor time is absolute. A substance had now to be considered as a series of events, connected together in one continuum, taking place in space time. In matter and in energy, as in organic evolution and the solar system, there occurs a process of everlasting change; and the only thing eternal is change itself. The new scientific synthesis of knowledge was shattering to the old, in all its aspects. But to all save the expert the full implications and consequences have remained largely unappreciated and obscure—whereas the Darwinian hypothesis had immediate repercussions on all human thought.

Biology and Psychology. In the generation before 1914 Darwinism was still the most far-reaching and controversial of all the theories put forward by science. When Darwin published his study of *The Descent of Man* in 1871, he summed up the firm conclusions to which his work

had led. After marshaling the evidence that man is related to all animal life, he wrote, "The great principle of evolution stands up clear and firm, when these groups of facts are considered in connection with others, such as the mutual affinities of the members of the same group, their geographical distribution in past and present times, and their geological succession. It is incredible that all these facts should speak falsely. He who is not content to look, like a savage, at the phenomena of nature as disconnected, cannot any longer believe that man is the work of a separate act of creation. . . ." Here was the ultimate clash between the new biology and theology. Accepting geological time, Darwinism supposed an endless sequence of minute changes, one vast continuum in time and space, effected not as previous biologists had thought by the inheritance of characteristics which had been acquired by deliberate efforts, but by the impersonal process of natural selection. Giraffes acquired long necks not by stretching, but because over centuries of evolution long necks paid in terms of survival. As T. H. Huxley, the chief popularizer of Darwinism, put it, "new species may result from the selective action of external conditions upon the variations from the specific type which individuals present." This selective action comes from the struggle for survival, the very will to live, and it selects by favoring those individuals who happen to possess variations of immediate use to them in their surroundings. These individuals tend to survive and to breed. The same process, repeated countless times for each succeeding generation, results in accumulated minute variations that account for the differentiation of species. The contribution of geologists to the theory was their proof that the earth had existed for billions of years during which this process could have occurred.

Just as the Copernican system of astronomy had deposed the earth from its central place in the universe, so Darwinism seemed at first to dethrone man from his central place in the history of the earth.² But from 1870 onward some reconciliation began to be achieved between Darwinism and its theological critics. Liberal theologians saw the need to adapt themselves to their new environment. Archaeology, anthropology, ancient history, and biblical textual criticism, all contributed to a drastic revision of theological thought which brought it more into harmony with the ideas implied by acceptance of Darwinism. The comparative study of religions even suggested a certain relativity in the validity of religious beliefs and rites. Sir J. G. Frazer's eleven volumes of comparisons between religions and myths (*The Golden Bough*) profoundly influenced European thought. While these trends toward readjustment and reconciliation were having effect, a new revolution in thought came from yet another direction—from the detailed study of the nature of man himself, from psychology.

² See p. 253.

The study of psychology was at first closely related to advances in biology and physiology. In the 1860's Gregor Mendel explored how heredity worked, but his researches were strangely overlooked for a generation. Francis Galton investigated the place of heredity in the mental development of human beings, and by 1872 the German physician, Wilhelm Wundt, showed the interdependence of mind and body, in his *Principles of Physiological Psychology*. During the 1890's psychological research continued on the assumption that understanding of human behavior could be deduced from experiments on animals: the most famous exponent being the Russian Ivan Pavlov, whose experiments on dogs and their reactions to external physical stimuli led to the theory of "conditioned reflexes" and to a doctrine that came to be known as behaviorism. Mind, like body, seemed to be governed by mechanistic laws, and to consist of matter not fundamentally different from body. It was only when the psychologists put emphasis less exclusively on the physiological side, and more on the unconscious urges and repressions within the mind itself, that revolutionary advances took place. This was achieved around the end of the century by the Austrian Sigmund Freud and his associates, Carl G. Jung and Alfred Adler. The attempt to identify psychology with physiology broke down, and it became apparent that psychology was a science distinct from both physiology and physics, and partly independent of them. Introspection—the less precise yet quite scientific investigation of human mind and will and their inner working—is valid as a source of verifiable data; so that while some psychological laws involve physiology, others do not. Freud's techniques of psychoanalysis opened new doors into the mind. The study of the subconscious made men aware of the power of the emotional, the nonrational, and the instinctive impulses that prompt human behavior.

The ideas put forward by psychologists had, like Darwinism, immediate consequences for philosophy and general ideas. This was partly because they were startling ideas about the inner nature of man himself and had obvious and instant implications, and partly because they seemed more comprehensible to the ordinary person than the abstruse mathematical calculations of an Einstein. The researches into the mind of the criminal conducted by the Italian Cesare Lombroso, into the testing of intelligence by the Frenchman Alfred Binet, into abnormal psychology by Freud, into the meaning of dreams by Freud and of family relationships by Jung, attracted a wide interest. Crude popularizations and perversions by charlatans caused considerable confusion in general understanding of what psychology could achieve. Psychological jargon about complexes and frustrations, inhibitions and repressions, entered wildly into the language of ordinary speech and writing. Novelists found new material for their work in pseudoscientific analysis of character. But when, after the war, much of the turmoil settled, it was apparent that

considerably greater understanding of the mind of man had been achieved, if without the precision or finality that the physical sciences could claim.

Lack of Synthesis. Between 1850 and 1870^a the advances of scientific thought and of social thought had all tended toward an ever more complete and confident synthesis. Benthamism and Marxism, mid-nineteenth-century thermodynamics and Darwinism, had belonged to the same world of thought. It was a world of self-regulating mechanism working according to "inevitable" laws, whether of supply and demand, of the iron law of wages and the inevitable class struggle, of the conservation of energy or the survival of the fittest. This homogeneity in the world of thought was now disoriented by the rapid advances of science, and it was only in part replaced by a new and quite different homogeneity. In this new world of 1914 notions of self-regulating mechanism seemed too crude to fit into the image of a universe subject to constant change, and of matter which was but diverse combinations of different forms of energy, and of man which was a creature of subtle psychological impulses. If all is one vast continuum and "things" can be described only in their ever-changing relationship to other phenomena, any notion of simple and inevitable laws seems inappropriate. Thus, although the new trends in scientific thought had a homogeneity of their own which was as great as that of the old, they were all at considerable variance with the sort of synthesis which in 1870 had so confidently been expected.

Moreover, by 1914, the main impression was one of disorientation and dislocation. The new branches of knowledge grew so fast and so unevenly that they lost contact with one another. The growing complexity of scientific study demanded narrow specialization and concentrated devotion. It remained true, perhaps, as Lavoisier had suggested a century before, that all threads of knowledge might be at last woven into one great tapestry of beauty and significance for mankind. But at this stage of advance men saw only raw ends and tattered edges. The most conspicuous feature of science was no longer synthesis but analysis, not unity but fragmentation. Scientists and mathematicians came to be looked upon not as the great teachers of mankind but as the wonder-workers of the modern world, priests of a mysterious and esoteric cult, practicing within their laboratories and publications secret and unknowable rites beyond the comprehension of all save the most expert and devout. The sectarianism of anticlerical liberals and socialists was matched by the sectarianism of scientists. There are many reasons for this; and not the least was that science so consistently produced results which were of obvious material benefit, that most men were content to enjoy these boons without inquiring too much how they came to be provided.

^a See p. 252.

When the German chemists discovered how to fix nitrogen from the air and so produce in abundance fertilizers that Germany had hitherto had to import from overseas, or when they learned how to extract from coal a rich range of commodities—from drugs to explosives, and from textiles to the dyes with which they were colored—it was enough to be thankful that these discoveries made the nation more independent of foreign imports, more ready to endure a war. But another reason for the continued fragmentation of knowledge was that philosophy and theology, the traditional instructors of mankind in the meaning of life, failed to serve as adequate interpreters of this new store of knowledge.

Philosophy spoke with many voices. On one hand there was a powerful revival of Hegelian idealism, especially in Germany, Italy, and Britain. The philosophers Rudolf Eucken in Germany, Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile in Italy, and the active school of Oxford idealists—stemming from T. H. Green and including Bernard Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley, Lord Haldane, and many other highly influential thinkers—denoted a reaction of philosophy away from the materialistic tendencies of utilitarian liberalism, socialism, and science itself. On the other hand, philosophers of realism and of power had a profound appeal in this age of dynamic growth. Characteristically enough, they were most vocal in Germany; and although Arthur Schopenhauer had died in 1860, it was only later in the century that he acquired fame. He taught that the only ultimate reality in the universe is blind, struggling will. His greatest disciple, Friedrich Nietzsche, combined with similar emphasis on masterful will an evolutionary doctrine of eternal struggle to dominate both environment and rival wills. He produced thereby his famous doctrine of the superman. The will to power was the driving force of history, and both goodness and truth were merely that which was believed to be useful for survival and for domination. Here was an ethic that chimed well with the current rivalry between states for wealth and territory, and also with the impending notions of relativity. In Britain, Thomas Carlyle preached a milder version of comparable ideas, and the vogue for his writings increased after his death in 1881. His profound respect for German literature and philosophy and his many writings about them earned him the award of the Order of Merit from the Prussian government. At the beginning of the twentieth century the hegemony of Germany in European affairs included the intellectual supremacy of her philosophy and her universities. In the racial theories of the renegade Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the philosophies of evolutionary struggle and the will to power were combined into a doctrine of the master race, which was later to be adopted by Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists. Chamberlain became a German citizen and married Richard Wagner's daughter. Kaiser Wilhelm II subscribed to a fund

for distributing to public libraries free copies of his work on *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899). It became the gospel of Pan-Germanism.⁴

The trend of thought embodied in Nietzsche and Chamberlain was an anti-intellectualist revival of paganism, a frontal attack on the teachings of Christianity. In it the materialistic undertones of nineteenth-century thought ceased to be undertones and came to predominate. While these ideas favoring the principles of strong leadership, state power, and racial imperialism attacked Christian theology and ethics from one side, the swelling tide of Marxist materialism attacked them from another. Not only did Marxism penetrate socialist thought through the new social democratic parties,⁵ but the variant of it known as syndicalism became important in the early twentieth century.

The French engineer, Georges Sorel, combined Marx's theories of dialectical materialism and class struggle with Nietzsche's ideas of power and will, to make a unique theory of violence as the medium of change. His *Reflections on Violence* appeared in book form in 1908, and provided a whole philosophy to justify labor unions as the natural medium for proletarian revolution and the general strike as the supreme weapon of class war. He incorporated also into his theories two further ideas that were to have an important future. Adapting Nietzsche's views of truth as relative, he argued that men are moved by myths, by nonrational beliefs that prompt action regardless of whether they are true or false. And adapting Nietzsche's ideas of the superman and an *élite*, he urged the necessity for political leadership by "audacious minorities," eliciting the energies of the mass of the proletariat by their own will to power and by use of appropriate "myths," which it is necessary for men to believe in order to succeed. Through Sorel, who has been correctly described as a "prismatic thinker," the various philosophical ideas hostile to liberal democracy and rationalism were focused for frontal attack. Although they bore little fruit before 1914, they became, after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the Italian Fascist revolution of 1922, a capacious reservoir of ideas which could be brought to bear against parliamentary democracies by the single-party dictatorships of the interwar years. Sorel had great posthumous significance as an apostle of irrationalism and violence in politics. His Italian friend and fellow engineer, Vilfredo Pareto, reinforced these ideas from his more systematic study of sociology.

In these ways the liberal, utilitarian, and democratic socialist philosophies of the mid-century were being attacked from both sides at once: by a reaction to Hegelianism, and by a more ruthless materialism. At the same time they were being more subtly questioned by the widely

⁴ See p. 481.

⁵ See p. 366.

influential philosophies of an American, William James, and of a Frenchman, Henri Bergson. James remained, in political opinions, a staunch defender of individualist liberalism and democracy. But his philosophy of pragmatism, with its insistence that experience exceeds logic and transcends reason, reinforced other trends toward accepting as true whatever proved most efficient and successful. Bergson constructed a philosophy based on the fact of evolution, and emphasized the realities that might be grasped by intuition if not by intellect and reason. Philosophy must use the data of science, but it must correct and supplement this knowledge by the use of intuition and insight, in the fashion of the great artists who see more than is seen by simple observation and reason alone. He wrote much about the life force, the advancing current of creative vitality, of which the supreme task is to dominate matter. His metaphysics in many respects recalls Hegelianism, save that for rational intelligence as the unfolding reality in history Bergson substitutes the free creative activity of mind which is broader and deeper than reason. The affinities between Bergson's teaching and the contemporary advances in biology and psychology, as well as in physics, made it the most complete synthesis hitherto attempted between old philosophy and new science. Hence came its widespread influence, both before and after 1914. That his ideas greatly influenced both Georges Sorel and Benito Mussolini is warning enough against regarding such a synthesis as being necessarily a reinforcement of liberalism and democracy; but it had close relevance to the contemporary trends of introspection, "impressionism" and "expressionism" in literature and painting.⁶

Religious Conflicts. Theology, like philosophy, moved part way toward making terms with the new currents of thought, but it proved even less successful in achieving a synthesis. Darwinism was a major blow to both fundamentalism and ecclesiastical dogma. As already seen, its rise at first coincided with a strong tendency within the Roman Catholic Church to assert more forcefully the dogmatic basis of Catholic faith.⁷ Insofar as churches in Europe appeared by 1870 to be on the side of conservatism and established order, and part of an alliance against secular progress, scientific discovery, liberalism, socialism, and even nationalism, they lost most of their appeal to the rising classes of intellectuals and industrial workers. The shift of balance between countryside and towns removed millions of Europeans from the traditional religious bonds of the parish and collected them in larger and more inchoate agglomerations, usually deficient in ecclesiastical organization and spiritual influences. The growing reliance upon the state or local government for provisions of social protection, poor relief, security, education, and welfare meant that men learned to look to the secular state for things that

⁶ See p. 418.

⁷ See p. 300.

had once been provided mainly by the church. While these tendencies bred apathy toward religion, the contemporary feuds between church and state about control of education fostered in many a more militant hatred for clericalism, dogma, ritual, and the faith which was dubbed superstition. Secular changes, whether the making of new nation-states, the spread of democracy, or the destruction of illiteracy, took place outside or even in spite of the churches. They seemed to be tied to the old order and in blind hostility to the future. This situation existed, though in different degrees of explosiveness, in almost every European country by the 1890's.

But during the twenty years before 1914 it changed with remarkable speed. Toward the ideas and movements of Marxism, syndicalism, and anarchism, Christianity everywhere remained inherently hostile. But increasingly the churches came to terms with the swelling demand for greater social justice, and they came to see that this was in no irrevocable conflict with the essential teachings of Christianity. In England the persuasive school of writers which had appeared by 1850, led by men like Charles Kingsley and Frederick Denison Maurice, had founded a form of Christian Socialism which abandoned doctrines of hell-fire, eternal damnation, and extreme Sabbatarianism, and sought expression for the spirit of Christian charity in work for social welfare. The tide of opinion which they started gained in force during the second half of the century, and the Christian Social Union was set up in 1889 to link the work of the churches with social reform. Fundamentalism took new shapes, expressing solicitude for material health and social justice. The Christian Science movement, which had originated in America in the 1870's and the Salvation Army, founded in England by William Booth in 1880, were significant signs of the times.

Throughout Europe the accession of Leo XIII to the Papacy in 1878 marked a new era of social Catholicism. The new pope—though sixty-eight when elected, he lived on to the age of ninety-three—was himself a great humanist, scholar, and artist, more sensitive and sympathetic than his predecessor to the trends of the modern world. In 1883 he opened the archives and library of the Vatican to historical researchers, encouraged the study of church history and of Thomist theology, and staffed the astronomical observatory of the Vatican with eminent mathematicians and physicists. These visible efforts to reconcile religion with science had their counterpart in his famous encyclicals, which restated Catholic social doctrines in terms relevant to modern society: the encyclicals *Immortale Dei* (1885), *Libertas* (1888), and *Rerum Novarum* (1891). He upheld private property as a natural right, but criticized capitalism for the poverty and social injustice it produced; he condemned materialistic socialism of the Marxist kind, but welcomed whatever in socialism was Christian in principle. He encouraged the formation

of specifically Catholic trade unions and socialist parties, and by the end of the century Catholics in most European lands had acted upon his advice. He tried to end the quarrels between the Church and the new liberal states of Europe, by urging French Catholics to accept the Third Republic and engage in its political life, and by reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Italian kingdom. The fierce struggles about lay control of popular education during the 1880's prevented this expected reconciliation, but the outcome of the struggle was not always to the disadvantage of the Church. The separation of church and state carried out in France in 1905 freed the Church in France from state control, while putting it more under the direct control of the Papacy. Leo XIII's successor in 1903, Pius X, undertook to stamp out "modernism" in the Church and in 1907 defined it as a heresy. Thereafter Roman Catholicism remained in considerable hostility to modern science, refusing to modify its basic doctrines so as to reconcile them with scientific beliefs and standing firm on its traditional dogmas and creeds. But the spread of social Catholicism in various forms continued, and forty years later was to bear rich fruit in the Catholic Democratic parties of Germany, Italy, and France.⁸

In world Jewry contrary impulses appeared, both of them hostile to the peaceful coexistence and assimilation of Jews within the new nation-states. The spread of liberal democratic principles and institutions should have made assimilation easier. The principles of toleration and equal citizenship, and the ending of old disabilities and restrictions, tended to turn Jews into ordinary citizens, and so to loosen their special ties to an exclusive religious and racial community. In politics, business, and the professions individual Jews assumed great eminence. Disraeli and Durkheim, Freud and Einstein were all Jews by birth. But these very tendencies evoked separatist forces by reaction—a nationalist movement among Jews themselves, and a racialist movement among Gentiles who resented the prominence and success of Jews in economic and public life. In 1897 the first Zionist congress met in Basle, representing a special Jewish nationalist movement and demanding that Palestine be made an independent state and a Jewish national home. On the other hand the spread of racialist ideas fostered anti-Semitic forces which at the end of the century swept through many European countries. There were anti-Jewish laws and massacres (pogroms) in Poland and Russia; strong anti-Semitic forces led by Adolf Stöcker in Germany; and the Dreyfus Affair in France, inflamed by the violently anti-Semitic writings of Édouard Drumont and by chauvinistic movements like Paul Déroulède's *League of Patriots*. Anti-Semitism transcended political parties, but it became a favorite theme of ultranationalist propaganda that Jewry

⁸ See p. 783.

represented an alien international conspiracy, operating inside each state to the detriment of national integrity and security. The Zionist and the anti-Semitic movements fed on one another, and the inflaming of all nationalist feelings by 1914 boded ill for the future of the Jews in Europe.

At the same time Judaism itself was divided by the issue of science and "modernism." While modernism triumphed in most of central and western Europe as well as in America, a more severe orthodoxy prevailed in eastern Jewry. Like the Orthodox Church and Islam, eastern Jewry remained least affected by the modernist upheavals that troubled the religious communions of Europe. But it was especially subjected to discriminatory legislation in Rumania, Poland, and Russia. In 1891 some three hundred thousand Jews left the tsarist empire, many to seek new homes in the United States.

Viewed as a whole, the tendencies of European thought by 1914 revealed the most astonishing contrasts and conflicts. In one sense, a keynote of the new trends was precision and refinement. The precision of modern science made possible not only the construction of new giants in liners, skyscrapers, and bridges, but also the investigation of the most minute objects in the universe—micro-organisms and electrons. Comparable applications of exact tests yielded great advances in archaeology and anthropology, in geology and chemistry. Mathematical precision not only made it possible to measure the speed of movement of celestial bodies and the speed of electrons, but showed that there were mathematical relationships between astro-physics and atomic physics. With closer understanding of the minutest objects came greater attention to the more imponderable and intangible forces—to the meaning of time and the importance of the subconscious impulses in the human mind. In another sense, the keynote of the period was just the opposite. There was a crudity of conflict between religious faith and materialism, between nations competing in wealth and armed might, between races and empires vaunting their superiority; a gross violence of mass hysteria and prejudice, a savage attack on the old human values of personal freedom and rationality, even upon the human intellect itself; a profound disorientation of established beliefs and habits of mind which led to mental and moral bewilderment. A crisis of culture and intellect no less than a crisis in international relations preceded the war of 1914. A moral world, within which men can agree because they share similar assumptions and values and goals and speak the same language, would have had to be remade after 1914, even if the material world also had not had to be remade because of the dislocations of war. Many of the essential elements in the spiritual crisis of the interwar years already existed before war even began.⁹

⁹ See p. 421.

Social Thought and Culture

SOME of the ways in which the changing concepts of science affected social thought have already been suggested. Through their impact on philosophy and religion, scientific ideas indirectly affected what men thought about social and political life. Study of anthropology and psychology tended to emphasize racial, environmental, and nonrational factors that govern the behavior of men in society. A series of writers, who may properly be called "social Darwinists," eagerly applied or transferred Darwinian ideas to the study of society and politics. In Britain the banker-journalist Walter Bagehot wrote during the 1870's a provocative study of *Physics and Politics: Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of Natural Selection and Inheritance to Political Society*. He argued that in order to survive a primitive tribe must hold itself firmly together, and this it does most successfully by forming a "cake of custom." The habits of discipline and conformity and the "legal fibre" which it acquires are essential to its survival. Progress comes from conflict between compact and coherent groups, a conflict in which, Bagehot argued, the group that is superior in customs triumphs. Thus good customs tend to drive out bad, for it is those groups which have a higher morality and religion which survive. But in later stages of evolution the "cake of custom" makes for too much stability and becomes an enemy of progress. Then it has to be broken, to make way for the freer operation of intelligence through discussion, and for individual initiative and freedom. In an ingenious way this subtle and ironic writer contrived to combine Darwinism with liberalism. But it was questionable whether so simple a transference of ideas from biology to politics was justifiable.

Sociology. It was natural that in Britain, which gave birth to Darwin, many other political thinkers should likewise absorb the notions of evolutionary biology. Pre-eminent among them was Herbert Spencer, who was ever sensitive to the latest teachings of science as he understood them. He became one of the most popular and important of European political thinkers in the latter part of the century. He held that the laws of evolution apply as much to man himself as to all animal creatures, and as much to man's mental, moral, and social characteristics as to his body. Human conscience, for example, is a product both of the past evolution of man in society and of the individual's personal experience during his lifetime. But Spencer, whose biological interests and ideas remained in many ways Lamarckian, favored the un-Darwinian view that purposive adaptations to environment were important. His methods, like his ideas, were less scientific than he liked to think; and his imprecise use of

terms, his excessive liking for mere analogies such as "social organism," have robbed his theories of more permanent value. More lasting in significance were the ideas of the Austrian, Ludwig Gumplowicz, whose influence on American social thinkers was very great. He argued that the state and all other political institutions originate in conflict between groups and in the conquest of one group by another. The state originates in force. In this view his approach was akin to Marxism, though the inferences he drew from it were far from being Marxist. He emphasized the power of social environment to condition the individual's thought and beliefs, but he regarded the ruling classes as likely to be superior to other classes within the state. Nor is the state evil, as it is for Marx. It is the prerequisite of material progress. The theories of Bagehot, Spencer, and Gumplowicz show how scientific theories could be used to serve quite contrary political and social doctrines.

Similarly, it was possible for anarchist theorists no less than conservatives to find support in ideas of evolution. The Russian prince, Pëtr Kropotkin, published articles between 1890 and 1896 which were later collected in 1902 in his *Mutual Aid*. As a student of biology he dared to challenge the basic postulate of the Darwinists (though not always, as he points out, of Darwin himself), that a bitter struggle for existence was the main driving force of evolutionary change. Having traveled in his youth in eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria, where the conditions of environment were exceptionally rigorous, he noted that very severe struggle for survival brought not progress and improvement but impoverishment in vigor and health; that co-operation and mutual support between members of the same species was liable to be more important for the survival of that species than struggle against other species; and that struggle between members of the same species was in fact very rare. These observations led him to contend that habits of mutual aid and group co-operation played a greater part than struggle in evolutionary survival. He applied this idea to the human species and argued in diametrical opposition to the champions of state power and racial rivalries, who saw only ruthless competition and conflict as the source of progress. His inferences from the actual theories of Darwin were as legitimate as those of his opponents; and politically the champions of socialism, co-operation, labor unions, and even anarchism welcomed his persuasive arguments. It was equally legitimate for the English Fabians to infer the "inevitability of gradualness," and so devise a gradualist and evolutionary school of democratic socialism in opposition to revolutionary Marxism, *Fabian Essays*, to which Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw contributed, first appeared in 1889 as the manifesto of English "gas and water socialism."¹⁰

In an age when the behavior of man in society and new kinds of

¹⁰ See p. 331.

community life were presenting obvious problems, it was inevitable that a science of social psychology should be developed, linking up with the infant studies of psychology and sociology. In France a group of brilliant pioneers explored the basis of individual behavior. They included Gabriel Tarde, who emphasized the power of imitation and habit; Gustave Le Bon, who expounded the reasons for the irrational behavior of crowds in a panic or a mob; and Émile Durkheim, who evolved a theory of "collective consciousness" and argued that the small local or functional group served the most valuable purposes in society. All were working and writing before 1914. At the same time, in Britain and the United States, the Fabian socialist, Graham Wallas, studied *Human Nature in Politics* (1908) and contended that the art of politics lay largely in the creation of opinion by nonrational inferences and emotional suggestions; and the social psychologist, William McDougall, taught that the basic primary emotions of man were largely derived from animal nature and were relatively few but enormously potent in their effects on human behavior. In Britain, too, Herbert Spencer, infatuated with the faith in positivism that he had imbibed from the Frenchman Auguste Comte, tried to synthesize the whole study of society in his three volumes of *Principles of Sociology* (1877-1896). But such pretentious studies were of less significance than the more truly scientific approach of men like the Frenchman, Frédéric Le Play, who patiently studied family life in Europe, or the factual surveys of urban life carried out by such men as Charles Booth in London. Booth startled late Victorian England by revealing that one third of Londoners were living below the "poverty line" of barest subsistence.

Sociology, like social psychology, had a long way to go in the collection of accurate data and statistics before it could validly expose any "laws of society" such as Spencer claimed to formulate. What was significant was that more close attention and more detailed study were now devoted to the conduct of men in society; and that this led to the almost unanimous discovery that man was prompted much less by rational impulses than nineteenth-century radicals or liberals had commonly assumed. In this way, too, man appeared to be very much less the controller of his destiny and the "captain of his soul" than had been previously believed. This more passive creature, molded biologically by natural selection, dominated by the mysterious promptings of his unconscious, and stimulated into action by his social and material environment, seemed a puny, helpless creature, buffeted by an impersonal universe of unending change. To offset this dispiriting picture were the undoubted fact that man had the intelligence, initiative, enterprise, and skill to discover all these new truths and the lurking hope that by conquering nature in all her forms and by discovering her laws he might use them to control

his own fate. The climax of a century of unparalleled scientific advance was the paradox that while greater understanding brought ample grounds for humility of spirit and a sense of helplessness, it brought also reasons for pride and hope. If the nineteenth century ended in 1914, it ended here, as in other respects, with a very large mark of interrogation. The famous statue of *The Thinker*, by the French sculptor Auguste Rodin, is a fitting symbol of the age.

The Study of History and Economics. Of all social studies, the two that developed most fruitfully in these years by absorbing the spirit rather than the jargon and analogies of modern science were history and economics. If Darwin was right, if Marx was even partly right, then it was important to study man's past. Historicism was the natural outcome of the new ideas. The cult of "scientific historiography," which had begun with von Ranke and his counterparts in other countries,¹¹ bore fruit by the end of the century in attempts to synthesize the mass of detailed research and specialized monographs, and to make their conclusions available to all. This led to an approach to history which was embodied, if not embalmed, in such co-operative or "synthetic" histories as the great series of *Medieval and Modern Histories*, and the *History of English Literature*, published by the Cambridge University Press. Teams of scholars contributed chapters on their own special fields of study. Mandell Creighton, Bishop of Oxford, stated the theory on which the series was compiled in his introduction to the first volume of the *Cambridge Modern History* when it appeared in 1902. He argued that "Every period and every subject has features of its own which strike the mind of the student who has made that period or subject the field of his investigations. . . . Round some definite nucleus, carefully selected, these impressions can be gathered together; and the age can be presented as speaking for itself." This method, it was believed, would eliminate personal bias or preconceived notions, and "allow the subject-matter to supply its own unifying principle." The snare of the argument came in selecting "the nucleus," which in fact was provided in the scheme for the whole work devised by the liberal Catholic, Lord Acton, in many ways a disciple of the Göttingen school of historians adorned by von Ranke. Acton thought in predominantly political terms and according to very definite moral opinions about the nature of history. The expectation that the result would be objectively scientific was an illusion, though as a work of reference and a source of factual knowledge it was to remain in wide use for some fifty years. Even biography became syndicated in the vast *Dictionary of National Biography* edited by Leslie Stephen. In opposition to such a trend, and as an advocate of the humanistic value of history as a form of literature, George Macaulay Trevelyan attracted a

¹¹ See p. 260.

wider public and more general support. In 1913, asserting that Clio was still a Muse, he noted that "History as literature has a function of its own, and we suffer to-day from its atrophy."

Throughout Europe, in contrast with the cult of detached objectivity in the writing of history, historians became caught up in the ecclesiastical, national, and political controversies of the time. The study of ecclesiastical history was greatly stimulated by the growth of ultramontanism under Pius IX,¹² and in Germany Ignaz von Döllinger led the liberal Catholic attack against papal claims. In each country national histories abounded, and if they showed traces of a scientific insistence on accuracy and verification of facts, they were also as a rule cast in the mold of national outlook and nationalistic assumptions. In France, Jean Jaurès, continuing the political traditions of Lamartine, Thiers, and Guizot, produced the beginnings of his avowedly socialist history (*Histoire socialiste*) of the French Revolution. It was acclaimed by no less an authority than the great historian Aulard as "a work of scientific inspiration and of scientific execution." If the historical work written in these years seldom shed completely the flavor of contemporary controversies, at its best it attained a standard of erudition, documentation, and scholarly judgment that was a triumph for the new methods of exact and precise scholarship. The stimulus to reassessment and investigation of the ancient world which came from the advances in archaeology, epigraphy, and kindred studies, and of the medieval world from access to documents and improved techniques of paleography, came in modern history from a more systematic collation of sources and a more discriminating verification of alleged facts. It came also from an increasing concern with social movements, economic processes, and changes in the actual functioning of political institutions. In Britain, Sidney and Beatrice Webb examined the history of co-operative movements, trade unions, local government, and poor relief; William Cunningham founded a systematic approach to economic history; Thorold Rogers used statistical methods to reveal changes in prices and wages; John and Barbara Hammond began their famous series of studies of working-class life in the earlier nineteenth century; Frederick William Maitland brought a lawyer's mind and a humanist's sympathies to the historical study of governmental institutions. Britain enjoyed a veritable renaissance of historical scholarship, less thunderous but perhaps more lasting than the German.

In every country an awakened interest in history, and a stimulus to its presentation in more popular and assimilable form, sprang from the growth of popular education, which called for more good textbooks; from the spread of literacy, which prompted the publication of cheap series of short studies by reputable historians; and from a general concern

¹² See p. 293.

with social and economic problems which could be explained only in historical terms. The legal and institutional emphasis of older histories began to be thought inadequate; the untilled fields of economic and social history demanded fresh techniques. When the historical approach to all things was becoming more and more prevalent, these shifts in emphasis had a far-reaching effect. The proliferation of such studies as sociology and economics demanded a foundation of historical knowledge which only professional historians could provide. In Germany Max Weber and Werner Sombart studied sociologically the development of modern capitalism. In Switzerland Jakob Burckhardt wrote his classical study of *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* in 1869, and revealed a new scope for historiography. In Italy Guglielmo Ferrero studied ancient and recent history in an anti-Carlylean spirit. In France a galaxy of historians headed by Ernest Lavisse, Alfred Rambaud, Gabriel Hanotaux, and Alphonse Aulard rewrote French history with special concentration on the history of the French Revolution. Everywhere archivists were busy collecting and classifying, and the professional historian suffered not from a scarcity but from an embarrassing bulk and variety of materials for the widened scope of his studies. Fuller understanding of the past became a continuing concern of European scholarship.

Economics, which Thomas Carlyle had christened "the dismal science," became if not more cheerful at least more scientific. Enjoying like the historians a vastly greater bulk of more reliable sources and improved techniques for handling them, the economists in many countries raised the study to a new level of significance and of usefulness. Just as Marx in writing *Das Kapital* (of which the first volume appeared in 1867, the remaining volumes by 1895) was able to draw upon the mass of official reports, surveys, and statistics compiled in mid-Victorian England, so his successors were able to use an ever-increasing bulk of statistical material. The evolution of large-scale business organization and of great schemes of insurance developed fresh techniques of accountancy and of statistical method.

Economists as a professional class began to secure greater influence and prestige, and nowhere more than in Germany. In the 1870's the "Socialists of the Chair" (*Kathedersozialisten*) led a revolt against laissez-faire economics and a demand for state intervention in social problems. They included conservative economists like Adolf Wagner; liberals like Lujo Brentano, who studied British trade unionism, and Adolf Held, who studied English social history. In 1872 more than a hundred and fifty economists met at Eisenach to discuss "the social question," and the following year they formed the most important organization of social scientists in Germany, the Association for Social Policy (*Verein für Sozialpolitik*), which survived until 1934. Its original purpose was to press for social legislation, but when this had been largely fulfilled

by Bismarck, it continued as a learned society promoting the scientific study of economics and social problems.

In France economists were mainly divided on the similar issue of state intervention in economic life, especially as regards protectionism, and there too they formed professional organizations. Paul Louis Cauwès, whose *Course of Political Economy* (*Cours d'économie politique*) first appeared in 1878, became the leading exponent of state action and furnished the chief economic arguments for the protectionists who passed the Méline tariffs of 1892. He founded the *Société d'économie nationale* and wrote for the *Revue d'économie politique*. But the tradition of liberal economics died hard in France, as in Britain, and Cauwès was opposed by Frédéric Passy of the rival *Société d'économie politique*, by Gustave de Molinari, and by the politically influential Léon Say. In critical opposition to both these doctrinaire groups there emerged a third which was more opportunistic and detached, led by Charles Gide whose important *Cours d'économie politique* appeared in 1909. There were comparable tendencies in Britain, symbolized by the ascendancy of the teaching of Alfred Marshall, whose standard work on the *Principles of Economics* appeared in 1890, and by Sidney Webb's foundation in 1895 of the London School of Economics and Political Science. In Germany, France, and Britain the modern science of economics was evolving.

Learning and Literature. All learning, indeed, was becoming increasingly institutionalized. A development of these years which was of incalculable importance for all learning, whether scientific or humanistic, was the transformation of old universities and the founding of many new ones. In Britain it was a time comparable with the Renaissance in its prolific extension of new facilities for higher learning and education. In the England of 1871 there existed only the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and the universities of Durham (since 1832), London (since 1836), and Manchester (since 1851). By 1914 there had been added five more civic universities at Birmingham (1900), Liverpool (1903), Leeds (1904), Sheffield (1905), and Bristol (1909), as well as the University of Wales (1893) and half a dozen university colleges. In addition the older universities had been thrown open to others than Anglicans in 1871 and reorganized in the subsequent decades, and special colleges for women had been established in Oxford, Cambridge, and London. In the Netherlands, Amsterdam acquired a new state university in 1877 and a new Calvinist university in 1905. Portugal founded two new universities in 1911, at Lisbon and Oporto. Although France and Germany had developed their university systems before 1870, these years saw great extensions of other institutions of higher learning such as technical high schools, scientific institutes, and academies of the arts. Learning was being institutionalized and subsidized more extensively than ever before, and it was made available to many more people.

The most striking feature of the literature of the period was its preoccupation with social and national problems in all their complexity, with social criticism and the impact of new ideas on human problems. There was little new in the concern of nineteenth-century novelists and poets with social and national problems. As already seen, there were close affinities between the romantic movement and the nationalist and social-revolutionary movements in the first half of the century. With Balzac and Hugo, Dickens and Tolstoi, social criticism as a function of the novelist had become an honorable and well-established tradition. But the concern of literature with the predicaments of man in society was now greatly deepened, became more widespread throughout the countries of Europe, and spread from the novel to the drama.

The great mid-century tradition of Russian literature was continued by Leo Tolstoi and Feodor Dostoevski; in France, Balzac and Flaubert were succeeded in their naturalism and social criticism by Émile Zola and Anatole France; in Britain, Dickens and Thackeray were followed by Thomas Hardy and George Meredith, whose *Diana of the Crossways* (1885) first won him a wide public. The dramatist who towered above all others in Europe was the Norwegian, Henrik Ibsen. His attacks on bourgeois hypocrisy and cramping social conventions began with *Pillars of Society* in 1877 and continued to *When We Dead Awaken* in 1899. Throughout these decades his great plays focused public attention on the social evils of industrial strikes and insanity, on prostitution and the subjection of women, and on psychological problems as they affected human relations. These years preceding the national independence of Norway saw a remarkable flowering of Norwegian culture. Ibsen's contemporaries included the novelist and dramatist Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson and the musician Edvard Grieg, who composed the music for Ibsen's *Peer Gynt* as an opera. Ibsen had a profound influence on the Irish dramatist and social critic, George Bernard Shaw, whose plays had by 1914 won a reputation that was to make him Ibsen's successor as the pre-eminent European dramatist. This was the great age of the Irish Literary Theatre, Dublin, where even before Shaw such dramatists as W. B. Yeats, George Moore, and Douglas Hyde began a veritable renaissance of Celtic culture. It was the Irish counterpart to the reawakening of nationally conscious culture in Scandinavia and the Balkans. The poems of Yeats and later the plays of J. M. Synge continued the movement, resting like musical revivals of other countries on ancient legends and folk songs, mystical and sadly nostalgic in tone and often intensely and delicately beautiful.

Next to social criticism the writers of the time were preoccupied with various futuristic aspects of the new science. Often the two were combined, as in the spate of scientific utopias depicted by so many of the novelists. Samuel Butler, influenced by Darwinism and psychology,

produced *Erewhon* in 1872. It was in effect a satire on contemporary thought. There followed in quick succession from America, Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1887) and Laurence Gronlund's *Co-operative Commonwealth* (1884); and from Britain, William Morris's *News from Nowhere* (1891) and H. G. Wells's *War of the Worlds* (1898)—all socialistic in tendency, and all concerned with the imaginary consequences of scientific progress. The Austrian, Theodor Hertzka in 1890 produced another such novel which enjoyed popularity and influence on the continent, *Freiland, ein soziales Zukunftsbild*. It described the founding of a socialist colony in equatorial Africa. Other novels were concerned with science fiction for its own sake, devoid of social criticism, in the tradition begun in the 1870's by the Frenchman, Jules Verne, whose fanciful *Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea* won immense popularity. In Britain the chief exponent of this genre before 1914 was H. G. Wells, and the first of a long series, *The Time Machine*, came out in 1895. At a still more popular level of fiction the detective story began to replace to a great extent the older ghost or mystery story. Depending for its appeal on logical deduction and modern scientific police methods, the vogue for detective fiction was firmly established for at least half a century to come by Arthur Conan Doyle's famous stories of Sherlock Holmes, which first began to appear in the 1880's.

Most of the realistic literature of the time which was not sociological was psychological. Émile Zola traced through a score of novels the case history of a degenerating French family; Björnson described the psychological effects of heredity and environment; Thomas Hardy showed the fateful working out of psychological conflicts in the English countryside; Samuel Butler joined the same trend in *The Way of All Flesh* (1903). Ibsen and Chekhov put similar psychological dramas on to the stage. But these sometimes over-sophisticated or morose works appealed less widely than the contemporary versions of traditional adventure stories. Old romance gained a new realism in Robert Louis Stevenson, Bret Harte, Pierre Loti, and Rudyard Kipling—all marking the contacts of European civilization with remote and exotic parts of the earth. It may have been the new blending of familiar types of romantic adventure with topical and tropical circumstances of setting that helped to bring such writers a very large public. In receiving so warmly writers of this high caliber popular taste before 1914 showed that it by no means lacked discrimination. The masses were less introspective, less prone to *fin-de-siècle* cynicism or pessimism, than some of the artistic creations of the intelligentsia might lead one to suppose. They still showed robust enjoyment of a good yarn, which writers of high quality were providing in unusual abundance.

Music and Painting. Germany, so prolific in scientific discovery and in learning, contributed disappointingly little to European literature and

arts. None of her dramatists, poets, or novelists of these years attained European stature, with the two exceptions of Gerhart Hauptmann whose play *Die Weber* (1892) handled mass psychology in a way that attracted wider attention, and Thomas Mann, whose great novel *Buddenbrooks* appeared in 1901. German writers received from Russia and Scandinavia the impulse toward naturalism and social criticism, but they wrote mostly for home consumption, and most of them lacked literary greatness. It was in music—where cultural tradition in Germany was strongest—that she most held her own. Richard Wagner lived until 1883, and enjoyed immense European importance. Like Nietzsche in philosophy, he represented a peculiarly Germanic revolt against western traditions. In Franz Liszt and Johannes Brahms the creative genius of German music showed itself at its best, and in these years Richard Strauss began his long musical career. German culture centered as much on Austria as on the *Reich*. Brahms spent most of his musical life in Vienna; Liszt was born in Hungary of an Austrian mother and a Hungarian father.

In music as in literature France was prolific in genius. With Massenet and Saint-Saëns, César Franck, Gabriel Fauré, and Claude Debussy, appeared an unrivaled galaxy of younger composers in all the main musical forms. Italy sustained something of her great operatic tradition with the work of Pietro Mascagni, whose *Cavalleria Rusticana* was first performed in 1890; Ruggiero Leoncavallo, whose *Pagliacci* won equal popularity immediately after; and above all Giacomo Puccini, whose operatic heroines Manon, Mimi, Tosca, and Madame Butterfly acquired European fame. Russia, too, continued traditions of past greatness through the works of Tchaikovsky, Rimski-Korsakov, Rachmaninoff, Scriabin, and Glazounov. No less striking a feature than the perpetuation of German, French, Italian, and Russian traditions was an unusually wide diffusion of musical genius among all the nations of Europe.

Everywhere composers found inspiration, as did the Irish dramatists and poets, in the folklore and songs of their native lands. They seemed to draw creative vitality from a new national consciousness. In Britain, there were Frederick Delius, Edward Elgar, Gustav Holst, and Ralph Vaughan Williams; in Finland, Jean Sibelius; in Poland, Jan Paderewski; in Bohemia, Bedřich Smetana and Anton Dvořák; in Hungary, Béla Bartók; in Norway, Grieg; in Spain, Manuel de Falla and Enrique Granados. It was the happiest outcome of the intensification of national consciousness in Europe before 1914. The musical counterpart to the great efflorescence of popular fiction of high quality was the international fame acquired by the light music and operettas of the Frenchman, Jacques Offenbach, and the Austrian, Johann Strauss; and the enduring (though less international) appeal of the comic operas of W. S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan, which established themselves as a permanent part

of English life from 1875 onward. Music, like literature, had a broad and democratic basis, and this is no less meaningful for the historian of European culture than the rapidly changing styles and fashions in the more esoteric forms of these arts.

In all these ways the texture of European culture between 1870 and 1914 was woven on a pattern closely representative of current trends in political, social, and intellectual life. Novelists, dramatists, and musicians wrote for a receptive public both national and European. Their themes were within the comprehension of a wide public; their purposes were didactic or critical; their modes of expression were suited to a cultivated public taste. Literature concerned itself with social criticism and with scientific ideas. Both literature and music were rooted in established national traditions and were in tune with national consciousness. The broad tendency was toward the engagement of artists, as of men of learning, in the spiritual and human conflicts of the age. But at the same time there set in a strong reaction against all such "engagement." Many artists became more introspective, more insistent that art should be separated from political and social interests, even from moral considerations. Pure aestheticism, or the doctrine of "art for art's sake," became a cult. This reaction can be discerned in poetry and music, but it manifested itself most clearly in painting, an art in which France led Europe. A brilliant school of "impressionists" succeeded now to the strong romantic movement in painting established before 1870 by such artists as Eugène Delacroix, to the realism of Gustave Courbet and Honoré Daumier, and to the landscape painting of Camille Corot. It was led by Édouard Manet, Claude Monet, and Auguste Renoir. A painting, they claimed, should be the spontaneous record of the artist's visual impressions. They abandoned the classical emphasis on studied form, and even the romantic emphasis on composition, in favor of the fortuitous compositions and forms of the photographic camera. Being concerned above all with registering an immediate impression of transient beauty, they depicted refractions and reflections of light and shade, the play of light which produces delicate tints of color. When the impressionists held their first exhibition in Paris in 1874, they were regarded as rebels, even charlatans, by the orthodox critics.

Paul Cézanne, though strongly influenced by the impressionists, refused to disregard deliberate composition and architectural form. Others again moved on beyond impressionism into the "expressionist" movement of the Dutchman, Vincent Van Gogh, emphasizing still more absolutely that a picture should reveal the artist's emotions at the moment of painting it. Objective reality was entirely subordinated to the personal emotions and taste of the painter himself. The logic of such an aesthetic theory was that artists must paint regardless of any public, and only to satisfy themselves or at most to please their fellow artists, who alone

might be expected to share their sensitivity. Art would be as entirely divorced from society as it would be divorced from intellectual composition and architectural form. It was an aristocratic, not a democratic, conception. Artistic creation would be the concern of coteries and handfuls of disciples, not a public concern at all; it would share in the sectarianism of the scientists already noted. In the 1880's came the inevitable counter-reaction with the carefully studied composition and lines of Georges Seurat, a style that was to displace impressionism almost completely. But amid the fashion for extremism, this, too, led in the early twentieth century to the cubism of the Spaniard, Pablo Picasso, and the Frenchman, Georges Braque, and to an extremely geometrical style.

Nowhere were the vigor and vitality of France's cultural genius shown to better effect than in the originality and experimentalism of her painters, and in the domination she established over European painting in these decades. Though Van Gogh was Dutch, and Picasso Spanish, both found their cultural homes in France. German painting was mostly content to reflect the contemporary shifts of style in French art, moving from the realism of Adolf Menzel through the impressionism of Max Liebermann to the expressionism of Emil Nolde. At no point did it assert a real initiative or rival the supremacy of the French. In poetry the revival of symbolism with Paul Verlaine and Stéphane Mallarmé manifested the same revolt against conventionality and form, the same quest for greater freedom and individuality of expression. In drama Maurice Maeterlinck reflected a similar trend. Here, by 1914, were the counterparts in art and literature to the trends already described in politics, science, philosophy, and social thought: the disorientation of traditional standards and values, the contrasts between an extreme collectivism and an equally extreme individualism.

It was fitting that a Frenchman, Maurice Barrès, should symbolize the final dilemma of European culture in 1914, just as the French sculptor Rodin symbolized its ultimate mark of interrogation. Barrès wrote two great series of novels. The first, between 1888 and 1891, was christened *The Cult of Self* (*Le Culte du Moi*); the second, between 1897 and 1909, was called *The Novel of National Energy* (*Le Roman de l'énergie nationale*). In psychological analysis and in style he was a pure individualist; in tendency he was a devotee of extreme nationalism. Individual egotism led to national egotism. If personal experience was to be the sole inspiration of thought and action, that experience led remorselessly to acute awareness of roots in time and place, in race and nation. That so many men had to make this spiritual pilgrimage and arrived at the same destination was the most distinctive feature of European culture in 1914.

PART *IX*

IMPERIAL
RIVALRIES
AND
INTER-
NATIONAL
ALLIANCES
1871-1914

19. The Eastern Question

20. Colonial Expansion and Rivalry

21. The System of Alliances



THE SETTLEMENT OF 1871, which redrew the map of central Europe, left, apparently intact, the three sprawling dynastic empires of eastern Europe—Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. It was in one sense completed by events a few years later. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was in essentials a resumption of the Crimean War and but the fifth in the series of such wars since 1768.¹ It was concluded, like the Crimean War, by a general congress of the major European powers, held at Berlin in 1878. The ensuing settlement involved a further demolition of the Ottoman Empire and a new assertion of the immediate interests and ambitions of Germany and Great Britain in the tangled “Eastern Question.” It also brought Russia back into European diplomacy as an integral factor in the international balance of power. Henceforth diplomacy involved all the six great powers in delicate systems of alliances which, manipulated at first by Bismarck to ensure German security against France, ended by embroiling all the powers in war. The grand designs of big-power diplomacy were complicated by two other elements in the situation: the restless nationalist aspirations of the peoples of the Balkans and the eastern marchlands, and the overseas rivalries of the great powers themselves for possession of colonial lands. Behind these political and diplomatic entanglements lay the economic realities of a shifting relative strength in industrial production, trade, investment, and population.² It was all these developments, in combination and interaction, which created the crisis of 1914.

The key to the understanding of international affairs between 1871 and 1914 is the way in which local conflicts, in eastern Europe or overseas, brought about a long sequence of subtle shifts in the attitudes and priorities of policy among the great powers of Europe. The stage for this drama was set by the “League of the Three Emperors” (*Dreikaiserbund*) of 1873. Until 1875 the prime danger to the peace of Europe seemed to be a recurrence of war between France and Ger-

¹ See p. 226.

² See p. 347.

many. Recovering fast under the adroit leadership of Thiers, France tried to break through the diplomatic isolation that had brought about her ruin in 1870. Bismarck, accordingly, worked to preserve that isolation. Since Britain needed little encouragement to keep out of formal alliances, he was free to concentrate on remaking the old triple alignment of the "three Northern courts" of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, which had first appeared in 1815 as the "Holy Alliance";³ it had been weakened by the events of 1848-49,⁴ but Bismarck saw that it could now profitably be resumed. The others were willing. After 1870 the Habsburg emperor Francis Joseph gave up all hope of regaining Austrian hegemony in Germany, or of making an alliance with republican France. Austrian foreign policy was in the hands of the self-confident Magyar aristocrat, Count Andr ssy, who wanted alliance with Bismarck against Russia. Alexander II of Russia was anxious for a general demonstration of conservative solidarity of the dynastic empires and, being frightened of German-Austrian combination against him, he, too, was ready to enter into some alignment with Germany. Given Austro-Russian rivalries and tension in the Balkans, Bismarck saw that what could best bring both governments into line with Germany was a "League of the Three Emperors." This he achieved in 1873. It was a fragile alliance, ostensibly devoted to upholding conservative principles and to keeping the peace in Europe, but in reality a useful device for keeping France in diplomatic isolation in the west and attempting to ease Austro-Russian rivalries in the east. It was incapable of surviving a sharp challenge on either front, but it served well enough for its temporary purpose.

In 1875 it received its first challenge in the scare of another war between France and Germany. France would have liked most alliance with both Britain and Russia. This aim seemed checkmated because to Disraeli, whose conservative ministry succeeded Gladstone's in 1874, Russia was the greatest menace to British security in the East. Since the Suez Canal had been opened in 1869, Britain was more than ever anxious to keep open the near-eastern route to India and the Far East. From Canning and Palmerston had descended the policy of checking

³ See p. 76.

⁴ See p. 218.

Russian pressure on Turkey and the Balkans. Russia's repudiation in 1870 of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris ⁸ had reawakened such anxieties in Britain. There was therefore no immediate hope of allying with Britain and Russia at the same time, and France had to choose; but, given British detachment and the *Dreikaiserbund*, had she any choice at all? By 1875 she still found herself isolated in Europe. The purpose of her conservative foreign minister, Decazes, was to bait Bismarck into indiscretions that might turn Europe, and especially Britain, against him. During 1875 several minor incidents accumulated into a diplomatic crisis. When Bismarck sent a special envoy to St. Petersburg in February, the French feared it meant preparation for an attack. When, next month, he forbade the export of horses from Germany, it was interpreted as real evidence of war preparations. In April the German press published articles on the theme "Is war in sight?" and the French could claim more plausibly that Bismarck was planning war. When his envoy indiscreetly defended the doctrine of preventive war, both the British and Russians took fright and warned Bismarck against the idea. He protested that it was all a false alarm, and the crisis blew over. But it had revealed, in silhouette, a possible alignment of France, Britain, and Russia against him: a Bismarckian nightmare that was to take solid shape in the end, but a whole generation later. Meanwhile, international relations were dominated by the Eastern Question and by colonial rivalries.

⁸ See pp. 225 and 293.

CHAPTER 19

THE EASTERN QUESTION

Ferment in the Balkans

ONLY two months after the alarm of May, 1875, a further crisis appeared in the east, which confronted all the powers with a new phase of the century-old "Eastern Question." The main features of that complex problem have already been outlined.¹ The new phase began, as usual, with a rising of the empire's subject peoples, and they were encouraged, as usual, by the rival powers of Austria and Russia. Habsburg interest in the Balkans, never absent, had been sharpened by desire to recover in southeastern Europe prestige that had been lost in Italy and Germany. Russian interest, likewise continuous, was intensified by evidences of Austrian interest. Accordingly, risings against Turkey in Herzegovina on the Adriatic coast in July, 1875, in Macedonia in September, and in Bosnia, to the north of Herzegovina, by the end of the year, all invited the attention of both Austria and Russia. By the middle of the following year full-scale revolts raged in these provinces and throughout the Bulgarian areas south of the Danube; and the Turks were engaged in suppressing them by the familiar methods of massacre and atrocity. While in Britain Gladstone denounced the pro-Turkish policy of Disraeli, a mob in Constantinople deposed the sultan Abdul-Aziz and replaced him by Murad V. When the Turkish government suspended payment of interest on its large foreign debts, it attracted the hostile attention of investors in France and Britain. The two small principalities of Serbia and Montenegro went to war against the Sultan, still nominally their suzerain, in support of the rebels in the neighboring territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It became evident that the "Eastern Question" was once again erupting in a way likely to embroil the whole of the Balkans. In August, 1876, Murad was in turn deposed by another palace revolution and succeeded by his crafty and unscrupulous brother, Abdul-Hamid II.

The powers of Europe reacted, at first, in characteristic manner.

¹ See pp. 117, 220, and 312.

Russia planned to bring about the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and so open her own path to the Balkans (*see* Map 8). Bismarck's anxiety was to prevent any open breach between his two partners, and so he was willing to serve as an "honest broker" in settling the Eastern Question. If the Turkish Empire, as he believed, was doomed to dissolve, then he wanted it dissolved by joint agreement of the powers. Austria wavered between anxious fears of Russian aims in the Balkans, which prompted her to back Turkey, and willingness to accept a limited and negotiated partition from which she could herself gain territories. France still nursed hopes of revenge against Germany, which were moderated only by fears that Bismarck might decide upon a preventive war to check French recovery. Although her investments in Turkey accounted for anxieties about Turkish collapse, she was averse to any direct engagement in the Eastern Question. The British government led by Disraeli gave first priority to preventing Russian expansion into the Balkans, but it was inclined to hesitate between regarding a bolstered Turkish Empire or strong national states as the best choice of buttress. Disraeli (who had recently bought for Britain from the khedive of Egypt a large portion of the stock in the Suez Canal) favored support for Turkey. By either means, the route to India was to be kept open; but if rearrangements of Turkey were to be made by international agreement, Disraeli was resolved to be present at the negotiations.

Crisis in Turkey. After the installation of Abdul-Hamid II in August, 1876, the course of events passed through three crises, each in turn involving larger issues for the powers. The first came in September when the army of the new Sultan, under its unusually efficient general, Osman Pasha, inflicted upon the Serbians a reverse so severe that Serbia sought the intervention of the powers. Faced with demands from Russia, the Sultan agreed that terms of peace should be settled by an international conference to meet in Constantinople in December. There Germany mediated between Austria and Russia, and various proposals for redrawing the Balkan map were agreed upon. The Sultan, in time-honored fashion, catered for the susceptibilities of the west by proclaiming a new liberal constitution, and then rejected these proposals of the powers. But Russia, intent on pursuing her policy of dismemberment, struck a bargain with Austria. In return for undertaking to respect the independence of Serbia and Montenegro, and offering Austria a free hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina, she gained Austrian promises that she could have a free hand in Rumania and Bulgaria. A month after Serbia had made peace with the Ottoman Empire, Russia declared war on it and precipitated a fresh crisis.


The Russo-Turkish War of April, 1877, quickly brought in other Balkan states. Rumania joined Russia in May, Serbia reverted to war against Turkey in December, and Bulgarian irregulars supported Russia.

Montenegro remained at war with Turkey, as she had been since June, 1876. By the beginning of 1878 Russian forces had taken Sofia and were advancing on Constantinople. The Turks asked for an armistice, and made peace in the Treaty of San Stefano in March. They undertook to recognize the independence of Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and a greatly enlarged Bulgaria; to cede to Rumania the area of Dobruja south of the delta of the Danube, and to Russia a few towns in the Caucasus; to destroy the Danube fortifications and pay a war indemnity; and to carry out reform of the administration in Bosnia and other areas. The treaty aroused all the inevitable jealousies and disappointments. Rumania, Serbia, and Greece resented the rise of Bulgaria. Austria and Britain feared that Russia would dominate the new Slav state of Bulgaria in the very heart of the Balkans. They pressed Russia to submit the settlement to a congress of the powers, and again it was Bismarck, ruler of the most disinterested power but with an overriding interest in reconciling his two partners of the *Dreikaiserbund*, who was the obvious choice as "honest broker." Accordingly, the congress met in Berlin in June, 1878, attended by Russia, Turkey, Austria, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.

The Congress of Berlin, 1878. The Congress of Berlin, third episode in this phase of the Eastern Question, was significant more for its effects on the alignments of the great powers than for its efforts to "settle" the fate of Turkey. Rumania, enhanced by addition of part of the Dobruja, and Serbia and Montenegro, less handsomely augmented, were all reaffirmed in their independence as sovereign states. Russia was allowed to take, as she had stipulated at San Stefano, the few Turkish towns and to reclaim from Rumania Bessarabia, which she had forfeited in 1856. But the projected state of Bulgaria was cut back in size, by exclusion of Rumelia and Macedonia. Bulgaria, thus reduced, was declared to be "an autonomous and tributary Principality under the Suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan," and was to have "a Christian Government and a national militia." Rumelia and Macedonia were restored to more direct Turkish rule, the former being confusingly described as "an autonomous province of the Turkish Empire." Austria was allowed to oc-

MAP 8. DISSOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1699-1914

The decline of the Ottoman Turkish Empire dated from 1699, when it lost Hungary to Austria. By 1815 Russia had also annexed the areas around the Crimea. By 1830 its Balkan territories (Serbia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Greece) were winning national independence, and France had begun the partition of its loosely held North African possessions by conquering Algeria (see inset). By 1914 the whole of the Balkans had broken away and the whole of North Africa had fallen under the colonial control of the European powers, leaving the Empire cut back to the black-shaded area. By 1923, when a Turkish Republic was set up, the Arabian states had also been lost (see also Maps 16 and 17).



cupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. Britain appropriated the island of Cyprus, and France was placated by being promised a free hand in Turkey's north African territory of Tunisia. Only Germany and Italy left the congress without territorial gains. It became abundantly clear that the "concert of Europe," as now conducted, sacrificed the nationalist aspirations of all Balkan peoples to the avarice and rivalries of the great powers. It was more than ever certain that the Balkan volcano would erupt again in the near future. That Turkey's "friends" should thus despoil her of territory so much more than her "enemies" was a warning she was to remember; and as soon as the Sultan had duly torn up the new constitution, he set about reorganizing his army with the help of German military experts. If Germany thereby gained a new and useful ally for the future, the immediate effect of the crisis was to leave the international scene less favorable to Bismarck's plans. His ally Russia now nursed a profound grievance, not only against his other ally Austria, but against Germany herself. The *Dreikaiserbund* had been badly strained at Berlin, and France had been shown that she might yet make an ally out of Russia. For Bismarck the main lesson was that Austria-Hungary now held the key position in his diplomacy. The forces of insurgent nationalism in the Balkans necessarily involved Austria; she could not countenance the progress of movements which were bound to have disruptive effects within her own territories, and which at the same time opened the Balkans to Russian influence. To keep Austria-Hungary as his foremost ally, Bismarck henceforward had to concern himself more continuously with the Eastern Question—and any overt backing of either of his partners must inevitably alienate the other.

The settlement reached at the Congress of Berlin had the remarkable outcome that it left each power dissatisfied and more anxious than before. It was a defeat for Russian prestige. Britain had sent a fleet through the Dardanelles in 1878 as a reminder of her interests in Turkey, and the crumbling of Turkey now left Russia face-to-face with Britain in the Near East. Austria-Hungary, too, had patently failed if her real interest lay in keeping the Ottoman Empire strong; as also had Disraeli, despite his boast of "peace with honor" and the acquisition of Cyprus. In general Britain, however, had asserted and reinforced her naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean and the Straits, and France had opened new doors for her diplomacy of recovery and her future policy of colonialism. Territorial gains, such as Russia's recovery of Bessarabia and Austria's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were of little profit if the legacy of enflamed, frustrated Balkan nationalism was to continue to embroil all the powers in further crises and wars. International tension was increased, not eased, by the events of these years. The new balance of power, now clearly centered on Germany, was destined to preserve the peace for another whole generation. But it was doomed to be a most uneasy and

unstable peace, subject to recurrent crises and threats of war. The next general European congress met forty years later not in Berlin but in Paris—and at it were to be no representatives of the *Dreikaiserbund*.

Bulgaria. The new storm center of the Eastern Question had been indicated clearly enough in 1878: it was Bulgaria. There hardy peasants had seen their new enlarged state truncated as soon as it had been set up. They looked favorably upon their Russian protectors only until it was clear that Alexander intended to fill all public offices with Russians and to impose on Bulgaria a constitution designed to produce a deadlock that Russia could exploit. In 1879 they elected as king Alexander of Battenberg, a nephew of the Tsarina and a gallant, well-meaning young man who, if he did not speak Bulgar, was sufficiently German by birth and training to be hostile to Russia. In 1881 he first gained personal power by suspending the constitution and so freeing himself from the hostility of the Bulgarian parliament (*Sobranje*), with its nationalist and anti-Russian majority. Two years later, when he resolved to resist further Russian domination, he restored the constitution and played off nationalists and parliament against the Russians. These symptoms of independence won British support, and British policy began to see in a strong Bulgaria a more reliable barrier to Russia than a disintegrating Ottoman Empire. This marked an important turn in international affairs. It made possible a synthesis of the policies of both political parties in Britain, for it meant supporting Balkan nationalism (which the Liberals favored) in order to withstand Russian pressure (which the Conservatives had always advocated).

This shift of policy proved important in 1885. Eastern Rumelia, the southeastern strip of Bulgaria which had been taken away in 1878 and declared "an autonomous province of the Turkish Empire," demanded reunion with Bulgaria under Prince Alexander. The union was achieved by a *coup* in the Rumelian capital, which was approved of by Alexander and the *Sobranje*. This defiance of both Turkey and Russia would have precipitated another war had not Britain restrained Turkey from protesting against her loss of suzerainty over Rumelia. Alexander III (who had succeeded to the tsardom in 1881) hesitated to coerce Bulgaria, which Russia had presented to Europe as her protégé. The crisis was caused once again by the mutual jealousies of the Balkan nations themselves. Serbia, always jealous of Bulgaria's rise and guided by her irresponsible King Milan, suddenly declared war on Bulgaria in November, 1885. Despite the Serbians' advantages of experience, training, and tactical surprise, they were hurled back in defeat after a desperate three-day battle. Austria, as protector of Serbia, intervened to force an armistice on Bulgaria, and in 1886 peace was signed.

Bulgaria now held Eastern Rumelia, and had asserted her power in the Balkans. Yet later that year Alexander was forced to abdicate, and six

months afterward another German prince, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, replaced him on the Bulgarian throne. This prince was a descendant of Louis Philippe of France and was related to Queen Victoria of England. He was therefore regarded by Russia as virtually a candidate of the western powers, but again the Tsar had to accept virtual defeat and restrain himself from intervening. What stabilized Ferdinand on his new throne was partly his own astuteness and patience, partly the backing of the most influential man in the country, Stambulov, who held sway for the next eight years. The son of an innkeeper and an ardent patriot, Stambulov carried out enlightened reforms and public works by strong-arm ruthless methods. He improved agriculture and encouraged industry, built roads and railroads and schools, and gave Bulgaria more efficient administration than she had known before. But he silenced opponents by imprisonment and terror, and eventually overplayed his hand. In 1894 Ferdinand made him resign and two years later signed a pact with Russia. Thereafter Bulgaria remained on terms of friendly independence with Russia, and consolidated both her economic progress and her means of national defense.

Internationally, the Bulgarian crisis of the 1880's contributed to the further shifting of power relationships in Europe. In December, 1887, Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy made an agreement about the Near East. They agreed to keep the peace and the *status quo*, ensuring freedom of the Straits, Turkish authority in Asia Minor, and her nominal suzerainty over Bulgaria. The pact was directed entirely against Russian expansion toward Constantinople, and marked the hardening of British policy toward Russia. But after swallowing her reverses over Bulgaria, Russia lost some of her former interest in the Balkans. Though still anxious for security in the Black Sea, she came to pursue other interests in central Asia and the Far East. The prizes offered there were bigger and easier to come by than in the Balkans where Russia had little investment or trade. With a government in Bulgaria after 1894 that was friendly to Russia, she pinned new hopes in the Trans-Siberian railway—then being built with French loans—and the control that it might bring her over China. This easing of Russian pressure in the Near East gave Austria-Hungary some reassurance. So long as King Milan ruled Serbia, Austria-Hungary had a reliable and economically dependent satellite of her own in the Balkans. In 1889 Milan abdicated, his popularity undermined by his defeat at Bulgarian hands in 1885. His son and successor, Alexander, in 1894 overthrew the liberal constitution which Milan had introduced the year before his abdication, and revived the old autocratic system of 1869. His high-handed rule lasted another nine years, then in 1903 Alexander and his unpopular queen were assassinated. The rebels called to the throne Prince Peter Karageorgevic, the elderly representative of the royal family which had been exiled since 1858. He ruled Serbia as a con-

stitutional monarch, won recognition from both Austria and Russia, and established the little state among the group of tough, aggressive Balkan kingdoms which were to engage in such violent battles after 1912.

Germany, too, was content enough with the situation that resulted from the Bulgarian crisis. In June, 1887, Bismarck made a "Reinsurance Treaty" with Russia, whereby each promised to remain neutral in any war in which the other became involved, with two exceptions. Russia need not stay neutral if Germany attacked France; Germany need not stay neutral if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. Bismarck also renewed promises of diplomatic support for Russia in Bulgaria and at the Straits. Since 1879 he had been in defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary, and in 1888 he published the text of this treaty in order to show that it was purely defensive. Austria, Hungary, and the German generals were by then pressing upon him the desirability of a preventive war against Russia. As anxious as ever to preserve peace by manipulation of the balance of power, he firmly refused. "I shall not give my consent," he declared, "for a prophylactic war against Russia." But that Germany would, in the last resort, stand by Austria left Russia more anxious to find another ally, which could only be France. The new German emperor, William II, who succeeded to the throne in 1888, favored close alliance with Austria-Hungary and Britain, and outright hostility toward Russia. His profound disagreements with the policies of the old Chancellor led to the resignation of Bismarck in 1890. Henceforth every thread in the tangled skein of diplomacy which Bismarck had woven felt the violent tugs and stresses imposed on it by the new emperor and his imperialistic advisers. Germany, like Russia, became more fully engaged in overseas and colonial ambitions. But Russia made her alliance with France in 1893.²

Armenians and Greeks. During the 1890's two further crises arose out of the intractable "Eastern Question," both concerning Turkish rule over her subject peoples. In 1894 Constantinople was confronted with another revolt, this time among the two million Christian Armenians who lived in the mountainous regions to the north of the city and around the southeastern coasts of the Black Sea. In the settlement of Berlin the powers had exacted a promise that these people, partly peasants and partly well-to-do men of business and trade, would be better treated and given "security against the Circassians and Kurds" who were wont to oppress them. From 1890 onward the Armenians, convinced not unreasonably that such reforms would never be carried out unless they invoked support from foreign powers, agitated in western states for the grant of national independence. Abdul-Hamid II, reassured by German support and resolved to tolerate no further rising of Balkan nationalities, launched his fanatical Moslem Kurds and other Turkish troops against the Armenians in a series of massacres and atrocities which horrified the powers. Despite

² See p. 491.

loud protests in France and England, the refusal of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany to take any action left the Sultan to complete his work with impunity. This defiance of the west by the allegedly "sick man of Europe" was taken as evidence of his reliance upon German support. When the German emperor visited Constantinople a few years later, he successfully negotiated the Berlin-Baghdad railway project, and Germany gained valuable openings for economic expansion into the Ottoman Empire.

If the newest of the Balkan nationalist movements thus failed tragically, the oldest was prompted to stake its fortunes on open war against Constantinople, and it was to prove more successful. Greece nursed grievances against the Berlin settlement because it had not granted her larger portions of Thessaly and Epirus, to the north. By negotiation with Turkey she gained Thessaly in 1881. In 1896 the island of Crete, which although close to the southern tip of Greece had been left under Turkish rule, broke into open revolt. It had suffered the miseries of a prolonged civil war between Christian majority and Moslem minority, which had been encouraged by the wily Turk. In 1897 the king of Greece yielded to great nationalist clamor and sent a small force to Crete. This gesture was followed by skirmishes on the Greek-Turkish frontier, which forced the Sultan to declare war. The unprepared and ill-equipped Greeks were driven back in a series of decisive defeats and within a month they had to ask for an armistice. The great powers intervened to force Turkey to grant one. Although Greece had to pay a heavy war indemnity and cede a few strategic villages to Turkey, international pressure saved her from further losses. If Greece did not gain Crete, Turkey virtually lost it. Britain, France, Italy, and Russia joined in making the Sultan grant autonomy to the island and withdraw Turkish troops from it. Again, the power which won a war lost the peace; and Prince George of Greece was appointed governor by the four protecting powers, even if he acted nominally "under the suzerainty of the Sultan."

By 1908 it was obvious enough that the Ottoman Empire had crumbled irretrievably. From its Balkan territories had now been carved no fewer than five independent national states—Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria; and former parts of its possessions, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dobruja and Crete, were administered by foreign powers. Every stage in its disintegration had reverberated throughout Europe, enlisting powerful liberal sympathies for oppressed nationalities and embroiling the great powers in dangerous diplomatic crises. Every chancellery in Europe was heartily sick of the sick man of Europe. But he was an unconscionable time in dying, and he still held the vitally strategic area around Constantinople and the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the central Balkan area of Macedonia. The tale, plainly, was not yet finished. In North Africa, too, the Euro-

pean powers had been engaged in stripping the Sultan of his Mediterranean territories of Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt.³ This was the general situation when, in 1908, there took place the "Young Turk" revolution which overthrew Abdul-Hamid II and in its aftermath tempted Turkey's neighbors into still more looting raids.

The Young Turks. This revolution, as already suggested,⁴ was analogous to the revolutionary movement of Russia in 1904-05. The Young Turks were Ottoman patriots, ardent supporters of the process of westernization which Abdul-Hamid II had tried to exclude from his dominions. Events in Russia after 1904 had repercussions in Turkey. They added to the preoccupations of Russia and still further freed the Balkans from Russian pressure; and at the same time many of the younger generation of Turkish noble families were inspired by ideas similar to those held by the liberal intelligentsia of Russia. They had come to realize that successful action against the Sultan lay not in isolated acts of terrorism but in the winning over of part of his armed forces to their cause. Their aim was to revive the abortive liberal constitution of 1876, which the Sultan had unceremoniously discarded as soon as the moment of danger was past. Their "Committee of Union and Progress" carried out intensive propaganda against the "Red Sultan," and by July, 1908, won over the ill-paid and discontented Third Army Corps stationed at Salonica. Aided by the Second Army Corps, they proclaimed the constitution revived and marched on Constantinople. Abdul-Hamid, faced with so formidable a military revolt, overnight converted himself into a full-dress constitutional monarch. He ordered the calling of a national parliament elected on universal male suffrage and stopped all censorship of the press. The abruptness and completeness of his *volte-face* took everyone by surprise, and amid universal rejoicing the Young Turks seized all offices, and elections were held. It seemed, for a time, that Balkan nationalism had come full circle, and to the nationalist zeal of subject peoples had suddenly been added the paradox of an Ottoman nationalism ready to embrace Greeks, Rumanians, Bulgars, and Serbs as brothers.

Power lay now in the hands of the managing committee of the Young Turks, led by Enver Bey. The new assembly lacked any political experience and was used as a rubber stamp for Young Turk measures. Abdul bided his time, mobilizing against the new regime all the forces of conservatism and all who were disappointed with the amateurishness and selfishness of the new rulers. By April, 1909, he was strong enough to head a counterrevolution, which retook Constantinople and overthrew the government. But at Salonica the Committee of Union and Progress rallied the army once more, and retook the capital after five hours of ferocious fighting. This time they made the parliament depose

³ See p. 432.

⁴ See p. 334.

Abdul-Hamid in favor of his younger brother, Mohammed V, and the dreaded "Red Sultan" retired with most of his harem to a comfortable villa in Salonica. Mohammed was the ideal figurehead for Young Turkish rule, reconciling the formalities of legitimist succession with a passive acquiescence in whatever his ministers required. The extent to which the Young Turks were to disappoint liberal and nationalist hopes, and to prove no less brutal and tyrannical toward subject nationalities than their predecessor, soon became apparent. But more important for international relations were the immediate consequences of their weakness.

The first was that Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had hitherto administered under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. This naturally inflamed Serbian nationalist sentiment against her, since these provinces included a million Serbs, and turned Serbia from a semi-client state into a relentless enemy. Ferdinand of Bulgaria at the same time threw off the suzerainty of the Sultan and proclaimed his kingdom completely independent. Both actions were breaches of the Treaty of Berlin and might be expected to evoke strong reactions from the powers which had taken part in that settlement. But they were not the first, and only Russia showed a lively interest in trying to summon another conference of the powers where she probably hoped to get agreement to the free passage of Russian warships through the Straits as compensation for Austria's gains. Britain and France were lukewarm; Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, was opposed to any such conference. None was held. Instead, Turkey was compensated in money for her losses—by Austria-Hungary on her own behalf and by Russia on behalf of Bulgaria, with whom Russia made secret pacts in 1902 and again in 1909. From the whole crisis Bulgaria emerged more closely tied to Russia, Serbia more violently hostile to Austria and therefore by reaction more likely to look to Russia for future support. Once again the acquisition of territory proved a less substantial gain than the winning of reliable allies, and Austria-Hungary was considerably weakened by the new alignments. The pressure that Germany put upon Russia to recognize Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a pressure amounting to virtual threat of war, left Bismarck's League of Three Emperors in ruins. Austria-Hungary and Germany were now bound more closely together, but Russia was finally thrown into the rival camp of France.

The second international consequence of the Young Turk revolution was that in 1911 Italy seized Libya. Within Italy had grown up a nationalist and colonial party, resolved to assert Italy's claim alongside that of France for colonial possessions in North Africa. In the 1880's France had taken Tunisia; Tripolitania was the corresponding strip of coastline south of Italy, and France had long before conceded Italy's claim to it. The Italians occupied the Turkish island of Rhodes and the Dodecanese archipelago, and bombarded the forts on the Dardanelles. In Libya the

Turkish troops withdrew to oases in the interior and refused to make peace. Italy found it expensive to keep both her army and fleet mobilized, and was unprepared for so stubborn a resistance. The war dragged on and might have turned against her had not the outbreak of another war in the Balkans compelled the Turks to cede Tripoli and make peace. Italy acquired little glory from the war, but yet another part of the Ottoman Empire had fallen away.

The Balkan Wars, 1912-13. The Balkan War of 1912 was a third consequence of the Turkish revolution. Nothing but experience of Young Turkish rule could have caused Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgars to unite into the common front of the Balkan League. The war was the crescendo of Balkan nationalism, forced into a common cause by Turkish intransigence and focused by the complex problems of Macedonia. Even the congress of Berlin had not tried to tackle the Macedonian question. This hill country lying between Greece, Albania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, with its port of Salonica on the Aegean Sea, contained national minorities of all its neighbors. Mutual hatreds, combined with Turkish oppression and tactics of "divide and rule," kept the land a prey to every form of banditry and misery. As soon as the more zealously nationalist government of Turkey tried to introduce into the territory such typically western institutions as a common law, a national language, and compulsory military service, it inevitably aroused fierce resentment: resentment among Greeks who cherished their separate law courts, among Arabs and Slavs of all kinds for whom distinctive language was the symbol of nationality, and among every minority which feared that its enlisted troops would be used against national liberties. It was impossible for Turkey to become a nation without surrendering its power over other nationalities, and this the Young Turks refused to do. In this sense, Balkan wars were inevitable, and Macedonia was the predestined bone of contention.

On October 8, 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and within a week Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia did the same. By the end of the month they had defeated every Turkish army in Europe, and now the Turks held only Adrianople, Scutari, and Janina. This rapid collapse took all the powers by surprise, and the clear victory of Balkan nationalism was a disaster for Austria-Hungary. The disintegration of one old dynastic empire now brought comparable tensions in a neighbor wherein lived restless national minorities of some of these victorious Balkan states. But Austria-Hungary was in no position to prevent the collapse. Likewise Russia, dragged back against her inclinations to concern about the Balkans, was averse to taking any preventive action. The victory of the Balkan League produced a strange *volte-face* on the part of each power. Austria-Hungary assumed the unfamiliar role of sponsor of subject peoples by championing the cause of Albanian independence in order to

check Serbian encroachment on the Adriatic. Russia took a firm stand against her former satellite, Bulgaria, to prevent it from seizing Constantinople.

The Eastern Question had lost none of its old capacity for producing the strangest somersaults in the policies of the powers. It now had the most surprising effect of bringing Russia and Austria-Hungary closer together, each to resist a Balkan state's advances; and of making Germany seek co-operation with France and Britain in order to keep Russia out of Constantinople. But France, now led by the vigorously anti-German Raymond Poincaré, refused to jeopardize the Franco-Russian alliance; and Britain was prepared to resist only in a general conference of the powers. The crisis was prevented from running its full course by the failure of the Bulgarians to take Adrianople or to press on to Constantinople; and in December the Balkan League had to make an armistice with Turkey. A conference of ambassadors of the powers met in London under the chairmanship of the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey. It could not undo the results of the war, but it could register them and carry out the Austrian demand, to which Russia agreed, that Albania should also become an independent state. Thus the conference carried still further the triumphs of Balkan nationalism: a reversal of the process at Berlin in 1878. In April, 1913, the powers even acted in concert to impose their joint decisions—if only against the smallest but the most aggressive of all Balkan states, Montenegro. The powers had allocated Scutari to Albania but it was seized by Montenegro. A western naval demonstration forced her to withdraw. In May, 1913, the Treaty of London ended the war and established Albania, though that country's internal condition remained far from settled for decades to come.

The Balkan League immediately broke up, because Serbia had occupied and kept most of Macedonia although the Serbs and Bulgarians captured Adrianople; and the Greeks had similarly taken Salonica and claimed larger stretches of the Aegean coast. Bulgaria, at the end of June, 1913, simultaneously attacked Serbia and Greece, her former allies. This second Balkan War—on the more familiar historical pattern of a conflict between Balkan states—gave the Turks under Enver Bey an opportunity to recover Adrianople and brought in Rumania against Bulgaria in the hope of taking the remainder of the Dobruja which had not been transferred to her in 1878. Against such odds the Bulgarians were helpless and in the Treaty of Bucharest, which they signed with Greece, Serbia, and Rumania in August, they paid a price to everyone. Greece kept southern Macedonia; Serbia, northern Macedonia; and Rumania, the southern Dobruja. Turkey kept Adrianople, which in the Treaty of London had been given to Bulgaria. In this way all four states defied the great powers and ignored the Treaty of London. The powers were hamstrung by their own mutual fears, for they knew that a wider war

would mean Germany and Austria-Hungary ranged on one side, at least France and Russia on the other. That they had come so near the brink of war over the Balkan disputes of 1912-13 made them more than ever conscious of the dangers to which the system of alliances now exposed them.⁵ But the hour for repentance was very late.

The Balkan wars left the international scene more enigmatic than before. No belligerent believed that the decisions about territory would last. Serbia and Montenegro now regarded war against Austria-Hungary, to liberate the Serbs in Bosnia, as inevitable. Bulgaria nursed plans for revenge against her rapacious neighbors, and looked to Turkey and Austria-Hungary as possible allies. Russia, her interest in the Balkans renewed by the evident collapse of Turkey, tended now to side with Serbia and Rumania against Bulgaria. Each state, its appetite whetted by gains or its spirit embittered by losses, remained more warlike than ever. The defiance of the great powers and the contempt for treaties alike deprived them of any expectations of gain or security by any means other than war. For the first time in a generation the never easy relations of the Balkan nations had relapsed into full-scale wars, and these wars had still produced no definitive or accepted settlement. Any resumption of war in this region was more likely to involve even bigger stakes, for neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia could contemplate, without their participation, the final eclipse of Turkey in Europe.

Insurgent Nationalism in Eastern Europe

FOR internal reasons both Russia and Austria-Hungary in these decades were sensitive to whatever happened in the Balkans. This was not merely because both governments pursued foreign policies that intersected in the Balkans, and were concerned with the balance of power in the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas. It was also because the very fabric of these empires rested upon a denial of the forces of nationalism and political independence which were fermenting so violently in the Balkan peninsula. Whether, at any moment, Austria backed or opposed Serbia, whether Russia backed or opposed Bulgaria, depended upon fine calculations of policy which took into account both the international scene and the internal condition of insurgent nationalities. It would be wrong to think of the rivalries of Austria-Hungary and Russia in this region as a battle only for spheres of influence or only for points of strategic defense. They involved both these considerations, but they also involved a domestic necessity to hold together somehow their own polyglot and multinational territories.

The importance of insurgent nationalities along the western fringes

⁵ See p. 504.

of the tsarist empire has already been indicated.⁶ Poles and Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Finns, continued to exert a strong centrifugal pull on the empire after 1870; and the more the regime looked eastward for its expansion, the more these peoples felt that they belonged to the west. Russian policy toward her western nationalities was accordingly one of more intense "Russification," especially under Tsar Alexander III between 1881 and 1894. This policy, begun in Poland after the revolt of 1863, was extended in the 1880's to all the nationalities of the eastern marchlands. It had the effect of turning the most extreme patriots of these national groups toward the Russian Social Revolutionaries, who were thus soon able to establish close links with Activists in Finland, the Social Democratic League in Latvia, Polish Socialists, Armenian Dashnyaks, and Georgian Socialist-Federalists. All these local movements represented radical nationalism. They wanted socialization of the land, to be administered by local elected authorities which would grant land to peasant families on a basis of "labor ownership." They also wanted a high degree of local national autonomy, amounting sometimes to complete independence. The clash between the Russian government's policy of assimilation or Russification and the more militant movements for national autonomy was the central theme in the history of these years. It reached its climax in the revolutionary years 1905-06, and then subsided into a sullen and sultry deadlock until 1914.

Poland. In Poland of the 1870's Russia combined a progressive social policy with a repressive educational policy. The purpose of the first was to split the Polish national ranks by alienating the landowners from the peasants who gained land at low redemption rates; of the second, to crush the teaching of the Polish language and culture. While local government was reformed so as to give greater power to the rural commune and placate the peasants, private Polish schools were forbidden, Russian schools were supported by the state, and religious education by the Catholic Church was impeded. What saved this ambiguous policy from ending in further revolt was the growth of industry and trade within the Polish territories, and with it greater general prosperity. Textiles from Polish mills found their way on to Asiatic markets in Turkey, China, and Persia, even in competition with Russian textiles, and this expansion was encouraged by the Russian government. It hoped to get the support of the prosperous Polish industrial classes against the nationalistic Polish nobility. The policy of killing Polish nationalism by prosperity paid dividends at the turn of the century, when Russia concentrated on expansion in the Far East. This expansion offered fresh opportunities of employment for skilled Polish engineers and managers. At the same time an agricultural depression set in, affecting Poland along with most of the rest of Europe since it was caused chiefly by the competition of

⁶ See p. 309.

grain imports from the New World. Landed estates went bankrupt, and more of the land was bought by the peasants. Landlords were impoverished. Their families found alternative careers blocked by Russians entrenched in the bureaucracy and by Jewish predominance in business and the professions. These changes stimulated a fresh wave of nationalism among the nobility and middle classes, and it was a less romantic and more realistic nationalism than the old. Only in an independent Polish state could the younger Poles of good education, eager for better careers, hope to find opportunities. Russian policy was now reversed, therefore, and tended to favor the landlords against the growing middle class. Constitutional changes such as the introduction of *zemstvo* institutions in 1911 and city councils in 1913 were carried out so as to weight the rural Polish and the Russian elements against the urban Polish and Jewish elements. As a result, by 1914 Polish nationalist sentiment had strongly revived and widened, and any weakening of tsarist rule would clearly lead to more clamorous demands for the resurrection of an independent Polish state.

This inevitably had repercussions in the Polish territories of Austria, especially Galicia, which enjoyed a much greater degree of autonomy than the Vistula provinces of Russia. In Galicia the administration was almost entirely staffed by Poles, who also controlled the schools, together with the two universities of Lvov and Cracow and the engineering college of Lvov. A separate Diet met at Lvov, elected on a restricted franchise. It was responsible for education, public health, agriculture, and forestry. The viceroy, head of the executive, was always a Pole. Galicia was represented in the *Reichsrat*, the imperial parliament at Vienna, and its representatives were popularly elected on a limited franchise. A special minister for Galicia served as a link between the viceroy and the government in Vienna. In 1907 universal male suffrage was introduced in Galicia, as in other parts of Austria.

The position of the Poles in the German *Reich* was less auspicious for future national unity. They were a Catholic minority in Protestant Prussia. Just as Russia was Russifying, so in her eastern marchlands Prussia was Germanizing, and her aim was to colonize the province of Poznań with Germans. Bismarck's quarrel with the Roman Catholic Church in the 1870's (the *Kulturkampf*) had led him into conflict with the Polish archbishop Ledochowski of Poznań, who was imprisoned in 1874. When Bismarck went on to attack the use of Polish language in schools, law courts, and the administration, and when he set aside funds, in 1886, to settle German families on the land, he aroused strong nationalist resistance. The Polish population was increasing faster than the German. It rose from 67 per cent of the whole population of the province in 1867 to 71 per cent by 1910. Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, at first followed a gentler policy toward the Poles, but this so greatly exacerbated

relations between Germany and Russia that from about 1894 onward it was reversed. In 1889 the process of Germanization was reinforced by the foundation of the *Deutsche Ostmarkenverein*, and until 1914 there continued a vigorous policy of colonization. Even so Germany's Poles, like Austria's, enjoyed most of the normal civil liberties, in sharp contrast with the discriminatory legislation and oppressiveness to which Russia's Poles were subjected. By 1918 the simultaneous collapse of all three empires was to leave a temporary vacuum in which the three parts of Poland were able to unite into one united Polish state.⁷

Ukrainians and Lithuanians. Ukrainians presented the Austrian and Russian empires with similar problems. They enjoyed freedom only in Galicia, where during the 1870's the nationalist movement took the familiar forms of literary societies and cultural propaganda. The leading Ukrainian intellectual, Drahomaniv, was a former professor of the university of Kiev who settled in Lvov. He urged not complete separation from Russia, but the reorganization of Russia on a federal pattern which would give Ukrainians wide cultural autonomy. In 1899 a separatist party was formed by Hrushevski, holder of the new professorship in Ukrainian history founded at Lvov in 1894. This National Democratic party was violently anti-Russian and demanded complete independence; it came to absorb the Radical party, formed a decade before by the disciples of Drahomaniv. A Ukrainian Social Democratic party was also formed in Galicia in 1899, and two years later the Revolutionary Ukrainian party was founded in Russia; both were socially revolutionary and politically nationalistic. In Russia the nationalist movement had to be, like all revolutionary movements, illegal and subterranean. Austrian policy was to play off Polish and Ukrainian forces against one another, and to hold both in reserve as possible threats to Russia. Germany, having no Ukrainian minority, was neutral toward Ukrainians but firmly anti-Polish. In 1905, although there were strikes and risings in the Ukraine as in the rest of western Russia, it was only the peasant revolts that had a markedly nationalistic flavor. The Ukrainian parties, like the Polish, sent representatives to the first Duma, but made no concrete gains. In 1908 their place was largely taken by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, a secret organization with socialist and autonomist aims that appealed strongly to the workers. Rural co-operative movements gained in strength, although cultural movements suffered decline and repression. Ukrainian nationalism spread among the peasants until 1914, partly because of agrarian discontent and partly because most of the big landowners were Russians or Poles. It looked mainly to Germany for help, and opposed alike Russian and Polish "Slav" movements that sought to absorb or crush it. With its emphasis on distinctive language and culture, its complex internal

⁷ See p. 586.

divisions, its "Young Ruthenian" party of the 1880's, its romantic flavor, it recalled the insurgent nationalism of half a century before.

To the north of Poland, in the Baltic provinces, similar separatist movements were stirring. Lithuanian nationalism, like Ukrainian, encountered hostility from Polish nationalism. Lithuanians, having formed part of Poland for nearly four hundred years, were predominantly Catholic. Their Democratic party, formed in 1902, aimed at autonomy within the Russian empire as a step toward eventual independence. Their Christian Democratic League, founded three years later, had a similar program of civil rights and local autonomy but was opposed both to the secularization of education urged by the Democrats and to the anti-Catholic Russification of St. Petersburg. A Lithuanian National Congress met in the fall of 1905 at Vilna, mostly supporting the Democrats. Socialism in the country faithfully reproduced the usual internal divisions common to socialist movements everywhere. Their neighbors in the great Baltic area between the Prussian frontier and the Gulf of Finland included the Latvians and Estonians—both mainly Lutheran in religion but differing in language. Each of these peoples also developed a livelier cultural consciousness in the years after 1870. Encouraged by the Lutheran pastors and led by the educated classes, both groups pressed for improved education and linguistic development. A Latvian Social Democratic party was active after 1904, and in 1905-06 took the lead in the revolutionary civil war which accompanied the revolution in Russia. The province suffered correspondingly savage repression in 1906. The "All-Estonian Congress" which met at Reval in 1905 represented a more conservatively democratic movement, strong among the urban middle classes, which prevented agrarian revolution in Estonia. But in both areas distinctive nationalistic forces were clearly at work, hostile to both Germanic and Russian elements in the Baltic.

Finns, Armenians, Jews. Finland, the other Baltic province of Russia, had long been a model of peaceful coexistence. During the reign of Alexander II the special privileges and rights of the Grand Duchy were respected. So long as Finnish sentiment regarded the Russians as allies against the Swedes who constituted most of the governing class in Finland, this happy situation persisted. Although the Swedes were only some 12 per cent of the population, and included people of all classes, their predominance in the administration, business, and higher education made them a buffer between Russian power and Finnish national resentment. It was the policy of Russification toward the end of the century which here, too, united the three million inhabitants, both Finns and Swedes, against the Russian bureaucracy. During the 1890's isolated moves toward the assimilation of Finland into Russia and the preferential treatment of Russians aroused strong opposition: A climax was reached

in 1898 when a new military law exacted longer military service from Finns and drafted them into Russian units or placed Russian officers in command of Finnish units. Against mass petitions and vigorous protests, the law was introduced by imperial decree and the Diet was reduced in powers to a mere provincial assembly. The Finns retaliated by passive resistance. They refused to implement the law. The whole constitution was suspended in 1903, and the next year the Russian governor general Bobrikov was assassinated by a young patriot. Finland was governed as a police state until the year of revolutions induced the Tsar to repeal the conscription law, and in 1906 to reinstitute the Diet on an even more completely democratic basis. Even female suffrage was introduced. The Social Democratic party (founded in 1903) won a majority in the new assembly, and though governments were formed by coalitions of their more moderate rivals, the Socialists succeeded in pressing for reforms in land rents and industrial working conditions. Finnish independence was short-lived, for in 1910 the Duma again reduced the powers of the Finnish Diet to those of a provincial assembly, and it was then dissolved to make way for extensive Russification. By 1914 Finland, too, was ready for nationalist rebellion. The strength of Finnish nationalism, as of Polish, was the rapid economic development which it shared with most of western Russia. Industry grew on cheap raw materials, especially timber, and on water power; and the number of industrial workers rose from 38,000 in 1885 to 113,500 in 1906. The value of Finland's industrial output grew nearly fourfold between these dates. When Russia sought to protect her own industries against Finnish competition by higher tariffs, she still further weakened links and loyalties between the two countries, and drove Finnish exports to find outlets in other European countries.

Of the other national groups taking clearer and more self-conscious shape in the eastern marchlands during these decades, only two call for mention. The Armenians of Russia, as of Turkey and Persia, began to claim distinctive cohesion.⁸ Their chief bond was religion. The center of the special Armenian religion was the city of Echmiadzin, where the head of the church, the Catholicos, resided. It had been within Russian territory since 1828. During the 1870's the hierarchy of the church was reorganized into a democratic system in which priests were elected by parishioners, and higher clergy by the priests. Under Alexander II the Armenians in Russia founded their own schools and press, and cultivated the teaching of their own language. Russia permitted them to do so because her policy was to attempt to attract Turkish minorities by tolerant treatment of their neighboring compatriots. But again the subsequent shift of policy toward Russification and the new militancy of the Orthodox Church combined to bring misfortunes upon the Armenians in the last decades of the century. Instead of treating them as possible allies

⁸ See p. 435.

against Turkey, St. Petersburg began to see Turkey as a dynastic monarchy threatened, like Russia, by disruptive nationalism and revolutionary activity. The Russians closed Armenian schools, appropriated church funds, and countered revolts and assassinations by savage reprisals outdone only by the Turks. From 1905 onward the local Russian administration followed a more tolerant policy, even restoring the independence of the Armenian church, but the impetus to independence once begun could not be checked. After 1890 a particularly violent Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnyaks*) was at work on both sides of the Russo-Turkish frontiers. Its aim was by crimes and assassinations to invite Turkish reprisals and massacres, and so to create an international scandal that would attract the intervention of the other powers. It split in 1905 between terrorists and moderates, but the latter looked to Russia as a counterpoise to Turkey and as a possible liberator of Turkey's Armenian subjects.

The other national minority, concentrated in no one area but distributed unevenly throughout the whole belt of the marchlands, was the Jews. There were some five million Jews within the Russian empire at the end of the century, mostly in the Polish provinces and Bessarabia, and in the towns of the eastern marchlands. Until the 1860's the government severely restricted their movement and employment, confining them to the borderlands and excluding them from all professions other than trade. By the 1870's they moved about more freely and spread rapidly. This led in the next decade to anti-Semitic measures and even pogroms under Alexander III. Severe legal restrictions were reimposed in 1882, and irksome discrimination forced large numbers to migrate. With the rise of Zionism at the end of the century and violent outbreaks of Jewish persecutions in Bessarabia, the cause of Jewish nationalism emerged as yet another element in the kaleidoscope of eastern separatisms.

Russia was a multinational empire, in which the "Great Russians" speaking the Russian language were outnumbered by a multitude of smaller nationalities. It was especially sensitive to all such separatist national movements. Yet its fluctuating policy in these years universally resulted in a strengthening of the very tendencies to disruption which were most likely to bring about its decline. Nationalities had been given enough freedom, intermittently, to arouse their hopes, but subjected to enough petty and savage repression, in the intervals, to strengthen their will for independence. Russia before 1914 was showing every indication of succeeding Turkey as the "sick man of Europe," and in the First World War the diverse peoples of the eastern marchlands were to play a considerable part in weakening Russian war effort and ensuring her defeat. Despite their diversity and their frequently mutual hostility, the most striking feature of their rise was their reduplication of the spectrum

of political parties and attitudes then visible in the whole of Europe.⁹ Like nearly every other European nation they divided into liberals and radical democrats, into moderate and revolutionary socialist movements. They too had their social democratic parties and their extreme revolutionary Marxists, their internal conflicts between nationalism and socialism. The pattern of western European history was reappearing in facsimile between the White Sea and the Black Sea; and it was likely even before world war began that when the people of this great area should attain national freedom and self-governing institutions, which their knowledge of the west had taught them to want, they would imitate in the closest possible detail the European pattern of life. The pull of the west was already dooming to extinction the Russian empire of the tsars, just as it was condemning to death the Ottoman empire of the sultans.

Austria-Hungary. The example of events in Turkey and Russia was bound to have no less explosive effects on the more westerly nations still confined within the borders of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The Habsburgs, like the Romanovs, ruled a multinational empire which had already, in 1848, shown its sensitivity to the ideals of nationalism, liberalism, and even socialism. The institution of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 won for the dynasty a temporary reprieve; but, as already suggested,¹⁰ this had been little more than a bargain between Germans and Magyars to keep in each half of the empire their separate predominance over Slovaks, Czechs, Serbs, Croats. The successive triumphs of the Balkan nations in the fight to liberate themselves from Turkish rule¹¹ had very far-ranging effects across the Austro-Hungarian borders; and the tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia gave constant opportunities for the national minorities to exploit the difficulties of their rulers, whether German or Magyar. Here again the central theme of the period is the recurrent interplay between internal and international events.

The Poles were the focal point of this interplay, and as already shown it was the Polish province of Galicia which became the hub of Polish nationalist hopes. In 1910 its inhabitants included four and three-quarter million Poles and some three million Little Russians (or Ukrainians), mainly in the east; but most of the landowners and officials were Polish. Eastern Silesia also included a large Polish minority which was mainly industrial working class and was increasing fast by natural multiplication and by immigration from Prussian Silesia. Polish minorities in other areas brought the total of Poles in the Austrian half of the monarchy to nearly five million, or 17 per cent of the total population. There were no significant numbers in the Hungarian half. Policies of Germanization and Russification in the other segments of Poland drove many ex-

⁹ See p. 370.

¹⁰ See p. 298.

¹¹ See p. 439.

iles into Galicia, among them Josef Pilsudski who was to become the regenerator of the Polish state in 1918, and who meanwhile trained Polish riflemen in Austria. The growing hostility between Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side, and Russia on the other, gave men like Pilsudski their opportunity.

To the south the most active minorities were the Serbians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbo-Croats of Dalmatia, the Slav populations of Styria and Carinthia, Istria and Carniola. All these areas had either Slovene majorities or large and compact Slovene or Croat minorities. Upon them the policies of Serbia and the Pan-Slav propaganda of Russia had effect. To the north were "the lands of the Bohemian Crown," including Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. In two of these provinces Czechs greatly predominated—three and a half million in Bohemia, one and a half million in Moravia. In Silesia, though Germans outnumbered either the Czechs or Poles separately, they did not outnumber both together. There were three quarters of a million Italians, mainly in the South Tyrol. In all, therefore, Germans were struggling to maintain power despite their relative inferiority in numbers; and a resurgence of Czech nationalism in the north matched that of Serbian nationalism in the south and of Polish in the east. Having failed to win Bohemian autonomy, the Czechs turned to systematic obstruction in the *Reichsrat*. The ten million Germans of Austria constituted little more than one third of the whole population, and could hold their position only with the help of the five million Poles. The exclusively German provinces of Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and Upper and Lower Austria, appeared as the Germanic heart of an empire surrounded on all sides by provinces predominantly non-German and becoming increasingly anti-German.

The kingdom of Hungary, under Magyar rule, duplicated this image. The "lands of the Crown of St. Stephen" comprised Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia south of the Danube, and to the east Transylvania bordered by the Carpathians. Transylvania's Rumanian majority was swamped by incorporation of the territory into Hungary after 1867, but there were nearly three million Rumanians under Magyar rule in 1910, half of them in Transylvania. Nearly ten million Magyars constituted barely half the whole population of the kingdom, and they were grouped in the center, with fringes containing two million Slovaks in the north, two million Germans in the west and in the towns, some six hundred and fifty thousand Serbs and Croats in the south, and Rumanians with nearly half a million Little Russians in the east.

The Magyars in Hungary enjoyed a more complete control over the subject nationalities than did the Germans in the Austrian provinces. In 1867 they had held the dynasty to ransom because a revolt would then have split the empire asunder, and they had seized every opportunity to entrench themselves in independent authority. Being both politically

astute and masterful, the Magyars saw salvation only in thorough Magyarization. The government tried to eliminate German and Latin languages as well as Slav, and non-Magyar publications suffered constant police persecution. It offered every inducement to assimilation and absorption. Budapest, like Vienna, made no concession to the representation of national minorities in parliament. The franchise was kept narrowly restricted, and so designed as to ensure power for the Magyar landowners. Every kind of corruption and trickery was used to carry elections. The non-Magyar nationalities, who collectively outnumbered the Magyars, never gained more than 70 out of the 453 deputies in parliament. The most indigestible part of the kingdom was Croatia-Slavonia, which in 1868 had contrived to get an unusual measure of local autonomy and even a local legislature of its own. Although it suffered a process of Magyarization as ruthless and ingenious as that in any other part, Croatia-Slavonia, with the magnetic attraction of an independent Serbia so near, never succumbed to the process. It evolved, instead, a more stubborn desire for independence. The Magyars were in consequence even more bitter in their hostility toward Serbia than were the German rulers of Austria.

As the cohesive appeal of dynastic monarchy declined and gave way to the desire for national solidarity and independence, it was inevitable that this great patchwork of the Dual Monarchy should suffer strain at every seam. That it withstood so long the disruptive forces that tore apart the Ottoman Empire and exerted such ominous strains on the Russian, was one of the miracles of the age. It was in part due to widespread personal affection for Francis Joseph himself, who ruled from 1848 to 1916 with the single desire to hold his domains together. In 1876 the Austrian minister, Andr ssy, showed that he appreciated the constant danger. "If it were not for Turkey," he said, "all these (nationalistic) aspirations would fall on our heads. . . . If a new state should be formed there, we would be ruined, and it would be we who would assume the role of 'the sick man.'" Francis Joseph entered the League of the Three Emperors in order to uphold the conservative forces in eastern Europe, just as he tried to impose reforms on Turkey in order to keep Russia inactive, and remained neutral in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. The settlement at Berlin in 1878 gave Austria-Hungary, as it gave Turkey, a new lease of life—guaranteed not by their own strength, but by the backing of Britain and Germany against Russia. It was the international balance of forces which provided the conditions needed for Habsburg survival. The only specific promise in the Austro-German treaty of alliance of 1879 assured Austria-Hungary of German support in case of a direct attack by Russia; this was the price Bismarck paid to keep Austria from looking for help, as in 1856, to France and Britain. But the alliance did not promise German support for Austrian ambitions in the Balkans,

and so it bound Austria-Hungary to a conservative Balkan policy of preserving the Ottoman Empire. It was a compact to keep the peace, so long as Russia kept it. But the two halves of the empire could follow somewhat different policies. Hungary looked not to Vienna, but to Berlin, for Germanic support of Magyar supremacy over subject nationalities. With Count Taaffe as minister between 1879 and 1893, the government of Vienna gave concessions to the Poles and tried to placate the separatist nationalities; with Count Koloman Tisza as minister from 1875 to 1890, the government of Budapest imposed Magyar rule on all its subject nationalities, and pursued a policy of Magyarization.

In each half of the empire, however, the main key to its survival was the same. It was the erection of a centralized administrative system, a new form of machinery of state, within which the diverse elements could be contained. Disruption could be checked, in the last resort, only by centralization. In the Austrian provinces between 1879 and 1897 this centripetal force was provided by giving the nationalities representation in the *Reichsrat* and by creating a vast bureaucratic machine that ran on a system of spoils, bribes, and manipulation. Both the electoral system and the method of representing separately the four classes of landowners, chambers of commerce, cities, and peasants gave ample scope for keeping power in the hands of the landowners and the officials. Czechs and Poles were given cultural autonomy as a substitute for political autonomy, not as a road to independence. Germans in Bohemia and Slovenes in Istria looked upon Habsburg rule as a protection against the oppression by Czechs or Italians which greater provincial autonomy would undoubtedly bring. The equipoise upon which the power of the emperor Francis Joseph rested derived support from every minority that feared local domination by a bigger minority. The large official class by which the country was administered depended upon Habsburg authority for its employment, and upon continued disunity for its perquisites.

In the Hungarian half the survival of the monarchy was ultimately due to a similar situation. There it was brought about by the rapid decline of the independent landowning gentry who, in 1848-49 under Kossuth, had been numerous enough to determine the course of the revolution.¹² Their economic decline was due in part to the abolition of the *Robot* in 1848,¹³ in part to the coming of the railways and with them competition from imported American wheat. The land became concentrated in the hands of a small number of bigger and more capitalistic landowning magnates, while the landless gentry found employment in the great new state bureaucracy. They ran the state railways and post offices, the educational and health services. They ran the state not, as before, from the countryside, but from the offices of officialdom. By the

¹² See p. 194.

¹³ See p. 205.

twentieth century a quarter of a million of them were so engaged. They provided the administrative machinery as well as the political support for the centralized state, and had every interest in carrying out the policy of Magyarization. By a strange alchemy the very forces of disunity, even the old gentry who were the traditional opponents of the centralized state, were thus converted into the mainstay of Habsburg survival. Prevented by its origins and composition from finding any foundations in the solidities of national unity, the empire ingeniously became a fabric held up by a scaffolding of officialdom and by a precarious equipoise of national animosities both within and without. Being of a kind with the dynastic empires of Turkey and Russia, the Habsburg Empire reached a crisis, too, in the years 1905-06. It was caused, inevitably, by the Magyars.

In 1903 the Magyar magnates challenged the Dual Monarchy by refusing to provide contingents for the common army, as agreed in 1867, unless Magyar became the language of command in their contingents. Stephen Tisza, son of Koloman, undertook to meet the challenge on behalf of the Emperor and the gentry; in January, 1905, he fought a really free election in Hungary, abandoning the normal methods of corruption and influence which his father had used. When he was heavily defeated, the Emperor used the army and bureaucracy to overthrow the constitution. In 1906 the Hungarian parliament was turned out by troops, and the country was thereafter governed by purely bureaucratic means, with the aid of the Croats. The two most menacing weapons in the Emperor's hand were, paradoxically, the threat (made in 1905) to establish universal suffrage and the threat to encourage Croatian independence. One would have ended the rule of the Magyar magnates; the other would have removed large territories from their rule. Rather than contemplate either prospect, they rallied to the Crown. Besides, Hungarian corn needed Austrian markets, and economic interests cut across the most self-assertive sentiments of nationalism. In April, 1906, the old partnership was resumed. Hungary went on contributing her contingents to the common army, and in return the magnates were allowed to keep their supremacy over the subject nationalities.

By the end of the century the three peoples of Austria-Hungary most clearly ready for the assertion of complete national independence were the Poles, the Czechs, and the Serbo-Croats. Already the outline had appeared of a Southern Slav union—the merger of all the Slav peoples south of the Danube into one large entity, with its nucleus in Serbia just as Italy had found unification around the nucleus of Piedmont. The blurred shadow of a future Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were detectable in the political situation of eastern Europe before 1914. Along with them Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania had already appeared on the political map of the Balkans. The Balkan Wars of 1912

and 1913¹⁴ showed that these states were likely to remain quarrelsome and separated by profound mistrusts and jealousies. Lesser known and, to western ears, strange submerged nationalities of Lithuanians and Ukrainians, Little Russians and Ruthenians, were astir everywhere along the great eastern marchlands. Dynastic empires, clearly, were falling rapidly out of repute and into difficulties. Their decline would certainly have great reverberations in all the chancelleries of western and central Europe. But meanwhile these chancelleries were also beset with their own disputes and difficulties outside Europe altogether. For the consolidated nation-states of Europe had entered upon a new phase in their own development, involving themselves in acute rivalries both economic and political in Africa, the Far East, and even the southern Pacific. The conflicts of colonial imperialism were added to those of dynastic imperialism.

¹⁴ See p. 439.

CHAPTER 20

COLONIAL EXPANSION AND RIVALRY

The Urge to Imperialism


BY 1815 the world had known some four hundred years of continuous European imperialism, in the sense of the outward expansion of European power over other continents. Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, British colonial empires had followed one another throughout these four centuries, and always these extensions of control over non-European territories had involved, in varying proportions, trading, missionizing, adventure, settlement, loot, national pride, conquests, and wars between rival powers. The very list of countries mentioned above emphasizes the lead taken in this expansion by the western, maritime peoples. But it is not necessary to cross sea, rather than land, to become an imperial power. The creation of the great dynastic empires of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Turks, the traditional drive eastward (*Drang nach Osten*) of the Germans in quest of lands for settlement and trade, the continental conquests of Napoleon, the rapid advance of Russia into southern and central Asia during the nineteenth century, even the expansion westward of the United States during the same period, are all examples of the same process carried out, it so happened, within continental land areas rather than across oceans. In 1870 there was, therefore, nothing whatever new about the extension of European control and power over other parts of the earth. Yet the very word "imperialism" was, it seems, a mid-nineteenth-century invention, and the generation after 1870 has come to be known, in some specially significant and discreditable sense, as "the age of imperialism." In what sense can these decades between 1870 and 1914 be so described?

A famous British economist, J. A. Hobson—and following him, Lenin—attributed the colonial expansions of these years to special new economic forces at work in the most industrialized nations of western

and central Europe. This economic explanation of the urge to imperialism is usually taken to mean that the basic motives were also the basest motives and that, whatever political, religious, or more idealistic excuses might be made, the real impulse was always one of capitalistic greed for cheap raw materials, advantageous markets, good investments, and fresh fields of exploitation. The argument has commonly been used, therefore, to denounce the events, and to attack the men, parties, and nations that took part in them. The argument, in brief, is that what Hobson called "the economic taproot of imperialism" was "excessive capital in search of investment," and that this excessive capital came from oversaving made possible by the unequal distribution of wealth. The remedy, he maintained, was internal social reform and a more equal distribution of wealth. "If the consuming public in this country raised its standard of consumption to keep pace with every rise of productive powers, there could be no excess of goods or capital clamorous to use imperialism in order to find markets." It is undeniable that the search for lucrative yet secure overseas investment played a very great part in the European urge to acquire colonies at the end of the nineteenth century.

Lenin elaborated the argument, in his pamphlet on *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), to emphasize the current importance of finance capital rather than industrial, and the priority of the desire to find new outlets for investment rather than new markets. His thesis was that imperialism was "a direct continuation of the fundamental properties of capitalism in general," and that "the war of 1914 was on both sides imperialist." He used this thesis to explain the fact, which Marx and Engels had declared to be normally impossible in a capitalist society, that there was a conspicuous general improvement in the economic condition of workers in the more advanced countries. In the backward colonial peoples, argued Lenin, capitalism had found a new proletariat to exploit; and from the enhanced profits of such imperialism it was able to bribe at least the "aristocracy of labor" at home into renouncing its revolutionary fervor and collaborating with the *bourgeoisie*. But such improvement could only be temporary, and since imperialist rivalries must lead to war, all workers alike must eventually suffer from it. This argument ignored the awkward facts that much of the foreign investment of the European powers was not in colonial territories at all but in countries such as South America and Russia, and that the standard of living of the working classes was high in countries like Denmark and Sweden which had no colonies, but low in France and Belgium which had large colonial territories. Nor, of course, could it be a general explanation of imperialism, which had existed centuries before there was a "glut of capital" and before finance capital was as plentiful or as well organized as it was in the later nineteenth century. But it was a convenient and persuasive enough case, at the time, for explaining the First

EXPORT OF EUROPEAN CAPITAL TO 1914



MAP 9. EXPORT OF EUROPEAN CAPITAL TO 1914

By 1914 the major European powers had become heavy investors in the underdeveloped countries overseas. British capital flowed mainly overseas to the Americas and Africa, French mainly to eastern Europe and Russia, German mainly to southeastern Europe, Turkey, and the Far

World War in exclusively economic terms, and for presenting it as the result of capitalist activities and the maldistribution of wealth. (See Map 9.)


The New Imperialism. What made it seem particularly necessary to find some special reason for modern imperialism was both the dramatic suddenness of its reappearance and its pre-eminence in the policies of the powers during the last quarter of the century. Until after 1870 national policies, and even more national public opinion, in most European countries had been hostile to colonies. By the 1820's several countries, after having long colonial connections, had lost these connections without suffering any apparent economic deprivation. By 1815 France had lost most of her colonial possessions in America and in the east, and Spain had lost her vast South American territories. Before that the thirteen colonies in America had broken away from Britain, and by 1822 Portugal lost Brazil. Advanced opinion everywhere welcomed these events. Adam Smith had argued that the burdens of colonialism outweighed its alleged benefits; radicalism favored *laissez faire*; Bentham urged France to "Emancipate your Colonies"; Cobdenism preached free trade and the abolition of all commercial privileges; and in 1861 France opened to all nations the trade of her colonies. Gladstone expected the whole British Empire to dissolve in the end, and in 1852 Disraeli, who agreed with Gladstone in little else, made his famous declaration that "These wretched colonies will all be independent in a few years and are millstones around our necks." As late as 1868 Bismarck, who until a decade later was opposed to colonial aspirations for Germany, held that "All the advantages claimed for the mother country are for the most part illusory," adding that "England is abandoning her colonial policy: she finds it too costly." But he was wrong, and only four years later Disraeli announced his conversion to a policy of imperial consolidation and expansion. The tide of opinion turned abruptly. The chorus of anticolonialism before 1870 was so strange a prelude to an era of especially hectic colonial scramble that some extraordinary explanation seems to be called for.

It is improbable that this explanation can be entirely, or even "basi-

East, though also to the Americas. Together they held some \$30 billion in loans and investments abroad. In addition the Dutch invested heavily in the Netherlands East Indies, and smaller countries such as Belgium, Scandinavia, and Switzerland took part. The flow led to a great development of hitherto backward lands. It raised the general standard of living in Europe because the interest on such investments enabled Europeans to import more goods than they exported. Imperialism, according to some economists, was explicable in terms of this "glut of capital" seeking safe investment. Most of it was lost or spent in the First World War.

cally," economic. However important the economic forces were, they cannot explain why France, one of the least fully industrialized of the northwestern European nations, was the one which had already set the pace of expansion by more than doubling her colonial possessions between 1815 and 1870, when she gained firm footholds in Algeria, Senegal, and Indochina; nor why after 1870 it was the political republican leaders, Jules Ferry and Léon Gambetta, who took the initiative in further colonial expansion in Tunisia and Tonkin, despite the great unpopularity of such expansion with public opinion in France. It is not a mere thirst for exporting surplus capital which can explain the new shape given to the British Empire by the invention of "dominion status" and the readiness with which complete political independence was granted first to Canada, and later to Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. British commercial and capitalist interests knew that trade with the United States had increased after it won political independence; that migration to the independent United States had been greater than to any of the territories which had remained under British control; and that Argentine railways had offered opportunities to British investors no less attractive than had Indian railways. German economic penetration of eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Ottoman Empire was remarkably effective without any of these territories becoming German colonies. What was most strikingly novel about the new imperialism was its intense concentration upon two continents—Africa and eastern Asia. These were the only two important areas of the globe still not brought under European influence before 1870. The decades between 1870 and 1914 speedily completed the expansion of European influence and civilization over the whole of the earth; and it was accomplished in an era when the realism, ruthlessness, and rivalries of European national governments were exceptionally great. It therefore had a temper uniquely masterful and remorseless, brooking no obstacles and pushfully self-assertive. This quality came as much from the nature of European politics as from the urges of European economic development. There was no international organization fitted to exercise any kind of control or regulation over the scramble for territories in which the great powers now indulged. The naked power politics of the new colonialism were the projection, onto an overseas screen, of the interstate frictions and rivalries of Europe. It was this combination of novel economic conditions with anarchic political relations which explained the nature of the new imperialism.

Among the economic forces behind it, the urge to find new outlets for the "glut of capital" and fresh markets for industrial output were in general more important than either the quest for raw materials or the factor of overpopulation. The special attractions of Africa and Asia were, indeed, that they offered many of the raw materials needed by the mul-



MAP 10. MIGRATION FROM EUROPE,

The Expansion of Europe after 1815 involved the export of people as well as of capital and goods. In the century before the Second World War more than 60 million people left Europe, distributed as shown in the chart. The greatest reception areas, taking some 85 per cent of the total, were North and South America. At the same time 7 million Russians moved eastward into Asiatic Russia. This rise of European settlements outside Europe helped to build up a new world economic system focused upon Europe; and explains why one aftermath of war in 1929 was an economic depression that was world-wide in its effects. See also Map 9 and Diagram 5.

tiplying factories of Europe: including cotton, silk, rubber, vegetable oils, and the rarer minerals. The products of the tropics were especially welcome to Europe. But many of these raw materials could be, and were, got by trading without political control. The pressure of population in Europe was becoming great by the early twentieth century, but it still found free outlet in migration to the traditional areas of reception in the United States and Australasia. Neither Africa nor eastern Asia offered climatic or economic conditions inviting enough to attract large-scale white settlements, and the pressure of population within Japan, China, and India was now itself so great as to exert a steady demand for fresh outlets. It was against Asiatic immigrants, not European, that the main barriers began to be raised. Chinese were excluded from the United States after 1882, from Hawaii after 1898, from the Philippines after 1902. The United States excluded Japanese laborers in 1907, and by the Immigration Act of 1917 barred the entry of other non-Europeans, especially Indians and inhabitants of the East Indies. Canada took similar action against the Chinese after 1885, and against the Japanese after 1908. New Zealand restricted Chinese, and in 1901 Australia passed a federal Immigration Restriction Act with the same purpose. The Union of South Africa barred Chinese in 1913, and some South American states followed suit. The main impediments to European migration came only after 1918, and the nineteenth-century flow out of Europe actually reached its peak in 1914. (See Map 10.)

The quest for markets in which to sell manufactured goods was more important. But here, again, the political factor was no less important than the purely economic. Until 1870 British manufacturers of textiles, machinery, and hardware had found good markets in other European lands. After 1870 Germany, France, Belgium, and other nations were able to satisfy their own home markets, which they began to protect against imports from Britain by tariff barriers.¹ They even began to produce a surplus for which they sought markets abroad. With increasing saturation of European markets, all tended to look for more open markets overseas, and in the competitive, protectionist mood of European politics they found governments responsive enough to national needs to undertake the political conquest of undeveloped territories. For this purpose, Africa and Asia served admirably. It was in these economic and political circumstances that the urge to exploit backward territories by the investment of surplus capital could make so much headway. It began especially after 1880, and gained rapidly in momentum until 1914. (Of the annual investment of British capital between 1909 and 1913, 36 per cent went into British overseas territories.) By then the main industrial countries had equipped themselves with an abundance of manufacturing plant, and the openings for capital investment at home were more

¹See p. 416.

meager. The vast undeveloped areas of Africa and Asia offered the most inviting opportunities, provided that they could be made safe enough for investment, and there seemed no better guarantee of security than the appropriation of these lands. Again governments were responsive, for reasons that were not exclusively economic. The ports of Africa and the Far East were valuable as naval bases and ports of call, no less than as inroads for trade and investment. Given the tangle of international fears and distrusting in Europe during these years, and the everpresent menace of war, no possible strategic or prestige-giving advantage could be forfeited. Once the scramble for partitioning Africa had begun, the powers were confronted with the choice of grabbing such advantages for themselves or seeing them snatched by potential enemies. The "international anarchy" contributed an impetus of its own to the general race for colonies. To say, as it was often said after 1918, that imperialism had led to war, was only half the story; it was also true that the menace of war had led to imperialism.

It was normally the coexistence of economic interests with political aims which made a country imperialistic; and in some, such as Italy or Russia, political considerations predominated. With nations as with men, it is what they aspire to become and to have, not only what they already are or have, that governs their behavior. There was no irresistible compulsion or determinism, and no country acquired colonies unless at least a very active and influential group of its political leaders wanted to acquire them. Britain had long had all the economic urges of surplus population, exports, and capital, but they did not drive her to scramble for colonies during the 1860's as much as during the 1870's and after. Neither Italy nor Russia had a surplus of manufactures or capital to export, yet both joined in the scramble; Norway, although she had a large merchant fleet which was second only to that of Britain and Germany, did not. Germany, whose industrial development greatly outpaced that of France, was very much slower than France to embark on colonialism. The Dutch were active in colonialism long before the more industrialized Belgians. What determined whether or not a country became imperialistic was more the activity of small groups of people, often intellectuals, economists, or patriotic publicists and politicians anxious to ensure national security and self-sufficiency, than the economic conditions of the country itself. And, as the examples of the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese show, nations that had traditions of colonialism were more prompt to seek colonies than were nations, such as Germany and Italy, that had no such traditions.


Besides the direct political motives of imperialism—the desire to strengthen national security by strategic naval bases such as Cyprus and the Cape, or to secure additional sources of manpower as the French sought in Africa, or to enhance national prestige as the Italians did in

Libya—there was a medley of other considerations which, in varying proportions, entered into the desire for colonies. One was the activities of explorers and adventurers, men like the Frenchmen, Du Chaillu and De Brazza, in equatorial Africa; or the Welshman, Henry Morton Stanley, in the Congo basin; or the German Karl Peters in east Africa. Prompted by a genuine devotion to scientific discovery, or a taste for adventure, or a buccaneering love of money and power—as was Cecil Rhodes in South Africa—men of initiative and energetic enterprise played an important personal part in the whole story.

Christian missionaries played their part too in the spread of colonialism. The most famous was the Scot, David Livingstone. A medical missionary originally sent to Africa by the London Missionary Society, he later returned under government auspices as an explorer “to open a path for commerce and Christianity.” When he had disappeared for some years in quest of the source of the Nile, Stanley was sent to find him, and duly met him in 1872 on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. When Livingstone died in Africa in 1873, his body was taken to London under naval escort, to be buried in Westminster Abbey as a great national hero. But Livingstone was only one among many, and France, even more than Britain, sent organized missions into Africa to convert the heathen to Christianity. The Catholic missions of France under the Third Republic were exceptionally active, and provided two thirds (some forty thousand) of all Catholic missionaries. They were spread all over the world, including the Near and Far East; and in 1869 Cardinal Lavigerie, installed only the year before in the see of Algiers, founded the Society of African Missionaries, soon to be known because of their Arab dress as the “White Fathers.” By 1875 they spread from Algeria into Tunisia, and set up a religious protectorate that preceded the political protectorate. Gambetta said of Lavigerie, “His presence in Tunisia is worth an army for France.” Other French missions penetrated into all parts of Africa, setting up schools and medical services, often in the footsteps of the explorers and

MAP 11. AFRICA, 1914

By 1900, and mainly since 1870, the great powers of Europe had divided up most of the African continent. The only independent states left were Liberia, Ethiopia, and the two Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Their separate holdings were so distributed that Britain, France, and Germany each aimed at linking up their holdings: the British by a Cape-to-Cairo line running south-north, the French by linking their large western territories with French Somaliland on the east, the Germans by a triangular thrust across the Congo and Angola (see inset). These thrusts led to colonial collisions at Fashoda and to the Boer War (see pp. 475–8), and to international agreements to preserve Belgian power in the Congo and Portuguese in Angola. By 1904 most African colonial disputes had been provisionally settled.



adventurers. Belgian missionaries were active in the Congo as early as 1878.

Yet another element in the growth of imperialism was the administrator and soldier—the man with a mission, who was not a missionary but who welcomed an opportunity to bring order and efficient administration out of muddle. Such men became the great colonial proconsuls—Lord Cromer in Egypt, Lord Lugard in Nigeria, Lord Milner at the Cape, Marshal Lyautey in Morocco, Karl Peters in German East Africa. Without such men the extent and the consolidation of European control over Africa would have been impossible. The sources and the nature of the urge to imperialism were multiple, and varied considerably from one country to another. It was not just that trade followed the flag, but that the flag accompanied the botanist and buccaneer, the Bible and the bureaucrat, along with the banker and the businessman. The unexplored and unexploited parts of the earth offered a host of possible advantages which, in the competitive world of the later century, few could resist seizing; they were seized, amid the enthusiastic approval of the newly literate nationalist-minded masses in Britain and Germany, or amid the sullen resentments of the French and Belgians.

In 1875 less than one tenth of Africa had been turned into European colonies; by 1895, only one tenth remained unappropriated. (See Map 11.) In the generation between 1871 and 1900 Britain added 4¼ million square miles and 66 million people to her empire; France added 3½ million square miles and 26 million people; Russia in Asia added half a million square miles and 6½ million people. In the same decades Germany, Belgium, and Italy each acquired a new colonial empire: Germany, of one million square miles and 13 million people; Belgium (or, until 1908, Leopold II, King of the Belgians), of 900,000 square miles and 8½ million inhabitants; and Italy, a relatively meager acquisition of 185,000 square miles and 750,000 people. The old colonial empires of Portugal and the Netherlands survived intact and assumed increasing importance. It was a historical novelty that most of the world should now belong to a handful of great European powers.

These immense acquisitions had no close correlation with the ascendancy of one political party. In Belgium they were originally an almost personal achievement of the king; in Britain and Germany they were mainly the work of conservative governments which had turned empire-minded, though in Britain former radicals like Joseph Chamberlain and liberals like Lord Rosebery supported them; in France they were the work of radical republicans like Jules Ferry and Léon Gambetta, and in Italy, of liberals like Depretis; in Russia they were mainly the work of the official military class and bureaucracy. The beneficiaries of imperialism were not always the initiators of it; and although King Leopold, Cecil Rhodes, and many of the other empire builders amassed great

personal fortunes and power, so too did many who merely stepped in later to reap the rewards of high administrative offices and rich concessions for trading and investment. On the other hand some of the initiators, such as Ferry in France and Crispi in Italy, earned only disrepute and violent hatreds for their achievements. Wherever there was any considerable section of public opinion generally in support of imperialism, it tended to be canalized into active propagandist associations and pressure groups, often distinct from any one political party. In Britain, Disraeli committed the Conservative party to a general policy of imperialism in 1872, backed by the purchase of shares in the Suez Canal in 1875 and by the conferring of the title "Empress of India" upon Queen Victoria in 1877. In 1882 a Colonial Society was formed in Germany, and in 1883, a Society for German Colonization. In the same year the British conservative imperialists founded the Primrose League, and the liberals soon followed suit with the Imperial Federation League. The British Navy League of 1894 was followed in 1898 by the corresponding German *Flottenverein*—incidents in the naval rivalry of the two powers. Each championed the rapidly increasing naval expenditures of their respective governments. The more explicit arguments for colonialism, and for the sea power which it necessitated, were as much expressions as causes of the expansion.

The Scramble for Colonies. By no means all the acquisitions of colonies caused disputes among the powers. Some of the earliest, like the French conquest of Algeria in the earlier years of the century or of Annam in 1874, and even some later acquisitions, like the British conquests of Nigeria and Ashanti in the 1890's, aroused little or no opposition from other European powers. Occasionally one power made gains with the encouragement or assent of others: Bismarck encouraged France to expand into Tunisia as a diversion from continental affairs that was likely to embroil her with Italy; Bismarck and Jules Ferry co-operated in 1884 to summon an international conference at Berlin to settle amicably the future of the Congo in central tropical Africa. To the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 came representatives from fourteen states—roughly all the states of Europe except Switzerland. It was occasioned mainly by the activities of the International African Association, which had been formed in 1876 by King Leopold II of Belgium. This Association had sent H. M. Stanley on explorations into the Congo between 1879 and 1884, where he made treaties with the native chiefs and established Leopold's influence over vast areas of the interior. By the beginning of 1884 Britain and Portugal, apprehensive of this development, set up a joint commission to control navigation of the whole river. The colony of Angola south of the Congo mouth had been held by Portugal since the fifteenth century, and now Britain recognized Portugal's claim to control the whole mouth of the river. It looked like an alliance of the

older colonial powers to strangle the expansion of the new; for France was increasingly interested in the tropical belt north of the Congo River, and Germany, in the Cameroons still further north. Leopold therefore looked to France and Germany for help, and the result was the Berlin Conference.

It was concerned with defining "spheres of influence," the significant new term first used in the ensuing Treaty of Berlin of 1885. It was agreed that in future any power that effectively occupied African territory and duly notified the other powers could thereby establish possession of it. This gave the signal for the rapid partition of Africa among all the colonial powers, and inaugurated the new era of colonialism. In the treaty it was agreed that Leopold's African Association would have full rights over most of the Congo basin, including its outlet to the Atlantic, under international guarantee of neutrality and free trade. Slavery was to be made illegal. Both the Niger and the Congo were to be opened on equal terms to the trade of all nations. The treaty was, in short, a compact among the powers to pursue the further partition of Africa as amicably as possible; and an attempt to separate colonial competition from European rivalries.

For a decade after the Berlin Conference, imperialistic conservative governments ruled in Britain and Germany and anticolonialist protests subsided in France and Italy. Their policies of mercantilism and protection, the popular mood of assertive nationalism in all four countries, favored colonialism. Expansion into Africa was unbridled. In 1885 the African Association converted itself into the Congo Free State, with Leopold as its absolute sovereign. The success prompted other powers to set up chartered companies to develop other African areas. Such companies, granted by their governments monopoly rights in the exploitation of various territories, became the general media of colonial commerce and appropriation in the subsequent decade. The German and British East African Companies were set up by 1888, the South Africa Chartered Company of Cecil Rhodes to develop the valley of the Zambesi in 1889, the Italian Benadir Company to develop Italian Somaliland in 1892, the Royal Niger Company in 1896. By these and every other means each power established protectorates or outright possessions, and made their resources available for home markets. Germany enlarged and consolidated her four protectorates of Togoland and the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa and German East Africa. France took Dahomey, and by pressing inland from Algeria, Senegal, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast, she linked up her west African territories into one vast bloc of French West Africa. She drove inland along the north bank of the Congo to consolidate French Equatorial Africa. On the east coast she established her claim to part of Somaliland and by 1896 conquered the island of Madagascar.

Great Britain was already firmly based on the Cape, and began to push northward. She appropriated Bechuanaland in 1885, Rhodesia in 1889, Nyasaland in 1893, so driving a broad wedge between German Southwest Africa and German East Africa and approaching the southern borders of the Congo Free State. This expansion, largely the work of Cecil Rhodes, involved her in constant conflicts with the Dutch Boer farmers, who set up, in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, two republics of their own. The Boer War of 1899 was the direct result.² From the Indian Ocean she also pressed westward inland, founding British East Africa by 1888 and taking Uganda by 1894. In West Africa, Nigeria was acquired by the activities of the Royal Niger Company between 1886 and 1899. Italy, indignant at the French occupation of Tunisia, had laid the basis of an Italian East African Empire in Eritrea by 1885, and added Asmara in 1889. In the same year she appropriated the large southern coastal strip of Somaliland and claimed a protectorate over the African kingdom of Abyssinia. But in 1896 her expeditionary forces were routed by Abyssinian forces at Adowa, and she was obliged to recognize Abyssinian independence. By 1898 the map of the African continent resembled a patchwork quilt of European acquisitions, and south of the Sahara the only independent states were Liberia and Abyssinia, and the two small Dutch Boer republics. The North African coastline, especially the provinces of Morocco in the west and Libya and Egypt in the east, remained a troublesome source of great power rivalries, and as such will be considered later.³


The Far East. In the south Pacific and the Far East the same story of separate thrusting, mutual rivalries, and at times joint agreement was repeated (*see* Map 12). The coming of steamships made islands figure

MAP 12. IMPERIALISM IN ASIA, 1840-1914. See following pages.

Rivalries of the European powers in the Far East also involved the United States, Russia, and Japan. Until 1900 gains were chiefly made in the southern Pacific. While the British thrust northward into Burma and North Borneo, and the Dutch consolidated their empire in the East Indies, new empires were built up by the French in Indochina, the Germans in New Guinea and the Pacific islands, the Americans in the Philippines, and the Japanese in Formosa. Thereafter tensions centered upon the north Pacific and China, where Russians and Japanese competed for control of Manchuria and Korea, and all sought concessions and rights at the expense of China (see inset). These tensions produced the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, as well as the Boxer rebellion of 1899 and the Chinese nationalist revolution of 1911.

² See p. 479.

³ See p. 483.



largely in the story. In 1885 New Guinea, where Dutch power was already well established, was partitioned between Dutch, British, and Germans. Germany occupied several neighboring islands (which she christened the Bismarck Archipelago) and the Marshall Islands. By the end of the century she shared the Samoan Islands with the United States and purchased the Caroline and Marianne Islands from Spain, when Spain sold out her empire after the Spanish-American War of 1898. In 1888 Britain set up a protectorate over North Borneo where a chartered British North Borneo Company had been active since 1881, and where in Sarawak Rajah Brooke had established a remarkable personal power as an independent sovereign. By the end of the century she also took the South Solomon, Tonga, and Gilbert Islands. France occupied the Marquesas, the Society Islands, and other small groups adjoining Tahiti which she had held since 1842. The United States, after her war with Spain, not only annexed Puerto Rico and set up a protectorate over Cuba in the Caribbean, but also took the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands. The twentieth century began, therefore, with the whole southern Pacific partitioned among the old colonial powers, such as the Dutch who held the East Indies and the British who held the key areas of Malaya and North Borneo, and the new colonial powers of Germany and the United States. Any future war between these powers was bound to be projected on to a world scale, and to affect even remote Pacific islets on the other side of the globe.

In the north Pacific the scramble centered upon China, where it had become a common practice for European powers in search of trade to extract from the crumbling Manchu dynasty concessions of port facilities and territories. The general aim was not to annex land but to establish focal points of influence and centers of trade, commercial footholds on the eastern Asiatic coast which could give access into the underdeveloped interior of China. The country was distracted by great disorder, of which the latest symptom had been the Tai-ping rebellion of 1850, resulting after prolonged civil war in the emergence of local war lords. By the 1870's Britain and France had secured, by wars or bargaining, treaties that gave their diplomats and traders considerable opportunities and security for trade with China. In 1842 Hong Kong had been ceded to the British; and more than a dozen cities, such as Canton and Shanghai, were opened to all Europeans as "treaty ports" where they could settle immune to Chinese law. When they traveled inland, they remained subject only to their own governments, not to the Chinese. To protect Europeans, British or American gunboats policed the Yangtse river in the south, and staffs of European officials were introduced to collect customs duties. The Chinese agreed to impose no import duty higher than 5 per cent, and the magnet of this vast new free-trade market attracted merchants of all western exporting countries. While the

western powers were penetrating China from the eastern shores, large parts of the empire were annexed to the north and south. Russia pressed down the Amur river and by 1860 established Vladivostok as the gateway of her eastern maritime provinces and the future eastern terminus of her Trans-Siberian railroad. During the 1880's France annexed the rest of Indochina, and Britain annexed the remainder of Burma. China was the Turkey of the Far East, and Manchus, like Ottomans, seemed destined to preside over the dissolution of their own empire.

A new imperial power, however, appeared to complicate the scene. Japan had first been opened to western influences by the American, Commodore Perry, in 1854. In 1867 she underwent an internal revolution that brought dramatically sudden westernization. The introduction within one generation (the reign of the Emperor Mutsuhito between 1868 and 1912) of industrialism, railroads, schools, a new legal system, modern science and technology, and all the apparatus of western civilization, effected a tremendous transformation. Her population grew with great speed, as did her foreign trade and her naval power. By the 1890's Japan was ready to engage in an imperial expansion of her own. The obvious field for such expansion was the coastline nearest to the islands of Japan, the peninsula of Korea and the large province of Manchuria which lay behind it. In 1876 she helped to detach Korea from its tenuous links with the Chinese empire by recognizing its independence, and in 1894 she went to war with China over disputes in Korea. Being equipped with much more modern organization and weapons than were the Chinese, Japan won the war. In 1895 she imposed on China a treaty that ceded to Japan not only Korea but also the island of Formosa and the Liaotung peninsula, the southern tip of Manchuria. Japan's sudden appearance as a formidable rival to the European imperialist powers—blocking Russia's eastern expansion and rivaling the colonialism of France and Britain—led to a joint protest by Russia, France, and Germany which forced Tokyo to restore the Liaotung peninsula to China. Her demand for it had indicated only too clearly that Japan's intention was to dominate Manchuria, for which it was the main outlet to the sea. Japan gave way, with much resentment.

China's reaction to her defeat in the war with Japan was to plan her own westernization, but this only placed her, for a time, still more at the mercy of the western powers. The Russians made her lease to them the Liaotung peninsula, in which to build railroads linking Port Arthur at its tip with Manchurian and eventually Trans-Siberian railroads. Germany took a lease of Kiaochow and concessions in the Shantung peninsula, to the south of the Liaotung peninsula. Britain took the port of Weihaiwei and consolidated her "sphere of influence" in the Yangtse, though she backed the demand of the United States for a policy of "the Open Door." This meant keeping open Chinese trade on

equal terms to all countries, and was in part directed against further annexations by Russia or Japan, whose military power on the spot naturally exceeded that of the western states. The first rumblings of a Chinese nationalist revolt against these foreign intrusions came the following year, in 1899, with the so-called Boxer Rebellion. A secret society called the Order of Literary Patriotic Harmonious Fists planned attacks on the foreign legations and officials, killing some three hundred people. The European powers, Japan, and the United States combined to suppress the rebellion, exacting a large indemnity as compensation and imposing still more stringent controls over the Chinese government. In the southern provinces appeared a strong Chinese nationalist movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. By 1911 it overthrew the Manchu dynasty and began the prolonged revolutionary process that reached its climax in the Communist revolution of 1949.⁴

These events, which may be summed up as the successful imperial penetration of a crumbling Chinese empire and the consequent stimulation of Chinese nationalist feeling and of more intense rivalries among the imperial powers themselves, led by 1904 to war between Japan and Russia. The bone of contention, inevitably, was the whole area of Manchuria and Korea. With the Japanese in possession of Korea and Formosa, the Russians in control of Vladivostok and the Liäotung peninsula and enjoying concessions to build a railway across Manchuria, there was for a time an equal balance of power. If Russia controlled much of the mainland and the hinterland, Japan controlled the Sea of Japan and Korea. In 1902 Great Britain and Japan made a treaty of alliance, taken in Europe as a significant sign of the end of Britain's policy of isolation. In 1904 the Japanese, without declaring war, suddenly attacked by sea the Russian base at Port Arthur, and both countries concentrated armies in Manchuria. The Trans-Siberian railway was not completed, which put Russia at the great disadvantage of having to rely on the remote operations of naval power. When she sent her Baltic fleet to the Far East, it was intercepted and destroyed by the new Japanese navy in the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea. In Manchuria the two armies clashed in the great battle of Mukden, and there, too, Russia was defeated. President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States intervened to persuade both governments to make peace.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 Japan regained the Liaotung peninsula with Port Arthur, and also the southern half of the northern island of Sakhalin; a protectorate over Korea, which remained independent of China; and concessions in Manchuria, which remained technically Chinese. Just as Abyssinia had routed Italy, so Japan had routed Russia; it was clear that colored peoples might now learn to hold their own against white peoples. Russian expansion, checked in the Far East, was

⁴ See p. 799.

diverted back again to the Balkans,⁵ while the internal effects of her defeat precipitated the revolution of 1905. At the same time the moral that rapid westernization had brought Japan victory was learned elsewhere, and encouraged the nationalist revolutions of Persia in 1905, Turkey in 1908, China in 1911. Before 1914 the consequence of imperialism in Asia was already that stimulation of nationalism in the undeveloped countries of Asia which has remained the dominating feature of their subsequent history. All that the war did was to weaken Russia still further, give Japan her unique opportunity to become a great world power in the Pacific, and so to hasten and clarify the tendencies that were already apparent before 1914.

Colonial Collisions

THE SIMULTANEOUS expansion of European powers overseas, especially during the twenty years after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85,⁶ brought them into frequent collisions at remote points all over Africa and the Far East. The history of international relations in these years is studded with such collisions, and accumulatively this kind of friction—the irritations of rival colonial claims and frontier disputes—no doubt added to tensions between the powers in Europe. But there is no evidence that colonial issues were in any instance decisive in determining the final alignment of powers in the two great rival systems of alliances.⁷ In some respects the relations of powers in the colonial field cut across their relations within the continent of Europe and positively helped to delay the hardening of the rival alliances. It was, significantly enough, only after 1904, when almost all the colonial issues had been substantially settled but when the Eastern Question came to predominate, that the alliances took final shape. Only then began that slithering of the powers down the inclined plane toward 1914, which looks, in retrospect, so fatalistic. In Africa and the Pacific there was usually enough elbowroom for compromise, and until after 1904 even disputes about the Near East could be settled by promising or taking “compensations” at the expense of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans or in North Africa. It was when the world’s resources of such cheap “compensations” were exhausted, in the decade after 1904, that European tensions reached breaking point. The beginning of the twentieth century brought not only the “end of the frontier” in American history; it brought a limit to the expansion of the world’s colonial frontiers in general and forced the powers back upon their more dangerous rivalries in

⁵ See p. 483.

⁶ See p. 466.

⁷ See Chapter 21.

Europe where no freedom of maneuver remained. Thereafter it was Morocco—the one remaining semidetached territory in Africa—which remained the only source of important colonial disputes.

It was intense French concentration on revenge for defeat in 1871, on the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, and on the security of her north-eastern frontier which had led to the war scare of 1875. It was the diversion of French energies and enterprise to colonial expansion in Africa and Indochina which helped, as Bismarck had shrewdly hoped, to ease Franco-German relations. The old rankling anxieties never completely disappeared. They revived from time to time, and in the 1880's General Boulanger could become popular by exploiting the deep-rooted fears and nationalist animosities of the French people.⁸ But thereafter Franco-German relations undoubtedly eased until after 1900, when the aggressive gestures of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his advisers resuscitated old fears in France and bred new distrusts in Britain—though the Anglo-German naval rivalry began to be a more decisive force in international relations than even Franco-German animosities. Likewise, by making common cause in the Far East against China in the Boxer rising in 1900 and against Japan in 1905, the western powers found a new community of interests and fresh ground for co-operation—just as in 1884–85 they had co-operated in settling the future of the Congo basin. Indeed the satisfactory settlement of colonial disputes became a normal prerequisite for making the alliances; and had colonial rivalries been decisive in shaping alliances, they would have tended to drive Britain more toward Germany than toward France or Russia.

The Anglo-French entente of 1904 was made on the basis of resolving mutual conflicts in Egypt and Morocco, the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907 on the basis of settling their separate spheres of influence in Persia. Italy, the one power that allowed colonial ambitions to govern its diplomacy, ended by making agreements with all the powers in turn and remained the most unpredictable and unreliable ally of either side. Diplomatically, colonial collisions were always disturbing, but they were certainly not decisive in making the situation that precipitated war between the rival alliances in 1914. There is strong evidence that all the most important colonial disputes had been settled before 1914. The crucial rivalry in naval power between Britain and Germany was by no means exclusively related to the possession of colonies. It affected the national security of the British Isles themselves, and Germany's bid to add great naval power to her existing military superiority in Europe alarmed France almost as much as it spurred Britain into activity.

The main tensions between powers induced by colonial collisions may be listed as the six disputes: between Britain and France about Egypt; between Britain and Germany over South Africa; between Brit-

⁸ See p. 343.

ain and Russia about Persia; between Germany and Russia about the Balkans; between Russia and Japan about China; and between Germany and France about Morocco, involving three crises. It is only by examining briefly the nature of each of these disputes—all of which occurred between 1895 and 1911—that it becomes possible to assess more precisely the significance of imperialism as a source of world war. In addition to these disputes, which were settled only after causing considerable heat and excitement and in one instance the Russo-Japanese War, there were many others which were arranged more amicably. The opening up of the great Congo basin, which had all the makings of a major quarrel between the competing powers of Belgium, France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal, was satisfactorily settled by the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. Despite the internal barbarities which aroused much hostile comment abroad, Belgian control over the area was eventually established in 1908 and paved the way for the peaceful and mainly beneficial development of the territory ever since. Britain's dispute with the United States over Venezuela in 1895 seemed, absurdly enough, capable of provoking war between them; but it was permanently settled by the eventual wisdom of both governments in appealing to arbitration.

Egypt and the Sudan. Frictions between Britain and France about Egypt and the Sudan, which caused the first dispute, reached their climax in 1898 in the famous incident of Fashoda. They dated back to the years between 1850 and 1870, when French and British business interests and engineers built the Suez Canal and Egyptian railroads, and when Egyptian cotton assumed a new importance in world markets (especially in British markets) during the American Civil War. More than any other part of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt in 1870 had become westernized in its economy and tastes. To celebrate the official opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Verdi's opera *Aida* had been first performed in the new opera house built in Cairo by the highly westernized Khedive, Ismail. But the lavish foreign loans needed to keep up this process of westernization put the Khedive more and more at the mercy of French and British banking interests. In 1879 they forced Ismail to abdicate and replaced him by Tewfik, who offered them better opportunities for investment. Britain and France set up a system of financial "dual control." Led by Arabi Pasha and the Egyptian army, there grew up a characteristic oriental movement of militant nationalism, opposed both to the foreign intruders and to the government that permitted such intrusions. Riots in Alexandria in 1882 led to British bombardment of the town and to the disembarkation of British troops at Suez and Alexandria. Egypt under Tewfik became, by French default, virtually a British protectorate, holding at bay both the native nationalists and the claims of Turkey. Between 1883 and 1907 Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) was established as British consul general, and under his able guidance the country was mod-

ernized and efficiently administered. The interest due on loans from British and French investors alike could be paid regularly because the country's economy was expertly developed and the system of taxation was overhauled. British engineers built the Aswân dam in 1902. The French came to resent being ousted so much from Egypt, but consoled themselves by extending their control over other parts of North Africa and the Near East. By the 1890's, with the exploration of the interior of Africa, fresh fields for Anglo-French competition appeared in the Sudan. Nominally governed by Egypt, it was in effect governed by nobody.

Egyptian forces had had to be withdrawn from the Sudan in 1885, after General Gordon had been killed at Khartoum. But Britain, firmly established on the lower Nile, made it clear that she would look upon any advance of the French into the upper Nile valley as a hostile act. In 1895 Sir Edward Grey stated in the House of Commons that the advance of a French expedition from the other side of Africa toward the Nile "would be an unfriendly act, and would be so viewed by England." In March the following year Britain decided to reconquer the Sudan and assembled a strong Anglo-Egyptian force in Egypt under Sir Herbert Kitchener. From Uganda in the south the railroad was pushed northward, and some began to dream of one continuous Cape-to-Cairo territory all under British control. Frenchmen, meanwhile, had dreamed a dream that cut right across this project—the completion of one continuous belt of French territory stretching from Dakar to the Gulf of Aden, from the basin of the Congo and French West Africa right across the upper reaches of the Nile and joining onto Abyssinia and French Somaliland in the east. The missing link was the gap between the southernmost limits of effective Egyptian power in the Sudan and the northernmost bounds of British power in Uganda. The strategic point in this gap was Fashoda, whose fortress had fallen into bad repair but which gave control of the waters of the Nile, upon which the whole of Egypt depended for its existence.

Toward this nodal point there began in 1896 a great race. The French leader was Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand, an explorer and soldier still in his thirties, and a passionate opponent of English colonialism. His march across darkest Africa, taking with him in pieces the steamer *Faidherbe* which he could reassemble when he reached the Nile, was itself an epic adventure. Its boiler was rolled on logs for hundreds of miles through the tropical forest. After more than a year Marchand reached Fashoda, on July 16, 1898. He restored the fort, made a treaty with the local chief, who put his territory under French rule, and hoisted the French flag over the fort. A fortnight later two messengers arrived from Kitchener, announcing that British forces had destroyed the Sudanese dervishes at the battle of Omdurman and that Kitchener himself would soon arrive at Fashoda. A few hours later Kitchener arrived with

five gunboats and some two thousand men, a force very much greater than Marchand's little band of Senegalese riflemen. The French had won the race in time, but Kitchener was there with superior strength, firmly based on the Nile and on British sea power in the Mediterranean. Marchand's garrison was only an isolated outpost. But it held on bravely, and its leader remembered the bold words of his foreign minister when he undertook the expedition: "You are going to fire a pistol shot on the Nile; we accept all its consequences."

The deadlock at Fashoda brought Britain and France to the brink of war. When the news reached London and Paris, public opinion reacted wildly and irresponsibly. British opinion was still smarting from the failure of the Jameson Raid in South Africa⁹ and the irritation of unpopularity in Europe; French opinion was being inflamed by the Dreyfus case. Fortunately the two men at Fashoda behaved with soldierly dignity and gallantry.

"I must hoist the Egyptian flag here," said Kitchener.

"Why, I myself will help you to hoist it—over the village," replied Marchand.

"Over the fort."

"No, that I shall resist."

"Do you know, Major, that this affair may set France and England at war?"

"I bowed," records Marchand, "without replying."

They agreed that Kitchener should hoist the Egyptian flag over an outlying part of the fort, but the French flag remained flying over the fort itself. With this sensible compromise, and with no bloodshed, the soldiers passed the dilemma back to their governments.

Fortunately, too, the foreign ministers of the two countries were more reasonable than opinion in press and country. The new French minister, Théophile Delcassé, saw the matter in broad perspective. He knew that Lord Salisbury's cabinet would be quite unyielding on the Sudan; that Marchand could easily be overwhelmed and that French naval power in the Mediterranean was no match for British. France's larger diplomacy, of seeking Russian and British support against Germany, forbade an open breach with Britain, from which Germany would be only too eager to profit. Nor would Russia support France on such an issue. British reactions were violent, and both Joseph Chamberlain and Michael Hicks-Beach used strong language, which made compromise difficult. But Salisbury had no desire for war, and was ready to wait to reach diplomatic agreement. At last, in March, 1899, agreement was reached. Marchand was withdrawn.

The watershed of the Nile and the Congo was made the dividing line between British and French spheres of influence. Though France

⁹ See p. 479.

was totally excluded from the Nile valley, she secured all her gains west of the watershed. She consolidated the whole hinterland of French West Africa, for Britain agreed not to seek territory or influence westward. Amid the general sense of humiliation and bitterness in France, Delcassé withstood the attacks of the violent nationalists. French interests lay first in security in Europe against Germany; he counted as slight the loss of Fashoda so long as these could be guaranteed by a closer understanding with Britain. When the fury died down on both sides, the two countries paradoxically found themselves nearer to a general understanding. Britain, where many began to feel ashamed of intransigence, reflected on the dangers of being at variance with both Germany and France at the same time; France realized that alliance with Russia alone was not enough. Italy, whose defeat at Adowa by the Abyssinians in March, 1896, had first left open the upper Nile to a French advance, remained an unjoyful third party, having gained neither territory nor allies. So did colonial events react in diverse ways on the system of international alliances. With Kitchener had been a young soldier called Winston Churchill; with Marchand, another called Charles Mangin. They were to fight as allies in 1914.

South Africa. The second dispute occurred when relations between Great Britain and Germany were complicated by similar developments in South Africa. South of the equator the relative positions of German and British colonial possessions corresponded to those of French and British north of the equator; that is, British expansion northward from the Cape to Uganda was intersected by the transverse pressure of Germany between German Southwest Africa and German East Africa. Here the gap between the two German colonies was filled by the Portuguese possession of Angola and by the Congo Free State. As already shown, the status of the Congo Free State had been determined by the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. In 1898 Germany held secret discussions with Britain about the possibility of partitioning the Portuguese colonies. They led to nothing, because Britain preferred Portugal to Germany as the governing power in these intermediate regions. Fresh dynamism in pressing the Cape-to-Cairo scheme had come from Cecil Rhodes, who in 1890 had become prime minister of Cape Colony. His drive into the territories which came to bear his name (Rhodesia) bypassed the two little Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. After British annexation of the Cape in 1814 the simple, obstinate, Dutch farmers had increasingly experienced pressure, and had tended to retreat before it. They even began their "great trek" in 1836 to escape from British rule. Descendants of the original Dutch settlers at the Cape in the seventeenth century, they clung, as did the French settlers of Canada, to their old ways of life and were opposed to the great new mining promoters who flocked into the territory after the discovery of gold and

diamonds in the 1870's. Paul Kruger, president of the Transvaal, which had asserted its independence in 1881 at the battle of Majuba Hill, symbolized their attitude of truculent obstruction and old-fashioned resentment toward new trends. When the discovery of gold in the Transvaal attracted a new batch of fortune hunters, Kruger treated them as "outlanders" and refused them full citizenship. Their status became the formal cause of war between British and Boers in 1899, but the substantial cause was the clash of two opposed ways of life. Meanwhile, in 1895, a band of irregular troops led by Dr. Jameson carried out a raid into the Transvaal from the Cape, encouraged by Cecil Rhodes who hoped to precipitate revolt. The raid was a complete failure, and brought upon Britain great criticism in Europe.

Feelings were particularly bitter in Germany. On the birthday of Kaiser Wilhelm II, in January, 1895, Kruger had been entertained by the German Club at Pretoria. In proposing a toast to the Kaiser, he had spoken of Germany as a "grown-up power that would stop England from kicking the child republic." Clumsy British protests in Berlin, and even clumsier German counterprotests, set the stage for news of the Jameson Raid and its failure. The Kaiser at once sent Kruger a telegram, congratulating him on successfully repulsing the invaders "without appealing for the help of friendly powers." This served only to divert British anger in full blast upon Germany, and made Kruger appear not as an injured innocent but as a plotter with Germany against British power in South Africa. In Germany the naval enthusiasts seized the chance to point their favorite moral: that only greater naval power could equip Germany to withstand such a policy. On both sides relations deteriorated. Friedrich von Holstein, in the German foreign office, seized the occasion of Britain's isolation in Europe to propose co-operation of all the other powers against her. The Dual Alliance of France and Russia might find common ground with the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) in concerting their colonial aims and forming a united front against the arch-imperialist power. But German policy, as others soon suspected, was aimed not at the final estrangement of Britain but only at forcing her into co-operation with the Triple Alliance by demonstrating the perils of isolation. The German proposal discreetly omitted to mention Egypt, which alone might have interested France; in the Transvaal France had no interest whatever. When Britain became involved in the Boer War (1899-1902), it was only Russia who proposed intervention, and Germany who refused to interfere. Although it took three years of fighting to subdue the two Boer republics, they were at last incorporated into the Union of South Africa in 1910 without having become the occasion of a European war. As over Fashoda, European states were apt to draw back from war among themselves about colonial disputes, however much they might snarl and hint at hostilities.

Persia. The third main imperial dispute in which Britain became involved in these years was with Russia about Persia. Russian imperial expansion in Turkestan, east of the Caspian Sea, brought her into contact with Afghanistan and Persia, just as her earlier spread southward, to the west of the Caspian, had led to encroachment upon Persia. The policy of Britain, fearful as ever of Russian designs upon India, was to support Afghans and Persians as buffers against such pressure. In 1885 they settled by arbitration details of the Russo-Afghan frontier in the Pendjeh area. By 1894 they reached an agreement about frontiers between the Russian and Indian empires in the Pamir mountains on the roof of the world. The biggest remaining problem was Persia. In 1890 the Persian government was given a loan by Britain, who took as security for it the control of customs in the ports of the Persian Gulf. Ten years later it received a comparable loan from Russia, who took as security all other Persian customs. Persia under the Shah was falling into the same position as Turkey under the Sultan—a decrepit and bankrupt eastern state, crumbling before the economic and political pressures of the great powers and losing all control over its own fate.

There was the usual consequence in 1905—a nationalist revolution that led to the calling of a nationally representative parliament. It was aimed against both the old regime of the Shah and the foreigners to which it had become subservient. Here again it proved possible to compromise. In August, 1907, Britain and Russia signed a convention defining their spheres of influence, and erecting neutral zones between them. The northern part of Persia, adjoining the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, became a Russian sphere of influence; the southeastern, adjacent to Afghanistan and India, a British sphere of influence. The center, including the Persian Gulf, was to be a neutral zone. At the same time Russia renounced direct contact with Afghanistan, and Tibet was made a neutral buffer state. The settlement did not, indeed, prove final. Russian ambitions revived, strengthened by the inclusion of the Persian capital of Teheran in their zone. In 1909, when a liberal revolution overthrew the Shah, who was Russia's protégé, it attracted British sympathy. When oil became important, the British found themselves in the more advantageous position to exploit it, and the Anglo-Persian Oil company did so. For these reasons, Anglo-Russian relations remained strained until eased by alliance in war when, in 1915, Russia agreed to British control over the original neutral zone. This was a colonial dispute resolved by the need for alliance in war, not a source of friction causing war—just as the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 formed part of that general settlement of disputes which had created the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Britain.

Crucial factors in the forging of this Entente were the proven difficulties of reconciling the three other major colonial conflicts of these

years: between Russia and Germany about the Balkans, between Russia and Japan about China, and between Germany and France about Morocco. It was clear that disputes of the kind already described, even when involving issues of national prestige and long-term national security, such as Fashoda and the Boer War and Persia, were capable of being handled so as to preclude war between the major powers. In each of the remaining three disputes, one side felt its national security too intimately involved to yield to the other: Germany could not forego her eastern expansion into an area of vital economic interests; France could not accept German intrusion into North African and Mediterranean affairs; Russia could not accept permanent exclusion from China by Japanese power. Of all colonial issues, here were three more liable to endanger European peace, more likely to cause war because they were so closely related to the intrinsic policies and interests of the powers. Compared with these, Anglo-French maneuvers about the Sudan or Anglo-Russian wrangles about Persia seemed remote and peripheral.

Pan-Germans and Pan-Slavs. The fourth major colonial dispute was between Germany and Russia. The ultimate collision of their interests in eastern Europe became evident with the growth of Pan-Slavism and of Pan-Germanism. The incompatibility of German expansion eastward with Russian expansion westward underlay the failure of the Three Emperors' League, Germany's increasing reliance upon Austria-Hungary, and the making of the alliance between France and Russia. In the 1870's Pan-Slavism was propagated by many writers, including the great novelist Fëodor Dostoevski and the publicist N. I. Danilevsky, whose *Russia and Europe* appeared in 1871. It forecast a long war between Russia and Europe, culminating in a union of all Slav peoples and the extension of Slavdom over central Europe and large parts of the Turkish Empire. Romantic in flavor as was the original Prague congress of 1848,¹⁰ Pan-Slavism became in this period a tool of more realistic politics—favored by the Slavs of the Balkans only as a possible bludgeon against Turkey, by the Russian government only as a mask for Russian imperialism. It played little part in arousing the Balkan revolts of these years¹¹ which sprang from indigenous nationalisms; yet it exacerbated relations between the great powers, particularly between Russia and Germany, because it stood for an indefinitely ambitious program of expansion.

Its counterpart, Pan-Germanism, was a more direct emanation from German nationalism, appealing strongly to the fast-growing German middle class. The Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*) of 1891 was supported mainly by business men, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, and its first president was Karl Peters. Its program, as it developed during the 1890's, was twofold: the union of all Germans in the world into one

¹⁰ See p. 193.

¹¹ See pp. 428-431.

great German state, with an enlarged central Germany at its heart; and the claim of this state to rule the world. Its advocates usually included within it the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, and parts of Switzerland. The Pan-German League helped to co-ordinate the activities of other nationalist societies such as the Navy League, the Army League, and the Colonial Society. It developed powerful connections and support overseas and in governmental, industrial, and journalistic circles within Germany. In policy it was strongly tinged with anti-Semitism and with anti-Slavism and, alike in its racial streaks and in the boundlessness of its objectives, it was a precursor of postwar National Socialism. The Pan-German program came close to fulfillment under Hitler after 1940; the Pan-Slav, under Stalin after 1945.¹²

Symbolic of the clash between Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism was the project of the Berlin-Baghdad railroad, initiated by the *Deutsche Bank*. For Germany to drive a trade route right through the Balkans to the Persian Gulf required the co-operation of Austria and friendship with Turkey, and it involved head-on collision with Russian ambitions. The ostentatious wooing of Turkey by the Kaiser, who visited Constantinople in 1889, was accompanied by overt German interest in railroad concessions. Ten years later the concession was granted, but only after negotiations for it had evoked characteristic reactions from the powers. Britain at first welcomed it: men like Cecil Rhodes, who had comparable ambitions of his own for a Cape-to-Cairo railroad, saw it as a useful diversion of German interests away from Africa. France welcomed it as making Germany equally interested in maintaining Turkish independence against Russia, and offered to put up some of the capital. The Russians were afraid of it, and since they could not forbid it, they tried to make an arrangement about it. They proposed that Germany, in return for their consent to it, should promise them control of the Straits. The Germans, having no need to buy Russian consent, refused; but in 1900 Russia made an agreement with Turkey which required Russian consent for the building of railroads in the Black Sea areas of Asia Minor. In fact the railroad took so long to build that it was still only a fragment in 1914; and then France and Britain both reached agreement with Germany about it. The chief importance of the whole scheme had been its contribution to the accumulating frictions between Germany and Russia, and so to the widening of the gulf between the two systems of alliances in Europe.

The Russo-Japanese War. The fifth major colonial dispute, that between Russia and Japan in the Far East, showed how wide the bonds, and therefore the repercussions, of the system of alliances had become. In 1902 Britain signaled her abandonment of the policy of isolation and

¹² See pp. 753 and 790.

of "keeping a free hand," by concluding an alliance with Japan. Each power agreed that it would keep in the Far East "a naval force superior in strength to that of any third power." If either were attacked by more than one power, the other promised to come to its assistance. This agreement not only served warning on Germany, who now held colonial possessions in the Pacific, that she would be outweighed in that half of the world; by ruling out the danger of an alliance between Japan and Russia which would have put the British Far Eastern squadron in grave danger, it also enabled Britain to keep the bulk of her growing fleet nearer home. In February, 1904, Japan took advantage of her new strength to attack the Russian naval base of Port Arthur, bottling up the Russian Far Eastern fleet. The Russo-Japanese War which ensued,¹⁸ and which ended in Russian defeat, was primarily a colonial war—the only colonial war of these decades fought between two major powers. As a result of it the Japanese gained virtual possession of Korea (which they annexed five years later), annexed the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, and took over the Russian lease of the Liaotung peninsula, which gave them entry to Manchuria. The effects of the war on Europe were great. Although France was the ally of Russia, and Britain the ally of Japan, both countries kept out, while noting how much advantage Germany could gain if either should become involved. It encouraged the conclusion of the entente between France and Britain in 1904. The startling disclosure of Russia's governmental weakness, which led to revolution in 1905, and of the military and naval weakness brought about by the destruction of her Baltic fleet dissipated Germany's traditional nightmare of a two-front war, while it left France feeling more exposed by the enfeeblement of her one certain ally. These events in the Far East violently oscillated the balance of power in Europe, intensifying both German intransigence and French determination to find another ally.

Morocco. The sixth main imperial dispute was between Germany and France about Morocco, which was a recurrent bone of contention between them in the twenty years before 1914. By 1895 it was the one remaining part of the Ottoman territory in North Africa which remained at least semi-independent of European control. But in its mode of government it seemed peculiarly ill-fitted for such a status. Muley Hassan, one of the strongest sultans Morocco had known, died in 1894. He was succeeded by a boy of fourteen. Arthur Nicolson, the British consul-general in Morocco, described the land as a "loose agglomeration of turbulent tribes, corrupt governors, and general poverty and distress." Half the territory was normally in open revolt. Yet because of its strategic position at the mouth of the Mediterranean, and because of the strained relations between the great powers of Europe, this unhappy land was to prove a source of international dispute on three occasions between 1905

¹⁸ See p. 472.

and 1911. It provides vivid illustration of how relatively minor colonial issues could set the powers snarling at one another in the decade before war began. But it also shows how such issues were resolutely resolved and kept subordinate to considerations that most of the powers regarded as their more vital national interests.

The first Moroccan crisis occurred in 1905. France claimed special interests in Morocco because its southern frontier with Algeria had never been precisely defined and certain oases, essential to communications between Algeria and French Equatorial Africa, were disputed between France and the Sultan. Britain had trading interests in Morocco, as well as possessing Gibraltar on the other side of the straits. Germany, anxious to detach France from the entente of 1904 with Britain, decided to exploit the Moroccan question for this purpose. At the end of March, 1905, the Kaiser landed at Tangier in Morocco and indicated that his visit was intended to be formal recognition of the Sultan's independence. Since Germany had no traditional or direct interest in Morocco, and since Britain and France had so recently reached agreement about its status, this was a deliberately provocative act. It was also foolish, for it encouraged the Sultan to expect from Germany support that could not be given without incurring the risk of a European war; it rallied French opinion behind Delcassé's policy; and far from dislocating the entente, it fostered in Britain a new conception of it as something that had to be strenuously defended against German threats. It was the beginning of a long series of diplomatic blunders on the part of the Kaiser and, even more, of his chancellor, Prince von Bülow—blunders in the double sense that they had results the very opposite to what Germany intended, and that they greatly increased the accumulating fears and distrusts which precipitated war. Bülow made it clear to the French prime minister, Maurice Rouvier, that "so long as M. Delcassé remains in office there is no possibility of an improvement in Franco-German relations." Delcassé, architect of the entente, had been France's foreign minister for seven years; in June, 1905, he was forced to resign. Nationalist opinion in France naturally stormed at this humiliation, and the apparent pretension of Germany to dictate who might be France's foreign minister rallied British sympathy to the French side.

France yielded to Bülow's demands for an international conference to settle Moroccan affairs, which duly met at Algeciras in January, 1906. Diplomatic representatives of the great powers, including the United States, Spain, the Low Countries, Portugal, and Sweden, were all there. Contrary to her expectations, Germany found that only Austria supported her in the conference, whereas Britain, Russia, Italy, and Spain backed France. The mendacity and mystifications of German diplomacy during the conference did her irreparable harm. In the outcome, she gained nothing from the settlement save a share for the *Deutsche Bank*

in Morocco's new State Bank. The crucial issues were who should control the police forces and the finances in Morocco. It was decided that the Sultan's Moroccan police should be under joint French and Spanish control under a Swiss inspector general, and that Moroccan finances should be run by a state bank which would be international. In effect this left France in predominant control of the administration of Morocco (despite the formal declaration of its independence), and also in partial control of its finances. It was Germany, not France, which left the meetings at Algeciras feeling humiliated. Whereas the defection of Italy revealed the basic weakness of the Triple Alliance, the entente between Britain and France passed, as André Tardieu put it, "from a static to a dynamic state." While the conference was meeting, military experts of France and Britain discussed secret plans for landing a hundred thousand British troops in France if war should come.

The second Moroccan crisis arose in 1908, when the French invaded the German consulate at Casablanca in order to arrest three German deserters from their foreign legion. The "Casablanca incident" coincided with the much more important crisis caused by Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹⁴ and Berlin seized upon it as a diversion. It was settled by submission to arbitration at the Hague.¹⁵ In 1909 France and Germany signed a declaration in which Germany recognized France's political predominance in Morocco, and France in return undertook not to injure Germany's economic interests.

The climax of Moroccan crises, the third, occurred two years later, when French troops occupied Fez, the most important town in Morocco, in the cause of maintaining order and protecting the Sultan against rebels. Germany demanded compensation, and indulged in the dramatic gesture of sending the German warship *Panther* to the Moroccan port of Agadir. If the French had been within their rights in marching on Fez, they had thereby aroused sleeping dogs all over Europe, in Madrid and London as well as in Berlin. The *Panther's* arrival in Agadir set these dogs barking, for it looked as if Germany was again brandishing the big stick. Britain's bark took the form of Lloyd George's speech at the Mansion House in London, wherein he declared:

I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. . . . But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.

¹⁴ See p. 438.

¹⁵ See p. 502.

Coming from the man who had opposed the Boer War and who was allegedly leader of the pro-German pacifists in the British government, these words had a startling effect. The British fleet prepared for action, and compromise between France and Germany became even more improbable. In November, Germany agreed, however, to a French protectorate over Morocco, in return for two strips of territory (100,000 square miles) in the French Congo, and the *Panther* was withdrawn. In all three countries public opinion remained angry, and the German Navy League used the crisis, as usual, to demand more dreadnoughts. The main effect of the crisis of Agadir was to accentuate Anglo-German rivalry and distrust, and to inflame public opinion in the cause of national prestige. This crisis and the Casablanca incident were more ominous forebodings of war than any of the previous crises. Prince von Bülow himself summed it up from the German point of view:

Like a damp squib, it startled, then amused the world, and ended by making us look ridiculous. After the leap of the *Panther* on Agadir there was a fanfare which, on Lloyd George's speech, died down in the most inglorious chamade.

The mere narration of these six main colonial collisions serves to emphasize to what extent political and strategic, rather than economic or financial considerations, governed the behavior of the great powers in the colonial field. Even where strong economic considerations existed, as with French trading concerns in Morocco or British oil interests in Persia, such considerations were kept entirely subordinate to political and strategic necessities or merely to issues of national prestige and dignity. When strong French financial interests, led by the minister of finance Rouvier, wanted to take part along with Germany in making the Berlin-Baghdad railway, they were prevented by the government under the influence of Delcassé, who was anxious not to annoy Russia. Apprehensions about national security and the quest for reliable alliances so engaged the attention of the governments of most of the powers that their decisions, whether to pursue active imperialist policies or to moderate their policies of expansion and settle colonial conflicts with other powers, were determined first by political calculations and only secondarily by economic. For this reason economic pressure groups tended to operate directly on public opinion, inflaming jingo sentiments for sectional advantage or urging policies that masked economic motives behind nationalistic slogans. Only rarely were the actions of governments directly guided by purely economic motives. International relations were conducted mainly by diplomats of the old school, and even many of the politicians were men who had been trained more in diplomacy than in statesmanship. Their dispatches show very little interest in economic conditions or social forces, and no understanding of the hopes of ordinary folk

for a more just social order, but only a profound absorption in the skilled game of power politics. Enshrouded in suspicions, alert to every sign of subtle shifts in the balance of power, they tirelessly and purposefully pursued the interests of their countries as they understood them; and they understood them almost exclusively in terms of alliances and counteralliances, maneuvers and bargains, always with the single purpose of enhancing national security and power.

For this reason the final understanding of the long sequences of interrelated events which led—in retrospect so remorselessly—to the outbreak of world war in 1914 must be sought neither in the Eastern Question alone, nor in imperialism alone, but in that delicate network of alliances and understandings between the major powers which it was the special craftsmanship of the diplomats to weave and to handle. Here was the snare in which all became eventually enmeshed, set usually in secret and at times wrenched violently by clumsiness of statecraft, yet potent enough, in the absence of any firmer and larger organization of world affairs, to drag all alike over the brink of disaster in 1914.

CHAPTER 21

THE SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES

Triple Alliance and Triple Entente

DESPITE occasional and momentary *rapprochements* between them, the enduring hostility between France and Germany was one of the most constant factors in international diplomacy between 1871 and 1914. It was on the assumption that this enmity would always, in the end, supervene over all other considerations, that the system of great alliances was built. On the side of Germany, Bismarck's main purpose was to preserve the settlement of 1871¹ and to ensure, for Germany at least, a generation of peace in which to consolidate her new-found national unity. On the side of France, once the most violent passions demanding revenge and the most violent fears of a preventive war had subsided, the main purpose was to find allies that would save her from the friendless isolation which had brought about her downfall in 1871. In this sense, the basic desire of the two most constant enemies in Europe was defensive rather than offensive. Not even the desire to recover Alsace and Lorraine—strong though that desire remained in the hearts of Lorrainers like Maurice Barrès and Raymond Poincaré—was greater than the anxiety to find some counterweight to the new supremacy of Germany in Europe. Germany had usurped France's traditional role as the superpower of western and central Europe, and had destroyed all balance. For the first time in centuries France herself was no longer a threat to the balance of power, but rather, like Britain before her, the mainspring of a policy which sought to recreate a balance of power in Europe.

France found Britain for long unresponsive to taking any share in this task. Britain saw in the existence of five major continental powers, where previously there had been only four, the elements of an almost automatic balance of power. She was so accustomed to regarding France or Russia, rather than Austria-Hungary or Prussia, as the most likely menace to an equable balance in Europe, that she was slow to appreciate

¹ See p. 298.

the full implications of German ascendancy, both diplomatic and economic. Even in 1904 the disposition of her east-coast naval bases still reflected the belief that France would be the main enemy. Her conception of the "balance of power" itself had always been different from the French or Italian. As befitted a nation of shopkeepers who had prospered on becoming the bankers of the world, she thought of it as like a balance at the bank—a reserve of security to be drawn upon for normal purposes, and to be reinforced by her own efforts only when the credit balance looked like disappearing. Her ideal arrangement of Europe was one which, like her own constitution, rested on a system of checks and balances operating smoothly and automatically so as to preserve the liberties and independence of all nations, yet calling for no engagement or commitment on her own part until one power should become so dangerously overgrown as to threaten this stability. Then, but only then, and as an emergency expedient, would she throw her own weight into the balance against it. This was what she had done against Louis XIV, against Napoleon, against Russia in the Crimean War. Meanwhile, it was essential for her, if she was to fulfill this ultimate role successfully, to keep a free hand and avoid firm precommitments to either side. She had interests and concerns enough elsewhere in the world. These she safeguarded by her naval supremacy, which was still, in the 1870's, completely unchallenged. Her traditions, her interests, and—as her leading statesmen mostly conceived it—her duty to Europe, all coincided most happily to justify the policy of "splendid isolation."

Bismarckian Diplomacy. Confronted with British isolationism, Bismarck set to work to make Austria-Hungary his major ally. To this he was driven by the precariousness of the Three Emperors' League of 1873, the collapse of which has already been considered.² The Dual Alliance of the two Germanic powers, concluded in 1879 but kept secret for some years, became the foundation of the Triple Alliance. The outcome of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 had indicated Austria, not Russia, as Bismarck's major ally, while it had left Russia as a possible ally of France.³ The Treaty of Vienna in 1879 assured Austria-Hungary of Germany's support in the event of a direct attack on her by Russia; and although the promise was for "reciprocal protection," this was its most substantial effect. It stipulated that if "one of the two Empires shall be attacked on the part of Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to assist each other with the whole of the military power of their Empire, and consequently only to conclude peace conjointly and by agreement." If either were to be attacked by any power other than Russia, the other signatory was pledged at least to a benevolent neutrality. This meant that Germany would back no aggressive Austrian policy in the

² See p. 435.

³ See p. 432.

Balkans, while Austria would back no aggressive German policy toward France. It was, therefore, a defensive alliance. It left Bismarck with the problem of trying to prevent Russia from drifting into alliance with France. The new tsar, Alexander III, was amenable, and in 1881 Bismarck revived the *Dreikaiserbund* with this end in view. But again it foundered on the rocks of Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans; hence his Reinsurance Treaty of 1887, wherein Russia undertook not to support France should she make war on Germany, and gained in return a German promise to back Russian interests in the Balkans.

Meanwhile the Triple Alliance was completed in 1882, when Germany and Austria made a further treaty with Italy. Stimulated by her annoyance at the French seizure of Tunis the year before, Italy was induced to make this agreement with her traditional nationalist enemy, Habsburg Austria, and with Germany for whom she bore no affection. Its terms were that both other powers would support Italy if she were attacked without provocation by France. Italy in return was pledged to support either of her allies only if it were attacked by two or more great powers, but would aid Germany if she were attacked by France alone. At Italy's special request, both her allies agreed that in no case would the treaty operate against Great Britain. These stipulations show how carefully the treaty was geared to the peculiar needs of Germany and Italy. Each of them gained further security against attack by France. Italy, however, was not obliged to back Austria except in conjunction with Germany and against at least two other major powers—that is, in the event of a general European war; and even then, if Britain were involved, she had reserved the right to contract out of this obligation. Austria-Hungary gained little from the bargain, save uncertain Italian backing in a general war and the promise of German backing against attack by two other powers, not merely against Russia. She did not secure Italian aid against an attack by Russia alone. In 1883 Rumania adhered to the Triple Alliance, and gradually Turkey also, despite her war with Italy in 1911, was drawn into its ambit. It must be remembered that, in those days of secret diplomacy, Italy did not know of the existence of the Dual Alliance when she signed the Triple Alliance treaty in 1882; and although France in 1883 knew of the existence of the Triple Alliance, its precise terms were not divulged before 1918. This lack of precise knowledge intensified fears and stimulated other powers in their incessant search for allies.

French Diplomacy. The Triple Entente had its corresponding foundation in the Franco-Russian entente of 1893. After Bismarck ceased to be German chancellor in 1890, his successors abandoned the careful delicacy of his diplomacy. They allowed the Reinsurance Treaty to lapse. Faced with the obvious hardening of the German-Austrian alliance, Russia became more responsive to French overtures, the more so as she

urgently needed French loans. At the end of 1893 Russia and France signed a military convention in which Russia undertook, if France were attacked by Germany or by Germany and Italy together, to go to war with Germany; and in return France pledged support for Russia if she were attacked by Germany, or by Austria and Germany together. Again, although the existence of the agreement was admitted two years later, its exact terms were not disclosed until 1918. At the expense of throwing in her lot with Russia to the extent of committing herself to take part in any future Russo-German war, France had by 1893 defeated the central purpose of Bismarck's diplomacy since 1871. Provided that Russian promises could be trusted, France would not again find herself fighting Germany alone.

It is a measure of the strength of British isolationist traditions that eleven more years elapsed before France could secure any assurance from Great Britain. Distrust of Russia reinforced British inclinations to keep a free hand in Europe, and for a time there was even a possibility that she might commit herself to the Triple Alliance, or at least to Germany rather than to France. Britain's alliance with Japan in 1902 was directed mainly against their common enemy, Russia, and might be expected to render still more improbable any *rapprochement* with Russia's ally, France.⁴ Only the mounting menace of German naval power and blundering German diplomacy could have overcome this tendency to aloofness. By 1902 they had successfully done so, for Britain nursed bitter memories of the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger; and Joseph Chamberlain, leading advocate of an alliance with Germany, had had rebuffs enough to turn his thoughts toward France. At the beginning of 1902 the German ambassador in London reported that he had learned, in the strictest confidence, of negotiations between Chamberlain and the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, for a general settlement of colonial disputes. In 1903 King Edward VII visited Paris, where he was welcomed with great popular enthusiasm, and the French president paid a return visit to London. Negotiations took nearly a year, but in April, 1904, the agreement was signed. It marked the beginning of the *entente cordiale* which was to survive for more than fifty years.

The famous agreement was viewed by the British foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne, as a purely colonial settlement—extensive and important, but exclusively colonial. So, in substance, it was. Its main provision gave France a free hand in Morocco in return for the cession to Britain of her rights and historic position in Egypt. It was in a sense a mutual recognition of spheres of interest and influence in North Africa. It also removed points of friction in other parts of the world—in Siam, Madagascar, the New Hebrides, Newfoundland, west and central Africa. For European affairs the most significant article was the last, in which the

⁴ See p. 472.

two governments agreed "to afford to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration." This made Morocco the focus of European disputes during the next decade⁵ and the occasion of several German discomfitures. Four articles of the agreement only were kept secret, but these were of little importance and added nothing to the extent of formal commitments. France and the United Kingdom were not in military alliance, and the agreement was not aimed specifically at Germany. But the lasting removal of Anglo-French frictions and the reconciliation of the two western powers betokened, as the French foreign minister Delcassé foresaw, a new era in European politics. The completion of the Triple Entente three years later, by the corresponding compromise about Anglo-Russian disputes in Persia, marked the hardening of Europe into two rival camps. Again, this was no military alliance. British susceptibilities were fully respected by avoiding any commitment to Russia which was inconsistent with her pledges to Japan. But since France was Russia's ally, and Britain and France in the course of the following years entered into undertakings about the disposal of their fleets in time of war, the judgment of most European statesmen, that Britain had at last given her long-coveted casting vote for the Entente powers, was not far from the truth. Morally, and in certain circumstances diplomatically, Britain would now back France in any future clash with Germany.

The Alignment of Powers. By 1907, then, seven years before war began, the greater European powers had grouped themselves into two blocs: a predominantly military but defensive alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Rumania; and a predominantly diplomatic alliance between France, Russia, and Great Britain. Neither, it must be emphasized, was constructed as a preparation for war. Both were attempts to prevent war by appearing so strongly embattled with allies that the other would not dare to launch an attack. Just as Bismarck's original system of alliances had been devised to keep the peace, so, too, the system of rival alliances which grew up after his retirement was intended to keep the peace in Europe. Just as Bismarck's nightmare had been the possibility of a war on two fronts and encirclement, so France's nightmare had been diplomatic isolation and solitary defeat. Now, as France's nightmare had been dispersed, Germany's recurred. From the viewpoint of an easing of those general fears and distrusts in Europe which underlay the competition in armaments and the restless quest for alliances, the position was no better. It was even worse. German economic and naval might were now growing so fast that her neighbors were justifiably more apprehensive; while her diplomacy was conducted with such reckless neglect for others' fears that hopes of possible reconciliation

⁵ See p. 483.

receded still further. The road to war was paved with good Conventions—and bad manners.

So feverish was the state of public opinion in most countries, so busy in their intricate arts were the professional diplomats, that it was scarcely noted how abnormal was the new alignment of powers, or how great had been the diplomatic revolution that made it possible. For centuries Britain and France had been rivals, both in Europe and overseas; now they based concerted action in Europe on an agreed settlement of disputes overseas. Throughout the nineteenth century the shadow of the Russian bear had lain across the lines between Britain and India; now the British had come to amicable terms with Russia about all the frontiers between their two empires. So complete a reversal of traditional animosities meant a radical change of outlook and a new balance of power in the world. So, too, the arch-enemy of both German and Italian nationalists for a century or more had been Austria of the Habsburgs, and both had fought wars with her within living memory. Yet now they found themselves her allies, pledged to help defend her against even their old friends and sympathizers such as the British and the French. The system of rival alliances marked the liquidation of nineteenth-century relationships, the abandonment of traditional foreign policies, the adoption by others of the new, mobile, dynamic diplomacy invented by Cavour and Bismarck.

The complexities of this new international order are suggested not only by the intricate provisions of the separate treaties of alliance, but also by the further minor alliances—the flying buttresses, as it were, of the new diplomatic fabric. Italy was especially active in the making of such agreements, and in the end made some agreement with every major power. In the Mediterranean Pact of 1887 with Britain, later extended to Austria, she was in effect promised the same sort of help in Tripoli as she might give Britain in Egypt, and in both cases the agreement was aimed against France. Lord Salisbury's promise of broader support was, however, couched in characteristically vague terms—"in general and to the extent that circumstances shall permit." Italy exchanged notes with Spain to preserve the *status quo* in Morocco. Together with Britain and Austria-Hungary she agreed to maintain peace and the *status quo* in the Near East, the Straits, and Bulgaria. When the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887, it was accompanied by new separate treaties with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Germany promised, in effect, to help Italy to get Tripoli if France got Morocco. In 1900 Italy also made the Racconigi agreement with Russia, aimed against Austria. Russia undertook to look favorably upon Italian claims to Tripoli, Italy to favor Russian claims for the opening of the Straits to Russian ships of war. Each promised not to make agreements with a third power about the Balkans without the

participation of the other. These promises not only ran counter to Italian obligations under the Triple Alliance, but were followed only a few days later by an agreement with Austria stipulating that neither state would make agreements with a third party without the knowledge of the other. The climax of duplicity was reached in 1902, in a secret agreement with France that each should remain neutral toward the other not only in the case of a war of aggression but also if the other "as a result of direct provocation, should find itself compelled in defence of its honor or security to take the initiative of a declaration of war." Italy's twofold determination, to get Tripoli and to have her bread buttered on both sides, led her into an astonishing tangle of conflicting promises until almost any action must involve the breach of some of them. Her secret and inconsistent promises reduced the system of alliances almost to a farce; and she was notably the one power whose European policy was so largely dominated by colonial aims. The others, guided by more constant considerations of national security or national interests in Europe, remained somewhat more predictable and reliable.

Italy's flirtations with both sides, and her eventual desertion of Triple Alliance for Triple Entente in 1915, raise the important question of why the promises made in the system of alliances proved so binding. In an age of secret diplomacy and cynical political realism, it might be expected that paper-promises would be felt to be so fragile as to be almost worthless. Germany's dismissal of her treaty-undertaking to respect Belgian neutrality as a mere "scrap of paper" when it ran counter to German military plans in 1914 suggests that such an attitude was not unknown. Yet the very alarm and denunciation which German action aroused on that occasion suggests, too, that it was rare. The deceitfulness involved in secret diplomacy, except when carried to Italian extremes, was expected to stop short at open breach of promise. Moreover, the greatest sanction behind treaty obligations was fear. The alliances themselves were cohesions of fear. Governments made them because they were afraid, because they came to dread diplomatic isolation, because if allies were in the market, it was always desirable to forestall a rival in buying them. There was always a seller's market for treaties of alliance, which was why Italy could sell to everybody. But since a price always had to be paid, each power found itself committed to backing an ally over disputes in which that power itself had no direct interest; peace became, in a phrase that was to become more prevalent but less applicable between the two wars, "indivisible." An outbreak of hostilities anywhere must, if the bonds of the alliances held, lead to a general war. The best hope for peace was that the powers, like bands of mountain climbers tied together with ropes, might contrive to restrain and haul back to safety any member of the party about to stumble over the edge of war. In the great Bosnian crisis of 1908 and in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and

1913.⁶ the system of alliances worked in this helpful manner. Allies served as powerful friction-brakes on the headstrong. But with the piling tensions of the international drama, it became ever more possible that the pulls would work the other way: that momentum of the more reckless and clumsy members might drag the cautious and reluctant over the edge with them into the abyss. That happened in 1914.

The philosophy behind the alliances, although their completion marked the total defeat of his purpose, was that of Bismarck. It rested on the assumption, truer in 1871 than it was in 1914, that there were five recognizably "great powers" in Europe: Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Great Britain. Italy counted by courtesy as a sixth, Ottoman Turkey as a very weak seventh. But in realistic terms there were only five. "You forget," said Bismarck to the Russian ambassador Saburov, "the importance of being a party of three on the European chess-board. . . . Nobody wishes to be in a minority. All politics reduce themselves to this formula: try to be *à trois* in a world governed by five powers." The *Dreikaiserbund*, had it been workable and durable, would have achieved this end for Germany. The Triple Alliance, which omitted Russia and in Italy included only the sixth power, could never serve this purpose. Even buttressed with Rumania and Turkey, it could not serve. The Triple Entente, though less formal, less binding, less military in purpose than the Triple Alliance, conformed more completely to Bismarck's principle. All three were undeniably great powers. What frustrated Bismarck's plan was that France—not Germany alone—adopted it. A world in which both these sworn enemies could contrive to be *à trois* was a fantastic, unarithmetical world, where the weights in the scales of power were so evenly balanced that only a long and exhausting tussle between the two sides could establish the superiority of one. Save that his decision to annex Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 saddled Germany with the lasting liability of French enmity, Bismarck was not to blame for the First World War. His conception of alliances was intended for German use only—applied universally it must, like the principle that might is right, end in absurdity. Even his conception of warfare was the opposite to that of 1914. His use of war was restricted to limited, finite wars for specific ends—instruments of precision for attaining definite objectives by decisive victory over isolated victims. The phenomenon of a general European war for indefinite objectives, even for determining the balance of power, would have been anathema to him. Yet this, in the course of events, is what his policy of alliances and his series of specific wars led to by 1914. The most important thing about the First World War is that it was the unsought, unintended end product of a long sequence of events which began in 1871. No man, no nation, worked for this result, which was the total outcome of the interplay of diverse policies and strategies

⁶ See p. 439.

usually aimed primarily at providing national security, stability, even peace. The first impression is one of fatality and fatalism—a drift of doom. But the historian, peering through the curtain which conceals the significance of events as recent as those within living memory, can detect at least a few features of the true image.

Germany and Britain. By 1900 two facts were certain: Germany was the greatest power in Europe, the British Empire was the greatest power in the world. With a rapidly expanding population of fifty-six million in the heart of Europe, a dynamic economy fast overtaking even that of Britain in industrialization, the strongest and best-equipped army on the continent, a firm alliance with Austria-Hungary, Germany was in 1900 the greatest power in Europe.⁷ Yet in the world at large—in that oceanic world which, throughout the previous century, had been dominated by British sea power—the British Empire loomed still mightier. It covered a quarter of the surface of the earth and included a quarter of mankind. Given the isolationism of the United States, and the effective extension of the Monroe Doctrine over central and south America by the growth of Pan-American organizations, British sea power controlled the high seas. Half the world's tonnage of merchant shipping was hers, and the lion's share of world trade. But unlike Germany's, Britain's populations and resources were not concentrated and compact. Most of her population lived in the widely separated areas of India and the British Isles; the rest were scattered over Africa, Canada, Australasia, and many small islands and outposts. Even by 1914 there were only some twenty-three thousand German settlers in German colonies—fewer than the number of Germans in France. In comparison with Germany's position of concentrated power in central Europe, the British Empire was peripheral and diffused.

This situation at the opening of the twentieth century meant that there was no balance of power anywhere: only an unbalance in Germany's favor in Europe, an unbalance in Britain's favor in the oceanic world. Between 1900 and 1914, with the expansion of German sea power and world trade on one hand, and the adhesion of Britain to the continental system of rival alliances on the other, there took place a gigantic contest about whether or not Germany's localized superiority could be widened by adding to it enough naval power to destroy British supremacy on the high seas. To do this Germany did not need to build a fleet larger than Britain's. The view of Admiral von Tirpitz was that German aims would be fulfilled by building a fleet which, in time of war, could sink enough British ships to reduce British naval strength below the two-power standard, and so expose it to defeat by any other two naval powers. His policy, like Bismarck's diplomacy, relied for success on Germany's being *à trois* in a world of five great powers. It was equally inappropriate once the Triple Entente had been forged. Yet Germany chose that moment to em-

⁷ See pp. 347–55.

bark upon unlimited competition in naval construction. It was widely inferred, therefore, that Germany's real aim was unilateral world domination, through an extension of Germany's continental supremacy into a parallel oceanic supremacy. This neither Britain nor France could view with other than the liveliest fears. Their aim was necessarily the antithesis of Germany's—to call in the favorable balance of power in the oceanic world to restore in Europe a balance less favorable to Germany. When, after 1907, the British Empire cast its lot with France and Russia, this aim became attainable. French and Russian military expansion offset German and Austrian, British naval expansion offset German; and the feverish competition between the two camps achieved a remarkable equalization of power and potential in Europe. By 1914 the balance of power was so even that only a long war of endurance and exhaustion could determine superiority; and the longer the struggle, the more foregone was its conclusion, for the favorable balance of power in the outside world could be imposed more decisively on Europe. The entry of the United States in 1917 made the outcome certain.

The frightening feature of the rival alliances by 1914 was their rigidity and reliability. Each succeeding international crisis, with its latent threat to the security of the great powers, tightened the ties within each group. The tactlessness of the Kaiser's diplomacy contributed to the final débâcle. In October, 1908, he published, in the London *Daily Telegraph*, an article in which he claimed, as proof of his friendship for Britain, the fact that he had worked out a plan of campaign for the Boer War which "by a matter of curious coincidence" was much the same as that successfully employed by Lord Roberts. It aroused resentful laughs in England, where the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger in 1896 was still remembered; in Germany it raised a storm of angry protest and even led to talk of the Kaiser's abdication. More dangerous still was his interview with the Austrian foreign minister Berchtold in October, 1913, at the height of Austrian anger against Serbia for her role in the Balkan Wars. According to Berchtold:

As often as opportunity offered during our hour-and-a-quarter's talk to touch upon our relations as Allies, His Majesty ostentatiously used the occasion to assure me that we could count absolutely and completely upon him. This was the red thread that ran through the utterances of the illustrious Sovereign. . . . His Majesty did me the honor to say that whatever came from the Vienna Foreign Office was a command for him.

The German emperor had become convinced that war between east and west was now inevitable, and this fatalism—combined with the general tightening of the bonds of the alliances—was itself one factor in the drift toward the abyss.

Whatever the blunders of the Kaiser, it was of decisive importance that Britain and Germany—the greatest world power and the greatest European power—were now competing for supremacy at sea. Nothing more quickly and decisively aroused popular emotions in either country than this naval rivalry. The challenge was first thrown down by the German Naval Laws of 1897 and 1898 which added 12 ships of the line to the existing 7; 10 large cruisers to the existing 2; and 23 small cruisers to the existing 7. This challenge was taken up in earnest by Britain from 1903 onward, when she began her program of naval rearmament. Fearing that the greatest military power in Europe would not embark on so large a project of naval construction unless she aimed at the domination of the world, the British parliament in 1903 approved the formation of a North Sea fleet based on the new naval base of Rosyth. For the first time her disposition of naval power began to face toward Germany rather than France or Russia. Nor could the behavior of Germany permit of any other interpretation of her intentions. A highseas fleet was needed by Germany only if she intended to use her power outside Europe; and the Navy Law of 1900, which doubled the number of battleships, made the winning of power on the high seas of the world an integral part of German policy. In 1905 Sir John Fisher, engaged in a technical overhaul of British naval strength since becoming First Sea Lord the year before, laid the keel of the first dreadnought. This larger and much more heavily gunned vessel—a “new type of floating gun-carriage”—made older and smaller ships obsolete. When Germany commenced soon after to build them too, a race began which stirred popular feeling in both countries.

British proposals for agreement to limit naval construction were repeatedly brushed aside by the Kaiser; and after the Triple Entente had been completed in 1907, they were doubly suspect by Germany, whose rejections of any suggestion of a “naval holiday” drove Britain further into the embrace of the entente. Anglo-German rivalry made for Anglo-French co-operation. In the autumn of 1912 it was agreements about dispositions of their naval forces which bound Britain as close to France as any formal pledge of support could have done. It was agreed that French naval strength should be concentrated in the Mediterranean, British in the North Sea. This committed France to defending British interests in the Mediterranean against Austria-Hungary and if need be against Italy, while she left to the British fleet the task of defending her northern coasts and the Channel against Germany. In Britain both Asquith, the prime minister, and Sir Edward Grey, his foreign secretary, continued to insist that they had made no alliance with France. Notes exchanged between Grey and Paul Cambon explicitly stated that the naval agreements were “not an engagement that commits either government.” This contention may have been formally correct, but in substance both countries now had such vital interests at stake in the faithful fulfillment of these undertakings

that no formal alliance could have been morally more binding or materially more reliable.

There was a similar interplay, during the decade, of naval competition and the rising temperature of public opinion in both Germany and France. The *Flottenverein* and the Navy League and other promotional bodies in both countries were especially active in these years; the popular sensational press in both countries missed no chance to publicize the race; and the notion of a prospective war between the two countries became more and more familiar until it seemed almost inevitable. The need to defend heavy military and naval expenditures in the *Reichstag* and House of Commons occasioned periodic debates about it and elicited ever more exaggerated claims and assertions.⁸ British excitement reached the level of panic in March, 1909, when a writer in *The Times* commented, "The people will be quite sane in a fortnight—they always went like this in March." The cabinet was divided between those who argued that to build four more dreadnoughts would give the British navy a safe margin of superiority in three years' time, and those who demanded six. Winston Churchill has described how the dispute was settled: "The Admiralty had demanded six: the economists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight." The Conservatives and the Navy League took up the slogan "We want eight and we won't wait." The hysteria did not, however, die down in a fortnight—it lasted through the summer and was revived in 1911 by the crisis of Agadir.⁹ This was followed by the failure of Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin to explore possible terms of conciliation; it took place in 1912, the year that had, from the outset, been dramatized as "the critical year" when German naval strength might become great enough to challenge British. The Haldane mission foundered on the German Navy Bill of 1912 (which proposed three new battleships and the creation of a third battle squadron) and on German attempts to insist on political equivalents for any naval limitation. Since political equivalents seemed to demand detachment from France and Russia, or at least a pledge of British neutrality amounting to much the same thing, they could not now be given. Its failure was immediately followed by the Anglo-French redistribution of naval strength. In 1913 a French army law raised the period of compulsory service from two years to three, and the Russian army extended military service from three years to three and a half. It was expected that the German army, now also enlarged and with great reserves, would amount to a force of five million men of all arms. Between 1912 and 1914, the rival alliances converted themselves into two great armed camps, preparing feverishly and lavishly for battle. Concessions or limitations seemed out of the question.

By 1914 the balance of power in Europe had been so successfully

⁸ See p. 392.

⁹ See p. 485.

restored that the nicety of its equilibrium was in itself a menace to peace. It was not that any of the great powers had planned this result. Each power, and each of the rival alliances, had consistently aimed not at an equal balance but at preponderance for itself and its allies. Each wanted, above all, to enjoy a margin of preponderance great enough to give it at least security against aggression, at most a superiority that could ensure success for policies of territorial and colonial expansion. In this purpose each had failed, but all had pursued it with such energy and perseverance that close equality of strength was the outcome. As the English liberal journalist, J. A. Spender, put it:

The stage which Europe had reached was that of a semi-internationalism which organized the nations into two groups but provided no bridge between them. There could scarcely have been worse conditions for either peace or war. The equilibrium was so delicate that a puff of wind might destroy it. . . .

It was out of this strange situation that the First World War erupted.

The Condition of Europe in 1914

THE CONDITION of Europe between 1904 and 1914 has often been called "international anarchy." In the sense that there existed no form of international government, the description is accurate enough. Yet there was nothing new in this absence of international government—that was the normal state of Europe; and the phrase, to mean anything specific, must refer more to the behavior of the powers in these years than to the nature of their relationships. Did governments, in these years, behave more like anarchists than usually—like those violent, destructive, turbulent anarchists who badgered the First and Second Internationals or assassinated so many monarchs and statesmen? While recreating a balance of power in Europe which had been overthrown in 1871, did they abandon all vestiges of that other idea, of a "concert of Europe" which, as a legacy of the Napoleonic wars, had prevailed in the earlier part of the nineteenth century?

Concert of Europe. Ideas of a "concert of Europe" were not entirely abandoned. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 was an impressive general conference of all the powers which attempted to settle general European problems in the east.¹⁰ It left all dissatisfied. But the device of general conferences was repeatedly invoked and it was often successful. The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 settled the future of the Congo.¹¹ The con-

¹⁰ See p. 430.

¹¹ See p. 465.

ference of Algeciras in 1906, attended by representatives of all the powers and of several smaller states as well, laid the basis for a settlement of disputes in Morocco. The Conference of London, summoned to settle the problems of the Balkans in 1912, was attended by ambassadors of all the six powers and sat until August, 1913.¹² It proved the most successful of all prewar conferences for relaxing tensions between the powers, and as its initiator, Sir Edward Grey, remarked, "it was as if we all put out anchors to prevent ourselves from being swept away." But at that late date its very success was a danger. As Grey adds, "Then the current seemed to slacken and the anchors were pulled up. The Conference was allowed to dissolve. We seemed to be safe." But the current, strongly set toward the cataract, was as powerful as ever, and no permanent machinery existed which could again be set in motion to resist it. Yet experiments in international organization were an important feature of the prewar years.

Two conferences were held at the Hague in 1899 and 1907. The first, promoted by the tsar of Russia, whose finance minister could not find the money for modernizing Russian artillery, was proposed in order to bring about general disarmament and make provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The proposal was received with the greatest skepticism and suspicion by other governments, who detected in it some hidden trick on the part of Russia and even dangers to the peace of Europe. They contrived to exclude from its agenda all matters of political importance, but left experts to work out innocuous schemes for arbitration. The conference was saved from complete failure by eventual agreement to set up the first permanent court of international arbitration; but recourse to it was to be entirely optional, and even that innovation seemed dangerous. The second Hague conference of 1907, prompted by President Theodore Roosevelt, was less successful, and from the outset it was clear that no proposals for disarmament were likely to get far. The attendance of representatives of the South American states made it more nearly a world conference, representing forty-four states. Britain and the United States disagreed about the question of immunity for private property at sea ("contraband of war"), and Germany, by backing America, maneuvered Britain into opposing humane proposals.

These first rehearsals for the "open diplomacy" (or "diplomacy by conference") of the postwar years were not auspicious. The powers used the occasion not to promote general agreement but to snatch separate tactical advantages. The net gains for internationalism were slender. It was agreed in 1899 to apply the Red Cross Convention of 1864 to naval warfare. A declaration was drawn up "prohibiting the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gases"; it was ignored by both sides in 1915. The so-called "Permanent Court" was at first only an agreed framework of rules, a

¹² See p. 440.

panel of suitable men who might be chosen to act as arbitrators, and a permanent office and secretariat. By 1914 fourteen cases had been settled by the court, including one of political importance between France and Germany about the Casablanca incident in 1909.¹³ At least this international institution, which has grown in usefulness to the present day, was a hopeful product of these years of tension. The Hague Conventions defined and regulated methods of intervention by outside parties in disputes between states; and to recognize the possible value of "good offices and mediation" in settling disputes was to admit that a war anywhere was a matter of concern to others. They provided for international commissions of inquiry, encouraging their use by states engaged in a dispute; and the method was successfully used by Britain and Russia in their dispute of 1904, when the Russian fleet passing through the North Sea fired on British fishing vessels at the Dogger Bank. But even such rudimentary facilities as did exist were not utilized in 1914; there had grown up no habit of persistently seeking peaceful means of settling disputes, no general propensity to substitute for diplomacy anything other than war.

Other steps toward organizing, or at least recognizing the need for, some agreed code of behavior had been taken before 1914. The Red Cross Convention signed at Geneva in 1864 has already been mentioned; its aim was to improve conditions for the wounded in time of war. Ten years later the Postal Union was formed; it was the first universal international union to come into being, and since 1897 every civilized nation has belonged to it. From the start its members were pledged to submit to arbitration all disputes that arose from its working. The interdependence of nations came to be recognized in almost every sphere except the political; during the last three quarters of the nineteenth century over a thousand international congresses were held, all to further some form of social or economic co-operation. The Inter-Parliamentary Union originated in 1889, and was permanently organized in 1892; it reflected the drawing together of political groups in all national parliaments who were pressing for a more thorough organization of peace. The Universal Peace Congresses, a parallel but nonparliamentary body, represented a wider popular passion to remove the tendencies that were regarded as making for war. International organizations of socialists and trade unionists were well-established.¹⁴ Whatever enthusiastic idealism and piecemeal specialized co-operation could achieve, was achieved. Yet all this activity counted as nothing in preventing war in 1914. What constructive internationalism needed in order to succeed was more time in which to change habits of mind and action, and a basic willingness of governments not to reserve for their separate judgment matters which

¹³ See p. 485.

¹⁴ See pp. 360 and 387.

they regarded as "vital interests." Neither prerequisite existed before 1914.

Europe in 1914 was not, therefore, in a condition of unusual "international anarchy." The notion of a "concert of Europe," of efforts to reach a consensus of agreement among the major powers about colonial, territorial, and social matters survived in some strength. In many respects there was even more elaborate, frequent, and systematic collaboration among the nations of Europe than ever before in modern history. But upon certain matters—upon the relative strengths and sizes of national forces and armaments, upon the need for reliable allies, upon the determination of what constituted vital national interests—every government was adamantly separatist. The most important characteristic of the whole situation was that European nations were passing through a strange, twilight era of mixed systems: not a stabilized balance of power, but a newly recreated and precarious balance of power; not a concert of Europe, but a residual and imperfect concert, with which was blended a system of divisive alliances; not an international community, but only an embryonic international society in which all political and military decisions remained the jealously guarded preserve of separate sovereign states; not anarchy, but semi-anarchy, liable to make the worst of both worlds. In this conjunction of circumstances, marking a unique phase in the historical development of Europe, lies the most fundamental explanation of why the First World War happened.

The Surface of Friction. Into this peculiar conjunction of circumstances there was thrust a convergence of diplomatic and political disputes. As international contacts had increased, so the surface of friction became larger. Colonial disputes, as has been shown, had for the most part been settled before 1914—though they had left behind them a sediment of imperialist jealousies and ranking grievances, and in their day had contributed to the alienation of Britain from Germany, and of Italy from France. Two interstate feuds overshadowed all others by 1914. One was the duel between Britain and Germany for naval power: the other was the violence of hatred between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, bequeathed by the later phase of the Eastern Question. Each of these leading issues was flanked by another. To the Anglo-German was added the older feud between France and Germany. France saw, in Germany's bid for adding supremacy at sea to her existing superiority of military and economic power in Europe, a threat to all prospect of ever recovering the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and even to French national independence on the continent. To the Austro-Serbian was added the older Austro-Russian feud for influence in the Balkan peninsula and in the rapidly disintegrating territories of the Ottoman Empire. This combination of issues, knit inextricably together by the hardening system of

rival alliances which was the final outcome of the old diplomacy, yielded a more explosive compound than could be contained within the mixed structure of international relations.

It is probable that the single chance of preventing a general war in 1914 lay in keeping separate the less dynamic and more conciliable disputes of western Europe, and the highly explosive conflicts between dynastic states and erupting nationalism in eastern Europe. Further wars in the Balkans, even involving Austria-Hungary, seemed almost unavoidable. There was occurring one of those great fundamental upheavals of history which have usually entailed considerable violence. That it was not localized was due mainly to the policy of Germany, both in lending unconditional support to Austria and in her habits of brutal diplomacy, which evoked fears and counteralliances. Germany's crucial central position on the continent and her immense power laid upon her a special responsibility for trying to keep the peace. Far from assuming this responsibility, her government indulged in a restless policy which disturbed the peace. Yet her quarrels with the western powers had none of that quality of historic doom which many have seen in the Eastern Question. Even four years of war brought changes in western Europe which were only marginal and local compared with the drastic transformation of the whole eastern Europe and the Balkans.¹⁵ It is in linking eastern upheavals with western quarrels, and in preventing the localization of Balkan wars, that German policy and the system of rival alliances which was its nemesis share a special responsibility for the coming of the First World War. By 1914 the sick man of Europe was no longer just Turkey: it was Europe itself, feverish and turbulent, and with strong suicidal tendencies.

How, finally, are these tendencies related to the internal developments of the European nations between 1871 and 1914 (previously described in Part V)? What connections are there between the growth of democracy and socialism after 1871 and the accumulation of circumstances which led to war? The states that went to war in 1914 had experienced half a century of rapid expansion in population, wealth, and power. The "age of the masses" had come upon Europe, transforming the foundations, structure, and working of the modern state; and revolutionizing, too, the outlook, expectations, and social loyalties of men and women everywhere. By 1914 this double process was far from complete even in the countries of western and central Europe, and it was only beginning in most of eastern Europe and Asia. The consequence of the incompleteness of industrialization and democracy was a universal surge of social unrest and violence manifest in the great strikes and conflicts of group loyalties. The growth of world trade made nations more eco-

¹⁵ See p. 588.

nomically interdependent than ever before, but the autarchic, protectionist measures of powerful states opposed this tendency. State activity in providing social services and security was at variance with the claims of labor organizations, socialist parties, and churches alike to attract human loyalties that would transcend state frontiers and national allegiances. Huge capitalist organizations had international ramifications in a world where there were no international political institutions. Economics and politics were more closely interrelated than ever before, yet the structure of economic life was nowhere correlated with the structure of political life. These conditions led to a widespread challenge to the cohesion and integrity of national states, which explains the conflict of loyalties and much of the moral and spiritual crisis of the prewar decade.¹⁶ By 1914 the governments of Europe commanded a concentration of economic resources, political authority, administrative and military power, which none of their predecessors had enjoyed. Yet this power had about it a certain fragility, evidenced by the imminence of a general strike in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1914, the turbulence of political life in most countries, and the prevalence of uncontrolled and unpredictable violence throughout Europe. The established authorities were everywhere subject to a recurrent challenge which struck at the roots of their power—the challenge of mass revulsion against the exacting disciplines of industrial urban civilization. They sat on domestic as well as international volcanoes.

To this precariousness of apparently formidable power a further complication was added by disruptive nationalism. The Irish and the Flemish separatist movements in western Europe were more than matched by the insurgent nationalism of eastern Europe and the Balkans.¹⁷ The dynastic states of the east were immediately and fundamentally threatened by these movements, and by one of them in particular: the Serbian. That is why a collision between Austria-Hungary and Serbia could bring general war. Serbia was the focal point of a triple conflict: that between dynastic imperialism and insurgent nationalism; that between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism; and that between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. This threefold importance explains why assassinations at Sarajevo could precipitate a world war.

Sarajevo, 1914. After the death in 1903 of the pro-Austrian king of Serbia, Alexander Obrenovitch, the Habsburgs faced the third great historic challenge of nationalism to the survival of their multinational empire. The political and military leaders of Vienna, led by Berchtold and Conrad, saw in Serbia another Piedmont and another Prussia. In 1859, confronted with the movement for Italian unification, the Habsburgs

¹⁶ See pp. 378-95.

¹⁷ See pp. 441-53.

had been defeated and driven out of Italy by Piedmont. In 1866, faced with the movement for German unification, they had been defeated and driven out of Germany by Prussia.¹⁸ Now, by 1914, there had emerged a comparable movement for national unification of all Slav peoples south of the Danube—that is, within Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia, and within Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey. The natural leader of this movement was Serbia, a small country of only five million people, but with the independence, energy, and drive to make itself the nucleus of a future Yugoslavia. In 1908 Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had caused a six months' crisis, and had started a continuous drift towards war, because it made clear Austria's intention to check the movement even by annexations.¹⁹ In Vienna Serbian independence seemed the latest and greatest historic threat to Habsburg power, and Austrian policy was obsessed by the urge to crush Serbia at all costs.

Serbia also occupied a key position in the clash between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. Germanic influence was already great in Turkey. Rumania was Austria's ally, and Bulgaria wanted to be. With Serbia, too, under German-Austrian control, Pan-German influence could prevail continuously from Berlin to Baghdad and the *Drang nach Osten* could proceed in favorable conditions. But an independent and restless Serbia, arousing and attracting Pan-Slav sentiments and winning Russian support against Austria, disrupted this whole picture.

Moreover, Serbia was not only the sorest thorn in Habsburg flesh, and an impediment to Pan-German designs; she was also the spearhead of western Entente influence in the Balkans. So long as she could be maintained as an independent state, Constantinople could be kept open to pressure from the Entente powers, and the extensive French and British interests in the Middle East would be more securely protected. She was a most useful wedge in the German-Austrian-Turkish combination. The crisis caused by Sarajevo was, therefore, a trial of strength between the two grand alliances, not merely between Belgrade and Vienna.

Incongruously enough, the incident that brought war was the murder of the heir to the Habsburg throne by a fanatic whose connection with the Serbian government could not be proven. There was no reason intrinsically why such an incident should necessitate war between Austria and Serbia. That it did so was due to the policy followed by Vienna. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand had liberal-minded plans for a federal reorganization of the Dual Monarchy, which involved appealing for the support of the southern Slavs against the ruling Magyar minority. Since the aim of fervent Serbian patriots was a southern Slav state completely outside the Dual Monarchy, they regarded

¹⁸ See pp. 274-93.

¹⁹ See p. 438.

with great animosity any plan for prolonging German rule over Slavs. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 the Austrian government was confronted with even more positive nationalist agitation for a "greater Serbia," to include all Slavs south of the Danube and so involving disruption of the Habsburg Empire. That Russian Pan-Slav ambitions lay behind this agitation they had no doubts. They resolved to tolerate no further Serbian gains. When the Archduke and his wife, visiting the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo on June 28, on a mission intended to win its good will, were fired at and killed by the Austrian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, Vienna regarded the murders as Serbian provocation of war.

The Austrian ministerial council sent to Belgrade on July 23 an ultimatum drafted in terms that were calculated to make its rejection certain. They demanded a reply within forty-eight hours. The demands meant the end of Serbian independence. No restraining hand was extended from Berlin. The Kaiser, on the contrary, assured the Austrian emperor that he understood the need "of freeing your Serbian frontiers from their heavy pressure." The Serbian reply was unexpectedly conciliatory, and went so far toward meeting Austria's demands that even the Kaiser, suddenly filled with misgivings, hailed it with relief because "with it every ground for war disappears." In Vienna it was nonetheless rejected, and war was declared on July 28. The Russians had advised Serbia to comply; Grey had offered to mediate. But Berchtold was bent upon war, and he lit the fuse when no one had time to extinguish it. From that decisive act everything else followed. Russia ordered general mobilization on July 30, Germany on July 31; and Germany declared war against Russia on August 1, against France on August 3. Germany's ultimatum to Belgium on August 3, and its rejection as being a violation of Belgian neutrality, ensured Britain's entry into war the following day. The bonds of the alliances held firm, and the two armed camps clashed in open battle at last. The British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was a patient devotee of fishing and of wild-bird life, and the gentle amenities of a stable and civilized society. That evening, as he looked out from the windows of the Foreign Office in London, this English country gentleman spoke words that have echoed plaintively down the years. "The lamps," he said, "are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."

